# The Grim Reaper AC

## Notes

I wrote this K aff for the September-October topic. The aff argues that states are traditionally viewed as if they are human bodies – immigrants or people who are different from the homogenous norm are analogized to pathogens who need to be exterminated. To challenge this insular body-state metaphor, the aff argues we should affirm organ transplantation as a metaphor – this can help us see bodies as porous and fluid, constantly exchanging parts (like organs) with other bodies, rather than homogenous and in need of purification.

Akhil is the only one who read this aff – I never did.

## 1AC GRIM REAPER

### 1AC Grim Reaper Regular Version

#### Contention 1 is the Incision

#### Political discourse is a metaphor – metaphorical ways of understanding society and the state make sense of the world to us – the entrenchment of these metaphors naturalizes the smooth functioning of the machine of power

Ringmar 12 [(erik, associate professor of political science at Lund University,) “The Power of Metaphor: Consent, Dissent and Revolution”] AT

Political discourse is necessarily profoundly metaphorical; the language of politics is knee-deep in and entirely shot-through by different metaphorical uses. This should not surprise us. Politics, after all, is the art of using power in order to achieve social goals. While some power can be exercised through the army and the police, far more can be accomplished ― and more easily and cheaply ― through the power of language. Metaphors give you power since they help to organise social life in a certain fashion. Metaphors tell you what things are and how they hang together; metaphors define the relationship between superiors and subordinates and between social classes; they identify social problems and their solutions and tell us what is feasible, laudable and true. <continued – text omitted> Compare the way in which metaphor exercise power. No one can say what ‘society’ or ‘the state’ really are. In fact, societies and states are not 'really' anything at all. Yet they come to be something rather than nothing as they are compared to other things which they are not. Once a particular definition is firmly established, it will influence our thoughts and our actions; it will guide and shape our presuppositions and our theories; it will make some things possible and others impossible. Say, for example, that the members of a political elite manage to convince a sufficiently large number of people to embrace a metaphor which identifies society as sharply hierarchical and social positions as rigidly fixed. Once this metaphor is perfectly accepted, it will simply describe ‘the way things are’ and as a result it cannot be questioned or altered. The more entrenched the metaphor, the more invisible the exercise of power and the more secure the position of the elites.

#### “Society” is one such metaphor – we use the “body as state” to refer to assemblages of people, constructing states as artificial bodies that are fixed, concretely bordered, and insulated from the outside world.

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

The ‘body’ as defined by the OED is “The material frame of man (and animals).” There can be spiritual meaning to this (as contrasted to the soul), a legal meaning (a material being taken as a whole), as a property (a thing that we carry around), or symbolically (taken as sacrament--find latin phrase). It can also connote an artificial person created for legal purposes as in a corporate-body or designating the sovereign as king or head of state. This artificial body can also have a wider a meaning and refer to assemblages of people who have been collected together for a common , or the OED phrases it, the ‘body politic’ also has the “wider sense of ‘organized society.’” Thomas Hobbes likens the commonwealth--the Leviathan--to an artificial man. Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed the lifeblood of the body politic was its sovereign authority. For John Locke, the creation of the body politic marks the passage from the state of nature consisting of many bodies with no common law or authority to one body--the body politic--to a society. While it is not within the scope of this paper to reenact the debates in philosophy and political theory over the body and its relation to mind and world, this paper questions approaches to bodies where they appear as passive objects of abstract moral reasoning that stems from a disembodied subject. This ‘disembodied subject’ is a ￼legacy of Cartesian dualism in the social sciences and accounts, in part, for the body's so-called absence from the social science agenda. It is noted now that the body was never really absent, just “silent and unacknowledged” (Blackman, 2008, 15). This “rediscovery” of the body as a legitimate object of study was supported by philosophers in the 20th century like Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Contemporary writers stress that the body has become a topic for study because of the modern processes of industrialization, consumer culture and its politics, changes in medical practice and technology, demographic shifts to an aging population, global pandemics likes AIDS and SARS, and advances in cybernetics and virtual reality, to list but a few (Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1996). Broadly, the body can theorized as something we have (object), as something we are (subject), and as something we become (process and performativity). For this paper, the body will not be theorized as a system of signs, a social construction, or a symbol. Although this paper is organized around metaphor, the body is a material, lived body, not a textual one. Metaphor plays the role of interlocutor in the discourse of International Relations and a way to organize my arguments about the creation of politics centered on the body. I am also aware that the ‘biological’ body is also constructed through the discourse of the biological sciences and public opinion. It is hoped that the example of metagenomics helps to ameliorate the tension between theoretical ‘body as discourse’ and the deterministic ‘body as biological.’ As Bryan Turner writes in The Body and Society: “We do not have to develop a sociological appreciation of the physicality of the body since the ‘natural body’ is always and already injected with cultural understanding and social history” (Turner, 1996, 34). ￼In Western tradition, this collection of bodies into a larger body often moves between the idea that the members of a body politic are a voluntary community or that it is created naturally and emerges when each is performing its proper function for the whole just as in a natural organism. Classical to modern thought, from Plato and the polis as “the body writ large” (O'Neill, 2004) to John of Salisbury and his “organic analogy” to Foucault’s theories of biopower and governmentality, the body politic has been a recurring theme for centuries of political and social thought. This work is not trying to bring back a classical or medieval tradition to modern politics, but rather argues that if it is true that the “body politic is the fundament structure of our political life,” (O'Neill, 2004, 35) or at the very least, that is a lasting and powerful way to imagine the organization of political community then it is trying to question the liberal individualist tradition in light of emerging knowledge about the body. Or, put differently it seeks to interrogate the modern political tendency to draw sharp boundaries and limits to distinguish both selves and states (Walker, 2010, 36). IV. Metaphors Metaphors are much more tenacious than facts. -Paul de Man This paper argues, following the cognitive theory of metaphor, that metaphors have meaning beyond being just descriptive or merely poetic flourishes. For this exploration, metaphor is not defined as a characteristic of extraordinary language or of poems and rhetoric, but a central part of our conceptual system. This approach to metaphor is defined in George Lackoff’s and Mark Johnson’s book Metaphors We Live ￼By (1980). This influential treatise of metaphor is expanded in later books (Lackoff, 1989; Lackoff, 1999). To briefly sum up their argument, Lackoff and Johnson write “[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lackoff and Johnson, 1980, 3). Our conceptual system guides how we see and make sense of the world on a daily basis. This means that much of what we do everyday engages in metaphor and metaphorical thinking. Metaphors are not random occurrences--they are systematic and include more than language. Importantly, metaphors are grounded in our experience of the world and our cultural ways of representing ideas in the world and “understanding emerges from interaction, from constant negotiation with the environment and other people” (Lackoff, 1980, 230). This works through “mapping” concepts from a source domain to a target domain. Target domains are conceptual and abstract worlds of ideas, mental or emotional states, social understandings, and often the “unseen and unknown domains of the physical world as, for example, the world of molecular action” (Quinn, 1991, 57). The use of metaphor in science is common, especially for explaining complicated scientific findings to the public. Source domains come from the physical world and are often things that are easily conceptualized or experience bodily. Simply put, we take our experiences and understandings of the physical world and use them to explain abstract or non-physical phenomenon as something we can relate to from our material experience. As Lackoff and Johnson succinctly put it: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lackoff, 1980, ￼5). It is in this mapping from the source domain that we can see the strength of metaphor comes from its grounding in what we have experienced. The choice of a particular source domain to match a particular target domain has an experiential basis. For example, affection is typically related to bodily warmth, and understanding often correlates with digesting. Both “affection” and “understanding”--the abstract concepts--are understood in terms of our bodily experience “warmth” and “digestion” respectively. The Lakoffian cognitive linguists thus emphasize the “embodied” nature of metaphor (Shogimen, 2008,81). Our understanding and creation of metaphors also relies on cultural understandings. Not only do we understand these metaphors from having a body of a certain sort (experiencing up-down, in-out, warm-cold, etc), but this body also understands the world through cultural presuppositions, some of which have more effect than others. (Lackoff, 1980, 57-58). In fact, we tend not to see them as metaphors at all because we live by these metaphors and they become so embedded in language we do not even recognize their metaphorical origins. Lackoff and Johnson call these collections of “speech formulas,” or “fixed-form expressions.” or “phrasal lexical items” (1980, 51). They write that these act as single words, but are in fact they are structured by a single metaphorical concept. For example, drawing upon the LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME 6 metaphor, we often speak of life situations with phrases such as “the odds are against us” or “we’ll have to take our chances” without these being viewed as metaphors, but as everyday language. “Nevertheless, your way of talking about, conceiving, and even experiencing your situation would be metaphorically structured” (Lackoff, 1980, 51). 6 When quoting or explaining examples from the texts I will preserve Lackoff and Johnsonʼs capitalizing of metaphors. When discussing my own analysis I will set the metaphors apart by quotation marks. ￼ ￼Lackoff and Johnson write that some metaphors came to be because of the way our culture understands concepts centrally important to it. “They emerged naturally in a culture like ours because what they highlight corresponds so closely to what we experience collectively and what they hide corresponds to so little. But not only are they grounded in our physical and cultural experience; they also influence our experience and our actions” (1980, 68). They use the examples LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE or TIME AS MONEY. Both of these metaphors employ a simple ontological metaphor that tells us that both labor and time can viewed as a quantifiable substance, that is, they can “used up” or assigned monetary value (1980, 66). This mapping allows us to comprehend statements such as I have to budget my time. I spent too much time on that. I’ve invested a lot of time on this project. You don’t use your time profitably. This mistake resulted in a considerable loss of time (Lackoff, 1999) [italics in original] The authors stress that this understanding is by no means universal. They were born from our culture because they highlight aspects that are centrally important to our way of seeing the world--the way work is viewed, and our interest in purposeful ends and quantification (1980, 76). But note that these aspects important to our culture de- emphasize or hide other aspects of labor and time. Lackoff and Johnson give two examples to demonstrate this effect. The first is if we regard labor as a kind of activity it assumes that we can tell productive activity from other kinds of activity, like play. The second is that if we see labor in terms of time--along with a purposive idea of time itself--this can lead to the parallel idea of LEISURE TIME. “what is hidden by the RESOURCE metaphors for labor and time is the way our of LABOR and TIME affect our concept of LEISURE, turning it into something remarkably like LABOR” (1980, 67). ￼The primary metaphor highlighted in this paper are ontological metaphors, or experiences with physical objects, especially our own bodies. Lackoff and Johnson define ontological metaphors as “ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities or substances” (1980, 25). These ontological metaphors “allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms--terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lackoff, 1980, 34). They also rely on spatial orientation metaphors like up-down, front-back, center- periphery, and near-far. We can then see nonphysical ideas as objects and understand them in orientational terms. These come form the fact that we have the bodies that we have and that they function a certain way in our environment (1980, 14). For example, HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN “I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits...I’m feeling down. I’m depressed...My spirits sank” (1980, 15). It is plausible that this came from a certain physical basis: “Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive state” (1980, 15). These examples make clear that we must experience our bodies in order to use them to explain other more abstract concepts. Also, we can understood things in the world via a range of metaphors and, of course, they must be understood non metaphorically as well. “Part of a concept’s structure can be understood metaphorically, using structure imported from another domain, while part may be understood directly, that is, without metaphor” (Lackoff and Turner 1989, 58). These ontological sets of metaphors based on entities and substance not only helps us, as stated above, understand our world in terms of objects or substances, but it also “allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them discrete entities or ￼substances of a uniform kind” (Lackoff, 1980, 25.) We can then “refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them--and, by this means, reason about them” (1980, 25). This, for example, can include what the authors name as container and personification metaphors. “Each of us is a container,” they write, “with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation” (1980, 29) and we project this onto to other physical objects. For example, we move from one room into another, we hike into and out of the woods, and the clearing in the woods with a natural boundary we perceive as something different even if the line is fuzzy. In fact, they argue that “[t]here are few human instincts more basic than territoriality. And such defining of a territory, putting a boundary around it, is an act of quantification” (1980, 30). Personification metaphors are perhaps the most obvious as the physical object or nonhuman entity can be comprehended in human terms by using human motivations, characteristics or activities. After this short introduction to the idea of cognitive metaphors, I can now introduce “the human body as container” is the primary metaphor for understanding why the ‘body politic‘ has persisted. The “the human body as container” metaphor also relies upon knowledge of the body as nonmetaphorical--we perceive our body and other’s body’s, react to them, and know that our body allows us to interact with the world in certain ways, but further understanding of it often requires metaphors. But these metaphors rely on a nonmetaphorical (the body’s physical nature) understanding of the body as we experience it (Lackoff, 1980, 58). The authors write We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces” (L and J 1980, 30). This paper is not trying to dispute that we imagine ourselves as containers, it is simply trying to look at the possibility that perhaps we are ‘lively’ containers and more porous and interconnected than we realize. That this container metaphor, while helpful for understanding our world and our body’s relation to it, might be obfuscating an emerging idea of the “body as collectivity.” The next section will take this up seriously through metagenomics and how this new science may affect our concepts of the body and what it means to be human.

#### The metaphor of the state as a unified and self-contained body politic necessarily casts those beyond the container as foreign matter, constructing “them” as enemies or racial impurities. The impact is endless cycles of warfare, genocide, and racial hierarchy.

Martin 90 [gender modified] [(Emily, professor of socio-cultural anthropology at New York University) “Toward an Anthropology of Immunology: The Body as Nation State” MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY QUARTERLY Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1990)] AT

In the new science of immunology, social differences—between men and women, managers and workers, or citizens and foreigners-are written metaphorically into the character of various immune system cells. As Haraway has put it, ''the immune system is an elaborate icon for principal systems of symbolic and material 'difference' in late capitalism" (1989:4). In this article I explore some central images that dominate recent popular and scientific discussions of the immune system, spelling out in detail the kind of "social world" the im- mune system is now imagined to be. I will also suggest what kinds of ideological work this way of picturing the world might be accomplishing and indicate in a preliminary way what kinds of uses people are making of this imagery. Finally I will look comparatively at other ways the immune system might be conceptual- ized. Cross-cultural and historical comparisons can help us realize the historical specificity of our own body images and suggest the possibility of different ones. Central Images in Popular and Scientific Literature on Immunology For the analysis of popular imagery I draw on my examination of major mass media articles on the immune system published in the last five years. 1 These in- clude material from mass-circulation magazines such as Time and Newsweek, as well as more specialized popular publications like National Geographic and Dis- cover. I also draw on all the book-length popular publications on the topic I have been able to locate through standard bibliographic search techniques. These total some 10 volumes. Although I do not quote from all sources, the images I discuss are pervasive throughout. The major metaphors used in popular accounts of immunology depict the body as a "regulatory-communications network" (Schindler 1988:1).2 As Hara ay's work has made plain, the body is seen as "an engineered communications system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network'' (1989:14). Whereas boundaries within the body are fluid and control is dispersed, the boundary between the body (self) and the external world (nonselt) is rigid and absolute: At the heart of the immune system is the ability to distinguish between self and nonself. Virtually every body cell carries distinctive molecules that identify it as self. [Schindler 1988:1] Added to the conception of a clear boundary between self and nonself is a conception of the nonself world as foreign and hostile. The immune system evolved because we live in a sea of microbes. Like man, these organisms are programmed to perpetuate themselves. The human body provides an ideal habitat for many of them and they try to break in; because the presence of these organisms is often harmful, the body's immune system will attempt to bar their entry or, failing that, to seek out and destroy them.... When immune defenders encounter cells or organisms carrying molecules that say "foreign," the immune troops move quickly to eliminate the intruders. [Schindler 1988: I] As a measure of the extent of this threat, the body is depicted in contemporary popular publications as the scene of total war between ruthless invaders and determined defenders. 3 If . . . we could become as tiny as cells or bacteria, and visit the sites of these superficially undramatic events, we would experience them as they really a r e - life and death struggles between attackers and defenders, waged with a ruthless- ness found only in total war. [Nilsson 1987:20] Inside the body, a trillion highly specialized cells, regulated by dozens of re- markable proteins and honed by hundreds of millions of years of evolution, launch an unending battle against the alien organisms. It is high-pitched biolog- ical warfare, orchestrated with such skill and precision that illness in the average human being is relatively rare. [Jaroff 1988:56] Besieged by a vast array of invisible enemies, the human body enlists a remarkably complex corps of internal bodyguards to battle the invaders. [Jaret 1986:702] A site of injury is "transformed into a battle field on which the body's armed forces, hurling themselves repeatedly at the encroaching microorganisms, crush and annihilate them" (Nilsson 1987:20). The array of forces at the body's com- mand is extensive. The organization of the human immune system is reminiscent of military defence, with regard to both weapon technology and strategy. Our internal army has at its disposal swift, highly mobile regiments, shock troops, snipers, and tanks. We have soldier cells which, on contact with the enemy, at once start producing homing missiles whose accuracy is overwhelming. Our defence system also boasts ammunition which pierces and bursts bacteria, reconnaissance squads, an intelligence service and a defence staff unit which determines the location and strength of troops to be deployed. [Nilsson 1987:24] Small white blood cells called granulocytes are ''kept permanently at the ready for a blitzkrieg against microorganisms" and constitute the "infantry" of the immune system (Nilsson 1987:24). "Multitudes fall in battle, and together with their vanquished foes, they form the pus which collects in wounds" (Nilsson 1987:24). Larger macrophages are another type of white blood cell that is the "armoured unit" of the defense system. "These roll forth through the tis- sues ... devouring everything that has no useful role to play there" (Nilsson 1987:25). Another part of the immune system, the complement system, can ''perforate hostile organisms so that their lives trickle to a halt" (Nilsson 1987:24). These function as" 'magnetic mines' [which] are sucked toward the bacterium and per- forate it, causing it to explode" (Nilsson 1987:72). When complement "comes together in the right sequence, it detonates like a bomb, blasting through the in- vader's cell membrane" (Jaret 1986:720). A type of white blood cell, aT-lymphocyte for which the technical scientific name is "killer cell," are the "immune system's special combat units in the war against cancer" (Nilsson 1987:96). Killer cells "strike," "attack," and "as- sault" (Nilsson 1987:96, 98, 100). "The killer T cells are relentless. Docking with infected cells, they shoot lethal proteins at the cell membrane. Holes form where the protein molecules hit, and the cell, dying, leaks out its insides" (Jaroff 1988:59). The great variety of different "weapons" is a product of evolutionary adaptation to changing defense needs: ''Just as modem arsenals are ever changing as the weaponry of a potential enemy becomes more sophisticated, so our immune system has adapted itself many times to counter survival moves made by the mi- crobial world to protect itself" (Dwyer 1988:28). Although the metaphor of warfare against an external enemy dominates these accounts, another metaphor plays nearly as large a role: the body as police state.4 Every body cell is equipped with "proof of identity"-a special arrangement of protein molecules on the exte- rior. . . . these constitute the cell's identity papers, protecting it against the body's own police force, the immune system.... The human body's police corps is programmed to distinguish between bona fide residents and illegal aliens-an ability fundamental to the body's powers of self-defence. [Nilsson 1987:21] What identifies a resident is likened to speaking a national language: ''An immune cell bumps into a bacterial cell and says, 'Hey, this guy isn't speaking our lan- guage, he's an intruder.' That's defense" (Levy, quoted in Jaret 1986:733). T cells are able to ''remember for decades'' the identity of foreign antigens: the intruders' descriptions are stored in the vast criminal records of the immune system. When a substance matching one of the stored descriptions makes a new appearance, the memory cells see to the swift manufacture of antibodies to com- bat it. The invasion is defeated before it can make us ill. We are immune. [Nils- son 1987:28] What happens to these illegal aliens when they are detected? They are ''executed" in a "death cell" (the digestive cavity inside a feeding cell) (Nilsson 1987:25, 31, 76, 81). "When the walls have closed around the enemy, the exe- cution-phagocytosis-takes place. The prisoner is showered with hydrogen per- oxide or other deadly toxins. Digestive enzymes are sent into the death chamber to dissolve the bacterium" (Nilsson 1987:81). A police state of course requires a highly trained administrative apparatus and field personnel. The body provides for these things in ''technical colleges,'' "training sites" located in lymph nodes, the thymus gland, and elsewhere (Jaret 1986:716; Nilsson 1987:26). "[Lymphocytes] are like blank pages: they know nothing, and must learn from scratch" (Nilsson 1987:26). These metaphors work easily for those cases where one can see ''missiles,'' "mines," "chemical warfare," or sniper ammunition. They run into trouble when the defensive forces seem inescapably to operate by consuming their vic- tims. We are accustomed to blowing up people on battlefields or poisoning them, but we are not accustomed to eating them. Notice in these examples how the met- aphors move back and forth between warfare and ingestion. "Once [the white blood cell] has reached its target (for example a bacterium), it uses phagocytosis, a process which, quite simply, involves the defender eating the attacker'' (Nilsson 1987:25). The antibodies attached to the enemy cells are not seen in this context as identity papers sought by the secret police, but as "appetizers" or an "aperi- tif" (Nilsson 1987:72, 78). Feeding cells squeeze through the blood vessel wall and move toward the enemy, with amoeba-like movements. The antibodies stimulate their appetites and, on contact with the bacteria, the feeding cells immediately start to swallow them. The battle is in full swing. [Nilsson 1987:29] In another example, "Powerful chemicals inside the macrophage will break down and destroy the components of the invading cells. The macrophage literally eats the enemy, digesting and metabolizing its materials" (Jaret 1986:718-719). Finally, when stimulated by T cells to attack viruses, macrophages are "whipped" into a "feeding fury." "They don't necessarily eat faster," notes Dr. Richard Johnston, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, "but they kill better" (quoted in Jaroff 1988:59). In the warfare metaphor, granulocytes are the infantry lost in large numbers; macrophages, the armored tanks. When ingestion enters the picture, we wind up with cannibalism: "During an infection, when millions upon millions of granu- locytes are lost in the struggle against the invaders, part of the macrophages' task is to ingest dead microphages-a phenomenon which might be described as a kind of small-scale cannibalism" (Nilsson 1987:25). What is the relationship between the kind of popular accounts I have quoted so far and the language of more technical scientific publications? Although this is a question that will be investigated more fully in research I have not yet com- pleted, at a general level it is clear that popular accounts often simply take the metaphors that occur in scientific writing a few paces further. 5 For this analysis I am drawing on one year's fieldwork in a university department of immunology, where I regularly attended classes, department seminars, and a journal club. I also attended all planning sessions of one research group within the department. In conjunction with the research of this group, I learned a standard experimental procedure (western blot) and helped carry out a series of experiments. I have con- sulted all texts currently required or recommended in graduate classes on immu- nology in this department and in graduate and undergraduate classes on immu- nology in another division of the university (i.e., Hood et al. 1984; Kimball 1986; Paul 1989; Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985; Sell 1987; and Stites, Stobo, and Wells 1987). One main image in virtually all scientific literature on the immune system is the distinction between self and nonself, a distinction that is maintained by a de- fense based on killing the nonself. The editorial from a recent issue of Science, ''Recognizing Self from Nonself,'' begins: ''Of all the mysteries of modem sci- ence, the mechanism of self versus nonself recognition in the immune system ranks at or near the top. The immune system is designed to recognize foreign invaders" (Koshland 1990:1273). A current clinical handbook begins, "The function of the immune system is to distinguish self from non-self and to eliminate the latter" (Kesarwala and Fischer 1988:1). And a textbook concludes its first chapter with a section headed "Self vs. Nonself": "Whatever the time frame, the development of immunocompetence represents a watershed in the life of the an- imal. At this time the organism learns to discriminate between 'self' and 'non- self' " (Kimball 1986:14). Images of a police state with associated training of personnel to protect its borders come in too: defense is carried out by "professional phagocytes" (Stites, Stobo, and Wells 1987:170). The cells and molecules of this defensive network maintain constant surveillance for infecting organisms. They recognize an almost limitless variety of foreign cells and substances, distinguishing them from those native to the body itself. When a pathogen enters the body, they detect it and mobilize to eliminate it. They ''remember'' each infection, so that a second exposure to the same orga- nism is dealt with more efficiently. Furthermore, they do all this on a quite small defense budget, demanding only a moderate share of the genome and of the body's resources. [Tonegawa 1985:72] Language like this is commonplace not only in texts6 but in explanations in sem- inars and classes. Once in a journal club discussion of an article on T cell func- tions, I counted dozens of uses of the words "kill" or "killing." The Body and the Nation These images of entities within our bodies relate in complex ways to social forms pervasive in our time. Consider, for example, Benedict Anderson and Er- nest Gellner's descriptions of the modem nation state. Both writers stress the im- portant role of communication in the identity of a nation state. [The] core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is [sic] important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such compre- hension, is included in a moral and economic community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded. [Gellner 1983: 127] Recall the emphasis placed on the immune system as a network of mutual communication and the glossing of an intruding foreign cell as "a guy who doesn't speak our language." Sometimes, as in this example, intruding foreign cells are explicitly compared to people of different national origin: 7 When you are the ever-vigilant protector of the sacrosanct environment of a body, anything foreign that should dare to invade that environment must be rapidly detected and removed. However, finding certain invaders and recognising them as foreign can be very difficult. . . . It can be as difficult for our immune system to detect foreignness as it would be for a Caucasian to pick out a particular Chinese interloper at a crowded ceremony in Peking's main square. [Dwyer 1988:29] Consider again the lack of mediating structures in the modem nation state between the individual and the state. [Nation states] are poorly endowed with rigid internal sub-groupings; their populations are anonymous, fluid and mobile, and they are unmediated; the individ- ual belongs to them directly, in virtue of his cultural style, and not in virtue of membership of nested sub-groups. Homogeneity, literacy, anonymity are the key traits. [Gellner 1983:138] In the popular picture of the immune system, we see individual cells launched into the body to protect its homogenous interior against attack. These cells are individuals that roam fluidly in blood and lymph within the body: ''The immune system consists of an interconnecting network of organs and tissues between which moves a heavy and ceaseless traffic of cells. This cellular traffic is borne along in the flow of blood and lymph" (Kimball 1986:131). There are structures which produce and "educate" these cells, primarily the thymus and bone marrow. As I pointed out, these "educational institutions" are crucial for maintaining the common language that ties the population of cells to- gether and enables it to distinguish self from nonself. 8 But these structures do not themselves continue to govern the immune response after they have produced and educated the cells. As Jaret describes it, "the human immune system is not con- trolled by any central organ, such as the brain. Rather it has developed to function as a kind of biologic democracy, wherein the individual members achieve their ends through an information network of awesome scope" (1986:709). Finally, it seems to be part of the defining character of the nation state that its domain is limited: ''the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elas- tic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with [hu]mankind" (Anderson 1983:16). In the maintenance of boundaries, of course, lie many of the conflicts between nation states; and in the protection of its boundaries against invasion from other, equally powerful organisms, lie the bellicose activities of the immune system. Although Anderson stresses the potentially egalitarian aspect of nations, in which internal hierarchies are flattened out in deference to defining national boundaries, Dumont stresses the way nationalist ideologies often carry within them a kind of suppressed hierarchy (Dumont 1986). For Dumont, nationalism involves the emergence of individualism and egalitarianism which ''are a partic- ular transformation on hierarchy . . . whereby hierarchy and its valuation of difference are suppressed. Racism is a property of suppressed hierarchy'' (Kapferer 1989:164). Therefore, "Dumont sees nationalism, because it ingrains individualist and egalitarian ideology, to be potentially integral to the generation of a western totalitarianism, fascism and racism" (Kapferer 1989:164). The world of the immune system also contains a kind of suppressed hierarchy within its boundary-oriented, internally mutually interacting system of components. Compare two cat egories of immune system cells: phagocytes (macrophages are one type), which surround and digest foreign organisms; and T cells which destroy foreign orga- nisms by shooting holes in them or transferring toxin to them. The phagocytes are a lower form of cell evolutionarily and are even found in such primitive organisms as worms (Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985:2.1); T cells are more advanced evo- lutionarily and have higher functions, such as memory (Jaroff 1988:60; Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985:2.5). It is only these advanced cells which "attend the technical colleges of the immune system" (Nilsson 1987:26). There is clearly a hierarchical division of labor here, one that is to some ex- tent overlaid with gender categories. Superficially, there are obvious female as- sociations with the engulfing and surrounding of phagocytes and obvious male associations with the penetrating or injecting ofT cells.9 In addition, many schol- ars have pointed out the frequent symbolic association of the female with lower functions, and especially with a lack of or a lesser degree of mental functions. In addition, phagocytes are the cells that are the "housekeepers" (Jaret 1986) of the body, cleaning up the dirt and debris including the "dead bodies" of both self and foreign cells. (One immunologist called them' 'little drudges.'' 10) The first defenders to arrive would be the phagocytes-the scavengers of the system. Phagocytes constantly scour the territories of our bodies, alert to any- thing that seems out of place. What they find, they engulf and consume. Phag- ocytes are not choosy. They will eat anything suspicious that they find in the bloodstream, tissues, or lymphatic system. [Jaret 1986:715]" Beyond this, when a phagocyte moves to surround a microorganism, the ex- tensions of itself are called ''pseudopodia'' or false feet. These ''feet'' surround the particle and lodge it within (Jaret 1986:717; Jaroff 1988:57-58; Leijh, Furth, and Zwet 1986:46.2). To round out the images that may come to mind at the thought of two feet opening wide to engulf something foreign, this process of forming a pouch is explicitly called "invagination" (Vander, Sherman, and Lu- ciano 1980:527). Still more fraught with psychosexual connotations is the fact that the "vaginal" pouch between the phage's feet is also a "death cell," which will execute and then eat its prey. 12 The feminized, primitive phagocytes kill by engulfing and eating "the en- emy.'' They often die in the process, but their deaths are seen as routine and unex- ceptional. One type of phagocyte, the macrophage, often dies because it engulfs something too big and pointed, which punctures it (more fertile material for psy- chosexual analysis). Nilsson comments on an illustration of an asbestos fiber puncturing a macrophage: "It is no use: the asbestos does not break down and the macrophage is defeated'' (1987: 129). The masculinized T cells however, kill by penetrating or injecting. They sometimes die, too, but their deaths take place on a battlefield where they shoot out projectiles and poisonous substances. Heroic imagery is brought directly to bear on them, as in one illustration, David (the T cell) takes on Goliath (the tumor cell). ''A killer cell-here in monstrous guise-grips a protoplasm thread of the large tumour cell and starts to penetrate the enemy. Goliath meets David: the giant seldom survives the encounter with the little killer cell" (Nilsson 1987:100). Immunology is a recent science recently institutionalized. Although such entities as macrophages, lymphocytes, antibodies, and antigens had been identi tied earlier, it was not until the mid-1960s that the concept of an immune system as such existed (Moulin 1989). Only then did macrophages, lymphocytes, and other cells come to be seen as a part of a mutually interacting, self-regulating, whole body system. It was generally not until the 1970s that departments of im- munology existed in American or other universities. Popular depictions of im- mune system functions only began after this time and grew frequent only in the 1980s. Therefore, given that the modem nation state has been in existence for over a hundred years, it is perhaps not even particularly surprising that such im- agery should be incorporated by a developing science. It might also seem that there would not be any ideological "work" for such imagery to do, since the forms they reflect are already so well entrenched as to be unquestionable. 13 As a speculation I suggest that one kind of ideological work such images might do is to make violent destruction seem ordinary and part of the necessity of daily life. Perhaps when the texts slip between warfare and ingestion they in effect domesticate violence. In another scientific language, used by nuclear defense intellectuals, Carol Cohn (1987) suggests that words and images taken from the home and farmyard serve to blunt the reality of massively destructive forces. For example, getting to see a nuclear missile is called "patting the bomb," and mis- siles themselves are kept in ''silos.'' In immunology the shifting of imagery from warfare to eating may similarly divert us from seeing that cellular events are constructed as total war. Destruction and death may appear to give way to friendly, sociable eating. Any diversion achieved could only be temporary: the overall picture conveyed by these texts is emphatically one of "the body at war." Some accounts even go so far as to warn us repeatedly against thinking any events inside the body are innocent: ''superficially undramatic events'' are really total war (Nilsson 1987:20); "tumour cells repos[ing] on a slide" are "no peaceful scene" (Nilsson 1987:102). What may seem innocent is really deadly: killer cells give cancer cells a ''poisonous kiss,'' a ''kiss of death,'' (Nilsson 1987: I05) that dis- patches them; the feeder cell encloses a bacterium in a "deadly embrace" (Jaret 1986:718; Nilsson 1987:25). Another kind of ideological work may be accomplished when a structure is posited in the body with hierarchical relations among its parts, a structure that relates to existing hierarchies in society. In the tiny world of these cells we see stereotypically ''male'' penetrating killer cells and stereotypically ''female'' de- vouring and cleaning cells, male heroes and females in "symbiotic service," to use Jean Elshtain's phrase (1987:198). "Male" activity is valued as heroic and life-giving, and "female" activity is devalued as ordinary and mortal. Jean Elshtain (1987), Judith Stiehm (1982), and Virginia Woolf (1929) have all argued in different ways that in Western culture warfare depends on females for whose sake male heroes can die. Maintenance of militarism depends on gender in the sense that there cannot be a "hero's" death without "little drudges" keep- ing things tidy at home. There is not a complete parallel in the cellular world, because the feminized macrophages are on the battlefield killing (by eating) in- vaders along with the masculinized T cells. However, there is a distinct replica- tion of status difference between them in the many ways I have already discussed. But it is not clear whether gender is the only overlay on this division of labor. Phagocytes are the cells that actually eat other cells belonging to the category "self," and so engage in a form of "cannibalism." William Arens has done a study of the ideological use of the trait of cannibalism and finds it often if not always associated with the attribution of a lower animal nature to those who en- gage in it (1979). In immunology phagocytes are seen as feminized in some ways, but as simply "uncivilized" in other ways. These "cannibals" are indiscriminate eaters, barbaric and savage in their willingness to eat any manner of thing at all. The implications of this depiction, with its unmistakable overtones of race and class, will be explored below. What Do People Do with the Imagery? In my research I have begun to look at the way scientists and others react to immune system imagery when it is pointed out to them, as a way of seeing the role of these constructions in the definition of personal identity and the creation of cultural meaning. The scientists I have worked with have had a variety of re- actions, but none has suggested it would be possible (or often, even desirable) to substitute different imagery for the current warfare/internal purity model. The head of the immunology research group in which I have been dDing participant observation was attentive when I described my impression of the extent to which the imagery of warfare dominates department discussions, lab talk, and technical literature. He was intrigued enough to report to me later, at the end of a semester course he taught on the immune system, that he had tried to keep track of his own use of such talk. He said that in the first half of the course, on immunochemistry and genetics, he had used no language of warfare or killing. But he did use this kind of language in the second half, when he dealt with "applications." He saw this later language as simply a shorthand, used to give an easy handle to the com- plexities that students have already understood. "It is hard to avoid reference to the 'killer' cell, for example, or saying the T cell 'kills' the germ, even though the class understands that the T cell only acts when a complex combination of other factors are present,' ' he told me. He referred to the first half of the course as the "conceptual" half, the second as the "applied" half. When I asked if the two halves were independent, he replied with an em- phatic ''yes.'' He also thought that it would not affect the first half of the course at all if he had a different shorthand to use in the second half. If we spoke of the cells, say, as "controlling" rather than "killing," it still would not affect the chemistry and genetics, he claimed. Another scientist, who is committed to writing biology textbooks so that they are less reflective of patriarchal and hierarchical assumptions in our society, was not fond of the warfare imagery. However, he commented to me that he was stumped by how else to describe the immune system. The warfare metaphor seemed to him in this case to be the only one that fit the facts. For people who are suffering from immune system disorders, the warfare language can also appear unobjectionable. My own ''buddy,'' 14 with whom I had innumerable conversations about the physical and emotional aspects of AIDS, never expressed any hesitation or criticism about the use of this language by med- ical personnel. However, he himself never used any military or nation state im- agery to describe what was happening to him or what the medical treatments were supposed to do. Instead he used only the imagery of a clean house. The treatment involving ablation of his immune system by radiation, which he was hoping to ￼TowARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMMUNOLOGY 419 receive, would "clean out the HIV virus"; his brother's immune system cells, injected by bone marrow transplant, would then "set up housekeeping" in his body. Other HIV patients embrace the warfare imagery wholly and use it creatively to organize their experience of mortal threat. We have grown up in our bodies, they are our native lands, and although we know their shortcomings by heart, we have a natural affection for them, warts and all. My country has occasionally disappointed me, but like a Resistance fighter, I'll stop at nothing when it comes to throwing off the foreign viral yoke. The main thing is to adopt a guerrilla attitude and reverse our roles. To declare that impostors have taken over my body, that the virus has illegally usurped au- thority, and that I must set out to recover my morale and all biological ground lost so far. I'm in my own home, this is my body, and it's up to AIDS to get out. [Dreuilhe 1988:8-9] AIDS activists also create powerful images of collusion between the damage done by the virus to individual bodies and the damage they suspect some political authorities intend. For example, at a public hearing held by the Maryland Gov- enor's AIDS commission, July 10, 1990, an Act Up spokesperson made the fol- lowing statement: "Schaefer [the Governor] is Hitler, AIDS is the holocaust, Maryland is Auschwitz. This is conscious genocide and can only be seen as the Governor's desire to wipe out this population." Alternative Images of the Body However creatively people attempt to forge meaningful uses of these belli- cose nation state images, they are still working within what strikes me as a rather narrow range o f options. A n important role for anthropology is to use its technique of comparative research to make plain the historical specificity of the cultural op- tions that occur to people and therefore their contingency. Other times and places may offer us other resources. In some times and other cultures, images of biological organisms as engaged in all-out struggle to the death have not held sway. Daniel Todes has shown how in the late 19th and early 20th centuries Russian biologists rejected Darwin's ma- jor metaphor, the struggle for existence, especially when it appeared in connec- tion with Malthusian ideas about overpopulation. In developing an alternative the- ory of mutual aid, Russian naturalists argued four tenets: the central aspect of the struggle for existence is the organism's struggle with abiotic conditions; organisms join forces to wage this struggle more effectively, and such mutual aid is favored by natural selection; since cooperation, not com- petition, dominates intraspecific relations, Darwin's Malthusian characterization of those relations is false; and cooperation so vitiates intraspecific competition that the latter cannot be the chief cause of the divergence of characters and the origin of new species. [Todes 1987:545] In rejecting Darwin's assumptions, Russians identified the idea of individualized competitive struggle as a product of English culture and society. Darwin's use of this assumption was "the same as if Adam Smith had taken it upon himself to write a course in zoology" (Chernyshevskii, quoted in Todes 1987:541); a Rus- sian expert on fisheries and population dynamics wrote that the English ''national type accepts [struggle] with all its consequences, demands it as his right, tolerates no limits upon it" (quoted in Todes 1989:41). This response to Darwin's theory, common to Russian intellectuals of a va- riety of philosophical and political viewpoints, derived, as Todes persuasively argues, from several factors: Russia's political economy lacked a dynamic, pro-laissez faire bourgeoisie and was dominated by landowners and peasants. The leading political tendencies, monarchism and a socialist-oriented populism, shared a cooperative social ethos and a distaste for the competitive individualism widely associated with Malthus and Great Britain. Furthermore, Russia was an expansive, sparsely populated land with a swiftly changing and often severe climate. It is difficult to imagine a setting less consonant with Malthus's notion that organisms were pressed con- stantly into mutual conflict by population pressures on limited space and re- sources. [Todes 1989:168] A second example of an alternative form of imagery comes from the work of Ludwik Fleck. Fleck was a Polish biologist who during the 1930s and 1940s developed important diagnostic and prophylactic measures for typhus fever. He also published a monograph and many papers on the methodology of scientific observation and the principles of scientific knowledge. Although his work was not widely disseminated at the time of its publication, he anticipated many of Thomas Kuhn's arguments (1962), published and acclaimed in the 1960s. 15 In the 1930s, Fleck had already seen the limitations of the metaphor of war- fare in immunology and conceived of another possibility. He described the pre- vailing idea of the organism as a closed unit and of the hostile causative agents in facing it. The causative agent produces a bad effect (attack). The organism responds with a reaction (defense). This results in a conflict, which is taken to be the essence of disease. The whole of immunology is permeated with such primitive images of war. [1979(1935):59] Out of his experience as a practicing biologist he thundered, "not a single exper- imental proof exists that could force an unbiased observer to adopt such an idea" (Fleck 1979[1935]:60). Instead of the organism as a self-contained independent unit with fixed boundaries, he proposed a "harmonious life unit," which could range from the cell, to the symbiosis between alga and fungus in a lichen, to an ecological unit such as a forest. 16 In the light of this concept, man appears as a complex to whose harmonious well- being many bacteria, for instance, are absolutely essential. Intestinal flora are needed for metabolism, and many kinds of bacteria living in mucous membranes are required for the normal functioning of these membranes. [Fleck 1979( 1935):61] Change in such a harmonious life form could be spontaneous (mutation), cyclic (aging), or simply change within the reciprocally acting parts of the unit. In the latter category fall most infectious diseases. But, and this is crucial, it is very doubtful whether an invasion in the old sense is possible, involving as it does an interference by completely foreign organisms in natural conditions. completely foreign organism could find no receptors capable of reaction and thus could not generate a biological process. It is therefore better to speak of a com- plicated revolution within the complex life unit than of an invasion of it. [Fleck 1979(1935):61] He meant that any "invading" organism had to have been living in our vicinity, symbiotically, long enough to be able to stick to our cells. The ability to generate a biological process could only come about from previous encounters. Thus, a previously minor organism could only rise to prominence within the body's life unit, not invade it as a foreign "other." In the overall scheme of things, this kind of "complicated revolution" would be a decidedly rare event, not one that was constantly on the verge of occurring. It is interesting to speculate whether Fleck's strongly stated objections to the warfare/internal purity model in immunology was influenced by his experience of the contemporary Nazi application of totalitarian practices to achieve the purity of the social body. By 1935 the removal, incarceration, or killing of German and Austrian Jewish, communist, and socialist physicians was well advanced. 17 After Poland was occupied by the Nazis, Fleck was deported to Auschwitz and forced to produce typhus vaccines for the German armed forces (Treon and Merton 1979:151). Speculation about the relationship between Fleck's ideas and his Nazi experience is made more compelling by Claude Lefort's observation that totalitarian regimes often produce images of themselves as a body: At the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the People-as-One . . . the constitution of the People-as-One requires the incessant production of enemies. . . . The enemy of the people is regarded as a parasite or a waste product to be eliminated. . . . What is at stake is always the integrity of the body. It is as if the body had to assure itself of its own identity by expelling its waste matter, or as if it had to close in upon itself by withdrawing from the outside, by averting the threat of an intrusion by alien elements. . . . The campaign against the enemy is feverish; fever is good, it is a signal, within society, that there is some evil to combat. [Lefort 1986:297-298] As immunology describes it, bodies are imperiled nations continuously at war to quell alien invaders. These nations have sharply defined borders in space, which are constantly besieged and threatened. In their interiors there is great concern over the purity of the population-over who is a bona fide citizen and who may be carrying false papers. False intruders intend only destruction, and they are meted out only swift death. All this is written into "nature" at the level of the cell. It seems possible that Fleck may have wondered whether this imagery might make analogous social practices come to seem ever more natural, fundamentally rooted in reality, and unchangeable. Within our own contemporary science there are hints of other models that might be used to describe immune responses. For example, Haraway suggests the work of Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores on cognition as providing a way of describing pathology without military imagery. By their account, a ' 'breakdown'' would not be "a negative situation to be avoided, but a situation of non-obvious- ness, in which some aspect of the network of tools that we are engaged in using is brought forth to visibility" (quoted in Haraway 1989: 18). Instead of the de- fended self who destroys the foreign intruder lest it be destroyed, we would have occasions when interaction becomes nonobvious, potentially creative situations that call forth clarification of the terms of the interaction. One final possibility for an alternative perspective is present as a minor motif in some of the biological texts I have discussed. If the eating aspect of phagocy- tosis were allowed to dominate in significance over the destructive aspect, the macrophage might be said to catabolize and utilize the "invading foreign orga- nism" in its own metabolic processes. In other words, the microorganism might be seen as food for the macrophage. Some standard sources make plain this aspect of what a macrophage does, telling us that when a macrophage ingests a microor- ganism, it "evokes a metabolic burst" which causes increased consumption of oxygen and production of substances which help digestion (Leijh, Furth, and Zwet 1986:46.2; Vander, Sherman, and Luciano 1980:528). But by no means do all texts mention these matters; never are they given very much attention or de- velopment in the overall picture. If the view that microorganisms serve as food for macrophages were given prominence, we could see this process as a food chain, linked by mutual dependencies. Instead of a life and death struggle, with terrorism within and war at the borders, we would have symbiosis within a life unit that encompasses the body and its environment, where all organisms are de- pendent on others for food. None of these alternative metaphors would be sufficient by itself to encourage us to imagine-let alone bring into existence-different forms of organiza- tion in our society than those that now exist. But at the least they can serve to add substance to the question: are there powerful links between the particular metaphors chosen to describe the body scientifically and features of our contemporary society that are related to gender, class, and race? Full consideration of this question would demand attention to issues I have not taken up here: what is the historical relationship between particular social formations and particular ideas about the body? Is there variation in scientific or pop- ular body images from one kind of nation state to another? From one perspective within a given nation state to another? Although I hope to address these questions in future work, in this article my aim has been more limited: to suggest that as long as there is a possibility that scientific descriptions give an aura of the "natural" to a particular social vision, there is a place for comparative ethnography to set this vision in a context of other ways bodies might be imagined and societies might be organized.

#### The imperative to preserve the insulated body at all costs was at the *core* of Hitler’s racism and allowed him to manipulate populations to participate in the Holocaust – the citizenry must be given the tools to critically interrogate the state’s metaphors

Musolff 10 [(Andreas, University of East Anglia Language and Linguistics Department Member) Metaphor, Nation and the Holocaust: The Concept of the Body Politic. Routledge Critical Studies in Discourse 2010] AT

The phrase body politic belongs to a field of clichéd metaphors in English that refer to political entities and issues in terms of bodily organs and functions, such as head of state, head of government, long arm of the law, organ (of a party), sclerosis or tumour (of the body politic), heart of Brit- ain/Europe.1 It is used by British and American media and politicians, e.g. in formulations such as “Europe could cease to be the cyanide in the British body politic”; “voices in the body politic”; “disembowelling the body poli- tic”, “campaign culture metastasize[d] throughout the entire body politic”.2 The Conservative politician and mayor of London, Boris Johnson, even described himself tongue-in-cheek as “a mere toenail in the body politic”.3 In German public discourse, by comparison, the idea of society and/or the nation or state as a body is perceived as highly problematic. The term Volkskörper (“people’s body”, or “national body”), in particular, is stigmatized. In 1998, for instance, the conservative German politician J. Schön- bohm was heavily criticised for having invoked the ideal of a homogeneous German “people’s body” as opposed to the notion of a “multi-cultural” society in the public debate about immigration. According to one of his critics, the notion of bodily homogeneity for the nation was likely to “kindle the fire” of inter-ethnic conflict.4 Eight years later, an article in the daily newspaper Die Welt discussed the low birth rate in Germany under the title “A hurt soul in the sick nation’s body [Volkskörper]”.5 Again, the notion of the nation’s or the people’s body was viewed as alluding to “the German traumata of the twentieth century”. Those who discussed demographic decline in terms of a threat to the national body’s health were suffering, the author asserted, from a hysteria similar to that which had motivated previ- ous “bio-political” attempts to cure the people’s body.6 Evidently, the term Volkskörper still reminds parts of the German public of statements such as the following which were made by Adolf Hitler and his propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels in the 1920s and 1940s: [the Jew] has always been a parasite in the body of other peoples.7 1914 witnessed the last flicker of the national instinct for self-preserva- tion in opposition to the progressive paralysis of our people’s body.8 . . . the Jew represents an infectious illness . . . Germany has no inten- tion of giving in to this Jewish threat but intends to oppose it in time, if necessary by the means of its most complete and radical extermin-, eh, elimination.9 Statements such as these, which were taken from Mein Kampf and from Goebbels’s infamous “total war” speech of 1943, were not just meant as insults of Jewish people. They implied a genocidal policy that ended in the Holocaust: the victims were treated as if they were agents of disease and parasites that threatened the German national body’s health and therefore had to be annihilated. Goebbels’s false start, Ausrott[-ung] (“extermina- tion”) in the third example, gives away his knowledge about the ongoing genocide but also illustrates the effort to avoid unequivocal references to killing and mass murder. The vague notion of “getting rid” of the victims, which is implied in the term Ausschaltung (“elimination”, “removal”), was meant to leave room for a non-genocidal interpretation. However, the met- aphor of an infectious illness leaves little doubt that a complete destruction of the agent of the illness was envisaged, or else the supposed infection would not be eradicated. The “logic” of the illness-cure imagery based on the body-state metaphor thus gives the lie to the dissimulating talk of “elimination”. How could the conceptualization of a socio-political entity as a human body acquire such sinister connotations? Is it a specific historical phenom- enon of German political culture in the 20th century? Or is the metaphor inherently racist, suggesting as it does a physical/physiological concreteness of politics, which perhaps “lends itself” to physical “solutions” of any per- ceived problems? Should anyone who employs body-related metaphors in politics be viewed as a potential advocate of genocide? These are some of the questions that this book will engage with, with a view to determining the function of metaphor in political communication, i.e. the basic issue of how a metaphorical concept can impact on people’s political perception and behaviour, even turn them into genocide perpetrators (or at least, pas- sive bystanders).10 The imagery used by the Nazis to legitimize their genocidal policies provides us with an extreme “test-case”, so to speak, of a metaphor that was turned into the horrendous reality of World War and Holocaust. We may ask, however, whether we are dealing with a “metaphor” at all. Standard definitions of “metaphor” describe it as the designation of a meaning unit by words taken from a different domain of meaning. This definition can seemingly be applied without great difficulty to our case: a social or political entity is usually not considered to belong in the category of biolog- ical bodies, and a group of people in it is not an illness or parasite. Hence, the semantic transfer of bodily expressions to political and social issues would appear to qualify for “metaphor” status. However, in regard of the Nazi use of body-illness-parasite imagery, we have to take into account the fact that they applied it in a horrifically “literal” sense by trying to physi- cally destroy and eliminate Jewish people. Neil Gregor has aptly put this problem in the form of a paradox: “it is not possible to see in Mein Kampf . . . a set of plans or a blueprint for mass murder in any specific way. . . . But, equally, we should not regard Hitler’s metaphors merely as metaphors: for him, they described reality.”11 We thus seem to be dealing with a form of discourse that is non-literal and at the same time “literal” (in a poignant historical and political sense). How can this contradiction be resolved? One way of dealing with this dilemma would be to assume that the meta- phor of the supposed Jewish “race” as an illness or parasite on the German nation’s body was known to be just part of propagandistic jargon both by its users (i.e. the Nazis) and its receivers (i.e. the German public and everyone within the reach of Nazi propaganda), and really meant something else, i.e. genocide. In this case, the metaphor could be assigned the same semantic status as euphemisms or camouflage words, such as deportation (Deporta- tion, Umsiedlung), special treatment (Sonderbehandlung) or final solution (Endlösung), which the Nazis used in administrative or legal documents when referring to their murderous practices. Such camouflage vocabulary was not primarily intended to be persuasive; rather, it was meant to misin- form those who were deemed outsiders or enemies, depending on the partic- ular circumstances and the phase of policy implementation. 12 The “insiders” would know what was meant and needed no persuasion: the camouflage language was just a ruse to cover their tracks (and, perhaps, to suppress the perpetrators’ own troubling emotions of empathy or guilt). 13 If the body/parasite metaphor complex as used by the Nazis were on a par with such terminology it would not in fact be metaphorical. On closer inspection, however, this interpretation seems implausible. Camouflage terms such as final solution or removal referring to genocide are deliber- ately abstract, vague and general: they are designed to hide any concrete, vivid form of reference. But denouncing a group of people as a parasite and describing one’s nation as a body that is in danger of perishing are not abstract or vague descriptions; on the contrary, they are striking and spec- tacular. The statements that included such metaphors were not confined to incidental, infrequent forms of “background” propaganda; as we shall see in detail later, they were carefully crafted and presented as “highlights” in the Nazi leaders’ speeches. Anyone living under the Nazi regime or being aware of it could not help but notice them as key elements of their ideol- ogy and propaganda. The metaphor was recognised as a core belief held by all the leading Nazis. That still does not mean that people mistook it for a literal description of political issues, or else it would have been regarded simply as a grotesque category mistake. So, if it was neither that nor a lie, how can we describe its meaning, both as a semantic category and as a pragmatic, political tool to advocate genocide? Some of the confusion about the semantic status of the body/parasite “metaphor” can be avoided if we follow the insights of modern metaphor theories that have developed a notion of metaphor as a cognitive “framing” strategy to provide access to innovative perspectives for the conceptualisation and the discursive negotiation of all kinds of experience. 14 In the metaphorical frame, new concepts are integrated into familiar sets of assumptions about classifications of entities, events and actions and their evaluations. With regard to Nazi metaphors, we have to investigate the frames that enabled their users to believe in assumptions that made the project of murdering all Jewish people in Europe seem possible, justifiable and necessary. It is this inferential cognitive link between assumptions embodied in the “source” concepts of bodies, illnesses and parasites and the political conclusions at the “target” level of genocidal ideology (and practice) that is at the centre of the first part of this study. In the follow- ing chapters I shall propose a cognitive analysis of the mappings of body- illness-parasite concepts onto politics as they appear in key texts produced by the Nazis and in documented contemporary reactions and comments, with a view to establishing the conceptual and argumentative framework in which the Holocaust would appear as a national healing exercise to the per- petrators and their audience.15 However, an analysis based on the corpus of texts from the Nazi period itself can only show its synchronic structure and function in its respective historical period. As we saw from our initial examples, the same metaphor complex is still being used in public discourse but it carries a kind of historical index of being related to the Nazi period. We therefore also need to look at its diachronic development. To depict societies, states and/or nations as a body is a metaphoric fram- ing that has a long and famous pedigree in the history of ideas. Histori- cal overviews16 locate its origins in pre-Socratic thinking and highlight a first flourishing of such metaphors in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (with The Republic and Timaios, Politics and On the movement of animals being the respective key texts). They were followed by a series of Hellenistic and Roman philosophers, the Stoics, Neoplatonists and mixed with Bibli- cal traditions (especially St. Paul’s Epistles to the Romans and Corinthi- ans), which were taken up by the “Church Fathers” and many political and social theorists from the early Middle Ages onwards, continuing up to the twentieth century. Closely connected is the tradition of the so-called “fable of the belly”, which has its beginnings in Aesopian texts dating back to the fifth century Introduction 5 BC and was handed down by historians and philosophers as a political les- son to avoid a rebellion.17 The fable tells the story of a rebellion against the belly by other “members” of the body, which is motivated by their anger over the injustice that the seemingly idle belly/stomach takes all nourish- ment. The rebellion ends in disaster because without the belly first receiving and then redistributing all the food, the other members get no nourishment either and so the whole body perishes.18 The standard political application of the fable is a vindication of the ruler’s right to receive all the revenues of the state, so that he in turn can allocate them (justly) to all other organs of the body politic. One of its most famous formulations can be found in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, where the Roman senator Menenius uses it to quell a Plebeian rebellion: Menenius: There was a time when all the body’s members/ Rebell’d against the belly; thus accused it:/That only like a gulf it did remain/ I’ the midst o’ the body, idle and unactive,/ Still cupboarding the viand, never bearing/Like labour with the rest, . . . / The belly answered . . . ‘True is it, my incorporate friends’, quoth he,/ ‘That I receive the gen- eral food at first,/ Which you do live upon; and fit it is;/ Because I am the store-house and the shop/ Of the whole body: but if you do remem- ber,/ I send it through the rivers of your blood,/ Even to the court, the heart, to the seat o’ the brain; . . . /The senators of Rome are this good belly,/ And you the mutinous members;19 After having stopped the unruly crowd in their tracks by telling the fable, Menenius singles out the leader of the rebellion (the “First Citizen” in the play) for humiliation. He calls him the “great toe of this assembly” on account of his “being one o’ the lowest, basest, poorest, Of this most wise rebellion” and still having the nerve to “[go] foremost”.20 The literal and figurative “forwardness” of the toe/First Citizen is thus utilized by Mene- nius to isolate and ridicule him. Perhaps B. Johnson’s above-quoted self- description as the “toenail of the body politic” was owed to his knowledge of Shakespeare (and even intended to demonstrate that). Another incidence of erudite reference to the “fable of the belly” can be found in the autobiog- raphy of the painter Oskar Kokoschka (1886–1980), who described the last decades of the Habsburg Empire before World War I as a time of continu- ous crisis during which the various nationalities “forgot the parable of the Roman statesman that body members which are separated from the body are not capable of life”.21 Such implicit or explicit “inter-textual” allusions are not essential, how- ever, for the understanding of the metaphor. Any competent adult speaker of English and German can in principle make sense of Johnson’s and Koko- schka’s statements or other uses of body imagery in politics without mak- ing the connection to the tradition of the fable. After all, the knowledge that body parts cannot normally exist if separated from the whole body, and that toes or toenails are less important body members than, say, the head, belongs to our everyday “encyclopaedic” and practical knowledge of the world. Shakespearean scholars and conceptual historians will of course recognise the image and reconstruct the links with ancient and modern uses to further its understanding, but this happens at a secondary level of interpretation. It may add to the intellectual and aesthetic appreciation of the text in question but it is not needed for the basic understanding of the metaphor. Clearly, the Nazis and their audience did not have to rely on a two- thousand-year-old philosophical tradition to motivate their wish to murder all Jewish people in Europe. Like the interdependence and the relative importance of parts of the body, the dangers of illness and the benefits of a cure are common knowledge, and racists of all times have employed that knowledge to denounce their enemies as agents of (political/social) disease. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that a special, vulgarised version of some of the theoretical and textual traditions mentioned earlier was accessed around the turn of the last century by Hitler and other Nazi ideologues, in a way similar to the pseudo-scientific theories on human “races” that influenced Hitler during his formative years in Vienna and Munich.22 They could in fact hardly have existed without the input from an “authoritative” tradition that had already established the metaphorical concept of the body, its organs and functions and its state of health as a model for thinking and talking about politics. These beliefs would have provided the semantic-ideological space in which Hitler’s political body and parasite metaphors could resonate. In order to substantiate this hypothesis, we have to investigate those strands of the metaphor tradition that are most likely to have informed the sedimented political assumptions in the early twentieth century, in par- ticular, conceptual and textual traditions of body politic theories and dis- cussions in German-speaking political culture. German traditions of this metaphor complex have been less well researched than, for instance, the English- and French-speaking histories; it has even been claimed that Ger- man political literature lacked the equivalent of body politic imagery.23 As we shall see later on, this assumption is unwarranted; in fact, the tradition of corporeal imagery in German political philosophy and discourse can be traced back to the early sixteenth century, i.e. to the same time when the phrase body politic itself became established in England and when similar terminological and conceptual developments took place in other European languages and political cultures. These long-standing metaphor traditions not only informed the popular attitudes and opinions of the period until 1945; they still exert an influence on current discourse, albeit as an undercurrent that is overlaid, as it were, by the stigma-laden memory of the use of illness/parasite imagery in Nazi ideol- ogy. As we saw in the few examples from contemporary German discourse quoted earlier, journalists and politicians still expect the German public to Introduction 7 understand allusions to the Nazi uses, which seems to indicate that some kind of a “discourse memory” relating to Nazi-typical metaphors still exists. Right-wing and Neo-Nazi groups still make use of body/parasite imagery as if nothing had happened, so to speak,24 but this lack of distance from Nazi jargon has probably helped to bar them from having a significant influence on post-war German political culture. The public judgement that a person or political group uses terminology and imagery comparable to that employed by the Nazis still serves as a powerful stigmatisation.25 For German politi- cians, to invoke body-parasite imagery when dealing with socio-political and ethnic conflicts and to feign ignorance of the Nazi precedent is disingenu- ous and/or potentially self-defeating as long as they want to remain part of the mainstream public political discourse.26 So, why do body-illness-parasite metaphors continue to be employed? By looking at the long-term history of body-based political thought and discourse we hope to find answers to this question; i.e. we not only try to understand the reasons for its historical “success” in persuading a majority the German public to participate in or at least tolerate the Holocaust but also the role that body-based metaphors generally play in current racist discourse and thought. Given the vastness of the material, the selection of textual and concep- tual traditions presented here can only claim to be a sample of the huge field of research (a cautious first estimate based on conceptual history research indicates the existence of at least 250 primary key texts ranging from antiq- uity to present-day texts in several European languages). The following chapters can thus not claim to be representative but only aim at providing insights into major continuities and discontinuities of the various strands of this metaphor leading up to (and beyond) its instrumentalisation by the Nazis. Some of these traditions were, as we shall see, explicitly connected to Nazi ideology, others seem to have only implicit and fragmentary links, and further strands even point to the ideological opposite of racism, i.e. an enlightened, tolerant vision of society and politics. The chapters are roughly ordered as follows. In the chapter introduc- ing Part I we establish the methodological implications of the cognitively oriented approach to metaphor analysis through its comparison with tradi- tional analyses of Nazi imagery as a “mere” rhetorical trick that was inci- dental to Hitler’s ideology and actual policy. By contrast, our analysis tries to demonstrate that his body-illness-parasite metaphors provided not just a propaganda ornament but were at the core of his racist ideology. Chapter 3 studies this conceptual core in detail by way of a close reading of Hitler’s statements on race in Mein Kampf; Chapter 4 investigates how the Nazi ideologues and propagandists announced and presented the genocide as a therapy for the German national body while they were in power. Chapter 5 provides a methodological reflection of the results of our analyses and relates them to the second part, which investigates the body-state meta- phor’s roots in Western cultural history. Chapters 6–9 proceed in a loosely chronological order from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance to the 8 Metaphor, Nation and Holocaust twentieth century and provide cross-references to conceptual strands taken up by the Nazis. The last chapter discusses the implications of this history for the assessment of the body-based political metaphors in creating and shaping racist attitudes.

continues

Carl Schmitt’s biased reconstruction of Hobbes’s Leviathan showed that the attempt was made to connect the “respectable” philosophical body politic tradition with the notion of a “total” state that gained its identity only through combating an existential foe. The permanent crisis of such a state founded on conflict, which classical thinkers considered mainly as a limiting concept for a situation that had to be avoided, was for Schmitt the pre-condition of all political activity. So it was for Hitler and the Nazis, but they drew from it the ultimate conclusion which Schmitt himself did not (dare to?) consider: the absolute necessity for the national body politic to destroy the foe as a parasite life form that was “unworthy to live”. The basis for such a conclusion was of course not Schmitt’s attempted recon- struction of Hobbes’s theory but the popularized “sedimented” tradition of body-state analogies. Our historical analyses in Part II have revealed that whilst a relatively wide range of conceptual/lexical source elements can be found in the rel- evant texts, only a handful of thematic clusters appear repeatedly and prominently: the hierarchically ordered anatomy of parts of the body, their mutual interdependence, the life cycle of the whole organism and the illness-diagnosis-cure scenario. These key themes and scenarios carry evaluative and emotive associations with them, as well as assumptions about preferred and feared consequences and courses of action, which are understood as evaluations of solutions of political crises. Whilst they may appear to be nothing but commonsense concepts grounded in bodily experience and pre- or folk-theoretical assumptions, we can in fact trace them back to philosophically and even theologically oriented tradi- tions reaching back to concepts of Christ’s/God’s body and its manifold worldly manifestations (e.g. as the “mystical body” of the church with the pope as its head, or as the emperor, or as the king in his “body poli- tic”, or as the “sovereign” as the principle of the state, the people’s body, etc.). Long after the ancient cosmological and theological frameworks that sustained these notions have disappeared or have been relativised to the point where they can no longer be considered belief systems that mem- bers of a particular national or religious culture adhere to uncritically, the “holiness” of the collective (social and/or political) body remains. It was and still is this holiness of the body politic that has had to be defended at all costs, against devilish inspired heretics in the Middle Ages, humoral imbalances in the Renaissance, rabid dogs that can bite a state “to the quick” for Hobbes, or racial vermin and agents of decomposition, in the Nazi worldview. Hitler’s “diagnosis” of Germany’s post–World War I crisis thus sounded plausible not despite but because of its metaphoric character and history. This apparent plausibility was grounded in its familiarity as an age-old, tried and tested commonsense analogy. It provided the German public with a conceptual and argumentative space to reason about the socio-economic and political hardships they were experiencing and 144 Metaphor, Nation and Holocaust to trust Hitler with applying the therapy that would end those hardships and prevent them in future. As a means to achieve the common good for the nation, these measures could be interpreted as ethically acceptable, even if they included hardships and sacrifices (hence Himmler and other SS-leaders’ self-stylisation as carrying out an unpleasant, almost sacrificial task in perpetrating the genocide). The function of the body- parasite scenario as employed by the Nazi elite was to make the genocide appear as the inevitable “solution” for Germany’s crisis. They stuck with this scenario through the changing fortunes of war. As the secretly recorded statements of popular opinion show, its genocidal agenda was understood by the majority German populace sufficiently to at least “tol- erate”, if not participate, in that final solution. This astonishing persuasiveness of the cure-by-elimination scenario remains inexplicable if we dismiss it as a propagandistic extra to Hitler’s “real” policies or view it as the re-manifestation of a “mind virus” (in an accidental, tragic historical context). Our findings show that Hitler’s metaphorical presentation of parasite annihilation as a natural, self-evident and necessary therapy for the existential problems of the German body politic convinced the public of his genocidal agenda. The comparison of Hitler’s scenarios with those promoted by medieval theologians, humanists and enlightened thinkers would seem at first sight to be almost an “open and shut” case of contrasting a conceptually incoherent and ethically depraved use with a highly respectable philosophical tradition of political thought. However, we have seen that not only the range of source domain concepts and scenarios can be shown to be similar but also that even “respectable” authors often come dangerously close to suggesting radical and potentially genocidal cures for perceived political illnesses. It is only through the explicit comparison and historical reconstruction that the differences between their uses of the metaphor and Hitler’s version become visible: • Where Hitler’s metaphor system is a closed set of “self-fulfilling”, mutually reinforcing scenarios and “prophecies”, classical and also many modern uses are embedded in textual structures that highlight their figurative status (e.g. simile, quotation, “exemplum”). • Where the Nazis depicted the worst-possible scenario outcome (destruction and decomposition of the body politic) as an imminent and inevitable danger, most other uses portray it as a potential, but not inevitable, worst-case scenario that can and should be avoided. • The therapy “offered” by the Nazi body-parasite scenario is a precise match of the supposed extreme danger to the body, i.e. complete anni- hilation of the supposed illness-inducing agent as a “final solution”, whereas in classical and enlightened scenario applications, extreme therapies are mentioned mainly as deterrents to underline the neces- sity to avoid such a negative outcome. Conclusion 145 However, as the examples of Rousseau’s corps de la nation concept in its application during the French Revolution, Herder’s idea of parasite nations in its later distortions and Hobbes’s theory of the state-as-Leviathan in Schmitt’s biased re-interpretation have shown, not even truly rationally oriented versions of the body-state metaphor are immune to being reconfigured as closed scenarios that legitimise murderous policies. The body- state metaphor complex is neither a superficial rhetorical ornament nor just an ahistoric, universal conceptual structure: in all its uses it provides an opportunity and a challenge for the respective body politic and its public “voices” to reflect on the ethical implications of their self-presentation and -interpretation. The metaphors by which nations define their destiny have the potential to shape that destiny.

#### Metaphors are inevitable and shape reality – citizens will always use them to make sense of political events. Our choice of metaphor is crucial – through it we either make effective reasoning possible or we perpetuate the manipulation of reality by existing structures.

Bougher 14 [(Lori, Postdoctoral Research Associate at Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) “COGNITIVE COHERENCE IN POLITICS: UNIFYING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CIVIC COGNITION” in Warring with Words: Narrative and Metaphor in Politics, April 29] AT

How do citizens make sense of the political world? Previous research has reiterated that citizens often lack detailed information when it comes to politics, revealing “a high variance in political awareness around a generally low mean”(Zaller,1992,p.18).1 Instead, citizens use cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) to “simplify cognitively taxing demands and to respond quickly to new information” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011, p. 14; see also Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Taber, 2011). And while a full review of this literature is outside the scope of this chapter, “[t]here is no question that citizens use heuristics to simplify their information processing; there is considerable uncertainty, however, about whether such shortcuts allow them to behave competently” (Taber, 2011, p. 380). While heuristics enable citizens to overcome cognitive limitations by making use of existing knowledge structures, they also leave citizens susceptible to bias and manipulation. Placing normative evaluations of heuristic usage temporarily to the side, there is still substantial merit in understanding the cognitive processes that can generate this susceptibility (see also Chong & Druckman, 2011). In the United States, for example, focus has shifted from “attributing failures of American democracy to the ignorance and stupidity of the masses” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 135) to securing richer, descriptive accounts of civic behavior and rationales (e.g., Lupia, Levine, Menning, & Sin, 2007; Lupia, McCubbins, & Popkin, 2000), and to more critical assessments of the media and political leaders (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011). In general, citizens use a number of cognitive tools to efficiently navigate the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity of the political world. Metaphor and narrative are not simply linguistic flourishes or persuasive devices in political rhetoric; they are effective reasoning tools in civic cognition. Both devices provide constructs for categorizing and making sense of incoming information and experiences in the political world, satisfying our need for cognitive coherence. Despite similarity in the cognitive functions of metaphor and narrative, few attempts have been made to integrate the two concepts into a unified cognitive model. This chapter will review why metaphor and narrative are important for civic reasoning and cognition, how they are similar, and how they are likely to be related. The discussion will highlight the cognitive nature of language, the need for an integrated model of civic cognition that includes both metaphor and narrative, prospects for the more explicit incorporation of metaphor and narrative in civic education, and the inextricability of political cognition from its social context. Because they shape political identities, frame political issues, and offer the potential to enhance civic tolerance and reflection, metaphor and narrative feature prominently in civic cognition and merit further investigation. Metaphor and Narrative in Civic Cognition One as the other: The cognitive similarities between metaphor and narrative Metaphor and narrative are both useful devices for navigating the political world (for overviews, see, e.g., Bougher, 2012; Patterson & Monroe, 1998, respectively). They share a similar history in that they are linguistic constructs that have each been increasingly recognized for their centrality in human cognition (e.g., Bruner, 1986, 1991; Gentner, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphor and narrative provide psychological structures that allow us to piece fragments of information together into a cohesive whole. With metaphor, we piece together bits of information by relying on our existing knowledge structures in other domains; with narrative, we try to fit fragments into a running storyline. In both instances, we use embedded knowledge structures, grounded in everyday life, to make sense of our social world. Metaphor and narrative allow us to draw causal inferences and make predictions based on limited information (Colhoun & Gentner, 2009; Costabile & Klein, 2008). Consequently, they provide efficient heuristics for filling gaps in knowledge, including those we witness in the political realm. Metaphor and narrative can help citizens make sense of political events, including campaigns and wars, candidates, policy issues, and so on. The metaphor of a “dog-fight,” for example, enables citizens to capture the severity of electoral competitions but also the candidates’ desperation. When it comes to policy issues, the narrative of a “death panel” dissuaded some American citizens from supporting President Obama’s healthcare plan. Metaphors can be equally influential in guiding policy preferences. Research has demonstrated that citizens can view healthcare in the metaphoric templates of community obligation, a societal right, employer responsibility, marketable commodity, and professional service (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000), or view obesity metaphorically as a sin, disability, eating disorder, food addiction, reflection of time pressure, manipulation of commercial interests, or consequence of a toxic food environment (Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, & Schlesinger, 2009). These “policy metaphors” not only structure how citizens view the relevant issues and its causes, but guide the types of interventions citizens support. 2 Metaphor and narrative also provide an integrative structure that allows citizens to identify themselves and others in political terms. Narratives weave together chronological events, ensuring coherence over time and space, “becom[ing] recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory, for not only guiding the life narrative up to the present but directing it into the future” (Bruner, 2004, p. 708). As such, narratives facilitate coherence in personal as well as group identities, including national identity (e.g., Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Narratives “allow individuals and communities to make sense of actions and events by telling stories” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 10; see also Ricoeur, 1992). Similarly, metaphors provide cognitive frameworks that can integrate values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior into cohesive political identities. Lakoff (2004), for example, has notably argued that the NATION-AS-FAMILY conceptual metaphor underlies ideological identity in American politics—with conservatives adopting a morality system that is metaphorically like a Strict Father model of the family (e.g., emphasis on self-discipline and punishment for bad behavior) and liberals adopting a morality system that is more like a Nurturant Parent model of the family (e.g., emphasis on compassion and respect). Metaphors can also dynamically shape our conversations about political matters (see, e.g., Cameron, 2010; Gibbs & Cameron, 2008). Through metaphor and narrative, “humans have agency to create new meanings and new understandings of ourselves” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 22). Both devices enable citizens to not only integrate political fragments into cohesive wholes, but metaphor and narrative also help citizens categorize new information more efficiently. Metaphor and narrative act as cognitive frames and “[f]rames function like political categories” (Nelson, 2011, p. 198.). “Categories are mental containers in a world that has only continua” (Stone, 2011, p. 381), and framing “refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). As frames, metaphor and narrative simplify the complex by focusing attention to particular attributes of an object, issue, or event, while masking others. Although the framing process facilitates cognitive efficiency, it leaves individuals susceptible to bias, misperception, and manipulation. More specifically, an adopted frame guides the subsequent search for and interpretation of new information, and “if the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off” (Lakoff, 2004, p. 17). To illustrate, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that the alternative metaphoric frames of crime-as-a- beast or crime-as-a-virus not only influenced the crime policy interventions respondents supported (e.g., enforcement vs. structural reforms, respectively), but the frames exerted an early effect by biasing the information search. Berinsky and Kinder (2006) similarly found that American perceptions of the Kosovo crisis were skewed according to whether study participants received the humanitarian or risk-to-America narrative, and the storied frames once again affected how information was sought and remembered. The heuristic nature of metaphoric and narrative frames means that facts can be omitted, distorted, or misremembered, and citizens can draw incorrect inferences. For example, viewing former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as “America’s lapdog” during the Iraq War underestimates the role his own convictions and motivations played in his decision making (see, e.g., Azubuike, 2005). Similarly, the narrative of US Senator and former presidential hopeful John McCain as a “maverick” may disproportionately attribute his political successes to his assertive, rebellious attitude when his capacity to forge political relationships was likely to be just as important. Revising frames or beliefs in light of conflicting information can be cognitively taxing. Because competing narratives and metaphors place different “spins” on the same information, these devices can contain the balance of power—with the “warring with words” resulting in the “winning with words,” as balance shifts to the side holding the dominant metaphor or narrative (see, e.g., Nelson, 2011). Ryan and Gamson (2006) similarly asserted that “[f]acts take on meaning by being embedded in frames, which render them relevant and significant or irrelevant and trivial. The contest is lost at the outset if we allow our adversaries to define what facts are relevant” (p. 14). Consequently, metaphor and narrative help explain collective divisions, including those based on ideology, partisanship, ethnicity, and nationality. In the case of national or ethnic conflicts, for example, opposing groups often adopt narratives that cast their own group as the victim or protagonist and the other group as perpetrator or antagonist, omitting the negative attributes of their own group, thereby limiting its accountability. In this sense, narrative can act to perpetuate a group-serving bias. With their role in structuring how citizens see the political world, metaphor and narrative can also be used to promote social change or justify the status quo and governmental decisions. Narratives become vehicles for action because they organize “plans, schemes, projects, and goals....providing a means for future actions” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 69). Narratives give coherence to the personal lives of social activists, but also help other citizens make sense of why things are the way they are, as in the case of Palestinian and Israeli youths (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Metaphoric frames have been used to make some government initiatives more palatable to the public, such as George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” (e.g., Steuter & Will, 2008). One factor that makes metaphor and narrative powerful devices for promoting social change or securing public support is their emotional content (see, e.g., Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001). For example, in the recent US presidential election, Mitt Romney’s campaign ran an emotionally-arousing commercial titled “Dear Daughter” where a mother narrated a dismal picture of the country and its prospects by piecing together fragments of statistics when welcoming her newborn child “to America.” Both metaphor and narrative demonstrate the difficulty of separating affect from cognition, further challenging the ideal notion of a “disembodied Cartesian citizen” (see Fischman & Haas, 2012). 4 ￼Because of the perceptual biases they can instill and the values, beliefs, and ￼motivations they embody, metaphor and narrative provide crucial predispositions in civic ￼cognition. As motivated reasoners (Taber & Lodge, 2006), citizens process new information ￼and events with adopted storylines or metaphoric source analogs; citizens do not “treat new ￼information evenhandedly” (Taber, 2011, p. 380). Metaphor and narrative structure previous ￼knowledge and experience into influential resources for political understanding, enabling ￼citizens to see how various pieces fit together, formulate worldviews, derive explanations, ￼attribute causation, and make predictions—whether accurate or not. Despite their powerful ￼influence in structuring political understanding, empirical research on the roles of metaphor ￼and narrative in civic cognition is not exhaustive. For example, empirical work on metaphor in ￼politics has predominately examined the influence of “given” metaphors as found in elite ￼discourse or priming experiments, emphasizing metaphor’s capacity in persuasion rather than ￼reasoning (Bougher, 2012). Similarly, more empirical work is needed on narrative’s role in ￼shaping individual subjectivity, including the effects of elite narratives and moving away from ￼the predominant focus on the formation of national identity (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Part ￼of the challenge in elaborating the roles of cognitive constructs like metaphor and narrative in ￼civic cognition is that their influence can operate automatically and largely outside of ￼conscious awareness (i.e., they are implicit; see, e.g., Bougher, 2012). While unconscious ￼processing can tackle more complex decisions with greater efficiency and fewer cognitive ￼limitations (Taber, 2011), devising empirical methods that capture the extent of implicit ￼procedures in civic understanding and cognition is far more difficult. ￼￼

#### Contention 2 is the operation

#### I defend the affirmation of the resolution.

#### The metaphor of organ procurement and transfer rupture the body-state – incorporating parts of each others’ bodies affirm a form of global citizenship

Fishel 9 [(Stefanie, Postdoctoral Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at Colgate University, AAUW American Fellow 2010-2011) “Profanation and Body Parts: An Experiment Agamben and IR” Submitted to the International Studies Association Conference Feb 2009] AT

This exploration is also based on the belief that the human body can be studied as a microcosm and the insights garnered at the corporeal level can be used to illuminate the assumptions that we make about parts and wholes, the one to the many, the self to the global. “The human body and its transplantable parts reveal much about the values we assign to the private self, sociality and intimacy, humanity, and human nature” (Sharp 2007, 17). The body also creates it own borders, and the body’s inviolability or disaggregation is an important debate that mirror debates about national borders. Who do we want to keep out and who deserves to be secured within? “With the specter of ethnic cleansing hovering over the world and with the paranoid policing of borders in the U.S. and elsewhere, the commerce in human bodies has a menacing pragmatism--getting rid of certain (radically unstable) categories of people, so-called undesirables… , and, in so doing, creating the means to save those worth saving …” (Stanford 1997, 31). Our ideas of what make us human, whole, and pure have always been at the forefront of the creation of political order. The history of colonization demonstrates the reality of placing some outside of what the center considers “human.” Even with a growing international controversy over organ procurement from Chinese prisoners 5 and the international trafficking of organs from India 6 and South America 7 , the discourses (and politics) of organ trade and procurement remain heavily medicalized, technical, and based on “expert opinion.” This bares a deep faith in technology as the redemptive force in the modern world (Stanford 1997, 34), and demonstrates that many believe that technology can answer all of contemporary society’s problems. This focus elides the majority of ethical and political issues raised by organ transfer and procurement. In many ways, technology and medical advances are beginning to make literal what was once a metaphor. The body can now literally be taken apart and shared with organ transplantation. What does it mean when the human body can be disaggregated into fragments that are derived from a particular person but are no longer constitutive of human identity? Pig’s islets and heart valves are used to replace failing human parts. Even at a less "theoretical" level, organ transfer and xenotransplantation forces us to deeply reevaluate what it means to be human and entangled in diverse relationships that defy borders, and even species distinction. In organ transfer, both the donor and recipient have to come to terms with, for lack of a better phrase, being un-whole. In xenografting, fears of contamination from a "lesser" being predominate. Discourses of purity and altruism thoroughly penetrate both of these discourses. If a new conception of what it means to be human follows from medical innovation what would be the legal, political and ethical status of this new being? Following Donna Haraway, can this new being deny a desire for wholeness or unity as an end, but accept the fractured identities and parts that create her and search for unity and connection with other beings, both like and unlike? Responsibilities are likely to be radically different given the changing life forms and novel social relationships based on the sharing of organs, tissues, and genes, to name but a few. At its most radical, these interminglings/incorporations of strangers/animals into our very bodies may lead us to create and embrace forms of global community not based on citizenship in a particular state or because of a certain ethnicity. This will be kinship by blood, but not in a way we have experienced thus far in the course of human history. I chose organ transfer and procurement to serve two purposes in this paper: the first, as I illustrated above, is to use the body to illuminate what assumptions under gird our ideas of the global and the human and question these hidden assumptions and to demonstrate that emergent material realities question IR’s theoretical relevance to the world. This paper also takes a sideways stab at two assumptions that persist in IR: well functioning states take care of the bodies inside their borders (and hence IR theory does not have to) and, secondly, our deep liberal commitments to individuality by demonstrating that our bodies are not the stable, sacred wholes we once thought they were. 8 [This paper has its own underlying assumption that the sovereign order, both national and somatic, are losing their power over reality and metaphor. This is evidenced in academia by the plethora of globalization literature debating the strengths and weaknesses of the State as new actors, technologies, and threats challenge its global authority. States continue to “fail,” and, increasingly military intervention is needed. Global networks, both malevolent and benign, bare the inadequacy of the state form as able to combat or support alternate forms of organization. While the breakdown of the sovereign nation state is indeed a persistent topic in IR, little is theorized about the concomitant questioning of the human body’s role as metaphor. One can begin to muse over advances in science, medicine, and technology related to the body and how this may shed light on the changes occurring in IR as a discourse and global politics as a whole] What relations of force and power animate and direct global somatic flows? To borrow from Michel Foucault, “the problem is not so much that of defining a political ‘position’ (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and bring into being new schemas of politicisation. If ‘politicisation’ means falling back on ready made choices and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the 8 relations of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile” (Foucault, 190). The second, and the focus of the remainder of the paper is that organ transplantation science tends to elicit strong feelings—both disgust and hope. Issues that incite moral panic and horror are often the sites that offer the richest data. They leave us feeling off-kilter and adrift; this space of moral and ethical confusion opens up alternative ways of thinking, “an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build” (Haraway 1992, 295). This opens the door to Agamben and his “praise of profanation.” The very act of organ transplantation and the creation of brain death criteria to facilitate the harvesting of organs from cadavars and non-beating heart donation (NBHD) are often debated in terms of the sacred and the profane. Along with the theoretical commitments outlined above, this paper also works to make these issues a political project aimed at critiquing both the biopolitical state and the international state system in such a way that does not reify the system itself. At base, this is a thought experiment that questions the current biopolitical order and its responses to organ transfer—a way to “wrest from the apparatus the potentiality it has captured.” Rather than point out the tendencies of the biopolitical state and global capitalism, ad nauseam, we can “play,” “profane,” and protect moments of pure means in an endeavor not to aid the state in its production of sovereign power or join in the capitalist spectacle of late modernity. It is an important task to derail these tendencies, not support them through constant critique and attention 9 . The remainder of this experiment will briefly touch on the details of organ transfer, and, through Agamben and the profane point out its unique ability to illuminate global politics.

#### My affirmation is crucial – revealing the ways metaphors shape our understanding is critical to equip citizens with the tools to think for themselves and avoid exploitation – key to democratic citizenship and social inclusion

Bougher 14 [(Lori, Postdoctoral Research Associate at Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) “COGNITIVE COHERENCE IN POLITICS: UNIFYING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CIVIC COGNITION” in Warring with Words: Narrative and Metaphor in Politics, April 29] AT

Metaphor, Narrative, and Political Learning: Suggestions for Civic Education The pervasive roles of metaphor and narrative in shaping our understanding of the social world make them crucial components for civic education. Although the extent of public malleability and its underlying processes are still under debate, public ignorance does leave citizens susceptible to political manipulation and exploitation (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011). Consequently, to safeguard democratic functioning, it is ideal to have a populace that is discriminating, yet not obdurately biased when processing new information (Chong & Druckman, 2011). Metaphor and narrative can help foster the development of critical citizenship through education in three main ways. Not only are they instrumental educational resources in their own right, but metaphor and narrative offer the opportunity to facilitate critical reflection and civic tolerance. Metaphor and narrative as educational tools Metaphor and narrative have long been appreciated as educational instruments. While a full review of this work is outside the confines of this chapter, it is important to highlight that metaphors and narratives can ease the teaching of abstract or difficult concepts and materials. Because metaphor is a form of analogical reasoning, it is fundamental for abstract learning and causal understanding (Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Colhoun & Gentner, 2009, respectively), making it particularly instructive when teaching science and mathematics (see, e.g., Duit, 1991; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007). In general, academic texts contain more metaphors than are found in the news, works of fiction, or conversations (Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, & Krennmayr, 2010). Narrative can equally help students integrate chronological events and causal relations in science texts (van den Broek, 2010). Even more, narratives in history textbooks help shape national identities, imbuing historical facts (or fiction) with cultural values, beliefs, practices, and ideals in compacted form (e.g., Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Metaphors enable teachers to explain complex topics and issues in terms that are more familiar to students; teachers can use narratives to organize a myriad of facts or events into more memorable storylines. In this sense, metaphor and narrative are both instructional tools available to educators, including those teaching history and civic education courses. Making the implicit visible in individual cognition and intergroup reconciliation Metaphor and narrative are no doubt useful instructional devices for teachers, but rather than acting simply as supplementary vehicles to convey some other kind of subject material, can metaphor and narrative themselves also be the explicit subject of learning? 7 Because metaphor and narrative are so integral to human cognition, students already frame difficult materials through these lenses without much prompting. For example, students generate their own spontaneous metaphors to make sense of challenging concepts in mathematics and science (e.g., Jakobson &Wickman, 2007; Oehrtman, 2009; Schinck, Neale, Pugalee, & Cifarelli, 2008). The question is whether teaching students more explicitly about how they understand politics and process political decisions can make them think more critically as citizens. Rather than focusing on the repetition of political facts, can drawing their attention to their own biases, misconceptions, erroneous inferences, and susceptibilities to outside influences, such as media persuasion, foster more adaptive and critical civic awareness? This would involve bringing largely implicit processes and dispositions into conscious awareness, “making thinking visible” (see Ritchhart, Church, & Morrison, 2011). Bringing spontaneous metaphors and narratives into conscious awareness may encourage citizens to think more critically about political issues. This is what happened in an innovative study examining discourse in political blogs (Baumer, Sinclair, &Tomlinson, 2010). A web application called metaViz identified conceptual metaphors contained in political blogs and then visually displayed those metaphors to blog readers for comment. The researchers then analyzed the content of the comments left by blog readers and found that bringing metaphors into conscious awareness not only prompted readers to critically reflect on the aptness of the metaphor, but it also facilitated creative thinking about the issue at hand. Explicit discussions of metaphors and narratives that underlie political cognition may not only help students understand how they themselves make political decisions, but can potentially facilitate the understanding of others’ viewpoints and promote more effective communication. Although their work does not deal with civic education or students, Cameron and Maslen (2010) have poignantly argued that political communication can be improved by identifying the metaphors that underlie how different groups understand political issues. In particular, Cameron and Maslen focused on the issue of terrorism and compared the metaphors used by the political elite versus the general public. They found that members of the general public were more likely than experts to understand governmental responses to terrorism in terms of body, animal, or physical action metaphors; in addition, while both groups used a balance metaphor, they used it differently, with the public using it to emphasize disruption after a terrorist act and experts using it to convey agency to restore equilibrium. The authors have suggested that experts can mitigate the public’s negative feelings, such as helplessness, and promote positive feelings in the advent of a terrorist act if they tailor their communication in light of these different applications of metaphor. The exchange of personal narratives too can help facilitate wider understanding. Not only did volunteering in a soup kitchen expose youths to personal narratives of homelessness that helped correct inaccurate stereotypes and flawed attributional reasoning, but discussing 8 these experiences of volunteering in the classroom helped students construct their own political identities (Yates & Youniss, 1996). As mentioned, contrasting metaphors and narratives can often underlie deep divisions in political understanding and perception. When individuals exchange personal narratives about political events and issues, this can help mitigate rigid “us” versus “them” dichotomies (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, p. 91). Oftentimes, “[s]uccessful reframing involves the ability to enter into the worldview of our adversaries” (Ryan & Gamson, 2006, p. 14). Mio (1996) found that political actors were more persuasive when they adopted and extended the metaphoric frames used by their opponent to structure their own counter-arguments rather than when they introduced a different metaphor into the debate. Political arguments are therefore strengthened when the metaphoric frameworks introduced by political opponents are taken into account (see also, e.g., Lakoff & Wehling, 2012). Narrative and metaphor thus offer the potential to both help identify and challenge preexisting ideologies (see, e.g., Alsup, 2003 for an application of this method to teachers themselves). While many studies document how citizens rely on cognitive heuristics in politics, more empirical work is needed on what happens when individuals are made aware of the biases and processes that underlie their political beliefs, attitudes, and decisions. Fischman and Haas (2012) have contended that “we cannot make much progress by ignoring the unconscious and automatic levels of thinking, which are not easily dissuaded with rational and factual arguments alone” (p. 187). The most educated and engaged citizens are often the most susceptible to bias (e.g., Taber, 2011), and research has shown that political misperceptions can be difficult to correct (Nyhan & Reilfer, 2010; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). These latter studies, however, focus on whether or not individuals update their political preferences in light of further information. Because we know that citizens seek and incorporate political facts in a biased manner, would it not be more efficient to bring the cognitive biases to their attention rather than simply presenting them with further information? Although this question still requires empirical study, some findings merit optimism for formal instruction that emphasizes the how over the what in social, and thereby political, reasoning. For example, formal education—particularly that which includes inferential rules students have already partially induced from their everyday lives—has been found to improve reasoning skills under certain conditions (Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988). But even the authors of this research added that “we know very little about reasoning and how to teach it” (Ibid., p. 441). Speculating on how to reduce the effects of implicit stereotypes, Banaji and Greenwald (1994) asserted that “drawing social category information into conscious awareness allows mental (cognitive and motivational) resources to overrule the consciously unwanted but unconsciously operative response” (p. 70). Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) have similarly questioned whether making individuals aware of extraneous feelings of disgust (i.e., those that are unrelated to the judgment at hand) can limit its heuristic effects on moral reasoning, such as in the case of jurors who may judge a defendant with a facial deformity more harshly because of those displaced feelings of disgust. This idea of testing the effects of bringing biases and heuristics into conscious awareness is likely to attract only further attention in the future because it affects decision making in so many social domains, whether it involve law, economics, politics, and so on. But the question for civic reasoning and cognition remains: Can bringing metaphor and narrative in particular into conscious awareness enhance civic competence, deliberation, communication, and tolerance? Designing new benchmarks and assessments for civic education If research confirmed that citizens can, in fact, improve their political decisions or become more tolerant when they become aware of the processes and biases that underlie their political beliefs and cognition, this would suggest the desirability of reforms in terms of how students are educated for their roles as citizens. Not least, this would further challenge any paradigms that prize the rote memorization of political facts alone. It may be more effective to teach students how to approach political information, rather than presenting information on its own—focusing on the how rather than what of political thinking. This focus may be especially important for encouraging critical reflection and social tolerance in an information age where opinions increasingly infiltrate the media in lieu of “hard facts” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011; see also Graber & Holyk, 2011; Jamieson & Hardy, 2011), and during a time when “the burden of democracy has shifted from skepticism about the competence of citizens to doubts and concerns about the wisdom and responsibility of their political leaders” (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011, p. 726). Educational approaches that more fully incorporate metaphor and narrative as civic tools complement definitions of civic competence that extend beyond full information alone. For example, Haste (2009) has identified managing uncertainty and ambiguity, managing technological change, agency and responsibility, finding and sustaining community, and managing emotion as five key civic competences. She has defined competence as the “capacity for adaptive responses and for appropriate interpretation of information” (p. 207), contending that it “is about effective and adaptive tool use” (p. 214). A more explicit recognition and discussion of cognitive frames such as metaphor and narrative may also facilitate open classroom climates, interactive discussions, and exposure to and “grappling with” diverse view—all of which have been identified as important school-based antecedents that foster Western democratic values such as critical reflection, tolerance of dissenting views, and social trust (Ferreira, Azevedo, & Menezes, 2012; Flanagan, Stoppa, Syvertsen, & Stout, 2010; Hess, 2009; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2006; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). Rather than setting the less realistic goal of eradicating the use of heuristics in political 10 understanding, it may be more effective to teach students how to better use those cognitive devices. Compelling individuals to want to revise their perceptions can be challenging. “The decision to appraise or reconsider the evidence takes time, is effortful, assumes one is somehow aware of having a biased set of considerations in mind, and believes the need to be accurate is worth the effort that will be required to rethink the issue” (Taber, 2011, p. 376). Schools can therefore be the ideal setting for intervention to help train students early on to think more critically about politics. In addition to challenging top-down, knowledge-based pedagogical paradigms (Haste, 2009), there is a need for “a revitalized sense of democracy within early childhood” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 6). By helping students understand their own perceptions of the political world, as well as those of others, and allowing students to generate creative responses, metaphor and narrative foster both interpretation and imagination—two elements that would contribute towards an ethical paradigm for civic education (see Farquhar, 2010; Ricoeur, 1992). Politics, as noted, represents a dynamic, uncertain, complex, and abstract world. As such, equipping students with a transferable, “adaptive toolbox” (see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002) may best facilitate the type of critical civic awareness, reflection and deliberation that will foster popular sovereignty and reason-based public talk, reinforcing democratic governance (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011; Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini, 2009). As it stands, at least in the United States, citizens tend to perform better on questions pertaining to stable elements or anchors in the political domain, such as institutions and political processes, and fare worse on questions regarding dynamic elements, such as candidates and issues (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996)—which is, paradoxically, where their vote has the most immediate impact. A shift of focus to adaptive training and toolsets would entail civic education programs adopting new forms of assessment that extend beyond the reproduction of political information.

#### The resolution is inevitably tied to tension between the body politic and human body – the AC is crucial to interrogate how organ policies reflect a conceptualization that sanctifies the body politic by treating our bodies as a matter of the health of the state.

Jones 11 [gender-modified] [(Rhys Jones, cultural and historical geographer; Mark Whitehead’s, focuses on the links between geography, philosophy and environmental politics; Jessica Pykett, researches educational state-citizen relations; Marc Welsh, research associate; all are researchers in Human Geography at the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University) “A body politic – the right to make live and let die” Governingtemptation blog oct 13] AT

Most political geographers would get the allusion of the title. The first part is to the 17th century world of sovereignty, rights and social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes peace would be secured when “a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power” choose to covenant their individual power to the ‘body politic’ by relinquishing some of their rights to a sovereign (the right to make war or take life for example) [see Hobbes 1640, Chp XIX, para 8]. The second part references Michel Foucault’s biopower where the claim to legitimacy by ‘the state’ is based on the guarding and fostering of productive life (see Foucault “Society Must Be Defended, Lectures 1975-76”, page 241) and the commensurate extension of state control over the biological. Foucault argued that in modernity [hu]man’s existence as biological (in contrast to legal or political) beings becomes the target of state strategies (biopower). He distinguished two forms of biopower: anatomo-politics and biopolitics – the former targeting the individual subject, the human body, the latter targeting man as a collectivity, the population as a body politic. Donor Card Concern with life and death of the individual and population comes to the fore in the questions around organ donation, revealing tensions between the body-politic and the politics of the body. Defaults, organs and the state Sadly it is statistically likely that three people in the UK died today awaiting a suitable donor. As Rhys, Jessica and Mark noted in their article “Geographies of Soft Paternalism”, published earlier this year, “organ donation has become an intensive site for soft paternalist policy experimentation […] One classic tool of soft paternalism [that] has been controversially proposed as an ultimate solution to organ donation shortfalls: the re-setting of the organ donation default.” [draft for Geog Compass viewed here] In the UK this default is based on the notion that the body is gifted, that is it is voluntarily made available for use after death through an act of conscious choice. So we have an opt-in system where people choose to enter their names on an Organ Donor Register. Doing so is simple, via phone, online or at various sites that we all visit such as the doctors surgery. Yet despite the ease and our consistent collective affirmation that organ donation is a good thing and we would like to be an organ donor in reality only about a quarter of us have done it. This coupled with increasing surgical advances, problems of organ compatibility, and the increase in demand (as life style related conditions like diabetes, liver and heart disease continue to rise) has seen year on year repeated headlines about soaring waiting list times. Switching to a system based on ‘presumed consent’, (where the citizen is entered onto the register and has to opt-out of it) has been debated in the UK for years. It is common in much of Europe and seems to result in higher donor rates but local and cultural factors may be equally significant. In nudge terminology this is changing the default option, a powerful tool for changing behaviour because the default position is what happens when you have a choice but choose to do nothing. The rationale for the presumed consent default is that numerous surveys show wide public support and a willingness to be entered on the register of organ donors but that that support is not reflected in the number who actually make the effort to place themselves on it. Why this is the case is varied, with the failure to follow through on stated preferences ranging from irrationality and insecurity – that doctors will not work as hard to save a patient, or an aversion to thinking about ones own death – to simple inertia – people are not motivated enough to enact their preferences by seeking out a means of entering their name on the donor register But messing with the body, or more precisely the corpse, is a provocative act that turns the body into a site of contestation between state and citizen. In particular some argue that subtle changes in the default position like this reflects the over-reaching of the state and people’s loss of control over their own bodies following death. Indeed in the absence of actual consent the autonomy of the individual, the patient, is undermined. As such changing the default for organ donation raises fundamental questions about legitimate state action and personal freedom. One of these was pointedly raised by the Archbishop of Wales in his Presidential Address to the Governing Body of the Church in Wales last month when he argued: Archbishop Barry Morgan “There is, in presumed consent, a subtle or perhaps not so subtle change of emphasis in the relationship between the individual and the State. That is, that unless we have opted out, our organs belong to the State and the State has the right to do with them as it wills.”

#### Contention 3 is the suture

#### “Terms of discussion” freeze alternative thought and prop up the structures of exclusion our aff criticizes

Bleiker, 98 – asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for the elusive Truth. But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often there is no common discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first. But the celebration of difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference, excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes [hu]man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering." And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places. Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

#### Epistemically outweighs – prior to any ethical decision we must first include every affected party since otherwise we don’t have access to their viewpoints – anything else is an authoritarian form of knowledge

#### Predictable debates encourage technocratic education where we are trained into obedient servants of the elite, replicating the same scripts and counter-scripts and calling it “thinking” – think about the same util vs autonomy debates we’ve been repeating

Delgado 92 [Richard Delgado, (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)]

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <Continues…> Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26 How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies. What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35 The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37 <continues> I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once-progressive people into harmless technocrats. n70

#### Debate should have some social significance, and the rules of debate should reflect that – 1. Fairness has no terminal impact beyond debate – an unfair debate doesn’t have a significant external impact, whereas a good debate can educate us.

#### 2. even if it’s a procedural requirement, maximizing fairness justifies voting for whoever has better norms rather than who won the debate, which defeats the purpose of fairness

#### 3. The rules of the game depend on what the purpose of the activity is – a competition should be fair, but a fair evaluation of *what?* The terminal impact of debate determines the fair rules, even if fairness limits education generally.

#### Thus, the judge’s role is to endorse the debater who best exposes the inner workings of power – this is the first responsibility of academics

Steele, 10 – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas

(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “Putyourself in our place **and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” are **miss**ing **the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “tact,” “**rules**,” and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).

### 1AC Substantive Version

#### Contention 1 is the Incision

#### Political discourse is a metaphor – metaphorical ways of understanding society relate the world to us and naturalize the smooth functioning of the machine of power

Ringmar 12 [(erik, associate professor of political science at Lund University,) “The Power of Metaphor: Consent, Dissent and Revolution”] AT

Political discourse is necessarily profoundly metaphorical; the language of politics is knee-deep in and entirely shot-through by different metaphorical uses. This should not surprise us. Politics, after all, is the art of using power in order to achieve social goals. While some power can be exercised through the army and the police, far more can be accomplished ― and more easily and cheaply ― through the power of language. Metaphors give you power since they help to organise social life in a certain fashion. Metaphors tell you what things are and how they hang together; metaphors define the relationship between superiors and subordinates and between social classes; they identify social problems and their solutions and tell us what is feasible, laudable and true. <continued – text omitted> Compare the way in which metaphor exercise power. No one can say what ‘society’ or ‘the state’ really are. In fact, societies and states are not 'really' anything at all. Yet they come to be something rather than nothing as they are compared to other things which they are not. Once a particular definition is firmly established, it will influence our thoughts and our actions; it will guide and shape our presuppositions and our theories; it will make some things possible and others impossible. Say, for example, that the members of a political elite manage to convince a sufficiently large number of people to embrace a metaphor which identifies society as sharply hierarchical and social positions as rigidly fixed. Once this metaphor is perfectly accepted, it will simply describe ‘the way things are’ and as a result it cannot be questioned or altered. The more entrenched the metaphor, the more invisible the exercise of power and the more secure the position of the elites.

#### “society” is one such metaphor – we use the “body as state” to refer to assemblages of people, constructing states as artificial bodies that are fixed, concretely bordered, and insulated from the outside world.

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

The ‘body’ as defined by the OED is “The material frame of man (and animals).” There can be spiritual meaning to this (as contrasted to the soul), a legal meaning (a material being taken as a whole), as a property (a thing that we carry around), or symbolically (taken as sacrament--find latin phrase). It can also connote an artificial person created for legal purposes as in a corporate-body or designating the sovereign as king or head of state. This artificial body can also have a wider a meaning and refer to assemblages of people who have been collected together for a common , or the OED phrases it, the ‘body politic’ also has the “wider sense of ‘organized society.’” Thomas Hobbes likens the commonwealth--the Leviathan--to an artificial man. Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed the lifeblood of the body politic was its sovereign authority. For John Locke, the creation of the body politic marks the passage from the state of nature consisting of many bodies with no common law or authority to one body--the body politic--to a society. While it is not within the scope of this paper to reenact the debates in philosophy and political theory over the body and its relation to mind and world, this paper questions approaches to bodies where they appear as passive objects of abstract moral reasoning that stems from a disembodied subject. This ‘disembodied subject’ is a ￼legacy of Cartesian dualism in the social sciences and accounts, in part, for the body's so-called absence from the social science agenda. It is noted now that the body was never really absent, just “silent and unacknowledged” (Blackman, 2008, 15). This “rediscovery” of the body as a legitimate object of study was supported by philosophers in the 20th century like Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Contemporary writers stress that the body has become a topic for study because of the modern processes of industrialization, consumer culture and its politics, changes in medical practice and technology, demographic shifts to an aging population, global pandemics likes AIDS and SARS, and advances in cybernetics and virtual reality, to list but a few (Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1996). Broadly, the body can theorized as something we have (object), as something we are (subject), and as something we become (process and performativity). For this paper, the body will not be theorized as a system of signs, a social construction, or a symbol. Although this paper is organized around metaphor, the body is a material, lived body, not a textual one. Metaphor plays the role of interlocutor in the discourse of International Relations and a way to organize my arguments about the creation of politics centered on the body. I am also aware that the ‘biological’ body is also constructed through the discourse of the biological sciences and public opinion. It is hoped that the example of metagenomics helps to ameliorate the tension between theoretical ‘body as discourse’ and the deterministic ‘body as biological.’ As Bryan Turner writes in The Body and Society: “We do not have to develop a sociological appreciation of the physicality of the body since the ‘natural body’ is always and already injected with cultural understanding and social history” (Turner, 1996, 34). ￼In Western tradition, this collection of bodies into a larger body often moves between the idea that the members of a body politic are a voluntary community or that it is created naturally and emerges when each is performing its proper function for the whole just as in a natural organism. Classical to modern thought, from Plato and the polis as “the body writ large” (O'Neill, 2004) to John of Salisbury and his “organic analogy” to Foucault’s theories of biopower and governmentality, the body politic has been a recurring theme for centuries of political and social thought. This work is not trying to bring back a classical or medieval tradition to modern politics, but rather argues that if it is true that the “body politic is the fundament structure of our political life,” (O'Neill, 2004, 35) or at the very least, that is a lasting and powerful way to imagine the organization of political community then it is trying to question the liberal individualist tradition in light of emerging knowledge about the body. Or, put differently it seeks to interrogate the modern political tendency to draw sharp boundaries and limits to distinguish both selves and states (Walker, 2010, 36). IV. Metaphors Metaphors are much more tenacious than facts. -Paul de Man This paper argues, following the cognitive theory of metaphor, that metaphors have meaning beyond being just descriptive or merely poetic flourishes. For this exploration, metaphor is not defined as a characteristic of extraordinary language or of poems and rhetoric, but a central part of our conceptual system. This approach to metaphor is defined in George Lackoff’s and Mark Johnson’s book Metaphors We Live ￼By (1980). This influential treatise of metaphor is expanded in later books (Lackoff, 1989; Lackoff, 1999). To briefly sum up their argument, Lackoff and Johnson write “[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lackoff and Johnson, 1980, 3). Our conceptual system guides how we see and make sense of the world on a daily basis. This means that much of what we do everyday engages in metaphor and metaphorical thinking. Metaphors are not random occurrences--they are systematic and include more than language. Importantly, metaphors are grounded in our experience of the world and our cultural ways of representing ideas in the world and “understanding emerges from interaction, from constant negotiation with the environment and other people” (Lackoff, 1980, 230). This works through “mapping” concepts from a source domain to a target domain. Target domains are conceptual and abstract worlds of ideas, mental or emotional states, social understandings, and often the “unseen and unknown domains of the physical world as, for example, the world of molecular action” (Quinn, 1991, 57). The use of metaphor in science is common, especially for explaining complicated scientific findings to the public. Source domains come from the physical world and are often things that are easily conceptualized or experience bodily. Simply put, we take our experiences and understandings of the physical world and use them to explain abstract or non-physical phenomenon as something we can relate to from our material experience. As Lackoff and Johnson succinctly put it: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lackoff, 1980, ￼5). It is in this mapping from the source domain that we can see the strength of metaphor comes from its grounding in what we have experienced. The choice of a particular source domain to match a particular target domain has an experiential basis. For example, affection is typically related to bodily warmth, and understanding often correlates with digesting. Both “affection” and “understanding”--the abstract concepts--are understood in terms of our bodily experience “warmth” and “digestion” respectively. The Lakoffian cognitive linguists thus emphasize the “embodied” nature of metaphor (Shogimen, 2008,81). Our understanding and creation of metaphors also relies on cultural understandings. Not only do we understand these metaphors from having a body of a certain sort (experiencing up-down, in-out, warm-cold, etc), but this body also understands the world through cultural presuppositions, some of which have more effect than others. (Lackoff, 1980, 57-58). In fact, we tend not to see them as metaphors at all because we live by these metaphors and they become so embedded in language we do not even recognize their metaphorical origins. Lackoff and Johnson call these collections of “speech formulas,” or “fixed-form expressions.” or “phrasal lexical items” (1980, 51). They write that these act as single words, but are in fact they are structured by a single metaphorical concept. For example, drawing upon the LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME 6 metaphor, we often speak of life situations with phrases such as “the odds are against us” or “we’ll have to take our chances” without these being viewed as metaphors, but as everyday language. “Nevertheless, your way of talking about, conceiving, and even experiencing your situation would be metaphorically structured” (Lackoff, 1980, 51). 6 When quoting or explaining examples from the texts I will preserve Lackoff and Johnsonʼs capitalizing of metaphors. When discussing my own analysis I will set the metaphors apart by quotation marks. ￼ ￼Lackoff and Johnson write that some metaphors came to be because of the way our culture understands concepts centrally important to it. “They emerged naturally in a culture like ours because what they highlight corresponds so closely to what we experience collectively and what they hide corresponds to so little. But not only are they grounded in our physical and cultural experience; they also influence our experience and our actions” (1980, 68). They use the examples LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE or TIME AS MONEY. Both of these metaphors employ a simple ontological metaphor that tells us that both labor and time can viewed as a quantifiable substance, that is, they can “used up” or assigned monetary value (1980, 66). This mapping allows us to comprehend statements such as I have to budget my time. I spent too much time on that. I’ve invested a lot of time on this project. You don’t use your time profitably. This mistake resulted in a considerable loss of time (Lackoff, 1999) [italics in original] The authors stress that this understanding is by no means universal. They were born from our culture because they highlight aspects that are centrally important to our way of seeing the world--the way work is viewed, and our interest in purposeful ends and quantification (1980, 76). But note that these aspects important to our culture de- emphasize or hide other aspects of labor and time. Lackoff and Johnson give two examples to demonstrate this effect. The first is if we regard labor as a kind of activity it assumes that we can tell productive activity from other kinds of activity, like play. The second is that if we see labor in terms of time--along with a purposive idea of time itself--this can lead to the parallel idea of LEISURE TIME. “what is hidden by the RESOURCE metaphors for labor and time is the way our of LABOR and TIME affect our concept of LEISURE, turning it into something remarkably like LABOR” (1980, 67). ￼The primary metaphor highlighted in this paper are ontological metaphors, or experiences with physical objects, especially our own bodies. Lackoff and Johnson define ontological metaphors as “ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities or substances” (1980, 25). These ontological metaphors “allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms--terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lackoff, 1980, 34). They also rely on spatial orientation metaphors like up-down, front-back, center- periphery, and near-far. We can then see nonphysical ideas as objects and understand them in orientational terms. These come form the fact that we have the bodies that we have and that they function a certain way in our environment (1980, 14). For example, HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN “I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits...I’m feeling down. I’m depressed...My spirits sank” (1980, 15). It is plausible that this came from a certain physical basis: “Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive state” (1980, 15). These examples make clear that we must experience our bodies in order to use them to explain other more abstract concepts. Also, we can understood things in the world via a range of metaphors and, of course, they must be understood non metaphorically as well. “Part of a concept’s structure can be understood metaphorically, using structure imported from another domain, while part may be understood directly, that is, without metaphor” (Lackoff and Turner 1989, 58). These ontological sets of metaphors based on entities and substance not only helps us, as stated above, understand our world in terms of objects or substances, but it also “allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them discrete entities or ￼substances of a uniform kind” (Lackoff, 1980, 25.) We can then “refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them--and, by this means, reason about them” (1980, 25). This, for example, can include what the authors name as container and personification metaphors. “Each of us is a container,” they write, “with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation” (1980, 29) and we project this onto to other physical objects. For example, we move from one room into another, we hike into and out of the woods, and the clearing in the woods with a natural boundary we perceive as something different even if the line is fuzzy. In fact, they argue that “[t]here are few human instincts more basic than territoriality. And such defining of a territory, putting a boundary around it, is an act of quantification” (1980, 30). Personification metaphors are perhaps the most obvious as the physical object or nonhuman entity can be comprehended in human terms by using human motivations, characteristics or activities. After this short introduction to the idea of cognitive metaphors, I can now introduce “the human body as container” is the primary metaphor for understanding why the ‘body politic‘ has persisted. The “the human body as container” metaphor also relies upon knowledge of the body as nonmetaphorical--we perceive our body and other’s body’s, react to them, and know that our body allows us to interact with the world in certain ways, but further understanding of it often requires metaphors. But these metaphors rely on a nonmetaphorical (the body’s physical nature) understanding of the body as we experience it (Lackoff, 1980, 58). The authors write We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces” (L and J 1980, 30). This paper is not trying to dispute that we imagine ourselves as containers, it is simply trying to look at the possibility that perhaps we are ‘lively’ containers and more porous and interconnected than we realize. That this container metaphor, while helpful for understanding our world and our body’s relation to it, might be obfuscating an emerging idea of the “body as collectivity.” The next section will take this up seriously through metagenomics and how this new science may affect our concepts of the body and what it means to be human.

#### The metaphor of the state as a unified and self-contained body politic necessarily casts those beyond the container as foreign matter, constructing “them” as enemies or racial impurities. The impact is endless cycles of warfare, genocide, and racial hierarchy.

Martin 90 [gender modified] [(Emily, professor of socio-cultural anthropology at New York University) “Toward an Anthropology of Immunology: The Body as Nation State” MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY QUARTERLY Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1990)] AT

In the new science of immunology, social differences—between men and women, managers and workers, or citizens and foreigners-are written metaphorically into the character of various immune system cells. As Haraway has put it, ''the immune system is an elaborate icon for principal systems of symbolic and material 'difference' in late capitalism" (1989:4). In this article I explore some central images that dominate recent popular and scientific discussions of the immune system, spelling out in detail the kind of "social world" the im- mune system is now imagined to be. I will also suggest what kinds of ideological work this way of picturing the world might be accomplishing and indicate in a preliminary way what kinds of uses people are making of this imagery. Finally I will look comparatively at other ways the immune system might be conceptual- ized. Cross-cultural and historical comparisons can help us realize the historical specificity of our own body images and suggest the possibility of different ones. Central Images in Popular and Scientific Literature on Immunology For the analysis of popular imagery I draw on my examination of major mass media articles on the immune system published in the last five years. 1 These in- clude material from mass-circulation magazines such as Time and Newsweek, as well as more specialized popular publications like National Geographic and Dis- cover. I also draw on all the book-length popular publications on the topic I have been able to locate through standard bibliographic search techniques. These total some 10 volumes. Although I do not quote from all sources, the images I discuss are pervasive throughout. The major metaphors used in popular accounts of immunology depict the body as a "regulatory-communications network" (Schindler 1988:1).2 As Hara ay's work has made plain, the body is seen as "an engineered communications system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network'' (1989:14). Whereas boundaries within the body are fluid and control is dispersed, the boundary between the body (self) and the external world (nonselt) is rigid and absolute: At the heart of the immune system is the ability to distinguish between self and nonself. Virtually every body cell carries distinctive molecules that identify it as self. [Schindler 1988:1] Added to the conception of a clear boundary between self and nonself is a conception of the nonself world as foreign and hostile. The immune system evolved because we live in a sea of microbes. Like man, these organisms are programmed to perpetuate themselves. The human body provides an ideal habitat for many of them and they try to break in; because the presence of these organisms is often harmful, the body's immune system will attempt to bar their entry or, failing that, to seek out and destroy them.... When immune defenders encounter cells or organisms carrying molecules that say "foreign," the immune troops move quickly to eliminate the intruders. [Schindler 1988: I] As a measure of the extent of this threat, the body is depicted in contemporary popular publications as the scene of total war between ruthless invaders and determined defenders. 3 If . . . we could become as tiny as cells or bacteria, and visit the sites of these superficially undramatic events, we would experience them as they really a r e - life and death struggles between attackers and defenders, waged with a ruthless- ness found only in total war. [Nilsson 1987:20] Inside the body, a trillion highly specialized cells, regulated by dozens of re- markable proteins and honed by hundreds of millions of years of evolution, launch an unending battle against the alien organisms. It is high-pitched biolog- ical warfare, orchestrated with such skill and precision that illness in the average human being is relatively rare. [Jaroff 1988:56] Besieged by a vast array of invisible enemies, the human body enlists a remarkably complex corps of internal bodyguards to battle the invaders. [Jaret 1986:702] A site of injury is "transformed into a battle field on which the body's armed forces, hurling themselves repeatedly at the encroaching microorganisms, crush and annihilate them" (Nilsson 1987:20). The array of forces at the body's com- mand is extensive. The organization of the human immune system is reminiscent of military defence, with regard to both weapon technology and strategy. Our internal army has at its disposal swift, highly mobile regiments, shock troops, snipers, and tanks. We have soldier cells which, on contact with the enemy, at once start producing homing missiles whose accuracy is overwhelming. Our defence system also boasts ammunition which pierces and bursts bacteria, reconnaissance squads, an intelligence service and a defence staff unit which determines the location and strength of troops to be deployed. [Nilsson 1987:24] Small white blood cells called granulocytes are ''kept permanently at the ready for a blitzkrieg against microorganisms" and constitute the "infantry" of the immune system (Nilsson 1987:24). "Multitudes fall in battle, and together with their vanquished foes, they form the pus which collects in wounds" (Nilsson 1987:24). Larger macrophages are another type of white blood cell that is the "armoured unit" of the defense system. "These roll forth through the tis- sues ... devouring everything that has no useful role to play there" (Nilsson 1987:25). Another part of the immune system, the complement system, can ''perforate hostile organisms so that their lives trickle to a halt" (Nilsson 1987:24). These function as" 'magnetic mines' [which] are sucked toward the bacterium and per- forate it, causing it to explode" (Nilsson 1987:72). When complement "comes together in the right sequence, it detonates like a bomb, blasting through the in- vader's cell membrane" (Jaret 1986:720). A type of white blood cell, aT-lymphocyte for which the technical scientific name is "killer cell," are the "immune system's special combat units in the war against cancer" (Nilsson 1987:96). Killer cells "strike," "attack," and "as- sault" (Nilsson 1987:96, 98, 100). "The killer T cells are relentless. Docking with infected cells, they shoot lethal proteins at the cell membrane. Holes form where the protein molecules hit, and the cell, dying, leaks out its insides" (Jaroff 1988:59). The great variety of different "weapons" is a product of evolutionary adaptation to changing defense needs: ''Just as modem arsenals are ever changing as the weaponry of a potential enemy becomes more sophisticated, so our immune system has adapted itself many times to counter survival moves made by the mi- crobial world to protect itself" (Dwyer 1988:28). Although the metaphor of warfare against an external enemy dominates these accounts, another metaphor plays nearly as large a role: the body as police state.4 Every body cell is equipped with "proof of identity"-a special arrangement of protein molecules on the exte- rior. . . . these constitute the cell's identity papers, protecting it against the body's own police force, the immune system.... The human body's police corps is programmed to distinguish between bona fide residents and illegal aliens-an ability fundamental to the body's powers of self-defence. [Nilsson 1987:21] What identifies a resident is likened to speaking a national language: ''An immune cell bumps into a bacterial cell and says, 'Hey, this guy isn't speaking our lan- guage, he's an intruder.' That's defense" (Levy, quoted in Jaret 1986:733). T cells are able to ''remember for decades'' the identity of foreign antigens: the intruders' descriptions are stored in the vast criminal records of the immune system. When a substance matching one of the stored descriptions makes a new appearance, the memory cells see to the swift manufacture of antibodies to com- bat it. The invasion is defeated before it can make us ill. We are immune. [Nils- son 1987:28] What happens to these illegal aliens when they are detected? They are ''executed" in a "death cell" (the digestive cavity inside a feeding cell) (Nilsson 1987:25, 31, 76, 81). "When the walls have closed around the enemy, the exe- cution-phagocytosis-takes place. The prisoner is showered with hydrogen per- oxide or other deadly toxins. Digestive enzymes are sent into the death chamber to dissolve the bacterium" (Nilsson 1987:81). A police state of course requires a highly trained administrative apparatus and field personnel. The body provides for these things in ''technical colleges,'' "training sites" located in lymph nodes, the thymus gland, and elsewhere (Jaret 1986:716; Nilsson 1987:26). "[Lymphocytes] are like blank pages: they know nothing, and must learn from scratch" (Nilsson 1987:26). These metaphors work easily for those cases where one can see ''missiles,'' "mines," "chemical warfare," or sniper ammunition. They run into trouble when the defensive forces seem inescapably to operate by consuming their vic- tims. We are accustomed to blowing up people on battlefields or poisoning them, but we are not accustomed to eating them. Notice in these examples how the met- aphors move back and forth between warfare and ingestion. "Once [the white blood cell] has reached its target (for example a bacterium), it uses phagocytosis, a process which, quite simply, involves the defender eating the attacker'' (Nilsson 1987:25). The antibodies attached to the enemy cells are not seen in this context as identity papers sought by the secret police, but as "appetizers" or an "aperi- tif" (Nilsson 1987:72, 78). Feeding cells squeeze through the blood vessel wall and move toward the enemy, with amoeba-like movements. The antibodies stimulate their appetites and, on contact with the bacteria, the feeding cells immediately start to swallow them. The battle is in full swing. [Nilsson 1987:29] In another example, "Powerful chemicals inside the macrophage will break down and destroy the components of the invading cells. The macrophage literally eats the enemy, digesting and metabolizing its materials" (Jaret 1986:718-719). Finally, when stimulated by T cells to attack viruses, macrophages are "whipped" into a "feeding fury." "They don't necessarily eat faster," notes Dr. Richard Johnston, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, "but they kill better" (quoted in Jaroff 1988:59). In the warfare metaphor, granulocytes are the infantry lost in large numbers; macrophages, the armored tanks. When ingestion enters the picture, we wind up with cannibalism: "During an infection, when millions upon millions of granu- locytes are lost in the struggle against the invaders, part of the macrophages' task is to ingest dead microphages-a phenomenon which might be described as a kind of small-scale cannibalism" (Nilsson 1987:25). What is the relationship between the kind of popular accounts I have quoted so far and the language of more technical scientific publications? Although this is a question that will be investigated more fully in research I have not yet com- pleted, at a general level it is clear that popular accounts often simply take the metaphors that occur in scientific writing a few paces further. 5 For this analysis I am drawing on one year's fieldwork in a university department of immunology, where I regularly attended classes, department seminars, and a journal club. I also attended all planning sessions of one research group within the department. In conjunction with the research of this group, I learned a standard experimental procedure (western blot) and helped carry out a series of experiments. I have con- sulted all texts currently required or recommended in graduate classes on immu- nology in this department and in graduate and undergraduate classes on immu- nology in another division of the university (i.e., Hood et al. 1984; Kimball 1986; Paul 1989; Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985; Sell 1987; and Stites, Stobo, and Wells 1987). One main image in virtually all scientific literature on the immune system is the distinction between self and nonself, a distinction that is maintained by a de- fense based on killing the nonself. The editorial from a recent issue of Science, ''Recognizing Self from Nonself,'' begins: ''Of all the mysteries of modem sci- ence, the mechanism of self versus nonself recognition in the immune system ranks at or near the top. The immune system is designed to recognize foreign invaders" (Koshland 1990:1273). A current clinical handbook begins, "The function of the immune system is to distinguish self from non-self and to eliminate the latter" (Kesarwala and Fischer 1988:1). And a textbook concludes its first chapter with a section headed "Self vs. Nonself": "Whatever the time frame, the development of immunocompetence represents a watershed in the life of the an- imal. At this time the organism learns to discriminate between 'self' and 'non- self' " (Kimball 1986:14). Images of a police state with associated training of personnel to protect its borders come in too: defense is carried out by "professional phagocytes" (Stites, Stobo, and Wells 1987:170). The cells and molecules of this defensive network maintain constant surveillance for infecting organisms. They recognize an almost limitless variety of foreign cells and substances, distinguishing them from those native to the body itself. When a pathogen enters the body, they detect it and mobilize to eliminate it. They ''remember'' each infection, so that a second exposure to the same orga- nism is dealt with more efficiently. Furthermore, they do all this on a quite small defense budget, demanding only a moderate share of the genome and of the body's resources. [Tonegawa 1985:72] Language like this is commonplace not only in texts6 but in explanations in sem- inars and classes. Once in a journal club discussion of an article on T cell func- tions, I counted dozens of uses of the words "kill" or "killing." The Body and the Nation These images of entities within our bodies relate in complex ways to social forms pervasive in our time. Consider, for example, Benedict Anderson and Er- nest Gellner's descriptions of the modem nation state. Both writers stress the im- portant role of communication in the identity of a nation state. [The] core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is [sic] important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such compre- hension, is included in a moral and economic community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded. [Gellner 1983: 127] Recall the emphasis placed on the immune system as a network of mutual communication and the glossing of an intruding foreign cell as "a guy who doesn't speak our language." Sometimes, as in this example, intruding foreign cells are explicitly compared to people of different national origin: 7 When you are the ever-vigilant protector of the sacrosanct environment of a body, anything foreign that should dare to invade that environment must be rapidly detected and removed. However, finding certain invaders and recognising them as foreign can be very difficult. . . . It can be as difficult for our immune system to detect foreignness as it would be for a Caucasian to pick out a particular Chinese interloper at a crowded ceremony in Peking's main square. [Dwyer 1988:29] Consider again the lack of mediating structures in the modem nation state between the individual and the state. [Nation states] are poorly endowed with rigid internal sub-groupings; their populations are anonymous, fluid and mobile, and they are unmediated; the individ- ual belongs to them directly, in virtue of his cultural style, and not in virtue of membership of nested sub-groups. Homogeneity, literacy, anonymity are the key traits. [Gellner 1983:138] In the popular picture of the immune system, we see individual cells launched into the body to protect its homogenous interior against attack. These cells are individuals that roam fluidly in blood and lymph within the body: ''The immune system consists of an interconnecting network of organs and tissues between which moves a heavy and ceaseless traffic of cells. This cellular traffic is borne along in the flow of blood and lymph" (Kimball 1986:131). There are structures which produce and "educate" these cells, primarily the thymus and bone marrow. As I pointed out, these "educational institutions" are crucial for maintaining the common language that ties the population of cells to- gether and enables it to distinguish self from nonself. 8 But these structures do not themselves continue to govern the immune response after they have produced and educated the cells. As Jaret describes it, "the human immune system is not con- trolled by any central organ, such as the brain. Rather it has developed to function as a kind of biologic democracy, wherein the individual members achieve their ends through an information network of awesome scope" (1986:709). Finally, it seems to be part of the defining character of the nation state that its domain is limited: ''the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elas- tic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with [hu]mankind" (Anderson 1983:16). In the maintenance of boundaries, of course, lie many of the conflicts between nation states; and in the protection of its boundaries against invasion from other, equally powerful organisms, lie the bellicose activities of the immune system. Although Anderson stresses the potentially egalitarian aspect of nations, in which internal hierarchies are flattened out in deference to defining national boundaries, Dumont stresses the way nationalist ideologies often carry within them a kind of suppressed hierarchy (Dumont 1986). For Dumont, nationalism involves the emergence of individualism and egalitarianism which ''are a partic- ular transformation on hierarchy . . . whereby hierarchy and its valuation of difference are suppressed. Racism is a property of suppressed hierarchy'' (Kapferer 1989:164). Therefore, "Dumont sees nationalism, because it ingrains individualist and egalitarian ideology, to be potentially integral to the generation of a western totalitarianism, fascism and racism" (Kapferer 1989:164). The world of the immune system also contains a kind of suppressed hierarchy within its boundary-oriented, internally mutually interacting system of components. Compare two cat egories of immune system cells: phagocytes (macrophages are one type), which surround and digest foreign organisms; and T cells which destroy foreign orga- nisms by shooting holes in them or transferring toxin to them. The phagocytes are a lower form of cell evolutionarily and are even found in such primitive organisms as worms (Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985:2.1); T cells are more advanced evo- lutionarily and have higher functions, such as memory (Jaroff 1988:60; Roitt, Brostoff, and Male 1985:2.5). It is only these advanced cells which "attend the technical colleges of the immune system" (Nilsson 1987:26). There is clearly a hierarchical division of labor here, one that is to some ex- tent overlaid with gender categories. Superficially, there are obvious female as- sociations with the engulfing and surrounding of phagocytes and obvious male associations with the penetrating or injecting ofT cells.9 In addition, many schol- ars have pointed out the frequent symbolic association of the female with lower functions, and especially with a lack of or a lesser degree of mental functions. In addition, phagocytes are the cells that are the "housekeepers" (Jaret 1986) of the body, cleaning up the dirt and debris including the "dead bodies" of both self and foreign cells. (One immunologist called them' 'little drudges.'' 10) The first defenders to arrive would be the phagocytes-the scavengers of the system. Phagocytes constantly scour the territories of our bodies, alert to any- thing that seems out of place. What they find, they engulf and consume. Phag- ocytes are not choosy. They will eat anything suspicious that they find in the bloodstream, tissues, or lymphatic system. [Jaret 1986:715]" Beyond this, when a phagocyte moves to surround a microorganism, the ex- tensions of itself are called ''pseudopodia'' or false feet. These ''feet'' surround the particle and lodge it within (Jaret 1986:717; Jaroff 1988:57-58; Leijh, Furth, and Zwet 1986:46.2). To round out the images that may come to mind at the thought of two feet opening wide to engulf something foreign, this process of forming a pouch is explicitly called "invagination" (Vander, Sherman, and Lu- ciano 1980:527). Still more fraught with psychosexual connotations is the fact that the "vaginal" pouch between the phage's feet is also a "death cell," which will execute and then eat its prey. 12 The feminized, primitive phagocytes kill by engulfing and eating "the en- emy.'' They often die in the process, but their deaths are seen as routine and unex- ceptional. One type of phagocyte, the macrophage, often dies because it engulfs something too big and pointed, which punctures it (more fertile material for psy- chosexual analysis). Nilsson comments on an illustration of an asbestos fiber puncturing a macrophage: "It is no use: the asbestos does not break down and the macrophage is defeated'' (1987: 129). The masculinized T cells however, kill by penetrating or injecting. They sometimes die, too, but their deaths take place on a battlefield where they shoot out projectiles and poisonous substances. Heroic imagery is brought directly to bear on them, as in one illustration, David (the T cell) takes on Goliath (the tumor cell). ''A killer cell-here in monstrous guise-grips a protoplasm thread of the large tumour cell and starts to penetrate the enemy. Goliath meets David: the giant seldom survives the encounter with the little killer cell" (Nilsson 1987:100). Immunology is a recent science recently institutionalized. Although such entities as macrophages, lymphocytes, antibodies, and antigens had been identi tied earlier, it was not until the mid-1960s that the concept of an immune system as such existed (Moulin 1989). Only then did macrophages, lymphocytes, and other cells come to be seen as a part of a mutually interacting, self-regulating, whole body system. It was generally not until the 1970s that departments of im- munology existed in American or other universities. Popular depictions of im- mune system functions only began after this time and grew frequent only in the 1980s. Therefore, given that the modem nation state has been in existence for over a hundred years, it is perhaps not even particularly surprising that such im- agery should be incorporated by a developing science. It might also seem that there would not be any ideological "work" for such imagery to do, since the forms they reflect are already so well entrenched as to be unquestionable. 13 As a speculation I suggest that one kind of ideological work such images might do is to make violent destruction seem ordinary and part of the necessity of daily life. Perhaps when the texts slip between warfare and ingestion they in effect domesticate violence. In another scientific language, used by nuclear defense intellectuals, Carol Cohn (1987) suggests that words and images taken from the home and farmyard serve to blunt the reality of massively destructive forces. For example, getting to see a nuclear missile is called "patting the bomb," and mis- siles themselves are kept in ''silos.'' In immunology the shifting of imagery from warfare to eating may similarly divert us from seeing that cellular events are constructed as total war. Destruction and death may appear to give way to friendly, sociable eating. Any diversion achieved could only be temporary: the overall picture conveyed by these texts is emphatically one of "the body at war." Some accounts even go so far as to warn us repeatedly against thinking any events inside the body are innocent: ''superficially undramatic events'' are really total war (Nilsson 1987:20); "tumour cells repos[ing] on a slide" are "no peaceful scene" (Nilsson 1987:102). What may seem innocent is really deadly: killer cells give cancer cells a ''poisonous kiss,'' a ''kiss of death,'' (Nilsson 1987: I05) that dis- patches them; the feeder cell encloses a bacterium in a "deadly embrace" (Jaret 1986:718; Nilsson 1987:25). Another kind of ideological work may be accomplished when a structure is posited in the body with hierarchical relations among its parts, a structure that relates to existing hierarchies in society. In the tiny world of these cells we see stereotypically ''male'' penetrating killer cells and stereotypically ''female'' de- vouring and cleaning cells, male heroes and females in "symbiotic service," to use Jean Elshtain's phrase (1987:198). "Male" activity is valued as heroic and life-giving, and "female" activity is devalued as ordinary and mortal. Jean Elshtain (1987), Judith Stiehm (1982), and Virginia Woolf (1929) have all argued in different ways that in Western culture warfare depends on females for whose sake male heroes can die. Maintenance of militarism depends on gender in the sense that there cannot be a "hero's" death without "little drudges" keep- ing things tidy at home. There is not a complete parallel in the cellular world, because the feminized macrophages are on the battlefield killing (by eating) in- vaders along with the masculinized T cells. However, there is a distinct replica- tion of status difference between them in the many ways I have already discussed. But it is not clear whether gender is the only overlay on this division of labor. Phagocytes are the cells that actually eat other cells belonging to the category "self," and so engage in a form of "cannibalism." William Arens has done a study of the ideological use of the trait of cannibalism and finds it often if not always associated with the attribution of a lower animal nature to those who en- gage in it (1979). In immunology phagocytes are seen as feminized in some ways, but as simply "uncivilized" in other ways. These "cannibals" are indiscriminate eaters, barbaric and savage in their willingness to eat any manner of thing at all. The implications of this depiction, with its unmistakable overtones of race and class, will be explored below. What Do People Do with the Imagery? In my research I have begun to look at the way scientists and others react to immune system imagery when it is pointed out to them, as a way of seeing the role of these constructions in the definition of personal identity and the creation of cultural meaning. The scientists I have worked with have had a variety of re- actions, but none has suggested it would be possible (or often, even desirable) to substitute different imagery for the current warfare/internal purity model. The head of the immunology research group in which I have been dDing participant observation was attentive when I described my impression of the extent to which the imagery of warfare dominates department discussions, lab talk, and technical literature. He was intrigued enough to report to me later, at the end of a semester course he taught on the immune system, that he had tried to keep track of his own use of such talk. He said that in the first half of the course, on immunochemistry and genetics, he had used no language of warfare or killing. But he did use this kind of language in the second half, when he dealt with "applications." He saw this later language as simply a shorthand, used to give an easy handle to the com- plexities that students have already understood. "It is hard to avoid reference to the 'killer' cell, for example, or saying the T cell 'kills' the germ, even though the class understands that the T cell only acts when a complex combination of other factors are present,' ' he told me. He referred to the first half of the course as the "conceptual" half, the second as the "applied" half. When I asked if the two halves were independent, he replied with an em- phatic ''yes.'' He also thought that it would not affect the first half of the course at all if he had a different shorthand to use in the second half. If we spoke of the cells, say, as "controlling" rather than "killing," it still would not affect the chemistry and genetics, he claimed. Another scientist, who is committed to writing biology textbooks so that they are less reflective of patriarchal and hierarchical assumptions in our society, was not fond of the warfare imagery. However, he commented to me that he was stumped by how else to describe the immune system. The warfare metaphor seemed to him in this case to be the only one that fit the facts. For people who are suffering from immune system disorders, the warfare language can also appear unobjectionable. My own ''buddy,'' 14 with whom I had innumerable conversations about the physical and emotional aspects of AIDS, never expressed any hesitation or criticism about the use of this language by med- ical personnel. However, he himself never used any military or nation state im- agery to describe what was happening to him or what the medical treatments were supposed to do. Instead he used only the imagery of a clean house. The treatment involving ablation of his immune system by radiation, which he was hoping to ￼TowARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMMUNOLOGY 419 receive, would "clean out the HIV virus"; his brother's immune system cells, injected by bone marrow transplant, would then "set up housekeeping" in his body. Other HIV patients embrace the warfare imagery wholly and use it creatively to organize their experience of mortal threat. We have grown up in our bodies, they are our native lands, and although we know their shortcomings by heart, we have a natural affection for them, warts and all. My country has occasionally disappointed me, but like a Resistance fighter, I'll stop at nothing when it comes to throwing off the foreign viral yoke. The main thing is to adopt a guerrilla attitude and reverse our roles. To declare that impostors have taken over my body, that the virus has illegally usurped au- thority, and that I must set out to recover my morale and all biological ground lost so far. I'm in my own home, this is my body, and it's up to AIDS to get out. [Dreuilhe 1988:8-9] AIDS activists also create powerful images of collusion between the damage done by the virus to individual bodies and the damage they suspect some political authorities intend. For example, at a public hearing held by the Maryland Gov- enor's AIDS commission, July 10, 1990, an Act Up spokesperson made the fol- lowing statement: "Schaefer [the Governor] is Hitler, AIDS is the holocaust, Maryland is Auschwitz. This is conscious genocide and can only be seen as the Governor's desire to wipe out this population." Alternative Images of the Body However creatively people attempt to forge meaningful uses of these belli- cose nation state images, they are still working within what strikes me as a rather narrow range o f options. A n important role for anthropology is to use its technique of comparative research to make plain the historical specificity of the cultural op- tions that occur to people and therefore their contingency. Other times and places may offer us other resources. In some times and other cultures, images of biological organisms as engaged in all-out struggle to the death have not held sway. Daniel Todes has shown how in the late 19th and early 20th centuries Russian biologists rejected Darwin's ma- jor metaphor, the struggle for existence, especially when it appeared in connec- tion with Malthusian ideas about overpopulation. In developing an alternative the- ory of mutual aid, Russian naturalists argued four tenets: the central aspect of the struggle for existence is the organism's struggle with abiotic conditions; organisms join forces to wage this struggle more effectively, and such mutual aid is favored by natural selection; since cooperation, not com- petition, dominates intraspecific relations, Darwin's Malthusian characterization of those relations is false; and cooperation so vitiates intraspecific competition that the latter cannot be the chief cause of the divergence of characters and the origin of new species. [Todes 1987:545] In rejecting Darwin's assumptions, Russians identified the idea of individualized competitive struggle as a product of English culture and society. Darwin's use of this assumption was "the same as if Adam Smith had taken it upon himself to write a course in zoology" (Chernyshevskii, quoted in Todes 1987:541); a Rus- sian expert on fisheries and population dynamics wrote that the English ''national type accepts [struggle] with all its consequences, demands it as his right, tolerates no limits upon it" (quoted in Todes 1989:41). This response to Darwin's theory, common to Russian intellectuals of a va- riety of philosophical and political viewpoints, derived, as Todes persuasively argues, from several factors: Russia's political economy lacked a dynamic, pro-laissez faire bourgeoisie and was dominated by landowners and peasants. The leading political tendencies, monarchism and a socialist-oriented populism, shared a cooperative social ethos and a distaste for the competitive individualism widely associated with Malthus and Great Britain. Furthermore, Russia was an expansive, sparsely populated land with a swiftly changing and often severe climate. It is difficult to imagine a setting less consonant with Malthus's notion that organisms were pressed con- stantly into mutual conflict by population pressures on limited space and re- sources. [Todes 1989:168] A second example of an alternative form of imagery comes from the work of Ludwik Fleck. Fleck was a Polish biologist who during the 1930s and 1940s developed important diagnostic and prophylactic measures for typhus fever. He also published a monograph and many papers on the methodology of scientific observation and the principles of scientific knowledge. Although his work was not widely disseminated at the time of its publication, he anticipated many of Thomas Kuhn's arguments (1962), published and acclaimed in the 1960s. 15 In the 1930s, Fleck had already seen the limitations of the metaphor of war- fare in immunology and conceived of another possibility. He described the pre- vailing idea of the organism as a closed unit and of the hostile causative agents in facing it. The causative agent produces a bad effect (attack). The organism responds with a reaction (defense). This results in a conflict, which is taken to be the essence of disease. The whole of immunology is permeated with such primitive images of war. [1979(1935):59] Out of his experience as a practicing biologist he thundered, "not a single exper- imental proof exists that could force an unbiased observer to adopt such an idea" (Fleck 1979[1935]:60). Instead of the organism as a self-contained independent unit with fixed boundaries, he proposed a "harmonious life unit," which could range from the cell, to the symbiosis between alga and fungus in a lichen, to an ecological unit such as a forest. 16 In the light of this concept, man appears as a complex to whose harmonious well- being many bacteria, for instance, are absolutely essential. Intestinal flora are needed for metabolism, and many kinds of bacteria living in mucous membranes are required for the normal functioning of these membranes. [Fleck 1979( 1935):61] Change in such a harmonious life form could be spontaneous (mutation), cyclic (aging), or simply change within the reciprocally acting parts of the unit. In the latter category fall most infectious diseases. But, and this is crucial, it is very doubtful whether an invasion in the old sense is possible, involving as it does an interference by completely foreign organisms in natural conditions. completely foreign organism could find no receptors capable of reaction and thus could not generate a biological process. It is therefore better to speak of a com- plicated revolution within the complex life unit than of an invasion of it. [Fleck 1979(1935):61] He meant that any "invading" organism had to have been living in our vicinity, symbiotically, long enough to be able to stick to our cells. The ability to generate a biological process could only come about from previous encounters. Thus, a previously minor organism could only rise to prominence within the body's life unit, not invade it as a foreign "other." In the overall scheme of things, this kind of "complicated revolution" would be a decidedly rare event, not one that was constantly on the verge of occurring. It is interesting to speculate whether Fleck's strongly stated objections to the warfare/internal purity model in immunology was influenced by his experience of the contemporary Nazi application of totalitarian practices to achieve the purity of the social body. By 1935 the removal, incarceration, or killing of German and Austrian Jewish, communist, and socialist physicians was well advanced. 17 After Poland was occupied by the Nazis, Fleck was deported to Auschwitz and forced to produce typhus vaccines for the German armed forces (Treon and Merton 1979:151). Speculation about the relationship between Fleck's ideas and his Nazi experience is made more compelling by Claude Lefort's observation that totalitarian regimes often produce images of themselves as a body: At the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the People-as-One . . . the constitution of the People-as-One requires the incessant production of enemies. . . . The enemy of the people is regarded as a parasite or a waste product to be eliminated. . . . What is at stake is always the integrity of the body. It is as if the body had to assure itself of its own identity by expelling its waste matter, or as if it had to close in upon itself by withdrawing from the outside, by averting the threat of an intrusion by alien elements. . . . The campaign against the enemy is feverish; fever is good, it is a signal, within society, that there is some evil to combat. [Lefort 1986:297-298] As immunology describes it, bodies are imperiled nations continuously at war to quell alien invaders. These nations have sharply defined borders in space, which are constantly besieged and threatened. In their interiors there is great concern over the purity of the population-over who is a bona fide citizen and who may be carrying false papers. False intruders intend only destruction, and they are meted out only swift death. All this is written into "nature" at the level of the cell. It seems possible that Fleck may have wondered whether this imagery might make analogous social practices come to seem ever more natural, fundamentally rooted in reality, and unchangeable. Within our own contemporary science there are hints of other models that might be used to describe immune responses. For example, Haraway suggests the work of Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores on cognition as providing a way of describing pathology without military imagery. By their account, a ' 'breakdown'' would not be "a negative situation to be avoided, but a situation of non-obvious- ness, in which some aspect of the network of tools that we are engaged in using is brought forth to visibility" (quoted in Haraway 1989: 18). Instead of the de- fended self who destroys the foreign intruder lest it be destroyed, we would have occasions when interaction becomes nonobvious, potentially creative situations that call forth clarification of the terms of the interaction. One final possibility for an alternative perspective is present as a minor motif in some of the biological texts I have discussed. If the eating aspect of phagocy- tosis were allowed to dominate in significance over the destructive aspect, the macrophage might be said to catabolize and utilize the "invading foreign orga- nism" in its own metabolic processes. In other words, the microorganism might be seen as food for the macrophage. Some standard sources make plain this aspect of what a macrophage does, telling us that when a macrophage ingests a microor- ganism, it "evokes a metabolic burst" which causes increased consumption of oxygen and production of substances which help digestion (Leijh, Furth, and Zwet 1986:46.2; Vander, Sherman, and Luciano 1980:528). But by no means do all texts mention these matters; never are they given very much attention or de- velopment in the overall picture. If the view that microorganisms serve as food for macrophages were given prominence, we could see this process as a food chain, linked by mutual dependencies. Instead of a life and death struggle, with terrorism within and war at the borders, we would have symbiosis within a life unit that encompasses the body and its environment, where all organisms are de- pendent on others for food. None of these alternative metaphors would be sufficient by itself to encourage us to imagine-let alone bring into existence-different forms of organiza- tion in our society than those that now exist. But at the least they can serve to add substance to the question: are there powerful links between the particular metaphors chosen to describe the body scientifically and features of our contemporary society that are related to gender, class, and race? Full consideration of this question would demand attention to issues I have not taken up here: what is the historical relationship between particular social formations and particular ideas about the body? Is there variation in scientific or pop- ular body images from one kind of nation state to another? From one perspective within a given nation state to another? Although I hope to address these questions in future work, in this article my aim has been more limited: to suggest that as long as there is a possibility that scientific descriptions give an aura of the "natural" to a particular social vision, there is a place for comparative ethnography to set this vision in a context of other ways bodies might be imagined and societies might be organized.

#### The imperative to preserve the insulated body at all costs was at the *core* of Hitler’s racism and allowed him to manipulate populations to participate in the Holocaust – the citizenry must be given the tools to critically interrogate the state’s metaphors

Musolff 10 [(Andreas, University of East Anglia Language and Linguistics Department Member) Metaphor, Nation and the Holocaust: The Concept of the Body Politic. Routledge Critical Studies in Discourse 2010] AT

The phrase body politic belongs to a field of clichéd metaphors in English that refer to political entities and issues in terms of bodily organs and functions, such as head of state, head of government, long arm of the law, organ (of a party), sclerosis or tumour (of the body politic), heart of Brit- ain/Europe.1 It is used by British and American media and politicians, e.g. in formulations such as “Europe could cease to be the cyanide in the British body politic”; “voices in the body politic”; “disembowelling the body poli- tic”, “campaign culture metastasize[d] throughout the entire body politic”.2 The Conservative politician and mayor of London, Boris Johnson, even described himself tongue-in-cheek as “a mere toenail in the body politic”.3 In German public discourse, by comparison, the idea of society and/or the nation or state as a body is perceived as highly problematic. The term Volkskörper (“people’s body”, or “national body”), in particular, is stigmatized. In 1998, for instance, the conservative German politician J. Schön- bohm was heavily criticised for having invoked the ideal of a homogeneous German “people’s body” as opposed to the notion of a “multi-cultural” society in the public debate about immigration. According to one of his critics, the notion of bodily homogeneity for the nation was likely to “kindle the fire” of inter-ethnic conflict.4 Eight years later, an article in the daily newspaper Die Welt discussed the low birth rate in Germany under the title “A hurt soul in the sick nation’s body [Volkskörper]”.5 Again, the notion of the nation’s or the people’s body was viewed as alluding to “the German traumata of the twentieth century”. Those who discussed demographic decline in terms of a threat to the national body’s health were suffering, the author asserted, from a hysteria similar to that which had motivated previ- ous “bio-political” attempts to cure the people’s body.6 Evidently, the term Volkskörper still reminds parts of the German public of statements such as the following which were made by Adolf Hitler and his propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels in the 1920s and 1940s: [the Jew] has always been a parasite in the body of other peoples.7 1914 witnessed the last flicker of the national instinct for self-preserva- tion in opposition to the progressive paralysis of our people’s body.8 . . . the Jew represents an infectious illness . . . Germany has no inten- tion of giving in to this Jewish threat but intends to oppose it in time, if necessary by the means of its most complete and radical extermin-, eh, elimination.9 Statements such as these, which were taken from Mein Kampf and from Goebbels’s infamous “total war” speech of 1943, were not just meant as insults of Jewish people. They implied a genocidal policy that ended in the Holocaust: the victims were treated as if they were agents of disease and parasites that threatened the German national body’s health and therefore had to be annihilated. Goebbels’s false start, Ausrott[-ung] (“extermina- tion”) in the third example, gives away his knowledge about the ongoing genocide but also illustrates the effort to avoid unequivocal references to killing and mass murder. The vague notion of “getting rid” of the victims, which is implied in the term Ausschaltung (“elimination”, “removal”), was meant to leave room for a non-genocidal interpretation. However, the met- aphor of an infectious illness leaves little doubt that a complete destruction of the agent of the illness was envisaged, or else the supposed infection would not be eradicated. The “logic” of the illness-cure imagery based on the body-state metaphor thus gives the lie to the dissimulating talk of “elimination”. How could the conceptualization of a socio-political entity as a human body acquire such sinister connotations? Is it a specific historical phenom- enon of German political culture in the 20th century? Or is the metaphor inherently racist, suggesting as it does a physical/physiological concreteness of politics, which perhaps “lends itself” to physical “solutions” of any per- ceived problems? Should anyone who employs body-related metaphors in politics be viewed as a potential advocate of genocide? These are some of the questions that this book will engage with, with a view to determining the function of metaphor in political communication, i.e. the basic issue of how a metaphorical concept can impact on people’s political perception and behaviour, even turn them into genocide perpetrators (or at least, pas- sive bystanders).10 The imagery used by the Nazis to legitimize their genocidal policies provides us with an extreme “test-case”, so to speak, of a metaphor that was turned into the horrendous reality of World War and Holocaust. We may ask, however, whether we are dealing with a “metaphor” at all. Standard definitions of “metaphor” describe it as the designation of a meaning unit by words taken from a different domain of meaning. This definition can seemingly be applied without great difficulty to our case: a social or political entity is usually not considered to belong in the category of biolog- ical bodies, and a group of people in it is not an illness or parasite. Hence, the semantic transfer of bodily expressions to political and social issues would appear to qualify for “metaphor” status. However, in regard of the Nazi use of body-illness-parasite imagery, we have to take into account the fact that they applied it in a horrifically “literal” sense by trying to physi- cally destroy and eliminate Jewish people. Neil Gregor has aptly put this problem in the form of a paradox: “it is not possible to see in Mein Kampf . . . a set of plans or a blueprint for mass murder in any specific way. . . . But, equally, we should not regard Hitler’s metaphors merely as metaphors: for him, they described reality.”11 We thus seem to be dealing with a form of discourse that is non-literal and at the same time “literal” (in a poignant historical and political sense). How can this contradiction be resolved? One way of dealing with this dilemma would be to assume that the meta- phor of the supposed Jewish “race” as an illness or parasite on the German nation’s body was known to be just part of propagandistic jargon both by its users (i.e. the Nazis) and its receivers (i.e. the German public and everyone within the reach of Nazi propaganda), and really meant something else, i.e. genocide. In this case, the metaphor could be assigned the same semantic status as euphemisms or camouflage words, such as deportation (Deporta- tion, Umsiedlung), special treatment (Sonderbehandlung) or final solution (Endlösung), which the Nazis used in administrative or legal documents when referring to their murderous practices. Such camouflage vocabulary was not primarily intended to be persuasive; rather, it was meant to misin- form those who were deemed outsiders or enemies, depending on the partic- ular circumstances and the phase of policy implementation. 12 The “insiders” would know what was meant and needed no persuasion: the camouflage language was just a ruse to cover their tracks (and, perhaps, to suppress the perpetrators’ own troubling emotions of empathy or guilt). 13 If the body/parasite metaphor complex as used by the Nazis were on a par with such terminology it would not in fact be metaphorical. On closer inspection, however, this interpretation seems implausible. Camouflage terms such as final solution or removal referring to genocide are deliber- ately abstract, vague and general: they are designed to hide any concrete, vivid form of reference. But denouncing a group of people as a parasite and describing one’s nation as a body that is in danger of perishing are not abstract or vague descriptions; on the contrary, they are striking and spec- tacular. The statements that included such metaphors were not confined to incidental, infrequent forms of “background” propaganda; as we shall see in detail later, they were carefully crafted and presented as “highlights” in the Nazi leaders’ speeches. Anyone living under the Nazi regime or being aware of it could not help but notice them as key elements of their ideol- ogy and propaganda. The metaphor was recognised as a core belief held by all the leading Nazis. That still does not mean that people mistook it for a literal description of political issues, or else it would have been regarded simply as a grotesque category mistake. So, if it was neither that nor a lie, how can we describe its meaning, both as a semantic category and as a pragmatic, political tool to advocate genocide? Some of the confusion about the semantic status of the body/parasite “metaphor” can be avoided if we follow the insights of modern metaphor theories that have developed a notion of metaphor as a cognitive “framing” strategy to provide access to innovative perspectives for the conceptualisation and the discursive negotiation of all kinds of experience. 14 In the metaphorical frame, new concepts are integrated into familiar sets of assumptions about classifications of entities, events and actions and their evaluations. With regard to Nazi metaphors, we have to investigate the frames that enabled their users to believe in assumptions that made the project of murdering all Jewish people in Europe seem possible, justifiable and necessary. It is this inferential cognitive link between assumptions embodied in the “source” concepts of bodies, illnesses and parasites and the political conclusions at the “target” level of genocidal ideology (and practice) that is at the centre of the first part of this study. In the follow- ing chapters I shall propose a cognitive analysis of the mappings of body- illness-parasite concepts onto politics as they appear in key texts produced by the Nazis and in documented contemporary reactions and comments, with a view to establishing the conceptual and argumentative framework in which the Holocaust would appear as a national healing exercise to the per- petrators and their audience.15 However, an analysis based on the corpus of texts from the Nazi period itself can only show its synchronic structure and function in its respective historical period. As we saw from our initial examples, the same metaphor complex is still being used in public discourse but it carries a kind of historical index of being related to the Nazi period. We therefore also need to look at its diachronic development. To depict societies, states and/or nations as a body is a metaphoric fram- ing that has a long and famous pedigree in the history of ideas. Histori- cal overviews16 locate its origins in pre-Socratic thinking and highlight a first flourishing of such metaphors in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (with The Republic and Timaios, Politics and On the movement of animals being the respective key texts). They were followed by a series of Hellenistic and Roman philosophers, the Stoics, Neoplatonists and mixed with Bibli- cal traditions (especially St. Paul’s Epistles to the Romans and Corinthi- ans), which were taken up by the “Church Fathers” and many political and social theorists from the early Middle Ages onwards, continuing up to the twentieth century. Closely connected is the tradition of the so-called “fable of the belly”, which has its beginnings in Aesopian texts dating back to the fifth century Introduction 5 BC and was handed down by historians and philosophers as a political les- son to avoid a rebellion.17 The fable tells the story of a rebellion against the belly by other “members” of the body, which is motivated by their anger over the injustice that the seemingly idle belly/stomach takes all nourish- ment. The rebellion ends in disaster because without the belly first receiving and then redistributing all the food, the other members get no nourishment either and so the whole body perishes.18 The standard political application of the fable is a vindication of the ruler’s right to receive all the revenues of the state, so that he in turn can allocate them (justly) to all other organs of the body politic. One of its most famous formulations can be found in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, where the Roman senator Menenius uses it to quell a Plebeian rebellion: Menenius: There was a time when all the body’s members/ Rebell’d against the belly; thus accused it:/That only like a gulf it did remain/ I’ the midst o’ the body, idle and unactive,/ Still cupboarding the viand, never bearing/Like labour with the rest, . . . / The belly answered . . . ‘True is it, my incorporate friends’, quoth he,/ ‘That I receive the gen- eral food at first,/ Which you do live upon; and fit it is;/ Because I am the store-house and the shop/ Of the whole body: but if you do remem- ber,/ I send it through the rivers of your blood,/ Even to the court, the heart, to the seat o’ the brain; . . . /The senators of Rome are this good belly,/ And you the mutinous members;19 After having stopped the unruly crowd in their tracks by telling the fable, Menenius singles out the leader of the rebellion (the “First Citizen” in the play) for humiliation. He calls him the “great toe of this assembly” on account of his “being one o’ the lowest, basest, poorest, Of this most wise rebellion” and still having the nerve to “[go] foremost”.20 The literal and figurative “forwardness” of the toe/First Citizen is thus utilized by Mene- nius to isolate and ridicule him. Perhaps B. Johnson’s above-quoted self- description as the “toenail of the body politic” was owed to his knowledge of Shakespeare (and even intended to demonstrate that). Another incidence of erudite reference to the “fable of the belly” can be found in the autobiog- raphy of the painter Oskar Kokoschka (1886–1980), who described the last decades of the Habsburg Empire before World War I as a time of continu- ous crisis during which the various nationalities “forgot the parable of the Roman statesman that body members which are separated from the body are not capable of life”.21 Such implicit or explicit “inter-textual” allusions are not essential, how- ever, for the understanding of the metaphor. Any competent adult speaker of English and German can in principle make sense of Johnson’s and Koko- schka’s statements or other uses of body imagery in politics without mak- ing the connection to the tradition of the fable. After all, the knowledge that body parts cannot normally exist if separated from the whole body, and that toes or toenails are less important body members than, say, the head, belongs to our everyday “encyclopaedic” and practical knowledge of the world. Shakespearean scholars and conceptual historians will of course recognise the image and reconstruct the links with ancient and modern uses to further its understanding, but this happens at a secondary level of interpretation. It may add to the intellectual and aesthetic appreciation of the text in question but it is not needed for the basic understanding of the metaphor. Clearly, the Nazis and their audience did not have to rely on a two- thousand-year-old philosophical tradition to motivate their wish to murder all Jewish people in Europe. Like the interdependence and the relative importance of parts of the body, the dangers of illness and the benefits of a cure are common knowledge, and racists of all times have employed that knowledge to denounce their enemies as agents of (political/social) disease. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that a special, vulgarised version of some of the theoretical and textual traditions mentioned earlier was accessed around the turn of the last century by Hitler and other Nazi ideologues, in a way similar to the pseudo-scientific theories on human “races” that influenced Hitler during his formative years in Vienna and Munich.22 They could in fact hardly have existed without the input from an “authoritative” tradition that had already established the metaphorical concept of the body, its organs and functions and its state of health as a model for thinking and talking about politics. These beliefs would have provided the semantic-ideological space in which Hitler’s political body and parasite metaphors could resonate. In order to substantiate this hypothesis, we have to investigate those strands of the metaphor tradition that are most likely to have informed the sedimented political assumptions in the early twentieth century, in par- ticular, conceptual and textual traditions of body politic theories and dis- cussions in German-speaking political culture. German traditions of this metaphor complex have been less well researched than, for instance, the English- and French-speaking histories; it has even been claimed that Ger- man political literature lacked the equivalent of body politic imagery.23 As we shall see later on, this assumption is unwarranted; in fact, the tradition of corporeal imagery in German political philosophy and discourse can be traced back to the early sixteenth century, i.e. to the same time when the phrase body politic itself became established in England and when similar terminological and conceptual developments took place in other European languages and political cultures. These long-standing metaphor traditions not only informed the popular attitudes and opinions of the period until 1945; they still exert an influence on current discourse, albeit as an undercurrent that is overlaid, as it were, by the stigma-laden memory of the use of illness/parasite imagery in Nazi ideol- ogy. As we saw in the few examples from contemporary German discourse quoted earlier, journalists and politicians still expect the German public to Introduction 7 understand allusions to the Nazi uses, which seems to indicate that some kind of a “discourse memory” relating to Nazi-typical metaphors still exists. Right-wing and Neo-Nazi groups still make use of body/parasite imagery as if nothing had happened, so to speak,24 but this lack of distance from Nazi jargon has probably helped to bar them from having a significant influence on post-war German political culture. The public judgement that a person or political group uses terminology and imagery comparable to that employed by the Nazis still serves as a powerful stigmatisation.25 For German politi- cians, to invoke body-parasite imagery when dealing with socio-political and ethnic conflicts and to feign ignorance of the Nazi precedent is disingenu- ous and/or potentially self-defeating as long as they want to remain part of the mainstream public political discourse.26 So, why do body-illness-parasite metaphors continue to be employed? By looking at the long-term history of body-based political thought and discourse we hope to find answers to this question; i.e. we not only try to understand the reasons for its historical “success” in persuading a majority the German public to participate in or at least tolerate the Holocaust but also the role that body-based metaphors generally play in current racist discourse and thought. Given the vastness of the material, the selection of textual and concep- tual traditions presented here can only claim to be a sample of the huge field of research (a cautious first estimate based on conceptual history research indicates the existence of at least 250 primary key texts ranging from antiq- uity to present-day texts in several European languages). The following chapters can thus not claim to be representative but only aim at providing insights into major continuities and discontinuities of the various strands of this metaphor leading up to (and beyond) its instrumentalisation by the Nazis. Some of these traditions were, as we shall see, explicitly connected to Nazi ideology, others seem to have only implicit and fragmentary links, and further strands even point to the ideological opposite of racism, i.e. an enlightened, tolerant vision of society and politics. The chapters are roughly ordered as follows. In the chapter introduc- ing Part I we establish the methodological implications of the cognitively oriented approach to metaphor analysis through its comparison with tradi- tional analyses of Nazi imagery as a “mere” rhetorical trick that was inci- dental to Hitler’s ideology and actual policy. By contrast, our analysis tries to demonstrate that his body-illness-parasite metaphors provided not just a propaganda ornament but were at the core of his racist ideology. Chapter 3 studies this conceptual core in detail by way of a close reading of Hitler’s statements on race in Mein Kampf; Chapter 4 investigates how the Nazi ideologues and propagandists announced and presented the genocide as a therapy for the German national body while they were in power. Chapter 5 provides a methodological reflection of the results of our analyses and relates them to the second part, which investigates the body-state meta- phor’s roots in Western cultural history. Chapters 6–9 proceed in a loosely chronological order from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance to the 8 Metaphor, Nation and Holocaust twentieth century and provide cross-references to conceptual strands taken up by the Nazis. The last chapter discusses the implications of this history for the assessment of the body-based political metaphors in creating and shaping racist attitudes.

continues

Carl Schmitt’s biased reconstruction of Hobbes’s Leviathan showed that the attempt was made to connect the “respectable” philosophical body politic tradition with the notion of a “total” state that gained its identity only through combating an existential foe. The permanent crisis of such a state founded on conflict, which classical thinkers considered mainly as a limiting concept for a situation that had to be avoided, was for Schmitt the pre-condition of all political activity. So it was for Hitler and the Nazis, but they drew from it the ultimate conclusion which Schmitt himself did not (dare to?) consider: the absolute necessity for the national body politic to destroy the foe as a parasite life form that was “unworthy to live”. The basis for such a conclusion was of course not Schmitt’s attempted recon- struction of Hobbes’s theory but the popularized “sedimented” tradition of body-state analogies. Our historical analyses in Part II have revealed that whilst a relatively wide range of conceptual/lexical source elements can be found in the rel- evant texts, only a handful of thematic clusters appear repeatedly and prominently: the hierarchically ordered anatomy of parts of the body, their mutual interdependence, the life cycle of the whole organism and the illness-diagnosis-cure scenario. These key themes and scenarios carry evaluative and emotive associations with them, as well as assumptions about preferred and feared consequences and courses of action, which are understood as evaluations of solutions of political crises. Whilst they may appear to be nothing but commonsense concepts grounded in bodily experience and pre- or folk-theoretical assumptions, we can in fact trace them back to philosophically and even theologically oriented tradi- tions reaching back to concepts of Christ’s/God’s body and its manifold worldly manifestations (e.g. as the “mystical body” of the church with the pope as its head, or as the emperor, or as the king in his “body poli- tic”, or as the “sovereign” as the principle of the state, the people’s body, etc.). Long after the ancient cosmological and theological frameworks that sustained these notions have disappeared or have been relativised to the point where they can no longer be considered belief systems that mem- bers of a particular national or religious culture adhere to uncritically, the “holiness” of the collective (social and/or political) body remains. It was and still is this holiness of the body politic that has had to be defended at all costs, against devilish inspired heretics in the Middle Ages, humoral imbalances in the Renaissance, rabid dogs that can bite a state “to the quick” for Hobbes, or racial vermin and agents of decomposition, in the Nazi worldview. Hitler’s “diagnosis” of Germany’s post–World War I crisis thus sounded plausible not despite but because of its metaphoric character and history. This apparent plausibility was grounded in its familiarity as an age-old, tried and tested commonsense analogy. It provided the German public with a conceptual and argumentative space to reason about the socio-economic and political hardships they were experiencing and 144 Metaphor, Nation and Holocaust to trust Hitler with applying the therapy that would end those hardships and prevent them in future. As a means to achieve the common good for the nation, these measures could be interpreted as ethically acceptable, even if they included hardships and sacrifices (hence Himmler and other SS-leaders’ self-stylisation as carrying out an unpleasant, almost sacrificial task in perpetrating the genocide). The function of the body- parasite scenario as employed by the Nazi elite was to make the genocide appear as the inevitable “solution” for Germany’s crisis. They stuck with this scenario through the changing fortunes of war. As the secretly recorded statements of popular opinion show, its genocidal agenda was understood by the majority German populace sufficiently to at least “tol- erate”, if not participate, in that final solution. This astonishing persuasiveness of the cure-by-elimination scenario remains inexplicable if we dismiss it as a propagandistic extra to Hitler’s “real” policies or view it as the re-manifestation of a “mind virus” (in an accidental, tragic historical context). Our findings show that Hitler’s metaphorical presentation of parasite annihilation as a natural, self-evident and necessary therapy for the existential problems of the German body politic convinced the public of his genocidal agenda. The comparison of Hitler’s scenarios with those promoted by medieval theologians, humanists and enlightened thinkers would seem at first sight to be almost an “open and shut” case of contrasting a conceptually incoherent and ethically depraved use with a highly respectable philosophical tradition of political thought. However, we have seen that not only the range of source domain concepts and scenarios can be shown to be similar but also that even “respectable” authors often come dangerously close to suggesting radical and potentially genocidal cures for perceived political illnesses. It is only through the explicit comparison and historical reconstruction that the differences between their uses of the metaphor and Hitler’s version become visible: • Where Hitler’s metaphor system is a closed set of “self-fulfilling”, mutually reinforcing scenarios and “prophecies”, classical and also many modern uses are embedded in textual structures that highlight their figurative status (e.g. simile, quotation, “exemplum”). • Where the Nazis depicted the worst-possible scenario outcome (destruction and decomposition of the body politic) as an imminent and inevitable danger, most other uses portray it as a potential, but not inevitable, worst-case scenario that can and should be avoided. • The therapy “offered” by the Nazi body-parasite scenario is a precise match of the supposed extreme danger to the body, i.e. complete anni- hilation of the supposed illness-inducing agent as a “final solution”, whereas in classical and enlightened scenario applications, extreme therapies are mentioned mainly as deterrents to underline the neces- sity to avoid such a negative outcome. Conclusion 145 However, as the examples of Rousseau’s corps de la nation concept in its application during the French Revolution, Herder’s idea of parasite nations in its later distortions and Hobbes’s theory of the state-as-Leviathan in Schmitt’s biased re-interpretation have shown, not even truly rationally oriented versions of the body-state metaphor are immune to being reconfigured as closed scenarios that legitimise murderous policies. The body- state metaphor complex is neither a superficial rhetorical ornament nor just an ahistoric, universal conceptual structure: in all its uses it provides an opportunity and a challenge for the respective body politic and its public “voices” to reflect on the ethical implications of their self-presentation and -interpretation. The metaphors by which nations define their destiny have the potential to shape that destiny.

#### Sovereignty replicates colorblindness and excludes non-whites as they were seen as outside sovereignty – this founded colonialism which caused anti-blackness – the aff reveals the way sovereignty is imagined rather than objective, which solves

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At first glance, the field of IR has hardly any parallels to the racial realism/colorblindness discussed above. Conventional IR do not claim any position on race, much less a colorblind position; indeed there is a “well-trained silence” around issues of race (Persaud 2002:58). However, much like the ontological maneuvers of racial realists that lead them to their objectivity claims, the well-trained silence of IR emerges from epistemological and ontological maneuvers in the discipline that replicate the colorblind position that we refer to. We suggest that while there is an alleged colorblindness to the discipline, issues of race and gender are systemically coded into some of the concepts such as the nation-state and sovereignty that are central to the discipline. Arguably, the focus of conventional IR on nation-states depends upon neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of race or racialized subjects. However, the centrality of the Westphalian state and the principle of sovereignty as the constitutive pillars of disciplinary authority and legitimacy in IR lead to several racialized inclusions and exclusions. Karena Shaw (2002) and Sankaran Krishna (2001), amongst others, discuss the ways in which the nation-state and sovereignty determine these inclusions and exclusions. Shaw examines the constitution and legitimation of disciplinary authority in IR by focusing on the exclusion of indigenous peoples from IR. For Shaw, the “preconditions established by the assumption of sovereignty as the grounds of analyses” in IR “provides the basic tension that any attempt to include indigenous peoples in disciplinary conversations must negotiate” (Shaw 2002:64). Acknowledging that the focus on sovereignty excludes yet to be decolonized indigenous peoples from the disciplinary boundaries, she also suggests that the efforts of scholars such as Franke Wilmer (1993) and Neta Crawford (1994) to seek inclusion of native voices in IR based on the terms of sovereignty limit their analysis. According to Shaw, Wilmer’s analysis on how indigenous voices are moving towards inclusion in IR does not take into account the fact that indigenous peoples “have not been incidental frills at the edges of but have always been central to IR—both as a discipline and as practices of politics among nations” (Shaw 2002:68). For example, Shaw suggests that the role of international law, primarily through the doctrine of terra nullius, in the violence and dispossessions enacted upon indigenous peoples remind us of how racialized difference was used in the theft of land and to deny sovereignty to indigenous nations. In addition, she reminds us that “the active marginalization of indigenous peoples has been necessary for IR to appear and function” (Shaw 2002:68). Another example of the ways in which the sovereignty abstraction of IR erases significant histories is provided by Krishna (2001). Remarking on the horrendous violence engendered by European powers during the misnamed Hundred Years of Peace (1815–1914), Krishna suggests the claim of peace for the period between 1815 and 1914 could only be made by relying on the abstraction of sovereignty. As the colonized were not perceived as sovereign entities, the violence against them during their occupation did not merit an accounting in the peace narrative. In addition to these claims of Krishna, it is important to note that the racialized and gendered construction of Africa, Asia, and the Americas as barbaric and uncivilized played an equally important role in the ontological maneuvers of the sovereignty narrative. Colonization became mission civilisatrice and references to the white man’s burden exorcised any repugnance for the inhumane practices associated with it. The history of the sovereign modern state in Europe is thus deeply embedded in the history of the imperial project of Europe. While most accounts of the history of modernity including the modern state claim a linear chronology, beginning with its origins in Europe and then its dissemination to the rest of the world, postcolonial scholars suggest the mutual constitution of the “West and the rest” in which the nation state and its identity emerge in the context of the “imperial social formation.”6 The state-centeredness of the sovereignty narrative rests on the assumption of an anarchical world in which sovereign nation states negotiate their interests, sovereignty being the alleged equalizing concept in IR. In this narrative, the sovereign state is thus projected as the universal and highest form of authority in the anarchical world system dissimilating its Eurocentric, hierarchical and violent origins. “Indeed, reflection on the past 300 or so years—since Westphalia—indicates that the dominant political form has in any case been the imperial state and empire rather than the sovereign state” (Laffey and Weldes 2004:125). Race(ing) the Global Security Imaginary: Identity, Nation, and Citizenship In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States of America unleashed “a war on terror” strongly supported by Britain, Spain, and Australia. While these events and what followed have been discussed by numerous scholars, we discuss briefly the “new” global security imaginary that emerged in the post-9/11 world. We conceptualize the global security imaginary as “a way of naming, ordering and representing” international security (Mälksoo 2006). It is this imaginary that draws boundaries, constructs identities and danger, and performs security (see Muppidi 1999; Weldes 1999). We suggest that the two conventional pillars of IR—the nation-state and sovereignty—remain central to the construction of this imaginary leading to a renewed interest in issues of national identity and citizenship in metropolitan centers. In the previous section, we have discussed the ways in which race is foundational to the sovereignty narrative. In this section we draw on Burton et al.’s engagement with the “imperial turn” to discuss the ways in which a racialized global security imaginary which serves the needs of metropolitan centers recuperates and reinscribes race into IR in significant ways through the twin concept of the nation-state. While the nation-state and sovereignty are constitutive of conventional IR, it generally treats the nation-state as given and does not take seriously questions regarding its construction, its nature, and its identity. However, critical interventions into IR (based on the historical sociology and anthropology of the state) interrogate the nation-state project and suggest that the nation is not based on pre-existing identities; rather the state inscribes “an imagined political community” to legitimize its national and sovereign status (Anderson 1983). The importance of understanding the nation as an imagined, political, cultural, and social project cannot be overstated for it demonstrates that the nation is not pre-given but is constructed and needs to constantly produce and reproduce itself (Campbell 1990). The construction of the imagined political community relies on the construction of a noncommunity, the “other,” the enemy, and maintenance of internal and external boundaries based on these constructions. Race, ethnicity, gender, religion, caste, class, and so on are crucial elements in the constructions of national boundaries, working particularly through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship defines who belongs to the nation and who does not; those who do not belong could be both within and outside the nation. Citizenship uses race, for instance, as an exclusionary mechanism to maintain the territorial integrity and identity of the nation legally and metaphorically defining those who really belong to the “imagined community” and others who are excluded from this community.

#### Metaphors are inevitable and shape reality – citizens will always use them to make sense of political events. Our choice of metaphor is crucial – through it we either make effective reasoning possible or we perpetuate the manipulation of reality by existing structures.

Bougher 14 [(Lori, Postdoctoral Research Associate at Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) “COGNITIVE COHERENCE IN POLITICS: UNIFYING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CIVIC COGNITION” in Warring with Words: Narrative and Metaphor in Politics, April 29] AT

How do citizens make sense of the political world? Previous research has reiterated that citizens often lack detailed information when it comes to politics, revealing “a high variance in political awareness around a generally low mean”(Zaller,1992,p.18).1 Instead, citizens use cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) to “simplify cognitively taxing demands and to respond quickly to new information” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011, p. 14; see also Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Taber, 2011). And while a full review of this literature is outside the scope of this chapter, “[t]here is no question that citizens use heuristics to simplify their information processing; there is considerable uncertainty, however, about whether such shortcuts allow them to behave competently” (Taber, 2011, p. 380). While heuristics enable citizens to overcome cognitive limitations by making use of existing knowledge structures, they also leave citizens susceptible to bias and manipulation. Placing normative evaluations of heuristic usage temporarily to the side, there is still substantial merit in understanding the cognitive processes that can generate this susceptibility (see also Chong & Druckman, 2011). In the United States, for example, focus has shifted from “attributing failures of American democracy to the ignorance and stupidity of the masses” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 135) to securing richer, descriptive accounts of civic behavior and rationales (e.g., Lupia, Levine, Menning, & Sin, 2007; Lupia, McCubbins, & Popkin, 2000), and to more critical assessments of the media and political leaders (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011). In general, citizens use a number of cognitive tools to efficiently navigate the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity of the political world. Metaphor and narrative are not simply linguistic flourishes or persuasive devices in political rhetoric; they are effective reasoning tools in civic cognition. Both devices provide constructs for categorizing and making sense of incoming information and experiences in the political world, satisfying our need for cognitive coherence. Despite similarity in the cognitive functions of metaphor and narrative, few attempts have been made to integrate the two concepts into a unified cognitive model. This chapter will review why metaphor and narrative are important for civic reasoning and cognition, how they are similar, and how they are likely to be related. The discussion will highlight the cognitive nature of language, the need for an integrated model of civic cognition that includes both metaphor and narrative, prospects for the more explicit incorporation of metaphor and narrative in civic education, and the inextricability of political cognition from its social context. Because they shape political identities, frame political issues, and offer the potential to enhance civic tolerance and reflection, metaphor and narrative feature prominently in civic cognition and merit further investigation. Metaphor and Narrative in Civic Cognition One as the other: The cognitive similarities between metaphor and narrative Metaphor and narrative are both useful devices for navigating the political world (for overviews, see, e.g., Bougher, 2012; Patterson & Monroe, 1998, respectively). They share a similar history in that they are linguistic constructs that have each been increasingly recognized for their centrality in human cognition (e.g., Bruner, 1986, 1991; Gentner, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphor and narrative provide psychological structures that allow us to piece fragments of information together into a cohesive whole. With metaphor, we piece together bits of information by relying on our existing knowledge structures in other domains; with narrative, we try to fit fragments into a running storyline. In both instances, we use embedded knowledge structures, grounded in everyday life, to make sense of our social world. Metaphor and narrative allow us to draw causal inferences and make predictions based on limited information (Colhoun & Gentner, 2009; Costabile & Klein, 2008). Consequently, they provide efficient heuristics for filling gaps in knowledge, including those we witness in the political realm. Metaphor and narrative can help citizens make sense of political events, including campaigns and wars, candidates, policy issues, and so on. The metaphor of a “dog-fight,” for example, enables citizens to capture the severity of electoral competitions but also the candidates’ desperation. When it comes to policy issues, the narrative of a “death panel” dissuaded some American citizens from supporting President Obama’s healthcare plan. Metaphors can be equally influential in guiding policy preferences. Research has demonstrated that citizens can view healthcare in the metaphoric templates of community obligation, a societal right, employer responsibility, marketable commodity, and professional service (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000), or view obesity metaphorically as a sin, disability, eating disorder, food addiction, reflection of time pressure, manipulation of commercial interests, or consequence of a toxic food environment (Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, & Schlesinger, 2009). These “policy metaphors” not only structure how citizens view the relevant issues and its causes, but guide the types of interventions citizens support. 2 Metaphor and narrative also provide an integrative structure that allows citizens to identify themselves and others in political terms. Narratives weave together chronological events, ensuring coherence over time and space, “becom[ing] recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory, for not only guiding the life narrative up to the present but directing it into the future” (Bruner, 2004, p. 708). As such, narratives facilitate coherence in personal as well as group identities, including national identity (e.g., Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Narratives “allow individuals and communities to make sense of actions and events by telling stories” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 10; see also Ricoeur, 1992). Similarly, metaphors provide cognitive frameworks that can integrate values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior into cohesive political identities. Lakoff (2004), for example, has notably argued that the NATION-AS-FAMILY conceptual metaphor underlies ideological identity in American politics—with conservatives adopting a morality system that is metaphorically like a Strict Father model of the family (e.g., emphasis on self-discipline and punishment for bad behavior) and liberals adopting a morality system that is more like a Nurturant Parent model of the family (e.g., emphasis on compassion and respect). Metaphors can also dynamically shape our conversations about political matters (see, e.g., Cameron, 2010; Gibbs & Cameron, 2008). Through metaphor and narrative, “humans have agency to create new meanings and new understandings of ourselves” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 22). Both devices enable citizens to not only integrate political fragments into cohesive wholes, but metaphor and narrative also help citizens categorize new information more efficiently. Metaphor and narrative act as cognitive frames and “[f]rames function like political categories” (Nelson, 2011, p. 198.). “Categories are mental containers in a world that has only continua” (Stone, 2011, p. 381), and framing “refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). As frames, metaphor and narrative simplify the complex by focusing attention to particular attributes of an object, issue, or event, while masking others. Although the framing process facilitates cognitive efficiency, it leaves individuals susceptible to bias, misperception, and manipulation. More specifically, an adopted frame guides the subsequent search for and interpretation of new information, and “if the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off” (Lakoff, 2004, p. 17). To illustrate, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that the alternative metaphoric frames of crime-as-a- beast or crime-as-a-virus not only influenced the crime policy interventions respondents supported (e.g., enforcement vs. structural reforms, respectively), but the frames exerted an early effect by biasing the information search. Berinsky and Kinder (2006) similarly found that American perceptions of the Kosovo crisis were skewed according to whether study participants received the humanitarian or risk-to-America narrative, and the storied frames once again affected how information was sought and remembered. The heuristic nature of metaphoric and narrative frames means that facts can be omitted, distorted, or misremembered, and citizens can draw incorrect inferences. For example, viewing former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as “America’s lapdog” during the Iraq War underestimates the role his own convictions and motivations played in his decision making (see, e.g., Azubuike, 2005). Similarly, the narrative of US Senator and former presidential hopeful John McCain as a “maverick” may disproportionately attribute his political successes to his assertive, rebellious attitude when his capacity to forge political relationships was likely to be just as important. Revising frames or beliefs in light of conflicting information can be cognitively taxing. Because competing narratives and metaphors place different “spins” on the same information, these devices can contain the balance of power—with the “warring with words” resulting in the “winning with words,” as balance shifts to the side holding the dominant metaphor or narrative (see, e.g., Nelson, 2011). Ryan and Gamson (2006) similarly asserted that “[f]acts take on meaning by being embedded in frames, which render them relevant and significant or irrelevant and trivial. The contest is lost at the outset if we allow our adversaries to define what facts are relevant” (p. 14). Consequently, metaphor and narrative help explain collective divisions, including those based on ideology, partisanship, ethnicity, and nationality. In the case of national or ethnic conflicts, for example, opposing groups often adopt narratives that cast their own group as the victim or protagonist and the other group as perpetrator or antagonist, omitting the negative attributes of their own group, thereby limiting its accountability. In this sense, narrative can act to perpetuate a group-serving bias. With their role in structuring how citizens see the political world, metaphor and narrative can also be used to promote social change or justify the status quo and governmental decisions. Narratives become vehicles for action because they organize “plans, schemes, projects, and goals....providing a means for future actions” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 69). Narratives give coherence to the personal lives of social activists, but also help other citizens make sense of why things are the way they are, as in the case of Palestinian and Israeli youths (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Metaphoric frames have been used to make some government initiatives more palatable to the public, such as George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” (e.g., Steuter & Will, 2008). One factor that makes metaphor and narrative powerful devices for promoting social change or securing public support is their emotional content (see, e.g., Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001). For example, in the recent US presidential election, Mitt Romney’s campaign ran an emotionally-arousing commercial titled “Dear Daughter” where a mother narrated a dismal picture of the country and its prospects by piecing together fragments of statistics when welcoming her newborn child “to America.” Both metaphor and narrative demonstrate the difficulty of separating affect from cognition, further challenging the ideal notion of a “disembodied Cartesian citizen” (see Fischman & Haas, 2012). 4 ￼Because of the perceptual biases they can instill and the values, beliefs, and ￼motivations they embody, metaphor and narrative provide crucial predispositions in civic ￼cognition. As motivated reasoners (Taber & Lodge, 2006), citizens process new information ￼and events with adopted storylines or metaphoric source analogs; citizens do not “treat new ￼information evenhandedly” (Taber, 2011, p. 380). Metaphor and narrative structure previous ￼knowledge and experience into influential resources for political understanding, enabling ￼citizens to see how various pieces fit together, formulate worldviews, derive explanations, ￼attribute causation, and make predictions—whether accurate or not. Despite their powerful ￼influence in structuring political understanding, empirical research on the roles of metaphor ￼and narrative in civic cognition is not exhaustive. For example, empirical work on metaphor in ￼politics has predominately examined the influence of “given” metaphors as found in elite ￼discourse or priming experiments, emphasizing metaphor’s capacity in persuasion rather than ￼reasoning (Bougher, 2012). Similarly, more empirical work is needed on narrative’s role in ￼shaping individual subjectivity, including the effects of elite narratives and moving away from ￼the predominant focus on the formation of national identity (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Part ￼of the challenge in elaborating the roles of cognitive constructs like metaphor and narrative in ￼civic cognition is that their influence can operate automatically and largely outside of ￼conscious awareness (i.e., they are implicit; see, e.g., Bougher, 2012). While unconscious ￼processing can tackle more complex decisions with greater efficiency and fewer cognitive ￼limitations (Taber, 2011), devising empirical methods that capture the extent of implicit ￼procedures in civic understanding and cognition is far more difficult. ￼￼

#### Contention 2 is the operation

#### My advocacy – I affirm the resolution metaphorically.

#### The metaphor of organ procurement and transfer rupture the body-state – incorporating parts of each others’ bodies affirm a form of global citizenship

Fishel 9 [(Stefanie, Postdoctoral Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at Colgate University, AAUW American Fellow 2010-2011) “Profanation and Body Parts: An Experiment Agamben and IR” Submitted to the International Studies Association Conference Feb 2009] AT

This exploration is also based on the belief that the human body can be studied as a microcosm and the insights garnered at the corporeal level can be used to illuminate the assumptions that we make about parts and wholes, the one to the many, the self to the global. “The human body and its transplantable parts reveal much about the values we assign to the private self, sociality and intimacy, humanity, and human nature” (Sharp 2007, 17). The body also creates it own borders, and the body’s inviolability or disaggregation is an important debate that mirror debates about national borders. Who do we want to keep out and who deserves to be secured within? “With the specter of ethnic cleansing hovering over the world and with the paranoid policing of borders in the U.S. and elsewhere, the commerce in human bodies has a menacing pragmatism--getting rid of certain (radically unstable) categories of people, so-called undesirables… , and, in so doing, creating the means to save those worth saving …” (Stanford 1997, 31). Our ideas of what make us human, whole, and pure have always been at the forefront of the creation of political order. The history of colonization demonstrates the reality of placing some outside of what the center considers “human.” Even with a growing international controversy over organ procurement from Chinese prisoners 5 and the international trafficking of organs from India 6 and South America 7 , the discourses (and politics) of organ trade and procurement remain heavily medicalized, technical, and based on “expert opinion.” This bares a deep faith in technology as the redemptive force in the modern world (Stanford 1997, 34), and demonstrates that many believe that technology can answer all of contemporary society’s problems. This focus elides the majority of ethical and political issues raised by organ transfer and procurement. In many ways, technology and medical advances are beginning to make literal what was once a metaphor. The body can now literally be taken apart and shared with organ transplantation. What does it mean when the human body can be disaggregated into fragments that are derived from a particular person but are no longer constitutive of human identity? Pig’s islets and heart valves are used to replace failing human parts. Even at a less "theoretical" level, organ transfer and xenotransplantation forces us to deeply reevaluate what it means to be human and entangled in diverse relationships that defy borders, and even species distinction. In organ transfer, both the donor and recipient have to come to terms with, for lack of a better phrase, being un-whole. In xenografting, fears of contamination from a "lesser" being predominate. Discourses of purity and altruism thoroughly penetrate both of these discourses. If a new conception of what it means to be human follows from medical innovation what would be the legal, political and ethical status of this new being? Following Donna Haraway, can this new being deny a desire for wholeness or unity as an end, but accept the fractured identities and parts that create her and search for unity and connection with other beings, both like and unlike? Responsibilities are likely to be radically different given the changing life forms and novel social relationships based on the sharing of organs, tissues, and genes, to name but a few. At its most radical, these interminglings/incorporations of strangers/animals into our very bodies may lead us to create and embrace forms of global community not based on citizenship in a particular state or because of a certain ethnicity. This will be kinship by blood, but not in a way we have experienced thus far in the course of human history. I chose organ transfer and procurement to serve two purposes in this paper: the first, as I illustrated above, is to use the body to illuminate what assumptions under gird our ideas of the global and the human and question these hidden assumptions and to demonstrate that emergent material realities question IR’s theoretical relevance to the world. This paper also takes a sideways stab at two assumptions that persist in IR: well functioning states take care of the bodies inside their borders (and hence IR theory does not have to) and, secondly, our deep liberal commitments to individuality by demonstrating that our bodies are not the stable, sacred wholes we once thought they were. 8 [This paper has its own underlying assumption that the sovereign order, both national and somatic, are losing their power over reality and metaphor. This is evidenced in academia by the plethora of globalization literature debating the strengths and weaknesses of the State as new actors, technologies, and threats challenge its global authority. States continue to “fail,” and, increasingly military intervention is needed. Global networks, both malevolent and benign, bare the inadequacy of the state form as able to combat or support alternate forms of organization. While the breakdown of the sovereign nation state is indeed a persistent topic in IR, little is theorized about the concomitant questioning of the human body’s role as metaphor. One can begin to muse over advances in science, medicine, and technology related to the body and how this may shed light on the changes occurring in IR as a discourse and global politics as a whole] What relations of force and power animate and direct global somatic flows? To borrow from Michel Foucault, “the problem is not so much that of defining a political ‘position’ (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and bring into being new schemas of politicisation. If ‘politicisation’ means falling back on ready made choices and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the 8 relations of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile” (Foucault, 190). The second, and the focus of the remainder of the paper is that organ transplantation science tends to elicit strong feelings—both disgust and hope. Issues that incite moral panic and horror are often the sites that offer the richest data. They leave us feeling off-kilter and adrift; this space of moral and ethical confusion opens up alternative ways of thinking, “an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build” (Haraway 1992, 295). This opens the door to Agamben and his “praise of profanation.” The very act of organ transplantation and the creation of brain death criteria to facilitate the harvesting of organs from cadavars and non-beating heart donation (NBHD) are often debated in terms of the sacred and the profane. Along with the theoretical commitments outlined above, this paper also works to make these issues a political project aimed at critiquing both the biopolitical state and the international state system in such a way that does not reify the system itself. At base, this is a thought experiment that questions the current biopolitical order and its responses to organ transfer—a way to “wrest from the apparatus the potentiality it has captured.” Rather than point out the tendencies of the biopolitical state and global capitalism, ad nauseam, we can “play,” “profane,” and protect moments of pure means in an endeavor not to aid the state in its production of sovereign power or join in the capitalist spectacle of late modernity. It is an important task to derail these tendencies, not support them through constant critique and attention 9 . The remainder of this experiment will briefly touch on the details of organ transfer, and, through Agamben and the profane point out its unique ability to illuminate global politics.

#### My affirmation is crucial – revealing the ways metaphors shape our understanding is critical to equip citizens with the tools to think for themselves and avoid exploitation – key to democratic citizenship and social inclusion

Bougher 14 [(Lori, Postdoctoral Research Associate at Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) “COGNITIVE COHERENCE IN POLITICS: UNIFYING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CIVIC COGNITION” in Warring with Words: Narrative and Metaphor in Politics, April 29] AT

Metaphor, Narrative, and Political Learning: Suggestions for Civic Education The pervasive roles of metaphor and narrative in shaping our understanding of the social world make them crucial components for civic education. Although the extent of public malleability and its underlying processes are still under debate, public ignorance does leave citizens susceptible to political manipulation and exploitation (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011). Consequently, to safeguard democratic functioning, it is ideal to have a populace that is discriminating, yet not obdurately biased when processing new information (Chong & Druckman, 2011). Metaphor and narrative can help foster the development of critical citizenship through education in three main ways. Not only are they instrumental educational resources in their own right, but metaphor and narrative offer the opportunity to facilitate critical reflection and civic tolerance. Metaphor and narrative as educational tools Metaphor and narrative have long been appreciated as educational instruments. While a full review of this work is outside the confines of this chapter, it is important to highlight that metaphors and narratives can ease the teaching of abstract or difficult concepts and materials. Because metaphor is a form of analogical reasoning, it is fundamental for abstract learning and causal understanding (Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Colhoun & Gentner, 2009, respectively), making it particularly instructive when teaching science and mathematics (see, e.g., Duit, 1991; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007). In general, academic texts contain more metaphors than are found in the news, works of fiction, or conversations (Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, & Krennmayr, 2010). Narrative can equally help students integrate chronological events and causal relations in science texts (van den Broek, 2010). Even more, narratives in history textbooks help shape national identities, imbuing historical facts (or fiction) with cultural values, beliefs, practices, and ideals in compacted form (e.g., Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Metaphors enable teachers to explain complex topics and issues in terms that are more familiar to students; teachers can use narratives to organize a myriad of facts or events into more memorable storylines. In this sense, metaphor and narrative are both instructional tools available to educators, including those teaching history and civic education courses. Making the implicit visible in individual cognition and intergroup reconciliation Metaphor and narrative are no doubt useful instructional devices for teachers, but rather than acting simply as supplementary vehicles to convey some other kind of subject material, can metaphor and narrative themselves also be the explicit subject of learning? 7 Because metaphor and narrative are so integral to human cognition, students already frame difficult materials through these lenses without much prompting. For example, students generate their own spontaneous metaphors to make sense of challenging concepts in mathematics and science (e.g., Jakobson &Wickman, 2007; Oehrtman, 2009; Schinck, Neale, Pugalee, & Cifarelli, 2008). The question is whether teaching students more explicitly about how they understand politics and process political decisions can make them think more critically as citizens. Rather than focusing on the repetition of political facts, can drawing their attention to their own biases, misconceptions, erroneous inferences, and susceptibilities to outside influences, such as media persuasion, foster more adaptive and critical civic awareness? This would involve bringing largely implicit processes and dispositions into conscious awareness, “making thinking visible” (see Ritchhart, Church, & Morrison, 2011). Bringing spontaneous metaphors and narratives into conscious awareness may encourage citizens to think more critically about political issues. This is what happened in an innovative study examining discourse in political blogs (Baumer, Sinclair, &Tomlinson, 2010). A web application called metaViz identified conceptual metaphors contained in political blogs and then visually displayed those metaphors to blog readers for comment. The researchers then analyzed the content of the comments left by blog readers and found that bringing metaphors into conscious awareness not only prompted readers to critically reflect on the aptness of the metaphor, but it also facilitated creative thinking about the issue at hand. Explicit discussions of metaphors and narratives that underlie political cognition may not only help students understand how they themselves make political decisions, but can potentially facilitate the understanding of others’ viewpoints and promote more effective communication. Although their work does not deal with civic education or students, Cameron and Maslen (2010) have poignantly argued that political communication can be improved by identifying the metaphors that underlie how different groups understand political issues. In particular, Cameron and Maslen focused on the issue of terrorism and compared the metaphors used by the political elite versus the general public. They found that members of the general public were more likely than experts to understand governmental responses to terrorism in terms of body, animal, or physical action metaphors; in addition, while both groups used a balance metaphor, they used it differently, with the public using it to emphasize disruption after a terrorist act and experts using it to convey agency to restore equilibrium. The authors have suggested that experts can mitigate the public’s negative feelings, such as helplessness, and promote positive feelings in the advent of a terrorist act if they tailor their communication in light of these different applications of metaphor. The exchange of personal narratives too can help facilitate wider understanding. Not only did volunteering in a soup kitchen expose youths to personal narratives of homelessness that helped correct inaccurate stereotypes and flawed attributional reasoning, but discussing 8 these experiences of volunteering in the classroom helped students construct their own political identities (Yates & Youniss, 1996). As mentioned, contrasting metaphors and narratives can often underlie deep divisions in political understanding and perception. When individuals exchange personal narratives about political events and issues, this can help mitigate rigid “us” versus “them” dichotomies (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, p. 91). Oftentimes, “[s]uccessful reframing involves the ability to enter into the worldview of our adversaries” (Ryan & Gamson, 2006, p. 14). Mio (1996) found that political actors were more persuasive when they adopted and extended the metaphoric frames used by their opponent to structure their own counter-arguments rather than when they introduced a different metaphor into the debate. Political arguments are therefore strengthened when the metaphoric frameworks introduced by political opponents are taken into account (see also, e.g., Lakoff & Wehling, 2012). Narrative and metaphor thus offer the potential to both help identify and challenge preexisting ideologies (see, e.g., Alsup, 2003 for an application of this method to teachers themselves). While many studies document how citizens rely on cognitive heuristics in politics, more empirical work is needed on what happens when individuals are made aware of the biases and processes that underlie their political beliefs, attitudes, and decisions. Fischman and Haas (2012) have contended that “we cannot make much progress by ignoring the unconscious and automatic levels of thinking, which are not easily dissuaded with rational and factual arguments alone” (p. 187). The most educated and engaged citizens are often the most susceptible to bias (e.g., Taber, 2011), and research has shown that political misperceptions can be difficult to correct (Nyhan & Reilfer, 2010; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). These latter studies, however, focus on whether or not individuals update their political preferences in light of further information. Because we know that citizens seek and incorporate political facts in a biased manner, would it not be more efficient to bring the cognitive biases to their attention rather than simply presenting them with further information? Although this question still requires empirical study, some findings merit optimism for formal instruction that emphasizes the how over the what in social, and thereby political, reasoning. For example, formal education—particularly that which includes inferential rules students have already partially induced from their everyday lives—has been found to improve reasoning skills under certain conditions (Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988). But even the authors of this research added that “we know very little about reasoning and how to teach it” (Ibid., p. 441). Speculating on how to reduce the effects of implicit stereotypes, Banaji and Greenwald (1994) asserted that “drawing social category information into conscious awareness allows mental (cognitive and motivational) resources to overrule the consciously unwanted but unconsciously operative response” (p. 70). Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) have similarly questioned whether making individuals aware of extraneous feelings of disgust (i.e., those that are unrelated to the judgment at hand) can limit its heuristic effects on moral reasoning, such as in the case of jurors who may judge a defendant with a facial deformity more harshly because of those displaced feelings of disgust. This idea of testing the effects of bringing biases and heuristics into conscious awareness is likely to attract only further attention in the future because it affects decision making in so many social domains, whether it involve law, economics, politics, and so on. But the question for civic reasoning and cognition remains: Can bringing metaphor and narrative in particular into conscious awareness enhance civic competence, deliberation, communication, and tolerance? Designing new benchmarks and assessments for civic education If research confirmed that citizens can, in fact, improve their political decisions or become more tolerant when they become aware of the processes and biases that underlie their political beliefs and cognition, this would suggest the desirability of reforms in terms of how students are educated for their roles as citizens. Not least, this would further challenge any paradigms that prize the rote memorization of political facts alone. It may be more effective to teach students how to approach political information, rather than presenting information on its own—focusing on the how rather than what of political thinking. This focus may be especially important for encouraging critical reflection and social tolerance in an information age where opinions increasingly infiltrate the media in lieu of “hard facts” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011; see also Graber & Holyk, 2011; Jamieson & Hardy, 2011), and during a time when “the burden of democracy has shifted from skepticism about the competence of citizens to doubts and concerns about the wisdom and responsibility of their political leaders” (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2011, p. 726). Educational approaches that more fully incorporate metaphor and narrative as civic tools complement definitions of civic competence that extend beyond full information alone. For example, Haste (2009) has identified managing uncertainty and ambiguity, managing technological change, agency and responsibility, finding and sustaining community, and managing emotion as five key civic competences. She has defined competence as the “capacity for adaptive responses and for appropriate interpretation of information” (p. 207), contending that it “is about effective and adaptive tool use” (p. 214). A more explicit recognition and discussion of cognitive frames such as metaphor and narrative may also facilitate open classroom climates, interactive discussions, and exposure to and “grappling with” diverse view—all of which have been identified as important school-based antecedents that foster Western democratic values such as critical reflection, tolerance of dissenting views, and social trust (Ferreira, Azevedo, & Menezes, 2012; Flanagan, Stoppa, Syvertsen, & Stout, 2010; Hess, 2009; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2006; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). Rather than setting the less realistic goal of eradicating the use of heuristics in political 10 understanding, it may be more effective to teach students how to better use those cognitive devices. Compelling individuals to want to revise their perceptions can be challenging. “The decision to appraise or reconsider the evidence takes time, is effortful, assumes one is somehow aware of having a biased set of considerations in mind, and believes the need to be accurate is worth the effort that will be required to rethink the issue” (Taber, 2011, p. 376). Schools can therefore be the ideal setting for intervention to help train students early on to think more critically about politics. In addition to challenging top-down, knowledge-based pedagogical paradigms (Haste, 2009), there is a need for “a revitalized sense of democracy within early childhood” (Farquhar, 2010, p. 6). By helping students understand their own perceptions of the political world, as well as those of others, and allowing students to generate creative responses, metaphor and narrative foster both interpretation and imagination—two elements that would contribute towards an ethical paradigm for civic education (see Farquhar, 2010; Ricoeur, 1992). Politics, as noted, represents a dynamic, uncertain, complex, and abstract world. As such, equipping students with a transferable, “adaptive toolbox” (see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002) may best facilitate the type of critical civic awareness, reflection and deliberation that will foster popular sovereignty and reason-based public talk, reinforcing democratic governance (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2011; Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini, 2009). As it stands, at least in the United States, citizens tend to perform better on questions pertaining to stable elements or anchors in the political domain, such as institutions and political processes, and fare worse on questions regarding dynamic elements, such as candidates and issues (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996)—which is, paradoxically, where their vote has the most immediate impact. A shift of focus to adaptive training and toolsets would entail civic education programs adopting new forms of assessment that extend beyond the reproduction of political information.

#### The resolution is inevitably tied to tension between the body politic and human body – the AC is crucial to interrogate how organ policies reflect a conceptualization that sanctifies the body politic by treating our bodies as a matter of the health of the state.

Jones 11 [gender-modified] [(Rhys Jones, cultural and historical geographer; Mark Whitehead’s, focuses on the links between geography, philosophy and environmental politics; Jessica Pykett, researches educational state-citizen relations; Marc Welsh, research associate; all are researchers in Human Geography at the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University) “A body politic – the right to make live and let die” Governingtemptation blog oct 13] AT

Most political geographers would get the allusion of the title. The first part is to the 17th century world of sovereignty, rights and social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes peace would be secured when “a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power” choose to covenant their individual power to the ‘body politic’ by relinquishing some of their rights to a sovereign (the right to make war or take life for example) [see Hobbes 1640, Chp XIX, para 8]. The second part references Michel Foucault’s biopower where the claim to legitimacy by ‘the state’ is based on the guarding and fostering of productive life (see Foucault “Society Must Be Defended, Lectures 1975-76”, page 241) and the commensurate extension of state control over the biological. Foucault argued that in modernity [hu]man’s existence as biological (in contrast to legal or political) beings becomes the target of state strategies (biopower). He distinguished two forms of biopower: anatomo-politics and biopolitics – the former targeting the individual subject, the human body, the latter targeting man as a collectivity, the population as a body politic. Donor Card Concern with life and death of the individual and population comes to the fore in the questions around organ donation, revealing tensions between the body-politic and the politics of the body. Defaults, organs and the state Sadly it is statistically likely that three people in the UK died today awaiting a suitable donor. As Rhys, Jessica and Mark noted in their article “Geographies of Soft Paternalism”, published earlier this year, “organ donation has become an intensive site for soft paternalist policy experimentation […] One classic tool of soft paternalism [that] has been controversially proposed as an ultimate solution to organ donation shortfalls: the re-setting of the organ donation default.” [draft for Geog Compass viewed here] In the UK this default is based on the notion that the body is gifted, that is it is voluntarily made available for use after death through an act of conscious choice. So we have an opt-in system where people choose to enter their names on an Organ Donor Register. Doing so is simple, via phone, online or at various sites that we all visit such as the doctors surgery. Yet despite the ease and our consistent collective affirmation that organ donation is a good thing and we would like to be an organ donor in reality only about a quarter of us have done it. This coupled with increasing surgical advances, problems of organ compatibility, and the increase in demand (as life style related conditions like diabetes, liver and heart disease continue to rise) has seen year on year repeated headlines about soaring waiting list times. Switching to a system based on ‘presumed consent’, (where the citizen is entered onto the register and has to opt-out of it) has been debated in the UK for years. It is common in much of Europe and seems to result in higher donor rates but local and cultural factors may be equally significant. In nudge terminology this is changing the default option, a powerful tool for changing behaviour because the default position is what happens when you have a choice but choose to do nothing. The rationale for the presumed consent default is that numerous surveys show wide public support and a willingness to be entered on the register of organ donors but that that support is not reflected in the number who actually make the effort to place themselves on it. Why this is the case is varied, with the failure to follow through on stated preferences ranging from irrationality and insecurity – that doctors will not work as hard to save a patient, or an aversion to thinking about ones own death – to simple inertia – people are not motivated enough to enact their preferences by seeking out a means of entering their name on the donor register But messing with the body, or more precisely the corpse, is a provocative act that turns the body into a site of contestation between state and citizen. In particular some argue that subtle changes in the default position like this reflects the over-reaching of the state and people’s loss of control over their own bodies following death. Indeed in the absence of actual consent the autonomy of the individual, the patient, is undermined. As such changing the default for organ donation raises fundamental questions about legitimate state action and personal freedom. One of these was pointedly raised by the Archbishop of Wales in his Presidential Address to the Governing Body of the Church in Wales last month when he argued: Archbishop Barry Morgan “There is, in presumed consent, a subtle or perhaps not so subtle change of emphasis in the relationship between the individual and the State. That is, that unless we have opted out, our organs belong to the State and the State has the right to do with them as it wills.”

#### Contention 3 is the suture

#### The aff’s representation of metaphor allows us to shift the frame

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Prepared for the ISA Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011] AT

Admittedly, this is a difficult task as there is no “outside” in which to place oneself to predict, study, and reflect on what happens “inside.” 6 We are embedded in our world--our thinking in the world and acting in the world are impossible to disentangle. This paper contends that trying to untangle ourselves would be a step in the wrong direction in this debate about our ability to attend to our ethical obligations in the world--a move that would cover up the politics that will be needed to engage in the world. Or as Latour succinctly sums up: “But obviously, in insisting ceaselessly on the existence of an external world beyond discussion, directly known without mediation, without controversy, without history, they render all political will impotent. Public life is reduced to a rump of itself” (Latour 2002, 78). I am also aware of the need to see the “big picture” sometimes. After all, this is global politics. So, without trying to extricate ourselves how do we see pictures forming that are larger than the singular view? This singular (subjective) view can be personal or disciplinary, but we often need to change perspective in order for different views to come into focus. This lack of distance can also cause feelings of panic as well as methodological conundrums. Part of this panic comes from realizing that “there is no ‘metalanguage’--that there is nowhere outside a signifying system from which to pronounce upon it; further, that it is one of the illusions that the signifying system enables and sustains. We are now compelled to achieve ways of sorting things out without the safety net of distance, ways that are linked to ways of sorting things out ethically and politically” (Morton 2007, 26-27). While there is no metalanguage, IR still functions on myth and metaphor, and these need to be examined critically. In this paper, metaphor and metagenomics functions as an aid to thinking critically and in creating a novel and productive framework for a new kind of body politic. This is done, in part, by allowing us to recognize the way in which IR theories and metaphors work in IR (balance of power, body politic, organs of the United Nations, surgical strike). What is more important is how they consciously and unconsciously bias our understandings and reactions to events and ideas. Science studies and the anthropology of science also aids in this endeavor by complicating the seemingly easy choice between social construction and reality (see Latour 2002) often put forward in both the social sciences and the physical sciences. For example, it is the contention of this paper that one idea of the body politic based on material bodies is more “real” or “true” than another, but that these ideas both open up and shut down myriad ways of understanding and shaping politics based on these bodies.

### Extra Solvency Cards

#### This metaphor allows us to radically disintegrate the divisions between bodies – by literally dismembering the divisions between bodies, we metaphorically dismember the divisions between states.

Palmie 6 [(Stephan Palmié, Professor of Anthropology and of Social Sciences at University of Chicago) “THINKING WITH NGANGAS: REFLECTIONS ON EMBODIMENT AND THE LIMITS OF “OBJECTIVELY NECESSARY APPEARANCES” Comparative Studies in Society and History] AT

Still, it is not just the semantic weight of concrete possibilities of bodily fragmentation and artificial recombination that is eroding the semantic functionality of the economic construct of individual embodiment and self-possession as the hegemonic signifier of social personhood. For, to give yet another example, it is precisely the vocabulary of contemporary immunology -- rife as it is with metaphors of high-tech military defense systems and post-industrial flexible accumulation (cf. Haraway 1991: 203-230, Martin 1994) -- which undermines the cultural salience of the definitions of biotic individuality on which it focuses to a degree where biological and social "non-self recognition" are no longer easily reconcilable. As Renée Fox (1996:255f.) reports, increasing biomedical control over the "rejection reaction" in transplant surgery (commonly conceived as based in a "natural" capacity of the body to distinguish between "self" and "non-self") appears to suggest that "the capacity of immunosuppressive, anti-rejection drugs to induce the recipient’s body to “tolerate” and retain whole-organ grafts rests on a process of cell-migration and systemic chimerism". What occurs is that "a population of donor cells (leukocytes) from the transplanted organ migrates to and ́seeds ́ other tissue of the recipient ́s body; simultaneously, a “reverse traffic” of similar recipient cells flows into the graft", eventually producing a relatively stable, chimeric unit: a heterogeneous individual in which both the biological, and social boundaries between "donor" and "recipient" have become blurred. What language (other than that of Greek mythology) might be appropriate to these processes? What imagery or narrative might reconcile such techno-biotic events with market- inculcated understandings of skin-bound individuality? Surely, the joining of gametes in sexual reproduction would seem a rather troubling analogy. Yet would we rather speak of alien tissue colonizing its new milieu? Might slave labor or the more benign image of the naturalization of economically vital immigrants provide an adequate metaphor? Or would we follow the physician and psychiatrist Stuart Youngner (1996:49) who provocatively speaks of transplantation as "a form of non-oral cannibalism, that is, the taking of the flesh and blood of one person into another"? Were we to agree with the philosopher and prominent bioethics-advocate H. Tristram Engelhardt, this, indeed, might be our conclusion: expounding on Hegel ́s theories of property Engelhardt (1996:155) argues that There is nothing we can more fully grasp [in the sense of a Hegelian seizure] or use [in Locke ́s sense] than ourselves. We render things ours by eating and devouring them, by incorporating them into ourselves. They become part of us, such that an action against them is an act against us as persons and therefore a violation of the morality of mutual respect.

#### This recognition of the porosity of the human body allows us to break down

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Prepared for the ISA Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011] AT

These insights can be applied analogically as well as metaphorically. Metagenomics can speak productively to theories of the state in IR as most theorizing about community begins and ends with the instantiation of sovereignty in the territorially bounded, homogenous nation-state. If this state form can be likened to the “pure culture paradigm” 14 critiqued in the report on metagenomics then compelling analogies can follow. The committee believes that this paradigm has both limited what microbiologists have studied and has also limited how they think about microbes. The emphasis has been on answering “Who is there?” rather than “What are they doing?” The methods used in metagenomics can answer the second question more completely as well as lead the discussion toward “What is being done by the community?” (Metagenomics 2007, 30) Microbes can “eat” rocks, “breathe” metals, transform the inorganic to the organic, and crack the toughest of chemical compounds. They achieve these amazing feats in a sort of microbial “bucket brigade”—each microbe performs its own task, and its end product becomes the starting fuel for its neighbor. For complex transformations, no microbe can do it alone—it takes a community. For example, no microbial species is capable of completely oxidizing ammonia to nitrate, but teams of microbes do it efficiently (Metagenomics 2007, 20). Pure cultures are unable to see the dynamics of communities. By dissecting and isolating the world into discrete sovereign states, we are unable to see other collaborations that may be possible. The language of sovereignty and sovereign power have always desired to make life livable. This, following Hobbes and Locke, is conceived of keeping others out and setting up boundaries between us and chaos. In Hobbesean language, this entailed a movement from the state of nature where life is “nasty, brutish, and short” to the safety of the great Leviathan. The preservation of the body and the body politic has had multiple figurations--the state and nation, of course, looming the largest in this horizon of politics, but these figurations have never quite worked completely. Other world views and truth claims have tried, but nothing has quite captured the extent to which we are blended and imbricated with each other--both between and across species boundaries and national boundaries. These leakages, or how these problems exceed the capacity of the sovereign state and the system of sovereign states, are the problems of modern politics. We can see them reflected in current debates in international politics: immigration, refugees, predator states, nuclear proliferation, and climate change. “[I]n the pure- culture paradigm, the presence of multiple species in the same culture medium means ‘contamination,’” (Metagenomics 2007, 22) and it is not unusual for claims of purity to result in ethnic cleansing and other forms of extreme violence. We may be autonomous and bounded by our skin, but we are also heterogeneous and we exist by harboring difference in the gut (Napier 2003, 211) and in fetal-maternal relations (Esposito 2008), to name but two instances. It is how we imagine these lines and borders that shape our idea of politics. If we look at the relationships in the human body and apply this to responses to immigrants we can see the absurdity of current policies. Society depends on migrants, the modern state is made of aliens who have become citizens. We underestimate how dependent we are and how contingent those boundaries have become, but rather than see this as a time to panic and frantically redraw lines in the sand over and again, it can be a moment to encourage encounters not dependent on the sovereign and the state. We need to be “contaminated” to stay healthy (Hadley 2004). The question then becomes: What kind of life is possible--what kind of body politic is needed--if we think about symbiosis and commensal relationships rather than purity and quarantines? This paper demonstrates that insights from the life sciences and metagenomics can both help us see other actants as vital to both politics and survival, support a critique of the state as a “pure culture” paradigm, and help foster, through metaphoricity and analogy, what the Committee on Metagenomics calls the “grandmother” of a paradigm shift in the realm of international politics. In the language of biology: “It will refocus us one level higher in the biological hierarchy (molecules, cells, organisms, species, populations, communities, the biosphere). It will shift the emphasis from individuals to interactions, from parts to processes” (Metagenomics 2007). In global politics, this begins to create framework for a materialist conception of life and force us to acknowledge from both inside and outside our bodies that Cartesian dualism and Newtonian atomism has proven inadequate. As our understanding of the complexity, porosity, and amalgamation of the human body with other beings has grown, so, too, must our idea of the “body politic.” A “new anatomy of collective bodies” (Hardt 2009, 26) and the political ethics appropriate to this anatomy must be debated in as many forums as possible. How will traditional notions of state sovereignty and policies of national security have to be altered? What other kinds of organization can we imagine beyond the Westphalian system? How could different metaphors, such as Timothy Morton’s mesh and Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome work to transform our notions of political community? If, as Jane Bennett writes, “We see how an animal, plant, mineral, or artifact can sometimes catalyze a public” (Bennett 2010, 107) how do we progress? This interest in enriching, enlarging, and recognizing other actants in our global demos is coupled with the denigration of classical categories such as sovereignty, law, and democracy. They may “continue to organize current political discourse--but their effective meaning always appears weaker and lacking any real interpretive capacity” (Esposito 2008, 13). Many pressing concerns exceed our political systems and categories and efforts should be made to scrutinize each and admit the possibility of other forms of life as we are both responsible for and need to find a way to respond to a mulititude of actants in a global demos.

#### Merely erasing the lines of IR risks reinscribing them, and fails to recognize how the state and individual are co-constituted – only poking holes in the rigid boundaries of the body-state can solve

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

However, I am unwilling to add to a growing literature about shifting or moving our focus in IR to different levels of analysis--instead of the international, the world; instead of the state, the individual; instead of anarchy, cooperation. By using the body, through the interrogation of bodily metaphors in politics, it is my aim to not to draw a simple line from the international to the individual as a way to ‘fix’ modern forms of violence created by certain conceptions of the international and an international system of states and subjects, but to look at the practices that create borders, exclusions, and limits in both time and space. Necessarily, it will include an admission that drawing these lines is a complex practice--merely erasing them or replacing them will not lead us out of a politics of the international to a more inclusive politics of the world or one based on the concerns of indiviuals (Walker, 2010, 6). This in no way endorses a move from state politics to body politics as a solution to the problem. The state and the individual are co-constituted from the very beginning in Western politics. This will not change outcomes or alleviate violence--it only serves to reinforce claims about how we think about subject creation and the borders that separate an idea of ‘I’ or ‘we’ from others. In this work, I do not seek to ‘embody’ International Relations, but to dislocate it, 5 to make it question the limits it has set in sovereign subjectivity and its anthropocentric practices. By this I mean that this project is not trying to find a ‘deeper’ or more ‘authentic’ meaning in the body, but to investigate how body metaphors operate in International Relations in order to determine what kinds of violence these body metaphors permit or excuse. We understand more about the human body and its processes than political theorists did when they began to imagine political metaphors based on the body. Illustrative of these new understandings, organs are exchanged on the global market and genomic information flows across borders; bacterial and viral communities, both symbiotic and pathogenic, affect our bodies and through this our politics. We can no longer uphold the the fiction of autonomous selfhood. This means the view of the body as a ‘free agent’ or Newtonian actor with sharp boundaries and distinctions from other bodies must be questioned. In fact, a larger question that this dissertation struggles with is what it means to be human now that we know other clife forms in our body outnumber us DNA-wise an estimated 9 to 1. “It might be important to figure out whether persons really are solid, single, lasting, and independent beings. This has huge implications for ethics and politics” (Morton, 2010, 119). The examples offered in this paper will force us to look at both inside and outside our bodies in order to unsettle the view of an Cartesian object/subject we thought was ‘natural’ and human. It will use the body metaphor to re-articulate politics at the borders to open up a space to begin to ask different questions about world order. On a larger level, I hope, through careful examination of the underlying normative claims of scientific and medical advances, to trace a history of the body in order to discover the ethical commitments needed to respond to current global challenges. This will also challenge IR’s theoretical and practical understandings of the body politic in order to interrogate whether the tools and ways of thinking in traditional IR are sufficient for answering the challenges and opportunities raised by new understandings of the body and the body politic in the 21st century. These examples force us to question traditional means of state and individual security connected to sovereignty and the sovereign state advanced in the field of IR, both as a discourse and as policy. Important (and admittedly questions that will not be answered by one paper) are: What other kinds of organization can we imagine beyond the Westphalian state system? What new metaphors can we create or are emerging to transform our notions of political community? To begin to look seriously at these large questions, the next section will briefly explore the metaphor of the ‘body politic’ and provide an explanation of how this work defines the ‘body’ and bodies in the world.

#### Understanding the metaphors behind policymaking is a pre-requisite to debates about state policy itself

Marks 11 [Michael P. Marks (Department of Politics, Willamette University). Metaphors in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan 2011] AJ

Many of the metaphors that have been devised by scholars to frame the study of international relations are self-consciously seen as con- trivances that help observers make inferences about how international relations works. For example, in introductory international relations classes college students are frequently taught to think of the world metaphorically as a “billiard table” with states imagined as metaphor- ical “balls.”7 These billiards images ostensibly introduce students to the basic elements of traditional international relations theory. States are thought of metaphorically as “hard-shelled and impenetrable ter- ritorially sovereign states” (Opello and Rosow 1999, 226), and are said to have “interests [that] are defined exogenously” in a “process [that] is characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and unlimited state interest” (Sjursen 2001, n.p.).8 In the billiard ball model there are no “good” states or “bad” states (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 48), and “[o]nly the hard exteriors touch, and heavier or faster moving ones push others out of the way” (Burton 1972, 28). There are other metaphorical contrivances for the milieu of international relations as well. For example, the “billiard ball” metaphor can be compared to the similar-sounding, albeit theoretically opposed, “‘egg-box’ con- ception of international society” whereby “the sovereign states are the eggs, the box is international society and the purpose of the box is to ‘separate and cushion, not to act’ ” (Wheeler 1996, 126).9 The “web” or “cobweb” model challenges the billiard ball image of states as hard-shelled actors by promoting the vision of an inter- national society in which relations among a variety of global actors resemble the intertwined threads of a web-like matrix (Burton 1972, 35–45). Sometimes it seems as if the billiard ball image of inter- national relations is the target for every other metaphor that chal- lenges the theoretical implications of the billiard ball model. In their 2007 article—“Billiard Balls or Snowflakes?”—for example, Benjamin Fordham and Victor Asal (2007, 48) suggest that major powers be seen less as hard-shelled impenetrable objects and more like metaphor- ical “snowflakes” “with many potentially relevant internal character- istics.” Other metaphors include the “burning house” vision of the international system and the “forest” image of an international system comprising homogenous states pictured metaphorically as “trees.”10 In recent years scholars have become rather creative in contriving metaphors to capture what they see as the nature of the milieu that constitutes the world of international relations. Robert Kaplan (1994, 75), for example, suggests the metaphor of a “hologram” to describe what he sees as the multifaceted nature of international relations. Examining the role of metaphors that frame the context of international relations is not a purely academic exercise. There are real-world implications for foreign policymaking of these metaphors as well. During her keynote address at the Citizen Diplomacy Summit in 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made the following metaphorical observation that reflected her view of foreign policy: As you may have seen, there are also many other surveys showing that inter- national support for US foreign policy is at the lowest level since the Vietnam War. The main complaint is that we don’t take the interests of other coun- tries into account and that we are too quick to use military force. How do we explain these perceptions? What can we do to change them? I thought about this and decided that it helps to compare foreign policy to a game of pool. Everybody always talks about foreign policy as a game of chess, but that doesn’t work for me because chess is a very deliberate and slow game where you take a lot of time to make decisions. I’ve always thought that a pool table makes more sense because when one ball is hit it smacks into others, and each of them caroms around and hits some more, just like our policy mak- ers that start out in one direction, but end up going in six. Everything that happens has an effect on everything else, all of which leads us to a lot of unintended consequences. In this case it’s the invasion of Iraq that has rear- ranged the balls on the table . . . The worst days in fact may well lie ahead—but we can help the situation overall by going back to that pool table and start- ing some balls moving in a different direction. (Albright 2005a, 23 emphasis added) The Realist metaphorical imagery of these statements is unmistakable and could be recognized by any first-year student in a college intro- ductory international relations class. Albright was speaking not as an academic but as a former senior policymaker in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. However, she was speaking not as a politician trying to frame an issue or gain popular support, but rather as a policymaker schooled in the theories of international relations. Madeleine Albright was one of the major architects of U.S. foreign policy during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Scholars can argue about the motivations of Albright and others in the U.S. foreign policy establishment at that time, but what emerges from the former Secretary of State’s 2005 observations is that her own think- ing about the world has been shaped by the theoretical conclusions that follow from the billiard ball metaphor so closely associated with Realist theory. One can presume that Secretary Albright had given a good deal of thought to the way she imagines the nature of inter- national relations and that her pool table reference was not just an off-the-cuff remark.11 Rather, we can reasonably infer that the actions taken by the Clinton administration were a direct reflection of the theoretical lens Madeleine Albright carried with her as Secretary of State. Armed with clues found in Albright’s billiards ball comments, scholars who had puzzled over the motivations of the framers of U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton administration now have a better ability to understand the theoretical roots of this policy. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that metaphors that frame the context of international relations are not solely part of a purely theoretical endeavor. What constitutes the field of inquiry that falls under the rubric of international relations depends on what metaphorical perspectives shape the field. In light of this observation, this book adopts a critical perspective in analyzing the central metaphors in international relations. The term “critical” often is associated with approaches in international relations that reveal relationships of power among international actors that are concealed by traditional theoretical perspectives. This book takes a different posture, directing its attention not at international actors but at theories of international relations themselves. While it is true that many critical IR scholars have as their immediate target what they see as deficiencies in existing theoretical frameworks, for many of them the ultimate aim is to direct attention at how international affairs are constructed in ways that are not revealed by traditional theoretical approaches. In this book I am less critical of the subject matter of international relations inquiry than I am of the nature of international relations theory used to study it. I neither know nor suspect that there is something about international relations that is not revealed to IR scholars via traditional theoretical perspectives, including critical ones. Rather, I assume that how international relations is revealed reflects scholars’ own conceptual impressions that they experience through metaphors and convey to others through metaphorical expression. My purpose in this book is to critically examine metaphorical expression in international relations to see what that reveals about the theoretical propositions that characterize diverse scholarly traditions.

#### The aff’s representation of metaphor allows us to shift the frame

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Prepared for the ISA Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011] AT

Admittedly, this is a difficult task as there is no “outside” in which to place oneself to predict, study, and reflect on what happens “inside.” 6 We are embedded in our world--our thinking in the world and acting in the world are impossible to disentangle. This paper contends that trying to untangle ourselves would be a step in the wrong direction in this debate about our ability to attend to our ethical obligations in the world--a move that would cover up the politics that will be needed to engage in the world. Or as Latour succinctly sums up: “But obviously, in insisting ceaselessly on the existence of an external world beyond discussion, directly known without mediation, without controversy, without history, they render all political will impotent. Public life is reduced to a rump of itself” (Latour 2002, 78). I am also aware of the need to see the “big picture” sometimes. After all, this is global politics. So, without trying to extricate ourselves how do we see pictures forming that are larger than the singular view? This singular (subjective) view can be personal or disciplinary, but we often need to change perspective in order for different views to come into focus. This lack of distance can also cause feelings of panic as well as methodological conundrums. Part of this panic comes from realizing that “there is no ‘metalanguage’--that there is nowhere outside a signifying system from which to pronounce upon it; further, that it is one of the illusions that the signifying system enables and sustains. We are now compelled to achieve ways of sorting things out without the safety net of distance, ways that are linked to ways of sorting things out ethically and politically” (Morton 2007, 26-27). While there is no metalanguage, IR still functions on myth and metaphor, and these need to be examined critically. In this paper, metaphor and metagenomics functions as an aid to thinking critically and in creating a novel and productive framework for a new kind of body politic. This is done, in part, by allowing us to recognize the way in which IR theories and metaphors work in IR (balance of power, body politic, organs of the United Nations, surgical strike). What is more important is how they consciously and unconsciously bias our understandings and reactions to events and ideas. Science studies and the anthropology of science also aids in this endeavor by complicating the seemingly easy choice between social construction and reality (see Latour 2002) often put forward in both the social sciences and the physical sciences. For example, it is the contention of this paper that one idea of the body politic based on material bodies is more “real” or “true” than another, but that these ideas both open up and shut down myriad ways of understanding and shaping politics based on these bodies.

### 1AC Akhil

#### Contention 1 is the opening – or, the advocacy:

#### I defend the affirmation of the resolution through the metaphor of organ transplantation. Using the body as a site of dramatic rupture allows us to challenge larger forces of state-centricity in international relations. Organ procurement and transfer symbolize our shared existence and combat alterity

Fishel 9 [(Stefanie, Postdoctoral Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at Colgate University, AAUW American Fellow 2010-2011) “Profanation and Body Parts: An Experiment Agamben and IR” Submitted to the International Studies Association Conference Feb 2009] AT

This exploration is also based on the belief that the human body can be studied as a microcosm and the insights garnered at the corporeal level can be used to illuminate the assumptions that we make about parts and wholes, the one to the many, the self to the global. “The human body and its transplantable parts reveal much about the values we assign to the private self, sociality and intimacy, humanity, and human nature” (Sharp 2007, 17). The body also creates it own borders, and the body’s inviolability or disaggregation is an important debate that mirror debates about national borders. Who do we want to keep out and who deserves to be secured within? “With the specter of ethnic cleansing hovering over the world and with the paranoid policing of borders in the U.S. and elsewhere, the commerce in human bodies has a menacing pragmatism--getting rid of certain (radically unstable) categories of people, so-called undesirables… , and, in so doing, creating the means to save those worth saving …” (Stanford 1997, 31). Our ideas of what make us human, whole, and pure have always been at the forefront of the creation of political order. The history of colonization demonstrates the reality of placing some outside of what the center considers “human.” Even with a growing international controversy over organ procurement from Chinese prisoners 5 and the international trafficking of organs from India 6 and South America 7 , the discourses (and politics) of organ trade and procurement remain heavily medicalized, technical, and based on “expert opinion.” This bares a deep faith in technology as the redemptive force in the modern world (Stanford 1997, 34), and demonstrates that many believe that technology can answer all of contemporary society’s problems. This focus elides the majority of ethical and political issues raised by organ transfer and procurement. In many ways, technology and medical advances are beginning to make literal what was once a metaphor. The body can now literally be taken apart and shared with organ transplantation. What does it mean when the human body can be disaggregated into fragments that are derived from a particular person but are no longer constitutive of human identity? Pig’s islets and heart valves are used to replace failing human parts. Even at a less "theoretical" level, organ transfer and xenotransplantation forces us to deeply reevaluate what it means to be human and entangled in diverse relationships that defy borders, and even species distinction. In organ transfer, both the donor and recipient have to come to terms with, for lack of a better phrase, being un-whole. In xenografting, fears of contamination from a "lesser" being predominate. Discourses of purity and altruism thoroughly penetrate both of these discourses. If a new conception of what it means to be human follows from medical innovation what would be the legal, political and ethical status of this new being? Following Donna Haraway, can this new being deny a desire for wholeness or unity as an end, but accept the fractured identities and parts that create her and search for unity and connection with other beings, both like and unlike? Responsibilities are likely to be radically different given the changing life forms and novel social relationships based on the sharing of organs, tissues, and genes, to name but a few. At its most radical, these interminglings/incorporations of strangers/animals into our very bodies may lead us to create and embrace forms of global community not based on citizenship in a particular state or because of a certain ethnicity. This will be kinship by blood, but not in a way we have experienced thus far in the course of human history. I chose organ transfer and procurement to serve two purposes in this paper: the first, as I illustrated above, is to use the body to illuminate what assumptions under gird our ideas of the global and the human and question these hidden assumptions and to demonstrate that emergent material realities question IR’s theoretical relevance to the world. This paper also takes a sideways stab at two assumptions that persist in IR: well functioning states take care of the bodies inside their borders (and hence IR theory does not have to) and, secondly, our deep liberal commitments to individuality by demonstrating that our bodies are not the stable, sacred wholes we once thought they were. 8 [This paper has its own underlying assumption that the sovereign order, both national and somatic, are losing their power over reality and metaphor. This is evidenced in academia by the plethora of globalization literature debating the strengths and weaknesses of the State as new actors, technologies, and threats challenge its global authority. States continue to “fail,” and, increasingly military intervention is needed. Global networks, both malevolent and benign, bare the inadequacy of the state form as able to combat or support alternate forms of organization. While the breakdown of the sovereign nation state is indeed a persistent topic in IR, little is theorized about the concomitant questioning of the human body’s role as metaphor. One can begin to muse over advances in science, medicine, and technology related to the body and how this may shed light on the changes occurring in IR as a discourse and global politics as a whole] What relations of force and power animate and direct global somatic flows? To borrow from Michel Foucault, “the problem is not so much that of defining a political ‘position’ (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and bring into being new schemas of politicisation. If ‘politicisation’ means falling back on ready made choices and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the 8 relations of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile” (Foucault, 190). The second, and the focus of the remainder of the paper is that organ transplantation science tends to elicit strong feelings—both disgust and hope. Issues that incite moral panic and horror are often the sites that offer the richest data. They leave us feeling off-kilter and adrift; this space of moral and ethical confusion opens up alternative ways of thinking, “an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build” (Haraway 1992, 295). This opens the door to Agamben and his “praise of profanation.” The very act of organ transplantation and the creation of brain death criteria to facilitate the harvesting of organs from cadavars and non-beating heart donation (NBHD) are often debated in terms of the sacred and the profane. Along with the theoretical commitments outlined above, this paper also works to make these issues a political project aimed at critiquing both the biopolitical state and the international state system in such a way that does not reify the system itself. At base, this is a thought experiment that questions the current biopolitical order and its responses to organ transfer—a way to “wrest from the apparatus the potentiality it has captured.” Rather than point out the tendencies of the biopolitical state and global capitalism, ad nauseam, we can “play,” “profane,” and protect moments of pure means in an endeavor not to aid the state in its production of sovereign power or join in the capitalist spectacle of late modernity. It is an important task to derail these tendencies, not support them through constant critique and attention 9 . The remainder of this experiment will briefly touch on the details of organ transfer, and, through Agamben and the profane point out its unique ability to illuminate global politics.

#### Exclusion is the language of biopolitical domination – it’s the root cause of every global crisis – there must be a counter-movement that dismantles state focused thinking

Gulli 13 [Bruno Gullì (professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York). “For the critique of sovereignty and violence.” 2013] AJ

We live in an unprecedented time of crisis. The violence that characterized the twentieth century, and virtually all known human history before that, seems to have entered the twenty-first century with exceptional force and singularity. True, this century opened with the terrible events of September 11. However, September 11 is not the beginning of history. Nor are the histories of more forgotten places and people, the events that shape those histories, less terrible and violent – though they may often be less spectacular. The singularity of this violence, this paradigm of terror, does not even simply lie in its globality, for that is something that our century shares with the whole history of capitalism and empire, of which it is a part. Rather, it must be seen in the fact that terror as a global phenomenon has now become self-conscious. Today, the struggle is for global dominance in a singularly new way, and war –regardless of where it happens—is also always global. Moreover, in its self-awareness, terror has become, more than it has ever been, an instrument of racism. Indeed, what is new in the singularity of this violent struggle, this racist and terrifying war, is that in the usual attempt to neutralize the enemy, there is a cleansing of immense proportion going on. To use a word which has become popular since Michel Foucault, it is a biopolitical cleansing. This is not the traditional ethnic cleansing, where one ethnic group is targeted by a state power s– though that is also part of the general paradigm of racism and violence. It is rather a global cleansing, where the sovereign elites, the global sovereigns in the political and financial arenas (capital and the political institutions), in all kinds of ways target those who do not belong with them on account of their race, class, gender, and so on, but above all, on account of their way of life and way of thinking. These are the multitudes of people who, for one reason or the other, are liable for scrutiny and surveillance, extortion (typically, in the form of over- taxation and fines) and arrest, brutality, torture, and violent death. The sovereigns target anyone who, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) shows with the figure of homo sacer, can be killed without being sacrificed – anyone who can be reduced to the paradoxical and ultimately impossible condition of bare life, whose only horizon is death itself. In this sense, the biopolitical cleansing is also immediately a thanatopolitical instrument. The biopolitical struggle for dominance is a fight to the death. Those who wage the struggle to begin with, those who want to dominate, will not rest until they have prevailed. Their fanatical and self-serving drive is also very much the source of the crisis investing all others. The point of this essay is to show that the present crisis, which is systemic and permanent and thus something more than a mere crisis, cannot be solved unless the struggle for dominance is eliminated. The elimination of such struggle implies the demise of the global sovereigns, the global elites – and this will not happen without a global revolution, a “restructuring of the world” (Fanon 1967: 82). This must be a revolution against the paradigm of violence and terror typical of the global sovereigns. It is not a movement that uses violence and terror, but rather one that counters the primordial terror and violence of the sovereign elites by living up to the vision of a new world already worked out and cherished by multitudes of people. This is the nature of counter-violence: not to use violence in one’s own turn, but to deactivate and destroy its mechanism. At the beginning of the modern era, Niccolò Machiavelli saw the main distinction is society in terms of dominance, the will to dominate, or the lack thereof. Freedom, Machiavelli says, is obviously on the side of those who reject the paradigm of domination: [A]nd doubtless, if we consider the objects of the nobles and of the people, we must see that the first have a great desire to dominate, whilst the latter have only the wish not to be dominated, and consequently a greater desire to live in the enjoyment of liberty (Discourses, I, V).¶ Who can resist applying this amazing insight to the many situations of resistance and revolt that have been happening in the world for the last two years? From Tahrir Square to Bahrain, from Syntagma Square and Plaza Mayor to the streets of New York and Oakland, ‘the people’ speak with one voice against ‘the nobles;’ the 99% all face the same enemy: the same 1%; courage and freedom face the same police and military machine of cowardice and deceit, brutality and repression. Those who do not want to be dominated, and do not need to be governed, are ontologically on the terrain of freedom, always-already turned toward a poetic desire for the common good, the ethics of a just world. The point here is not to distinguish between good and evil, but rather to understand the twofold nature of power – as domination or as care. The biopolitical (and thanatopolitical) struggle for dominance is unilateral, for there is only one side that wants to dominate. The other side –ontologically, if not circumstantially, free and certainly wiser—does not want to dominate; rather, it wants not to be dominated. This means that it rejects domination as such. The rejection of domination also implies the rejection of violence, and I have already spoken above of the meaning of counter-violence in this sense. To put it another way, with Melville’s (2012) Bartleby, this other side “would prefer not to” be dominated, and it “would prefer not to” be forced into the paradigm of violence. Yet, for this preference, this desire, to pass from potentiality into actuality, action must be taken – an action which is a return and a going under, an uprising and a hurricane. Revolution is to turn oneself away from the terror and violence of the sovereign elites toward the horizon of freedom and care, which is the pre- existing ontological ground of the difference mentioned by Machiavelli between the nobles and the people, the 1% (to use a terminology different from Machiavelli’s) and the 99%. What is important is that the sovereign elite and its war machine, its police apparatuses, its false sense of the law, be done with. It is important that the sovereigns be shown, as Agamben says, in “their original proximity to the criminal” (2000: 107) and that they be dealt with accordingly. For this to happen, a true sense of the law must be recuperated, one whereby the law is also immediately ethics. The sovereigns will be brought to justice. The process is long, but it is in many ways already underway. The recent news that a human rights lawyer will lead a UN investigation into the question of drone strikes and other forms of targeted killing (The New York Times, January 24, 2013) is an indication of the fact that the movement of those who do not want to be dominated is not without effect. An initiative such as this is perhaps necessarily timid at the outset and it may be sidetracked in many ways by powerful interests in its course. Yet, even positing, at that institutional level, the possibility that drone strikes be a form of unlawful killing and war crime is a clear indication of what common reason (one is tempted to say, the General Intellect) already understands and knows. The hope of those who “would prefer not to” be involved in a violent practice such as this, is that those responsible for it be held accountable and that the horizon of terror be canceled and overcome. Indeed, the earth needs care. And when instead of caring for it, resources are dangerously wasted and abused, it is imperative that those who know and understand revolt –and what they must revolt against is the squandering and irresponsible elites, the sovereign discourse, whose authority, beyond all nice rhetoric, ultimately rests on the threat of military violence and police brutality.

#### State centricity necessitates the exclusion of other identities – this lays the groundwork for violence

McCormack 10 [Tara McCormack is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. “Critique, Security and Power.” Routledge. 2010] AJ

Furthermore, the traditional state security problematic excludes questions of identity: [T]o speak of security is to engage in a discourse of repetitions, to affirm over and over again the dangers that legitimize the sovereign authority that is con- stituted precisely as a solution to dangers. But it is important to remember that this discourse of dangerous affirmations becomes, in another guise, a discourse of excluded subjectivities . . . of class, race, gender, and humanity . . . the forms of modern politics expressed in contemporary security discourses admit only one – although largely abstract – identity, in relation to which struggles among all other identities are expected to take their proper place. (Walker, 1997: 73) Yet critical security approaches suggest that matters of identity are crucial when considering the implications of the traditional security framework for the individual. The world is a much more complicated place than the one which we have been taught to see through Realism: multicultural, divided by gender and class, and made up of individuals, families, tribes, nations, and other collectivities; there are also some solidari- ties across all these (and other) subdivisions of humanity. The field of security studies, constructed out of political realism, continues to offer its students one image of reality, with predefined answers to key global questions. (Booth, 2005: 4) Because the traditional security problematic is premised on inclusion and exclusion, certain identities may threaten the state, for example, or certain identities may be threatened by state practices. Feminist security approaches also emphasise the exclusion of the experience and role of women in terms of the traditional security perspectives and the need to transcend this narrow security framework in favour of a much broader concept of security which takes in violence, economic suffering and highlights the oppressive effects of militarisation (for an overview see Tickner, 1995 or Sylvester, 2002; although it would be incorrect to assume that a feminist perspective automatically translated into a critique of military intervention, see for example Elshtain’s arguments in favour of military intervention, 2002). Feminist security perspectives highlight, for example, the particularly vulnera- ble position of women under current security regimes. As critical feminist security theorist J Ann Tickner argues: The unitary state actor model favoured by realists conceals the extent to which individuals’ insecurities are dependent on race, class and gender, categories that also cross state and regional boundaries. (1995: 192) For theorists working within a critical security perspective, the contemporary inter- national order of sovereign states causes insecurity and worse for those who make up the states. State security is revealed as being another way of saying human inse- curity: When national security is defined negatively, as protection against outside military threats, the sense of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a secure community and a dangerous external environment. For this reason, many critics of realism claim that, if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed. (Tickner, 1995: 189) For some theorists working within a critical security theory, the limits to problem- solving security theory are exposed by the behaviour of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In this narrative, the Soviet Union (under Mikhail Gorbachev) made a vo untary decision to reconceptualise its security priorities (see for example, Dalby, 1997: 11–12). This opens up the problem-solving security framework. Realism had not predicted the end of the Cold War, nor did the change, nor the behaviour of the Soviet Union, seem to fit into the traditional security framework that had domi- nated assumptions about international relations and security theory: The end of the Cold War raised serious questions about the dominant paradigms of International Relations, and particularly neorealism, given the failure to predict one of the most dramatic changes of the century (Fierke, 1996: 467)1

#### The current metaphors of the state and body are morally bankrupt – they necessitate and justify a hierarchy where elites have all power. Challenging this understanding should be the first ethical undertaking of state studies

Brown 05 [Rasmussen, Claire (Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware), and Michael Brown (Department of Geography, University of Washington). "The body politic as spatial metaphor.” Citizenship Studies 9.5: 469-484] AJ

The description of the embodied polity assumes a naturally bounded and unified space in which the parts come together for form a whole. The body is defined as a particular space in situ, rather than in a space (see Grosz, 1992). Within this space, the body prescribes a particular relationship between members of the body politic and the unity to which they belong. The naturalness of the body implies a necessary relationship to the body; the belly cannot exist alone, nor may it escape the space of its particular body. The citizen is bound to the polity through the natural structure represented by the space of the body. Second, the organic body is also naturally hierarchical. The internal spatial structure and orientation are key to conveying a normative order within the space of the polity. For example, the head, being the highest point on the body suggests superiority and greater significance that all other parts of the body, while lower organs like the belly or appendages like the feet connote worse or less important parts of the body politic (see Dirven, 1983; Boers, 1996). Placed on the head are lesser rulers, administrators and bureaucrats such as judges and provincial administrators. Suggesting might and physical power, the military is placed in the arms and hands. Central in the torso is the spiritual “heart” of the polity: the priesthood. The peasants are embodied in the feet, the lowest point in the image that is furthest from the head. Above them are courtiers, those who serve and support the prince. Comparing the polity to the natural space of the body lends itself to a functionalist understanding of this hierarchy. The unhealthy body politic is one in which either a single part of the body (quite often the belly, the signifier of the common people) is neglected, or is unwilling to cooperate, thereby leading to a gradual weakening of the entire body. In comparing the polity to the organic or natural space of the body, the metaphor reifies the hierarchical relationship between the state and its subjects, providing a justification for centralized power. As Lefort notes, the body politic, when viewed as a natural, organic body, is linked with a form of politics that sees political membership as grounded in a particular space and that minimizes participation. However, even as the body of the King lost its central place in political theory, the metaphor of the body politic does not die, it is transformed. We should understand this shift as both a change in the way we think about politics and in the way we think about body. Hables-Gray argues that, starting with Thomas Hobbes, political theorists begin using the body less as a way to justify political power through its apparent grounding in nature than as a representation of the very artificiality of political bodies.

#### Contention 2 is the closure – why you should vote aff

#### Examination of metaphors is a prerequisite to any study of IR – understanding the knowledge bases that shape our very cognition allows us to break through the molds that prevent true change in the status quo

Marks 11 [Michael P. Marks (Department of Politics, Willamette University). Metaphors in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan 2011] AJ

It is increasingly apparent that what is known about international relations is not so much a universally shared agreement about objective realities but rather a reflection of dominant ways of knowing that frame issues and debates not to mention the empirical bases of inter- national affairs. The Constructivist paradigm is probably the most prominent and most explicit school of thought in its acknowledg- ment that the empirical bases of world affairs can be conceptualized theoretically such that different visions of reality can be constructed. However, it is not the only approach in the study of international relations that advances claims about the discursive framing by which the facts of international relations are conceived. As Jim George (1994) asserts, all of the major theoretical perspectives in IR advance a discursive project that sets out what is conceivable in the study of international relations. Metaphors are just one set of discursive tools with which the fac- tual bases of international relations can be represented in the theories that are used to conceptualize world affairs. As John Agnew (2007, 138) observes, knowledge about any subject (but for Agnew’s pur- pose as well as ours, knowledge about international relations) can be defined as “explanatory schemes, frames of reference, crucial sets of assumptions, narrative traditions, and theories.” Agnew (ibid.) fur- ther states that a “great deal of interpretive projection is the result of the imposition of intellectual/political hegemonies from some places onto others.” Thus, whether they are metaphors or any of the other means for constructing knowledge available to scholars, what is known at any given time or in any given place about international relations is reflective of how knowledge about a subject is formulated. One of the main theses of this book is that metaphors in inter- national relations theory do far more than simply supply evocative imagery to explanatory frameworks. Instead, a major contention of this study is that the generally accepted paradigms that are used to analyze international relations are built on metaphorical imagery that provides the very theoretical propositions these paradigms use to hypothesize and make predictions about international affairs.6 It is now generally agreed that metaphors play an integral role in human cognition. Most, if not all, human thought is metaphorical in the sense that humans use metaphors to recognize patterns and relationships among concrete and conceptual categories. Language reflects the inclination of humans to use metaphors in understanding the world, and thus both everyday language and the vocabulary of theoretical reasoning alike are built on the metaphorical images that people use to recognize similarities and differences in what they encounter in both the old and the new. Metaphors in theory of any sort can be casual, for example, the image of a metaphorical “big bang” that physicists employ to visualize the origins of the “universe” (itself a metaphor), or integral, for example, the metaphor of economic “cycles” on which entire schools of thought are devoted in the field of economics. In international relations theory, the ontological assumptions and epistemological methods of the various paradigmatic approaches are suffused with metaphors. For example, Vincent Pouliot (2007, 362) observes that the structuro-functionalist approach to the study of international relations is distinguished by its “talk of systems, equilibriums, and structures,” each of which is a metaphorical image that constructs what is knowable using this approach. By the same token, Pouliot (362) points out that the contending Constructivist approach “has its own dialect full of social constructions, norms, and identities,” which are also metaphorical in nature. Some of these metaphors are obvious, while others, due to either their repeated use or mundane quality, go largely unnoticed and undetected by schol- ars in the field. Metaphors in IR theory used deliberately to generate hypotheses can eventually become reified to the extent that they lose their heuristic nature, while metaphors used casually often are not investigated with regard to their validity for giving insight into the subject matter at hand. Throughout the course of this book readers will discover that the vast majority of the terms cataloguing, defining, and naming theories, concepts, and analytical tools pertaining to the study of interna- tional relations are metaphorical in nature. The reader may then be prompted to ask, if that is the case, what is not a metaphor in inter- national relations theory and, if the answer is very little to nothing, what is the point of highlighting what could then be thought of as unavoidable elements in the scholarly discipline at hand? As the next chapter will explain, it is a fact that no realm of human cognition is devoid of metaphorical imagery, including every academic discipline. It is because of this that the choice, conscious or not, of metaphors that aid in any theoretical process has consequences for what empiri- cal topics are studied, what assumptions underlie these inquiries, and what theoretical propositions are put to the test. Since no sustained attention has been paid to this endeavor in the past, it is helpful to undertake an examination of metaphors in IR theory to see what impact they have had in the field.

#### Understanding the metaphors behind policymaking is a pre-requisite to debates about state policy itself

Marks 11 [Michael P. Marks (Department of Politics, Willamette University). Metaphors in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan 2011] AJ

Many of the metaphors that have been devised by scholars to frame the study of international relations are self-consciously seen as con- trivances that help observers make inferences about how international relations works. For example, in introductory international relations classes college students are frequently taught to think of the world metaphorically as a “billiard table” with states imagined as metaphor- ical “balls.”7 These billiards images ostensibly introduce students to the basic elements of traditional international relations theory. States are thought of metaphorically as “hard-shelled and impenetrable ter- ritorially sovereign states” (Opello and Rosow 1999, 226), and are said to have “interests [that] are defined exogenously” in a “process [that] is characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and unlimited state interest” (Sjursen 2001, n.p.).8 In the billiard ball model there are no “good” states or “bad” states (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 48), and “[o]nly the hard exteriors touch, and heavier or faster moving ones push others out of the way” (Burton 1972, 28). There are other metaphorical contrivances for the milieu of international relations as well. For example, the “billiard ball” metaphor can be compared to the similar-sounding, albeit theoretically opposed, “‘egg-box’ con- ception of international society” whereby “the sovereign states are the eggs, the box is international society and the purpose of the box is to ‘separate and cushion, not to act’ ” (Wheeler 1996, 126).9 The “web” or “cobweb” model challenges the billiard ball image of states as hard-shelled actors by promoting the vision of an inter- national society in which relations among a variety of global actors resemble the intertwined threads of a web-like matrix (Burton 1972, 35–45). Sometimes it seems as if the billiard ball image of inter- national relations is the target for every other metaphor that chal- lenges the theoretical implications of the billiard ball model. In their 2007 article—“Billiard Balls or Snowflakes?”—for example, Benjamin Fordham and Victor Asal (2007, 48) suggest that major powers be seen less as hard-shelled impenetrable objects and more like metaphor- ical “snowflakes” “with many potentially relevant internal character- istics.” Other metaphors include the “burning house” vision of the international system and the “forest” image of an international system comprising homogenous states pictured metaphorically as “trees.”10 In recent years scholars have become rather creative in contriving metaphors to capture what they see as the nature of the milieu that constitutes the world of international relations. Robert Kaplan (1994, 75), for example, suggests the metaphor of a “hologram” to describe what he sees as the multifaceted nature of international relations. Examining the role of metaphors that frame the context of international relations is not a purely academic exercise. There are real-world implications for foreign policymaking of these metaphors as well. During her keynote address at the Citizen Diplomacy Summit in 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made the following metaphorical observation that reflected her view of foreign policy: As you may have seen, there are also many other surveys showing that inter- national support for US foreign policy is at the lowest level since the Vietnam War. The main complaint is that we don’t take the interests of other coun- tries into account and that we are too quick to use military force. How do we explain these perceptions? What can we do to change them? I thought about this and decided that it helps to compare foreign policy to a game of pool. Everybody always talks about foreign policy as a game of chess, but that doesn’t work for me because chess is a very deliberate and slow game where you take a lot of time to make decisions. I’ve always thought that a pool table makes more sense because when one ball is hit it smacks into others, and each of them caroms around and hits some more, just like our policy mak- ers that start out in one direction, but end up going in six. Everything that happens has an effect on everything else, all of which leads us to a lot of unintended consequences. In this case it’s the invasion of Iraq that has rear- ranged the balls on the table . . . The worst days in fact may well lie ahead—but we can help the situation overall by going back to that pool table and start- ing some balls moving in a different direction. (Albright 2005a, 23 emphasis added) The Realist metaphorical imagery of these statements is unmistakable and could be recognized by any first-year student in a college intro- ductory international relations class. Albright was speaking not as an academic but as a former senior policymaker in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. However, she was speaking not as a politician trying to frame an issue or gain popular support, but rather as a policymaker schooled in the theories of international relations. Madeleine Albright was one of the major architects of U.S. foreign policy during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Scholars can argue about the motivations of Albright and others in the U.S. foreign policy establishment at that time, but what emerges from the former Secretary of State’s 2005 observations is that her own think- ing about the world has been shaped by the theoretical conclusions that follow from the billiard ball metaphor so closely associated with Realist theory. One can presume that Secretary Albright had given a good deal of thought to the way she imagines the nature of inter- national relations and that her pool table reference was not just an off-the-cuff remark.11 Rather, we can reasonably infer that the actions taken by the Clinton administration were a direct reflection of the theoretical lens Madeleine Albright carried with her as Secretary of State. Armed with clues found in Albright’s billiards ball comments, scholars who had puzzled over the motivations of the framers of U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton administration now have a better ability to understand the theoretical roots of this policy. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that metaphors that frame the context of international relations are not solely part of a purely theoretical endeavor. What constitutes the field of inquiry that falls under the rubric of international relations depends on what metaphorical perspectives shape the field. In light of this observation, this book adopts a critical perspective in analyzing the central metaphors in international relations. The term “critical” often is associated with approaches in international relations that reveal relationships of power among international actors that are concealed by traditional theoretical perspectives. This book takes a different posture, directing its attention not at international actors but at theories of international relations themselves. While it is true that many critical IR scholars have as their immediate target what they see as deficiencies in existing theoretical frameworks, for many of them the ultimate aim is to direct attention at how international affairs are constructed in ways that are not revealed by traditional theoretical approaches. In this book I am less critical of the subject matter of international relations inquiry than I am of the nature of international relations theory used to study it. I neither know nor suspect that there is something about international relations that is not revealed to IR scholars via traditional theoretical perspectives, including critical ones. Rather, I assume that how international relations is revealed reflects scholars’ own conceptual impressions that they experience through metaphors and convey to others through metaphorical expression. My purpose in this book is to critically examine metaphorical expression in international relations to see what that reveals about the theoretical propositions that characterize diverse scholarly traditions.

#### Next, the judge is an academic, not just a neutral adjudicator:

#### A) “better” is a normative term, so it requires an idea of what academic standards judge should endorse. B) This is an academic forum – we’re all students and the judges are educators which gives them an intrinsic obligation to foster important academic ideals. C) There are multiple ways to have a fair game, for example chess and basketball have different rules but both are fair. Fair rules depend on what best preserves the goal of the activity.

#### Thus, the judge’s role is to endorse the debater who best exposes the inner workings of power – this is the first responsibility of academics

Steele, 10 – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas

(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “Putyourself in our place **and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” are **miss**ing **the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “tact,” “**rules**,” and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).

#### By examining the constraints modern biopolitics of it, we’re able to resist those biopolitics

Edkins 2K [(Jenny, Professor of International Politics, MA (Oxon) St Anne’s College, University of Oxford) “Whose Hunger?: Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid”] AT

CONCLUSION Foucault's characterization of the epistemic discontinuity that occurred around the time of Malthus has been used to sketch a few features of an archaeo-genealogy of famine—an exploration of the incorporation of famine in the modern episteme. Foucault's method is an attempt "to examine both the difference that keeps us at a remove from a way of thinking in which we recognize the origin of our own, and the proximity that remains in spite of the distance which we never cease to explore."n6 Our contemporary thought about famine lies within the modern episteme, constrained and yet enabled by it. By examining those constraints, and in a sense denaturalizing them, we are able to see the possibility of thinking otherwise and to resist more effectively the forces that constrain our reflections and thus our practices. Foucault draws our attention to signs of movement: In attempting to uncover the deepest strata of Western culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet.117 ￼In the case of famine we have found a number of discontinuities and dissonances between what I have very loosely labeled a modern discourse of famine and nonmodern or non-European thought. Particular discontinuities that actually produced our modern notion of famine and constituted it as an object of study surround or are signaled by the work of Thomas Malthus in eighteenth-century En- gland. His work was used in formulating and legitimizing responses to the Irish famine, and it still sets the parameters for debates about famine and food supply today. Malthus's view of famine as a short- age of food for a growing population that leads to mass starvation arose at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries with the rise of the modern episteme. The contemporary view has a particular notion of food as fuel, of the natural and social worlds as distinct, and of order as arising from hidden structures be- neath surface appearances. There is a contrast between this view and alternative pictures of famines, some of which have been described. The modern account also writes its own prehistory. The contempo- rary view is not unitary or homogeneous, however, and later chap- ters elucidate debates that take place within the modern episteme and against it. In many senses it is impossible to stand outside the present. However, the hope is that a discussion of these discontinuities may serve to defamiliarize and dislodge some of the notions that form part of the assumptions that we take for granted and show how firmly these are located in the form of knowledge that character- ￼izes modernity. In chapter 4,1 examine the role of power/knowledge in the constitution of the subjects of food aid and practices of famine relief and how the modern way of knowing famine leads to methods of relief that discipline and reproduce relations of power. The forms of knowledge of modernity are closely entangled with particular forms of politics.

#### Society should use critical pedagogy to inculcate reflection and knowledge transformation

Carr 11 [(Paul R. Carr, Lakehead University (Orillia) Brad J. Porfilio, Lewis University) “The Obama Education Files: Is There Hope to Stop the Neoliberal Agenda in Education?” Journal of Inquiry & Action in Education, 4(1), 2011] AT

We have chosen to highlight neoliberalism’s impact on education because we believe that modern, progressive, highly-functioning societies need a broadly responsive, socially relevant, socially just, and pedagogically-engaged educational system, one that bolsters and cultivates critical teaching and learning, accepting that knowledge is socially constructed and mediated (Kincheloe, 2008c). As a starting-point, we accept Friere’s contention that education is, and needs to be understood as, a political project (Freire, 1973). Our interest in critical pedagogy helps us elaborate a conceptual framework of analysis, and to identify the potential for transformation within schools and society, a connection that we believe is fluid and necessarily complex (see Kincheloe’s body of work, including 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Ultimately, we believe that there is a link, as others have pointed out, including John Dewey decades ago, between education and democracy (Ayers, 2009; Carr, 2010; Giroux, 2009; Porfilio & Carr, 2008). Thus, the spectacular victory of the first African-American to become President of the United States, which was hailed by the media as well as the world, has been seen as a watershed moment in the political and historical development of not only the US but all nations. Given the dearth of critical analysis in relation to Obama’s leadership and his administration’s educational agenda, which we contend is fundamental to meaningful democratic development, we examine herein the meaning of potential transformation in and through the Obama administration’s approach to education.

# Case Frontlines

## Conditionality

### Conditionality Bad

#### The neg’s choice to endorse multiple conditional advocacies is a reason to vote against them

#### 1. It’s an attempt to insulate yourself from the outside world – they avoid engagement and responsibility on any position, which reproduces the logic of the body-state – the aff was a kritik and condo is the link

#### 2. Strategically avoids discussion of the aff – multiple positions mean they don’t have to answer clash on any one – discussion is a reason to vote them down, Bougher says discussing the metaphor is key to educate students as critically thinking citizens, which is a key role of debate

#### 3. Kills fairness- negs can shift, while aff must advocate the same position. They go for whatever I undercover, making it impossible to substantively answer each position.

#### Dropping the argument can’t solve since it’s the same as kicking a conditional advocacy and doesn’t solve the harm – only dropping them solves

## Case Extensions

### Thesis

#### We understand the state through a metaphor, as if it is a human body, with concrete boundaries that need to be defended at all costs – that’s Fishel. Martin says this legitimizes violence – states eradicate populations seen as foreign within their boundaries– just like the human body with disease threats. I defend the metaphor of organ transfer – by literally cutting open and sharing our body parts, this dismembers the metaphorized sanctity of the state’s borders, solving the psychological precondition of violence.

## Case Extensions vs T

### T overview

#### Politicians use metaphors to shape how citizens view their responses – Musolff says the body-state metaphor constructe genocide as natural to the public – including the aff is key to question the political impact of metaphors; failing to do so causes my impacts

#### Debating policies fails if citizens don’t recognize how policies are justified to them - outweighs

#### Prior question – Bougher 1 says learning about metaphors teach information processing skills which outweighs since *even educated citizens can be manipulated* with metaphorical framing – only *exposing* metaphors allows us to consciously reflect on policies instead of passively accepting them

#### Scope – they only teach us about organ policy, I shift the way citizens think about politics as a whole

#### The impact outweighs – war, oppression, and genocide are results of a public that’s unable to engage

### K of T

#### *K of T* - The AC was a K and T gave me a link – it’s an attempt to create yet another arbitrary border, bringing the paranoid policing of exclusionary boundaries from the body to the state to debate – this is a reason to vote against them

#### All my offense against T proves they FORCE debates into harmful metaphorical frames that re-entrenches the logic of the body-state

#### *T’s not prior* – it’s a debate about whose method is better, they say T affs solve their impact, whereas I say my aff solves my impact – you should vote for the method that’s better – the aff outweighs T, real-world violence is worse than unfairness in a debate round

### Topic Bad

#### The topic operates within the problematic metaphor of a bounded body-state – Ringmar and Fishel 1 say “society” is a metaphor of the body politic, and repeating this script as if it’s objective *entrenches* that metaphor

#### *Second, Jones says the topic has been conceptualized within the frame of the body politic – the shortage of organs is debated and viewed as a matter of the body politic’s health – operating within the harmful frame we criticize*

#### The aff is a disad to T – a strict non-metaphorical of the topic is both impossible and shuts off the productive identification of the body-state metaphor

#### [SWITCH SIDE] Ringmar says discussing the state assume the body-state metaphor on BOTH SIDES of the topic, so switch-side *locks us into harmful frames*

#### [BE NEG] Traditional affirmation is bad – even if we can be neg, they allow affs repeat this script as if it’s objective, which *entrenches* that metaphor

### Bougher 1

#### Extend Bougher 1 – studies confirm metaphors shape how citizens view policies – the right metaphor can justify a violent response to the public

#### [ED OVERVIEW] Their offense assumes an ideal Cartesian citizen, in which we use autonomous reasoning capacities to deliberate about policies – this ignores *social context* – Bougher 1 indicts this model, it ignores the way metaphorical frames shape thinking, we can’t objectively deliberate without challenging this FIRST

#### [ROLE-PLAY] They have no state-specific warrants –Bougher accesses their impacts since recognizing metaphors causes higher-quality political understanding – outweighs, citizens already process information in a biased way, so presenting new information isn’t as useful as restructuring the metaphorical frames citizens are biased by

### Bougher 2 – Democracy

#### Extend Bougher 2 – the aff’s act of revealing these metaphors allows citizens to consider how metaphors affect their cognition

#### [DELIB DEMOCRACY] Bougher 2 says the aff is key to deliberation – failing to question metaphors ensures citizens are manipulated by them, failing to process new information – this makes democracy meaningless; even if they teach us things we won’t integrate that information unless we challenge their metaphorical frames

#### [DIALOGISM/OPEN MINDED] The squo locks in harmful metaphors, which Bougher 2 says impedes democratic dialogue – calling metaphors into question creates better dialogue since it ensures citizens acknowledge opponents’ viewpoints

#### [DIALOGISM WEIGHING] Outweighs

#### I foster dialogue in political interactions at large; they only increase dialogue in a debate round which is smaller

#### The loss of dialogue from the aff is minor since lots of neg ground links, but status quo politics is profoundly violent so the aff increases dialogue more

#### [OPEN MIND WEIGHING] Outweighs – a. *Prior question* – students don’t even *consider* other views if they don’t fit their own frames – challenging the biases of these frames makes us more open in a way switching sides can’t

#### b. *Openness* – they make us open-minded *only to ideas within our frame*, but both sides of the topic assume the body-state metaphor, so our *narrow understanding of politics at large* remains. Only the aff can solve that by calling the conceptual frame ITSELF into question

#### c. *Broader* – Switching around the topic means we’re open-minded about organ policy, but the aff opens us to metaphors which shape politics as a whole

#### d. Our evidence is better – Bougher 2 specific to classroom discussions about politics and metaphor, theirs isn’t nearly as specific

#### [ADVOCACY SKILL] We access this better – Bougher 2 says recognizing metaphorical frames allows us to persuade a larger variety of audiences by recognizing their conceptual frames, making us more effective advocates

### Delgado

#### Extend Delgado – the repetition of the same predictable scripts turns us into technocrats who safeguard the machine of power without challenging it. We kritik fairness – what is “fair” or “predictable” is constructed by the elite to maintain structures of power causing the aff impacts

#### [DELIB DEMOCRACY] Turns deliberative democracy – the aff challenges the frame to make democracy *productive*; the neg’s model is a sham democracy that isn’t self-reflexive

### Bleiker

#### Their “terms of discussion” are an act of violence that marginalize all opposing perspectives. Inclusiveness comes first – these structures of power are exactly what the aff criticizes

## A2 Defense

### A2 Not Always Bad

#### One, Musolff says the metaphor *inevitably* rationalizes violence – multiple examples prove it will always be used to legitimize violence

#### Two, The sanctified body-state is racist – all foreign matter is seen as a threat to be exterminated – this is an inherent feature of the metaphor

#### Three, there’s still a potential for violence – even if it’s not always actualized, the possibility should be avoided

### A2 This Metaphor is Gone

#### The metaphor is far from gone – the Martin evidence says it’s still used in medicine and Fishel 1 says it’s still used to understate the state – the metaphor underlies current violence, from the illegal detainment of so-called “threats”, war, and the exclusion of non-white, disabled, poor, etc members of the social body

#### Moreover, the metaphor creates the *potential* for violence – even if there’s no ethnic cleansing now, it creates the psychological preconditions for violence, a possibility that we should avoid

### A2 “jew = disease” is propaganda, not metaphor

#### Not true – careful analysis goes aff

Mussolf 10 [(Andreas, University of East Anglia Language and Linguistics Department Member) Metaphor, Nation and the Holocaust: The Concept of the Body Politic. Routledge Critical Studies in Discourse 2010] AT

The imagery used by the Nazis to legitimize their genocidal policies provides us with an extreme “test-case”, so to speak, of a metaphor that was turned into the horrendous reality of World War and Holocaust. We may ask, however, whether we are dealing with a “metaphor” at all. Standard definitions of “metaphor” describe it as the designation of a meaning unit by words taken from a different domain of meaning. This definition can seemingly be applied without great difficulty to our case: a social or political entity is usually not considered to belong in the category of biolog- ical bodies, and a group of people in it is not an illness or parasite. Hence, the semantic transfer of bodily expressions to political and social issues would appear to qualify for “metaphor” status. However, in regard of the Nazi use of body-illness-parasite imagery, we have to take into account the fact that they applied it in a horrifically “literal” sense by trying to physi- cally destroy and eliminate Jewish people. Neil Gregor has aptly put this problem in the form of a paradox: “it is not possible to see in Mein Kampf . . . a set of plans or a blueprint for mass murder in any specific way. . . . But, equally, we should not regard Hitler’s metaphors merely as metaphors: for him, they described reality.”11 We thus seem to be dealing with a form of discourse that is non-literal and at the same time “literal” (in a poignant historical and political sense). How can this contradiction be resolved? One way of dealing with this dilemma would be to assume that the meta- phor of the supposed Jewish “race” as an illness or parasite on the German nation’s body was known to be just part of propagandistic jargon both by its users (i.e. the Nazis) and its receivers (i.e. the German public and everyone within the reach of Nazi propaganda), and really meant something else, i.e. genocide. In this case, the metaphor could be assigned the same semantic status as euphemisms or camouflage words, such as deportation (Deporta- tion, Umsiedlung), special treatment (Sonderbehandlung) or final solution (Endlösung), which the Nazis used in administrative or legal documents when referring to their murderous practices. Such camouflage vocabulary was not primarily intended to be persuasive; rather, it was meant to misinform those who were deemed outsiders or enemies, depending on the partic- ular circumstances and the phase of policy implementation. 12 The “insiders” would know what was meant and needed no persuasion: the camouflage language was just a ruse to cover their tracks (and, perhaps, to suppress the perpetrators’ own troubling emotions of empathy or guilt). 13 If the body/parasite metaphor complex as used by the Nazis were on a par with such terminology it would not in fact be metaphorical. On closer inspection, however, this interpretation seems implausible. Camouflage terms such as final solution or removal referring to genocide are deliberately abstract, vague and general: they are designed to hide any concrete, vivid form of reference. But denouncing a group of people as a parasite and describing one’s nation as a body that is in danger of perishing are not abstract or vague descriptions; on the contrary, they are striking and spectacular. The statements that included such metaphors were not confined to incidental, infrequent forms of “background” propaganda; as we shall see in detail later, they were carefully crafted and presented as “highlights” in the Nazi leaders’ speeches. Anyone living under the Nazi regime or being aware of it could not help but notice them as key elements of their ideology and propaganda. The metaphor was recognised as a core belief held by all the leading Nazis. That still does not mean that people mistook it for a literal description of political issues, or else it would have been regarded simply as a grotesque category mistake. So, if it was neither that nor a lie, how can we describe its meaning, both as a semantic category and as a pragmatic, political tool to advocate genocide?

## A2 Random Turns

### A2 Mandatory Procurement Better

#### Perm do both – I don’t defend presumed consent, only the metaphor of organ transplantation, so the two are compatible

#### This metaphor is aff ground

Hughes 09 [J. Andrew Hughes (J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009; B.A., Rhodes College, 2001). “You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models.” VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW. Vol. 42:351. 2009] AJ

Only a few countries employ a presumed voluntary consent regime without the opportunity for the donor or the donor’s family to opt out of the “donation.”118 Proponents justify this nationalization of cadavers by considering harvestable organs a national resource.119 As an extreme form of presumed consent, the nationalization of cadavers creates some of the same problems that critics associate with presumed consent procurement systems. Nationalization particularly implicates concerns about the ethics and morality of denying people’s right to control their own bodies.

#### Mandating choice is equivalent to presuming consent – the presumption of consent would be so strong it can’t be overridden

#### To “presume consent” doesn’t imply the ability to opt out – this is a PIC out of opting out, which wasn’t an intrinsic part of the aff to begin with

#### Who requires states to exchange their parts in this metaphor? Even if mandatory procurement as a policy means more donation, mandatory procurement as a metaphor doesn’t make any sense

### A2 Metaphor = Infinite Regress

#### Not relevant – status quo already uses the body as a metaphor – the aff changes the metaphor but doesn’t create a new one

#### Non-unique - Metaphors are inevitable; the AC Fishel evidence says we will always use them to structure our world

#### I don’t take a stance on metaphors good/bad – the aff just acknowledges their influence and uses them productively

#### The aff doesn’t deny the existence of literal meaning – it’s a spectrum

Marks 11 [Michael P. Marks (Department of Politics, Willamette University). Metaphors in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan 2011] AJ

Literal and metaphorical are not, however, absolute categories. They exist along a spectrum such that while all language may be metaphorical, in certain respects and in certain contexts it may pos- sess more literal than metaphorical qualities.26 Thus, for example, David Rumelhart (1979, 88–89) shows that the statement “John is a cold person” could be taken literally to mean that John’s tempera- ture is cold to the touch or metaphorically in the sense that John is a remote and aloof person. Lakoff and Turner (1989, 57) observe: “To the extent that a concept is understood and structured on its own terms—without making use of structure imported from a completely different conceptual domain—we may say that it is not metaphorical. The word ‘extent’ was chosen with care. A given concept may be metaphorically understood and structured in some respects but not in others.”27 That is to say, Lakoff and Turner (134) reject the thesis that “every aspect of every concept is completely understood via metaphor” (emphasis added) since certain concepts can be expressed in literal terms. Instead, they observe that there are “some concepts that are not completely understood via metaphor to serve as source domains”; one can use literal terms to describe them inasmuch as they can be “understood on their own terms” (ibid., 135).

### A2 Metaphor =/= Reality

#### Not relevant – no duh, metaphors aren’t reality, but they are a construct we use to understand abstract concepts, and have a concrete influence on how we think and act

#### Reality is an unattainable fiction – examining discourses and metaphors key to understand our perception of reality

Marks 11 [Michael P. Marks (Department of Politics, Willamette University). Metaphors in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan 2011] AJ

What is the relationship between metaphors and “reality?” Is there some objective, discernible reality that is obscured or distorted by metaphors, or as one scholar who read a preliminary draft of a por- tion of this book asks, is it “metaphors all the way down?” (a question that itself is a metaphor given the figurative sense of what is meant by “down”). To put it another way, is there some way of conveying ideas substantively that does not make use of metaphors, and if not, does that imply that all reality is metaphorical? The answer given by George Lakoff and other cognitive linguists to the question of metaphors’ relationship to “reality” acknowledges a “reality existing independent of human beings” but also accepts “constraints on our conceptual sys- tems due to the nature of that reality” (Lakoff 1987, 266). In Lakoff and Johnson’s “experiential realism” or “experientialism,” humans’ grasp of reality is tied to what Lakoff (ibid., 267) calls “conceptual bodily experiences.” Metaphors are integral to this process: The social reality defined by a culture affects its conception of physical real- ity. What is real for an individual as a member of a culture is a product both of his social reality and the way in which that shapes his experience of the physical world. Since much of our social reality is understood in metaphorical terms, and since our conception of the physical world is partly metaphori- cal, metaphor plays a very significant role in determining what is real for us. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980b, 146) What Lakoff and Johnson are concerned with is the way that humans understand the world. For metaphysicists hoping to answer the question about whether there is an “objective” reality, Lakoff and Johnson reject the view of an “objective” reality, arguing instead that in terms of human cognition, reality is conceptualized as metaphors.23 That is, they argue that all human thought is metaphorical regardless of whether there is a physical reality that can be “objectively” perceived or not. Lakoff and Johnson’s view on this has been accepted by other scholars of cognitive linguistics. Eve Sweetser (1990, 1–2), for exam- ple, writes: “the observed regularities are natural and readily motivated within a cognitively based theory which takes not the objective ‘real world,’ but human perception and understanding of the world to be the basis for the structure of human language.” Similar sentiments are expressed by Karsten Harries (1978a, 173), who opines that “reality and language are so intimately joined that the rift that separates the two . . . is covered up,” and David Cooper (1986, 211), who observes that “the truth of metaphor, far from deriving in all cases from literal truth, will help determine what the literal truth is.”24 For scholars of metaphor, then, the matter of metaphor’s relationship to “reality” is a false question. Furthermore, for scholars of international relations, it is worth keeping in mind, as Jim George (1994, 11) argues, that “reality is never a complete, entirely coherent ‘thing,’ accessible to univer- salized, essentialist, or totalized understandings of it.” Thus, for the study of both metaphors and international relations alike, the effort to arrive at an understanding of “reality” is a metaphysical project not relevant to the task at hand. The question, then, is not if the empirical subject matter of interna- tional relations is one of “reality” versus metaphors—a false choice that was posed by some readers of an early draft of this project (but which some readers may still want resolved). The more important issue is determining the extent to which communicative discourses among scholars of international relations employ varying degrees of literal versus metaphorical language as a means of conveying human under- standing about the world. All language is metaphorical and literal at the same time, but to varying degrees of both. By “literal” I mean as the dictionary defines it—“being in accordance with, conforming to, or upholding the exact or primary meaning of a word or words” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1050). That is to say, literal com- munication uses words that convey precisely that which is intended in the words themselves. This can be contrasted with metaphorical communication, which may convey primary meaning but also evokes the secondary meaning of the source domain of the metaphorical construction.25

### A2 Science Good/ You Deny Reality

#### The AC doesn’t say nothing is real – rather that a lot of what we think is objective isn’t really objective

#### Science is our impact – transnationalism has made traditional analysis obsolete; only the aff shifts the frame to revitalize social science

Robinson 98 [(William, 2Departmentof Sociology and Anthropology) “Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies1” Sociological Forum, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1998] AT

What is required is an “epistemological break.” “Prevailing modes of analysis simply lack the requisite vocabulary” to address transnational realities, notes Ruggie, “and what we cannot describe, we cannot explain” (1993:143-144). This problem of language—continued reliance on nation-state terms, and along with them, the concepts they denote and the particular nation-state centered framing and interpretation of empirical data they imply—is indicative of an underlying problem of incommensurability. In the view of Kuhn (1962) and Althusser (1966), the relations among rival or successive paradigms are always liable to be that of disjuncture and in- commensurability, in which the central concepts and procedures of one paradigm or problematic are unstable in the language of the other. The different “nation-state” paradigms have a language unsuitable for grasping transnational or global dynamics and require a certain epistemological break. So long as social structure was commensurate with the historically specific form it took through the system of nation-states, then we had a type of incommensurability advanced by Feyerabend (1975). The different theoretical perspectives, or paradigms, could enter into dialogue with the aim of appreciating each others views even though they were not strictly comparable in terms of a theory-neutral data language since they involved sharply contrasting and often diametrically opposed interpretations of data (and also normative structure). For instance, the NCIPE, as articulated by Evans and Stephens (1988), suggested just such a dialogue within develop- ment studies and proposed as its goal a theoretical synthesis around the NCIPE. However, the fundamental epistemological assumption that under- girded this and related efforts was precisely the nation-state framework of social analysis, around which modernization, dependency, world-system, and other development theories all converge. Globalization requires therefore an epistemological break, that is, a break with the very underlying assumption driving competing theories. What is at issue is the relation between our knowledge of the world and social structure. Social structure is becoming transnationalized; an epistemological shift is required in concurrence with this ontological change. Transnational studies requires that social science methods and the epistemological assumptions that underpin them revert back to those of classical political economy and sociology, which set out to theorize a set of rela- tionships that were not self-evident in contemporary practices in order to highlight both structures and historic movement latent in existing conditions. In the case of transnational studies, this means distinguishing in social analysis between appearance (national phenomena derived from nation- state analysis) and essence (transnational phenomena). Facts and theory are interpenetrating, and therefore nation-state theories will guide and circumscribe our interpretation of data. Utilizing the nation-state framework for social analysis can be highly misleading and illusory, leading us to believe we are observing phenomena that is nation-state in character when in fact it is transnational. An essential task of a new transnational studies is to decipher the transnational essence in social phenomena that appear as national.8 Our view of reality is mediated by our finite cognitive abilities, which are structured by evolving theories and concepts and their units of analysis. A shift in the unit of analysis from the nation-state to the global system facilitates a switch to a more powerful set of “cognitive lenses” and yields, in my view, quite dramatic results. Several examples will suffice.

## Aff impact frontlines/weighing

### Environment

#### My impact turns their –

#### Bougher 2 says I increase deliberative democracy by making citizens aware of the metaphors that constrain thinking – this is key to the environment

Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change, “Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]

It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion.65 Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest.70

#### We criticize sovereignty, which is anthropocentric – who is INCLUDED in the body of society excludes the environment, causing its destruction

Wendt 8 [(Alexander Wendt, political scientist who is one of the core social constructivist scholars in the field of international relations The Ohio State University; Raymond Duvall, University of Minnesota) “Sovereignty and the UFO” Political Theory August 2008 vol. 36 no. 4 607-633] AT

Few ideas today are as contested as sovereignty, in theory or in practice. In sovereignty theory scholars disagree about almost everything—what sovereignty is and where it resides, how it relates to law, whether it is divisible, how its subjects and objects are constituted, and whether it is being transformed in late modernity. These debates are mirrored in contemporary practice, where struggles for self-determination and territorial revisionism have generated among the bitterest conflicts in modern times. Throughout this contestation, however, one thing is taken for granted: sovereignty is the province of humans alone. Animals and Nature are assumed to lack the cognitive capacity and/or subjectivity to be sovereign; and while God might have ultimate sovereignty, even most religious fundamentalists grant that it is not exercised directly in the temporal world. When sovereignty is contested today, therefore, it is always and only among humans, horizontally so to speak, rather than vertically with Nature or God. In this way modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, or constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone.1 Humans live within physical constraints, but are solely responsible for deciding their norms and practices under those constraints. Despite the wide variety of institutional forms taken by sovereignty today, they are homologous in this fundamental respect. Anthropocentric sovereignty might seem necessary; after all, who else, besides humans, might rule? Nevertheless, historically sovereignty was less anthropocentric. For millennia Nature and the gods were thought to have causal powers and subjectivities that enabled them to share sovereignty with humans, if not exercise dominion outright.2 Authoritative belief in non-human sovereignties was given up only after long and bitter struggle about the “borders of the social world,” in which who/what could be sovereign depends on who/what should be included in society.3 In modernity God and Nature are excluded, although in this exclusion they are also reincluded as the domesticated Other. Thus, while no longer temporally sovereign, God is included today through people who are seen to speak on Her behalf. And while Nature has been disenchanted, stripped of its subjectivity, it is re-included as object in the human world. These inclusive exclusions, however, reinforce the assumption that humans alone can be sovereign. In this light anthropocentric sovereignty must be seen as a contingent historical achievement, not just a requirement of common sense. Indeed, it is a metaphysical achievement, since it is in anthropocentric terms that humans today understand their place in the physical world. Thus operates what Giorgio Agamben calls the “anthropological machine.”4

#### The aff’s reformulation of the insular nature of sovereignty solves ecologically destructive patterns – transforming the state through cultural shifts is key

Hayward 5 [(Tim, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of the Just World Institute; Director MSc International Political Theory; Convenor Fair Trade Academic Network.) “Greening the Constitutional State: Environmental Rights in the European Union” In The State and the Global Ecological Crisis] AT

If a green posture toward the nation-state can be discerned from the diverse writings of green political theorists and fellow environmentalists, it is that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environ- mental management, facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection. At worst, it is fundamentally ecocidal.1 Indeed, there are very few radical political ecologists and green political theorists who are prepared to defend the nation-state as an institution that is able to play a positive role in securing sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem integrity. Moreover, those interested in global political ecology are increasingly rejecting the “statist frame” through which international relations and world politics have been traditionally understood, prefer- ring to understand states as but one set of actors or institutions among a myriad of actors and institutions on the global scene that are implicated in ecological destruction.2 In all, the radical green analysis seems to point toward the need for alternative forms of political identity, authority, and governance that break with the traditional statist model of exclusive terri- torial rule. In this chapter, I take the position that this green antipathy toward the nation-state and state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation should not be taken as a reason for avoiding an inquiry into the emanci- patory potential of the nation-state as a significant node in any future net- work of ecological governance. This is especially true given that we can expect states to persist as major sites and channels of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green institutional transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be path-dependent. In any event, if it is indeed the case that states are so deeply implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry ￼into the potential for their transformation or even their modest reform into something greener would seem to be compelling. To the extent that those who reject a statist analysis still concede that the state has an important role to play, the question arises as to what that role ought to be, given its present limitations and trajectory. After all, implicit in the day-to-day policy demands made of the state (both domestically and internationally) by environmentalists is a notion of what the state ought to be doing (or not doing)—in short, a green ideal or vision of what a “good state” might look like. Actively defending and cultivating such an ideal would seem to be politically and strategically necessary if the green movement is to avoid unwitting, ad hoc reinforcement of the destructive or oppressive tendencies of states in the course of pursuing its green public policy goals. I am concerned to encourage a debate among green theorists and activists as to how we might rethink the nation-state and the state system from a critical green perspective (which I call critical political ecology). I acknowledge the contradictory role of the nation-state in managing ecological problems but suggest we search for ways of amplifying the state’s role as an environmental protector while dampening its ecologically destructive potential over time. These complementary, paths point toward less exclusionary ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and citizenship yet retain the nation-state as a container of social processes (albeit with some potentially radical reworking of the meaning of “nation” and “national sovereignty”). I suggest that while in the long run such an approach provides a fundamental challenge to the link between territorially based structures of democratic rule and particular peoples, in the short to medium term it sees the state as a crucial facilitator in the transition toward more ecologically responsive governance. By way of theoretical preliminaries, my critical political ecology framework approaches the state from a structurationist, or critical construc- tivist, perspective, which emphasizes the mutual constitution of agents and social structures.3 Whereas mainstream rationalist approaches to international relations (namely, neorealism and neoliberal institutional- ism) regard the principle of state sovereignty as an immutable ordering principle of world politics that is accepted as a given, critical constructivists understand state sovereignty as a protean concept, the meaning of which is determined by a web of constitutive discourses that are constantly contested and evolving (such as the norms of nonintervention, ￼ ￼self-determination, and their subsidiary discourses, such as the rules of war, the so-called right to develop, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources, and so forth). The lesson for the green movement is that by playing a more informed and self-conscious role in the debates over the meaning and application of these norms, the movement might help to redefine sovereignty as an ally in its broader global project. Three Standard Green Critiques of the State Green theorists (and many environmentalists) have been highly skeptical of the nation-state and the state system. The three most significant (and recurring) of these critiques concern The anarchic character of the system of sovereign states, which is under- stood as structuring a dynamic that leads to the “tragedy of the com- mons.” The parasitical dependence of states on private capital accumulation; that is, the state is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally com- promised by, the promotion of capital accumulation, which is a key driver of ecological destruction, and states are now actively promoting economic globalization in ways that further undermine their own polit- ical autonomy and steering capacity. The highly centralized and hierarchical character of states as institutions, with imperatives that are fundamentally at odds with the green vision of a more participatory democracy and human-scale, decentralized forms of governance. In support of these three propositions, there is no shortage of detailed historical accounts of the various ways in which particular states (whether communist or capitalist, developed or undeveloped) have acted as resource plunderers and active prosecutors of environmentally destructive and sometimes violent agendas, most graphically during times of war but also during times of peace.4 Moreover, if one of the defining features of states is that they hold the monopoly of legitimized violence, with democracy featuring as a contingent rather than defining characteristic of states, then they would seem by their very nature to represent institutions that run contrary to the basic green principle of nonviolence. Taken together, these three general objections would appear to provide a powerful green indictment of states per se (rather than just particular “ecocidal” governments), with the implication that the prospects for the ￼ ￼development of more ecologically responsive states are bleak. This reading also has significant short-term tactical and longer-term strategic implications for environmental movements and green parties struggling with limited resources, both of which, without further analysis, would seem to be best advised looking for alternative sites of political action. Yet we should not be too hasty to assume that the structures and social dynamics referred to in these three analyses are necessarily always anti- ecological and always mutually reinforcing (although they often can be) or that they provide a complete green analysis and evaluation of the emanci- patory potential of states as governance structures. Moreover, on their face, none of these arguments addresses the crucial question of state legitimacy or places any store on the possibilities of deepening the democratic accountability of states to the citizens of particular states, to transnational civil society, or to the society of states in general. It is as if the democratic form of the state were dismissed being not merely as contingent but also as illusory in the sense that it is typically overridden by the struc- tural imperatives of international anarchy, global capitalism, and administrative hierarchy. These are, to be sure, deeply problematic structural dynamics for those concerned to secure global environmental integrity. However, they are not “iron laws” but rather constantly evolving practices that can change in character and influence depending on the movement of social forces and the prevailing social and cultural conditions and understandings. Indeed, one does not have to search very far to find historical examples of how each of these dynamics can be qualified, re- strained, or otherwise moderated by state and nonstate agents acting back upon states, which in turn have acted back upon economic and social structures. Here, we might single out three, mutually informing developments that have served to moderate, and in some exceptional cases work synergistically to transform, the respective “logics” of anar- chy, capitalism, and administrative hierarchy: The rise of environmental multilateralism, including environmental treaties and declarations and international environmental standards The emergence of sustainable development as an alternative develop- ment strategy and of ecological modernization as a new “competitive strategy” of corporations and states The emergence of domestic environmental legislation, including new democratic discursive designs within the administrative state (such as ￼community right-to-know legislation, community environmental moni- toring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public inquiries It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conduct a detailed and systematic evaluation of these developments and the degree to which they may or may not have qualified international anarchy, global capitalism, and bureaucratic domination, not to mention other, less overarching political dynamics.5 In any event, we would expect the story to vary significantly from state to state and region to region. Nonetheless, it is possible to track some broad trends and to suggest a framework for how greens might understand and selectively accentuate some of these positive trends in relation to where and how they may be situated as political actors. Here I concentrate only on the first two structural constraints, namely, global anarchy and the compromised capitalist state. My critical political ecology framework will be defended as an alternative to the deep pessimism of ecorealists, eco-Marxists, and radical political ecologists about the possibilities of more ecologically enlightened state governance. Along the way, I also seek to highlight the dangers of the green movement’s turn- ing its back on the state. International Anarchy: Ecorealism versus Critical Political Ecology In a recent critical assessment of the prospects for a green democratic state, Michael Saward has pointedly asked, “Could it be that the contem- porary state is simply not the type of entity which is capable of systemati- cally prioritizing the achievement of sustainability?”6 Historically, the defense of state territory, military success, and the exploitation of natural resources and the environment for the purposes of national economic development have been widely understood as overriding state imperatives that are common to all states and constitutive of the state’s very form.7 Indeed, the exploitation of natural resources within the territory has sometimes been justified as a “nation-building exercise” or intimately linked with national security.

#### 2. No impact to biodiversity

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

#### Biodiveristy isn’t essential to life

Maier 2012 [Donald S. Maier- Moral and Environmental Philosopher Aristotle & Company. “What’s So Good About Biodiversity?”. The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics VOLUME 19 (August 2012).] **NM**

The component set of species has undergone transformation due to human influences. The component set of ecosystems has been concomitantly transformed. This is a matter of humanity’s transformation of “the lay of the land” and of its biogeochemistry. It is the major point of the concept of anthropogenic biomes (mentioned in Sect. 5.3 , The moral force of biodiversity), none of which existed 70,000 years ago. The biomes from that past time are now extinct, like many of the species that occupied them, and partly on account of the extinction of those species. In other words, whatever biological conditions have sustained life over the last 200,000 years have also sustained so many changes in life that the planet now is hard to recognize as a later biotic and environmental version of its former self. This is a serious blow to the supposition that biodiversity, just as it was at some point arbitrarily selected within the interval of human tenure, was essential to sustaining life from that point onward.

#### Genocides and warfare are CERTAIN to cause mass harm – environment impacts are mere speculation and don’t kill on a mass scale

### War Vs Environment

#### War turns environment – strongest internal link

Worldwatch 8 [(independent research institute devoted to global environmental concerns; cites Sarah DeWeerdt, author of “War and the Environment)“Modern Warfare Causes Unprecedented Environmental Damage” Jan/Feb 2013] AT

Washington, D.C.— Modern warfare tactics, as seen in the American war in Vietnam, the Rwandan and Congolese civil wars, and the current war in Iraq, have greatly increased our capacity to destroy the natural landscape and produce devastating environmental effects on the planet, according to Sarah DeWeerdt, author of “War and the Environment,” featured in the January/February 2008 issue of World Watch. Wartime destruction of the natural landscape is nothing new, but the scope of destruction seen in more recent conflicts is unprecedented. “For one thing, there is the sheer firepower of current weapons technology, especially its shock-and-awe deployment by modern superpowers. The involvement of guerrilla groups in many recent wars draws that firepower toward the natural ecosystems—often circumscribed and endangered ones—where those groups take cover,” writes DeWeerdt. The deliberate destruction of the environment as a military strategy, known as “ecocide,” is exemplified by the U.S. response to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. In an effort to deprive the communist Viet Cong guerrillas of the dense cover they found in the hardwood forests and mangroves that fringed the Mekong Delta, the U.S. military sprayed 79 million liters of herbicides and defoliants (including Agent Orange) over about one-seventh of the land area of southern Vietnam. By some estimates, half of the mangroves and 14 percent of hardwood forests in southern Vietnam were destroyed during Operation Trail Dust, threatening biodiversity and severely altering vegetation. Less deliberate, but still devastating, were the environmental effects that stemmed from the mass migration of refugees during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Nearly 2 million Hutus fled Rwanda over the course of just a few weeks to refugee camps in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, making it the most massive population movement in history. Approximately 720,000 of these refugees settled in refugee camps on the fringes of Virunga National Park, the first United Nations World Heritage site declared endangered due to an armed conflict. The refugees stripped an estimated 35 square kilometers of forest for firewood and shelter-building materials. The dense forests also suffered as a result of the wide paths clear-cut by the Rwandan and Congolese armies traveling through the park to reduce the threat of ambush by rebel groups. The longterm ecological effects of the current war in Iraq remain to be seen. Looking to the effects of the recent Gulf War as a guide, scientists point to the physical damage of the desert, particularly the millimeter-thin layer of microorganisms that forms a crust on the topsoil, protecting it from erosion. Analysis of the area affected by the Gulf War has already shown an increase in sandstorms and dune formation in the region, and one study suggests that desert crusts might take thousands of years to fully recover from the movement of heavy vehicles. “Warfare is likely to have the most severe, longest-lasting effects on protected areas that harbor endangered species, and slow-to-recover ecosystems such as deserts. Even in the most fragile environments, sometimes nature—and people—can surprise us,” writes DeWeerdt. “But turn and look in another direction and you are likely to see warfare’s enduring scars.”

#### I access a war impact – that goes nuclear

Drum, Staff Writer, ’10 [Kevin, Mother Jones, Smart, Fearless Journalism, “The Non-Nuclear Nuke,” 4/23, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/non-nuclear-nuke AD: 4/23/10, Nisarg]

For years the Pentagon has been wrestling with a problem: when you get intel telling you that a high-value terrorist has been located somewhere, how do you take him out? They aren't likely to stick around at the target location for long, so you need something that can (a) get there quickly and (b) cause a lot of damage once it does. Bombers and cruise missiles take hours. Local forces, even if they're in place, aren't always lethal enough. What to do? One answer is to use ICBMs. Not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but missiles with a big conventional payload. The Obama administration is apparently planning to revive this idea, and Noah Shachtman explains why it's crazy: Over and over again, the Bush administration tried to push the idea of these conventional ICBMs. Over and over again, Congress refused to provide the funds for it. The reason was pretty simple: those anti-terror missiles look and fly exactly like the nuclear missiles we’d launch at Russia or China, in the event of Armageddon. “For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations,” a congressional study notes. That could have world-changing consequences. “The launch of such a missile,” then-Russian president Vladimir Putin said in a state of the nation address after the announcement of the Bush-era plan, “could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.” I guess I can imagine possible ways to fix this. I just can't imagine any good ways. Even if the Russians and Chinese and Indians and Pakistanis are provided with some reliable way of identifying non-nuclear ICBM launches, they could never be sure that the United States hadn't figured out some way to fool them. So they'd always be on a short fuse. And do we really want to make that particular fuse even shorter than it already is? Sometimes bad ideas are just bad ideas. This really seems like one of them.

#### Extinction and turns environment

Starr 9 (Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, October 2009, by Steven Starr Steven Starr is a Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the STAR (Strategic Arms Reduction) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986, new scientific research makes it clear that the environmental consequences of nuclear war can still end human history. A series of peer-reviewed studies, performed at several U.S. universities, predict the detonation of even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal within large urban centers will cause catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of the protective stratospheric ozone layer.

### R/C of war

#### We control the *root cause* of war. Wars are fought and life is exterminated not because of particular geopolitical interests but because of the biopolitical commitment to *eugenic violence* that stems from the desire to defend the body-state

Elden 2 [Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2002 (Boundary 2 29.2) ]

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques. A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir : Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136)

### War = Extinction

#### I access a war impact – Martin says the metaphor justifies warfare to exterminate all outside threats

#### That goes nuclear

Drum, Staff Writer, ’10 [Kevin, Mother Jones, Smart, Fearless Journalism, “The Non-Nuclear Nuke,” 4/23, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/non-nuclear-nuke AD: 4/23/10, Nisarg]

For years the Pentagon has been wrestling with a problem: when you get intel telling you that a high-value terrorist has been located somewhere, how do you take him out? They aren't likely to stick around at the target location for long, so you need something that can (a) get there quickly and (b) cause a lot of damage once it does. Bombers and cruise missiles take hours. Local forces, even if they're in place, aren't always lethal enough. What to do? One answer is to use ICBMs. Not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but missiles with a big conventional payload. The Obama administration is apparently planning to revive this idea, and Noah Shachtman explains why it's crazy: Over and over again, the Bush administration tried to push the idea of these conventional ICBMs. Over and over again, Congress refused to provide the funds for it. The reason was pretty simple: those anti-terror missiles look and fly exactly like the nuclear missiles we’d launch at Russia or China, in the event of Armageddon. “For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations,” a congressional study notes. That could have world-changing consequences. “The launch of such a missile,” then-Russian president Vladimir Putin said in a state of the nation address after the announcement of the Bush-era plan, “could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.” I guess I can imagine possible ways to fix this. I just can't imagine any good ways. Even if the Russians and Chinese and Indians and Pakistanis are provided with some reliable way of identifying non-nuclear ICBM launches, they could never be sure that the United States hadn't figured out some way to fool them. So they'd always be on a short fuse. And do we really want to make that particular fuse even shorter than it already is? Sometimes bad ideas are just bad ideas. This really seems like one of them.

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### Racism D-rule

#### Racism is the foremost impact – it makes all ethical action impossible

Albert Memmi, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 2000

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

### Racism O/w Nuke War

#### Nuclear war claims are exaggerated by elites. The systemic impacts OUTWEIGH their improbable impact. Nuclear war does not cause extinction.

Martin 84 (Brian, research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA; SANA Update (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter), number 16, May 1984, pp. 5-6.  <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html>)

Most of the continuing large-scale suffering in the world - caused by poverty, starvation, disease and torture - is borne by the poor, non-white peoples of the third world. A global nuclear war might well kill fewer people than have died of starvation and hunger-related disease in the past 50 or 100 years. It is estimated that at the least several million people - perhaps many more than this - die each year of starvation and hunger-related disease. Counting back a sufficient number of decades gives a total of similar magnitude to the death toll from a major global nuclear war and these are actual rather than possible deaths. The problem of hunger and starvation is similar to that of nuclear war in one important respect: the problems are political ones, and require political and institutional change rather than technical fixes for solution. Smaller nuclear wars would make this sort of contrast greater.[[23]](http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82jpr.html#fn23) Nuclear war is the one source of possible deaths of millions of people that would affect mainly white, rich, western societies (China and Japan are the prime possible exceptions). By comparison, the direct effect of global nuclear war on nonwhite, poor, third world populations would be relatively small. White westerners may tend to identify their own plight with that of the rest of the world, and hence exaggerate the threat of destruction wreaked on their own societies into one for all of humanity. White westerners may also tend to see the rest of the world as vitally dependent on themselves for survival, and hence see catastrophe for all as a result of a nuclear war which destroys 'civilisation'. In practice, poor non-white populations arguably would be better off without the attentions of white, western 'civilisation' - although nuclear war is hardly the way to achieve this.

#### Scenario planning is NOT neutral. It MANUFACTURES the future instead of PREDICTING it –the predictive VIEW FROM NOWHERE legitimates IMPERIAL RACISM. They’re structured to disregard systemic violence

O’Brien 10 - O’Brien, Susie. "Postcolonial Fiction and the Temporality of Global Risk." Associate Professor of English and Cultural Studies and Director of CSCT MA Program, McMaster University Susie O'Brien has been at McMaster since 1997. Hired to teach postcolonial literature and theory, she got lost in the thickets of popular culture, where she watched a lot of good and bad TV, and co-wrote (with Imre Szeman) a textbook, Popular Culture: A User's Guide, the third edition of which is forthcoming in 2013. She continues to teach and research in cultural studies, with a focus on postcolonialism, the environment and globalization..

Postcolonial Fiction and the Temporality of Global Risk Susie O’Brien, McMaster University Two thirds of the way into Indra Sinha's novel, Animal's People, is a description of a simulation exercise. A chemical company, referred to simply as "the Kampani" conducts a drill based on the hypothetical scenario of a terrorist attack. Police and emergency services participate in the exercise, versions of which have become commonplace in industry and government planning circles. As a variation of scenario planning, simulations like this one are designed to cope with a world in which the future is seen as increasingly uncertain. Ideas of linear change, and a corresponding faith in the possibility of prediction, have given way to a model of perpetual global turbulence, and practices of rigorous yet imaginative risk-management. The Kampani's counter-terrorist drill reflects this sense of imminent mayhem, personified by a gang of terrorists from the Indian city of Khaufpur. The exercise is typical in its ambivalent imagination of the world as a single global system (exemplified in the Kampani's multinational operations, which include a factory in Khaupur), which nevertheless remains divided into distinct imaginary communities, and the "terrorists" that haunt their borders. Animal's People invites us to take a different view, by portraying the Kampani's exercise from the perspective of the people on whom the imaginary terrorists are based. These people--the citizens of Khaufpur, a thinly veiled fictionalization of Bhopal--were the victims of a horrendous industrial accident, in which a pesticide factory owned by the Kampani (a barely disguised stand-in for Union Carbide), released a toxic gas into a densely populated urban area, killing as many as 10,000 people instantly, and sickening up to 60,000, a large number of whom ended up dying in the ensuing decades. Animal's People, whose eponymous narrator gets his name from the scoliosis resulting from the accident, which forces him to walk on all fours, documents the story of Khaufpuris’ attempt to secure justice from the American-based Kampani. Animal and his friends, on hearing about the simulation exercise, react with laughter, and elaborate the story with imagined details of their own: "'In the Kampani's fantasy,'" Animal's friend Zafar tells the group, "the Khaufpuris took hostages and demanded coffee, then executed one of the hostages because the coffee was not to their liking." "What was wrong with it?' someone asks. "Not enough cardamom, probably," says someone else. In typical Khaufpuri fashion a debate starts about how much cardamom or clove should be used in coffee, and whether a few grains of salt improves the flavour. "It was not hot enough," says Zafar. Silence, a moment's incredulity, then a rose of laughter blossoms in the room. (283) These embellishments serve to underline the absurdity of the initial premise, which characterizes the Kampani as a virtuous corporate citizen, and its victims as terrorists. I use this incident as a way into a critique of the discourse of scenario planning, the constructions of globalization and of temporality it draws on, and the potential of postcolonial literature--a different kind of fictional exercise--to function as a counter discourse, that implies alternative futures. Using Animal's People as an example, I suggest that postcolonial fiction challenges prevailing assumptions in the discourse of scenario planning by unravelling the temporality of globalization, and the model of risk management it inspires. The world according to scenario planners In the discourse of scenario planning, a scenario is “an account of a plausible future”, an “alternative, dynamic stor[y] that capture[s] key ingredients of our uncertainty about the future of a study system” (Peterson et al 360). Employed by a diverse range of groups, including military strategists, corporations, educational institutions, and public policymakers, scenario planning also encompasses a variety of practices, including simulations of future crisis situations to demonstrate the capacities and limits of systems and equipment, and the construction, often by multiple agencies and stakeholders, of complex narratives of possible futures. Combining elements deemed to be predetermined or inevitable with a variety of unpredictable circumstances, scenarios of this latter type play out the storylines suggested by these combinations producing alternative future worlds. Such exercises are not designed to be predictive: "the point," as pioneering scenario planner Pierre Wack notes "is not so much to have one scenario that 'gets it right' as to have a set of scenarios that illuminates the major forces driving the system, their interrelationships, and the critical uncertainties. The users can then sharpen their focus on key environmental questions, aided by new concepts and a richer language system through which they exchange ideas and data" (Wack, "Scenarios: Shooting" 146). While it is not a new phenomenon, scenario planning has become increasingly popular since the 1990s, a development proponents attribute to the rise of uncertainties, particularly in the realms of finance, environment and security. Following Ulrich Beck, globalization is frequently cited as the major force behind the proliferation of risks, as well as a weakening--in practical and social terms--of conventional forms of knowledge. A significant body of risk theory eschews the historical analysis Beck offers in favour of a more systems-oriented understanding of globalization: "From the standpoint of systemic analysis, our global supernetwork is what is called a dynamically unstable system, or one so responsive and interconnected (i.e., tightly coupled), that it is prone to operating in an uncontrolled manner" (Robb). While some practitioners of scenario planning explain its use in the context of specific developments associated with globalization, such as the acceleration of technological change, the spread of informational technologies, market deregulation and demographic change" (Martelli, 2), it is often justified in simpler terms, such as those offered by geographer and scenario planning expert Barbara Heinzen: Scenario planning exercises “have come into being thanks to two important factors: first we are living in very changeable and uncertain times, leading all societies, everywhere, to grope for new answers. Second, this need for new understanding and direction comes at a time when governments and politicians are mistrusted” (Heinzen 6) Scenario planning thus, according to its proponents, addresses two key weaknesses in knowledge that affect our ability to plan for the future: 1) increasing turbulence; 2) decreasing trust in traditional sources of authority for information and leadership. The collaborative nature of scenario planning addresses both these weaknesses: including a broad group of "stakeholders" in the scenario-creation process expands and nuances the knowledge base, as well as gesturing towards more democratic decision-making processes. The nature and extent of that democratic element is particularly pertinent to this discussion, an issue to which I will return. First, though, a brief and selective history of the practice will be useful, both for establishing the key moments to which its proponents often refer as evidence of its legitimacy, and also to highlight the historical conditions of its emergence that tend to get left out of the official story. Herman Kahn, a military strategist employed by the RAND Institute in the 1950s, drew on systems theory and game theory to produce what he called scenario planning--"a collective thought-experiment in which specialists from different disciplines are asked to establish and unfold a series of alternative futures from a position of present uncertainty" (Cooper, "Turbulent" 172). Kahn departed from conventional Cold War assumptions by "thinking about the unthinkable"--the possibility of various survival scenarios, postnuclear war (qtd. in Bradfield et al, 798).1 Kahn went on to establish the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank that popularized the use of scenarios as a policyplanning tool, with a particular focus on economics. Perhaps the best-known use of scenario planning is that of Royal Dutch Shell, whose adoption of the strategy in the early 1970s allowed the company to move outside conventional assumptions of continued price falls and anticipate the formation of OPEC and associated worldwide shortage of oil. Shell's success with scenario planning (which has become a permanent part of its corporate strategy) is routinely invoked as a case study for the usefulness of the practice as a way of navigating a crisis-laden future. Scenario planning has since been employed in a variety of different settings. However the instance that proponents cite most is one in South Africa, in 1992, to 1 Kahn inspired the title character in Stanley Kubrick's film Dr. Strangelove explore "the dangers and opportunities that lurked in the transition" to democracy (Peterson et al 363). Not the first scenario planning exercise in South Africa, the Mont Fleur exercise, facilitated by Shell executive Adam Kahane, is most widely cited, based partly on the diversity of participants (a group of twenty-two, including "political office bearers, academics, trade unionists and business people" [LeRoux and Maphai]), with consultation from the ANC and PAC. The stories the group constructed, which became the basis for public consultation, were given deliberately neutral-sounding metaphorical titles: the "Flight of Icarus", for example, described a dizzying ascent, followed by a crash, while "Ostrich" described a "head-in-the-sand" approach, in which the government under-estimated the magnitude of resistance, and "Flight of the Flamingoes" described everyone “taking off together” slowly, etc. Talking about the way different stories played out helped participants to figure out which outcomes they wanted, and what needed to happen in order to get there. The Mont Fleur exercises are frequently cited in scenario planning literature as an example not just of the utility but also the broad social value of scenarios. "The scenario planning process," according to this perspective, "made South Africa's transition to democracy significantly smoother" (Peterson et al, 363), and (leaving aside for the moment the question of evidence, or the definition of “democracy”) was therefore deemed a success. In his widely cited article in Harvard Business Review, Pierre Wack, the Shell executive credited with devising that company's first scenario planning exercises, suggests that, in order to test the value of scenarios, it is important to ask two questions: 1. What do they leave out? In five to ten years, managers must not be able to say that the scenarios did not warn them of important events that subsequently happened. 2. Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past experience, they are nothing more than interesting speculation ("Scenarios: Shooting"146-147) I will return to the question of what scenario-planning exercises leave out. For now, let's look at the question of efficacy, or what Wack terms "existential effectiveness" (84). One of the most significant, unanticipated difficulties in the scenario planning exercise for Shell was, not in coming up with intellectually coherent stories about the world, but in dislodging the outdated world-views of managers that impeded their willingness to act on the scenarios. "We came to understand," as Wack explains it, "that making the scenarios relevant required a keener knowledge of decision makers and their microcosm [mental model] than we had ever imagined" ("Scenarios: Uncharted" 87). A key part of acquiring this knowledge, in Wack's account--a critical issue for any transnational company--was the recognition of cultural differences between, say, managers in France and Germany. Accordingly: To construct a framework for the message, we borrowed the concept of archetype from psychology. Just as we often view individuals as composites of archetypes (for example, part introvert and part extrovert), so we developed governmental archetypes to help us examine differing national responses. In our view, nations would favor either a market-force or government-intervention [dirigiste] response" ("Scenarios: Uncharted" 88). The stories produced by the planning team had to account for these differences, to create a "world" plausible enough for different national archetypes to inhabit, enabling a balance of decentralized decision-making and adherence to the same general picture. The latter requirement points to another key part of the scenario planning process: that one scenario eventually be selected as the "best" narrative to direct decision-making going forward. Most scenario planning exercises have a normative element, that is, one narrative encompasses the combination of circumstances and decisions that seem conducive to the long-term goals of the organization. In the South African case, the flight of the flamingoes, which described a path of minimal political tension and slow but evergrowing prosperity ("everyone takes flight together"), fulfilled this mandate. It also echoed in formal terms the odd mix of the myth/metaphor (a crucial element in scenarioplanning that is seen to make the scenarios both universally intelligible and compelling as stories) and classical economics, in which behaviour is seen to be motivated by rational self-interest, with the key variable on a national scale being the degree of openness to free enterprise. The normative value assigned to the market corresponds with the legitimation of scenario planning as a solution to the incapacity of governments to regulate the economy, and a corresponding acceptance of turbulence as the new reality. Concepts loosely borrowed from evolution science help to suture the elements of myth and neoliberal economics into a framework of progress, according to which organizations adapt or die. In the adaptive scenario, Wack explains, Decentralized management in worldwide operating companies can adapt and use that view for strategic decisions appropriate to its varied circumstances. Its initiative is not limited by instructions dictated from the center but facilitated and feed by a broad framework; all will speak the same language in adapting their operations to a new business environment. . . . From studying evolution , we learn how an animal suited to one environment must become a new animal to survive when the environment undergoes severe change. We believed that Shell would have to become a new animal to function in a new world ("Scenarios: Uncharted" 73). It is unclear in this formulation, whether "animal" refers to a species or an individual; this slippage is characteristic of Social Darwinist deployments of a crude version of evolution to commend the verve and imagination of entrepreneurs. Scenario planning, Wack asserts, "aims to rediscover the original entrepreneurial power of foresight in contexts of change, complexity and uncertainty" (Wack 150). The ambiguous invocation of animals and evolution also illuminates the colonialist spectre of race that haunts both theories of neoclassical economics and the universal mythical imagination. It is telling in this regard that the animating vision of the Mont Fleur scenarios, which were funded by Germany's Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss Development Agency, tied social democracy to economic development and the need for South Africa to evolve into a solid player in the global economy. The neoliberal orientation of the exercise emerges in the normative thrust of the scenarios, in which the "populist" option of responding to black demands for fair income distribution corresponded with the doomed "Icarus" narrative. By contrast, the preferred scenario of the "Flight of the Flamingoes" "combined strategies that le[d] to significant improvements of social delivery with policies that create[d] confidence in the economy" (Le Roux et al 17). The choice of this as the most plausible/desirable narrative derived validation from the muchtouted democratic character of the process, in which the ANC's involvement was seen to be critical. Graham Galer explains: "it took 3-4 months to convince relevant people of the value of this approach, and then 6-9 months to get the right people together (many of those involved are now in government)" (30). Getting the "right" and "relevant" people clearly played an important role in the planning exercise's effectiveness. While the ANC imprimatur was critical to the project's credibility, the "right" people were those whose eventual election to power would retroactively confirm their qualifications for devising plausible futures. In an article that critically examines scenario planning in South Africa, Patrick Bond comments skeptically on the "evolution of the scenario plan from corporate survival strategy to social contract parable" (Bond 1). Noting the tendency, borrowed from the corporate model, to construct scenario planning teams made up of "semicharismatic individuals," he suggests that in the South African transition context, "the scenario exercises reflected a desire and carefully hand-picked participants to come up with a deal rather than with good analysis" (Bond 2).2 In line with the mandate for consensus, which, along with the selection of the most "plausible" scenario, is essential for investor confidence, it is significant that, as one commentator notes approvingly: none of [the Mont Fleur] scenarios focuses on the divisive issues of black-white antagonism. Rather, they keep their sights on the long term economic prosperity of the nation as a whole. The word apartheid, for example, is only mentioned once. This was intentional, and is one of the great benefits of the scenario process: scenarios shift the focus from specifically opposed political positions to a broader look at what will work--or fail--in the long run. (Flowers, note 2) 2 Sampie Terreblanche takes a similar view, suggesting that the exercises were "aimed at formulating an economic-strategy that would be business-friendly and would perpetuate its position of power and privilege in a fully democratic South Africa" (80). The rejection of politics in favour of pragmatics defines the seamless narrative of scenario planning as an activity that doesn't just serve both corporate strategies to secure future profits and the efforts of citizen groups to create diverse, sustainable communities: it unites these activities in the name of a global future in which diverse groups of people work harmoniously to secure the conditions for sustainable, if not stable, capitalism. The capitalist scaffolding sometimes intrudes awkwardly in scenario-planning literature, e.g. a long laudatory interview with an editor with the Shell project omits details about the actual scenarios, because at the time these were considered to be proprietary information. The issue of private ownership is of critical significance, given the drive and the capacity of scenario planning to shape events on a global scale. Melinda Cooper elaborates this aspect of scenario planning, suggesting that, "[i]n its globalizing scope, scenario planning might be characterized as the practical, methodological counterpart to the power relations described by world systems theory" (Cooper, "Turbulent" 170-171). Linking the speculative nature of scenario-planning to finance, in which, she suggests, the derivative (a wager on future uncertainty), works as a kind of short-hand for a scenario, Cooper highlights the capacity for such speculative activity to bring about the conditions it forecasts; indeed this is an explicit goal of scenario planning. As in finance, the wager is not on the likelihood of this or that event, but rather on the proliferation of unpredictable events, whose volatility itself creates the climate for profit. When scenario planners invoke Mont Fleur, they lend an aura of democracy to this process--but it is just an aura, confirming Wendy Brown's argument that "neo-liberal policies and actions" often work "under the legitimating cloth of a liberal democratic discourse increasingly void of substance" (para 25). The hollowing out of democracy into a shell for neo-liberalism is hastened, and given sanction, by a post 9/11 security climate. The war on terror has proved a fertile ground for scenario planning of all kinds, including the fictional simulation in Animal's People with which I began this paper. Within the world-system framework that supports scenario planning, terrorism joins financial crisis and climate change as an arena of turbulence that knows no borders. However undercurrents of imperialist ideology, cloaked in the naturalizing discourse of evolution, mean that the world imagined and generated by scenario planning remains radically unequal, the lines of race, class and nation shaping the outcome of the swirl of events. Before concluding with a discussion of Animal's People, let's summarize the problems arising from scenario planning by returning to, and amplifying, Pierre Wack's question: what does scenario planning leave out? Scenario planning literature characterizes the practice as a kind of epistemological evolution, in tune with the proliferation of unpredictable events associated with globalization. Scenario planning, in this narrative, constitutes an adaptation to a changing reality, characterized by the new predominance of change itself.3 Scenario planners have moved on, with some difficulty, as one Shell executive admits, from the time when "we thought the world was makeable" (van der Heijden et al). Facilitated by the post-WW II burgeoning of computer technology, as van der Hejiden explains it, the science of forecasting "really got shaken somewhere in the '60s I think. . . and the oil crisis [of the early 1970s] also had something 3 Recall Wack's second criteria for successful scenarios: "Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past experience, they are nothing more than interesting speculation" ("Scenarios: Shooting" 146-147). Scenario planning is steeped in the business language of innovation, whereby the nature of the "something other" is less important than the process of active change in and of itself. to do with this--another big shakeup to the system and suddenly we were discovering that maybe this was a bit simplistic" (10, square brackets in original). The defining moment for van der Hejiden was a visit to the office of a Shell manager in the Philippines, to gather data for the company's Unified Planning Machinery. As he explains it, The guy was ready to kick me out of his office. . . he thought it was a totally ridiculous question. How could he possibly know this? He understood there were some things not predictable in this world. This was the first time that I was confronted with the notion that a makeable world was a bit of an illusion. Anyway. . . it happened and I think it happened in Shell much earlier than in most other places for some reason. . . and of course then it was reinforced by the oil crisis, which was another totally unpredictable thing (10). A couple of things are notable in this account; first, the apparently unselfconscious admission of an arrogant presumption that "we"--a group he later describes, vaguely but tellingly as "a fraternity" (12)--had the authority and capacity to shape the world. Second, the identification of the 1960s as the time when this authority began to wane. While van der Hejiden doesn't identify the factors that led to this shift, outside the reference to the "unpredictable" oil crisis that followed, it is worth noting that this period corresponded to the shake-up of the formal Anglo-American empire, the burgeoning of postcolonial nationalisms, and mass immigration from the former colonies to the imperial centres. It is to the upheaval these shifts caused in those centres, and not merely economic conditions, that many commentators attribute the hard right shift in Britain and the US in the 1970s (Hall, Harvey). Interestingly, in his account of the meeting with the Filipino office manager, van der Hejiden, credits, not the manager, whose residency in a country historically subject to the upheaval of repeated imperial incursions might have informed his insights into unpredictability, but Shell, for its prescient view of the future. So an important element that is "missing" from scenario planning, to return to Wack's question, is a historical perspective, or, more broadly, any sense of reflexivity about the temporal framework scenario planning depends on, a framework whose claims to universality masks the unequal power relations that inflect conventional understandings of time, including concepts of event, evolution, past present and future. The absence of reflexivity infects the science of scenario planning in another way: planners are acutely conscious of the affective elements of scenarios when it comes to persuading managers and the public of their plausibility; achieving this objective depends on a clear understanding of, and ability to speak to, managers' worldviews, with all the values, assumptions and biases, that inform them (recall the Jungian archetypes that predict national mindsets [Wack]). "We call this mental model the decision maker's 'microcosm'; the real world is the 'macrocosm" (84). The goal of the planners is to construct scenarios that will help decision makers, or managers to bridge the gap; however it isn't clear where the scenario planners themselves stand. Validated by the universalizing discourses of myth and economics, buttressed by the inclusion of the "right" balance of expertise, authority and diversity in scenario planning groups, the scenarios emerge with apparent autonomy, unmarked by ideology or the historical circumstances of their production. These missing elements in scenario planning--the erasure of context, and the absence of history--inform the kinds of futures they imagine and help to produce.

## A2 Impact Turn

### TL Impact Explanation

#### THE AFF DOES NOT GET RID OF THE STATE – the body-state metaphor constructs states as insular entities that must be heavily guarded at all times, which causes my impacts – the aff advocacy ruptures this insularity – the body and state still exist, we just see them as perforated and open to change

#### Their impact turn needs to prove that we SHOULD see states as insular and in need of “purification” against enemies both inside and outside the body – if they don’t prove this, they don’t get their turns

### A2 State Key to Environment

#### The state is ECOCIDAL now – only reformulating it through the aff’s cultural shift can solve

Hayward 5 [(Tim, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of the Just World Institute; Director MSc International Political Theory; Convenor Fair Trade Academic Network.) “Greening the Constitutional State: Environmental Rights in the European Union” In The State and the Global Ecological Crisis] AT

If a green posture toward the nation-state can be discerned from the diverse writings of green political theorists and fellow environmentalists, it is that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environ- mental management, facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection. At worst, it is fundamentally ecocidal.1 Indeed, there are very few radical political ecologists and green political theorists who are prepared to defend the nation-state as an institution that is able to play a positive role in securing sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem integrity. Moreover, those interested in global political ecology are increasingly rejecting the “statist frame” through which international relations and world politics have been traditionally understood, prefer- ring to understand states as but one set of actors or institutions among a myriad of actors and institutions on the global scene that are implicated in ecological destruction.2 In all, the radical green analysis seems to point toward the need for alternative forms of political identity, authority, and governance that break with the traditional statist model of exclusive terri- torial rule. In this chapter, I take the position that this green antipathy toward the nation-state and state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation should not be taken as a reason for avoiding an inquiry into the emanci- patory potential of the nation-state as a significant node in any future net- work of ecological governance. This is especially true given that we can expect states to persist as major sites and channels of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green institutional transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be path-dependent. In any event, if it is indeed the case that states are so deeply implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry ￼into the potential for their transformation or even their modest reform into something greener would seem to be compelling. To the extent that those who reject a statist analysis still concede that the state has an important role to play, the question arises as to what that role ought to be, given its present limitations and trajectory. After all, implicit in the day-to-day policy demands made of the state (both domestically and internationally) by environmentalists is a notion of what the state ought to be doing (or not doing)—in short, a green ideal or vision of what a “good state” might look like. Actively defending and cultivating such an ideal would seem to be politically and strategically necessary if the green movement is to avoid unwitting, ad hoc reinforcement of the destructive or oppressive tendencies of states in the course of pursuing its green public policy goals. I am concerned to encourage a debate among green theorists and activists as to how we might rethink the nation-state and the state system from a critical green perspective (which I call critical political ecology). I acknowledge the contradictory role of the nation-state in managing ecological problems but suggest we search for ways of amplifying the state’s role as an environmental protector while dampening its ecologically destructive potential over time. These complementary, paths point toward less exclusionary ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and citizenship yet retain the nation-state as a container of social processes (albeit with some potentially radical reworking of the meaning of “nation” and “national sovereignty”). I suggest that while in the long run such an approach provides a fundamental challenge to the link between territorially based structures of democratic rule and particular peoples, in the short to medium term it sees the state as a crucial facilitator in the transition toward more ecologically responsive governance. By way of theoretical preliminaries, my critical political ecology framework approaches the state from a structurationist, or critical construc- tivist, perspective, which emphasizes the mutual constitution of agents and social structures.3 Whereas mainstream rationalist approaches to international relations (namely, neorealism and neoliberal institutional- ism) regard the principle of state sovereignty as an immutable ordering principle of world politics that is accepted as a given, critical constructivists understand state sovereignty as a protean concept, the meaning of which is determined by a web of constitutive discourses that are constantly contested and evolving (such as the norms of nonintervention, ￼ ￼self-determination, and their subsidiary discourses, such as the rules of war, the so-called right to develop, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources, and so forth). The lesson for the green movement is that by playing a more informed and self-conscious role in the debates over the meaning and application of these norms, the movement might help to redefine sovereignty as an ally in its broader global project. Three Standard Green Critiques of the State Green theorists (and many environmentalists) have been highly skeptical of the nation-state and the state system. The three most significant (and recurring) of these critiques concern The anarchic character of the system of sovereign states, which is under- stood as structuring a dynamic that leads to the “tragedy of the commons.” The parasitical dependence of states on private capital accumulation; that is, the state is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally com- promised by, the promotion of capital accumulation, which is a key driver of ecological destruction, and states are now actively promoting economic globalization in ways that further undermine their own polit- ical autonomy and steering capacity. The highly centralized and hierarchical character of states as institutions, with imperatives that are fundamentally at odds with the green vision of a more participatory democracy and human-scale, decentralized forms of governance. In support of these three propositions, there is no shortage of detailed historical accounts of the various ways in which particular states (whether communist or capitalist, developed or undeveloped) have acted as resource plunderers and active prosecutors of environmentally destructive and sometimes violent agendas, most graphically during times of war but also during times of peace.4 Moreover, if one of the defining features of states is that they hold the monopoly of legitimized violence, with democracy featuring as a contingent rather than defining characteristic of states, then they would seem by their very nature to represent institutions that run contrary to the basic green principle of nonviolence. Taken together, these three general objections would appear to provide a powerful green indictment of states per se (rather than just particular “ecocidal” governments), with the implication that the prospects for the ￼ ￼development of more ecologically responsive states are bleak. This reading also has significant short-term tactical and longer-term strategic implications for environmental movements and green parties struggling with limited resources, both of which, without further analysis, would seem to be best advised looking for alternative sites of political action. Yet we should not be too hasty to assume that the structures and social dynamics referred to in these three analyses are necessarily always anti- ecological and always mutually reinforcing (although they often can be) or that they provide a complete green analysis and evaluation of the emanci- patory potential of states as governance structures. Moreover, on their face, none of these arguments addresses the crucial question of state legitimacy or places any store on the possibilities of deepening the democratic accountability of states to the citizens of particular states, to transnational civil society, or to the society of states in general. It is as if the democratic form of the state were dismissed being not merely as contingent but also as illusory in the sense that it is typically overridden by the struc- tural imperatives of international anarchy, global capitalism, and administrative hierarchy. These are, to be sure, deeply problematic structural dynamics for those concerned to secure global environmental integrity. However, they are not “iron laws” but rather constantly evolving practices that can change in character and influence depending on the movement of social forces and the prevailing social and cultural conditions and understandings. Indeed, one does not have to search very far to find historical examples of how each of these dynamics can be qualified, re- strained, or otherwise moderated by state and nonstate agents acting back upon states, which in turn have acted back upon economic and social structures. Here, we might single out three, mutually informing developments that have served to moderate, and in some exceptional cases work synergistically to transform, the respective “logics” of anar- chy, capitalism, and administrative hierarchy: The rise of environmental multilateralism, including environmental treaties and declarations and international environmental standards The emergence of sustainable development as an alternative development strategy and of ecological modernization as a new “competitive strategy” of corporations and states The emergence of domestic environmental legislation, including new democratic discursive designs within the administrative state (such as ￼community right-to-know legislation, community environmental moni- toring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public inquiries It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conduct a detailed and systematic evaluation of these developments and the degree to which they may or may not have qualified international anarchy, global capitalism, and bureaucratic domination, not to mention other, less overarching political dynamics.5 In any event, we would expect the story to vary significantly from state to state and region to region. Nonetheless, it is possible to track some broad trends and to suggest a framework for how greens might understand and selectively accentuate some of these positive trends in relation to where and how they may be situated as political actors. Here I concentrate only on the first two structural constraints, namely, global anarchy and the compromised capitalist state. My critical political ecology framework will be defended as an alternative to the deep pessimism of ecorealists, eco-Marxists, and radical political ecologists about the possibilities of more ecologically enlightened state governance. Along the way, I also seek to highlight the dangers of the green movement’s turn- ing its back on the state. International Anarchy: Ecorealism versus Critical Political Ecology In a recent critical assessment of the prospects for a green democratic state, Michael Saward has pointedly asked, “Could it be that the contem- porary state is simply not the type of entity which is capable of systemati- cally prioritizing the achievement of sustainability?”6 Historically, the defense of state territory, military success, and the exploitation of natural resources and the environment for the purposes of national economic development have been widely understood as overriding state imperatives that are common to all states and constitutive of the state’s very form.7 Indeed, the exploitation of natural resources within the territory has sometimes been justified as a “nation-building exercise” or intimately linked with national security.

### A2 Malthus Top Level

#### My impact turns their – Bougher 2 says I increase deliberative democracy by making citizens aware of the metaphors that constrain thinking – this is key to the environment

Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change, “Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]

It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion.65 Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest.70

#### My impacts outweigh---

#### No impact to biodiversity

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

#### Genocides and warfare are CERTAIN to cause mass harm – environment impacts are mere speculation and don’t kill on a mass scale

#### War turns environment – strongest internal link

Worldwatch 8 [(independent research institute devoted to global environmental concerns; cites Sarah DeWeerdt, author of “War and the Environment)“Modern Warfare Causes Unprecedented Environmental Damage” Jan/Feb 2013] AT

Washington, D.C.— Modern warfare tactics, as seen in the American war in Vietnam, the Rwandan and Congolese civil wars, and the current war in Iraq, have greatly increased our capacity to destroy the natural landscape and produce devastating environmental effects on the planet, according to Sarah DeWeerdt, author of “War and the Environment,” featured in the January/February 2008 issue of World Watch. Wartime destruction of the natural landscape is nothing new, but the scope of destruction seen in more recent conflicts is unprecedented. “For one thing, there is the sheer firepower of current weapons technology, especially its shock-and-awe deployment by modern superpowers. The involvement of guerrilla groups in many recent wars draws that firepower toward the natural ecosystems—often circumscribed and endangered ones—where those groups take cover,” writes DeWeerdt. The deliberate destruction of the environment as a military strategy, known as “ecocide,” is exemplified by the U.S. response to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. In an effort to deprive the communist Viet Cong guerrillas of the dense cover they found in the hardwood forests and mangroves that fringed the Mekong Delta, the U.S. military sprayed 79 million liters of herbicides and defoliants (including Agent Orange) over about one-seventh of the land area of southern Vietnam. By some estimates, half of the mangroves and 14 percent of hardwood forests in southern Vietnam were destroyed during Operation Trail Dust, threatening biodiversity and severely altering vegetation. Less deliberate, but still devastating, were the environmental effects that stemmed from the mass migration of refugees during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Nearly 2 million Hutus fled Rwanda over the course of just a few weeks to refugee camps in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, making it the most massive population movement in history. Approximately 720,000 of these refugees settled in refugee camps on the fringes of Virunga National Park, the first United Nations World Heritage site declared endangered due to an armed conflict. The refugees stripped an estimated 35 square kilometers of forest for firewood and shelter-building materials. The dense forests also suffered as a result of the wide paths clear-cut by the Rwandan and Congolese armies traveling through the park to reduce the threat of ambush by rebel groups. The longterm ecological effects of the current war in Iraq remain to be seen. Looking to the effects of the recent Gulf War as a guide, scientists point to the physical damage of the desert, particularly the millimeter-thin layer of microorganisms that forms a crust on the topsoil, protecting it from erosion. Analysis of the area affected by the Gulf War has already shown an increase in sandstorms and dune formation in the region, and one study suggests that desert crusts might take thousands of years to fully recover from the movement of heavy vehicles. “Warfare is likely to have the most severe, longest-lasting effects on protected areas that harbor endangered species, and slow-to-recover ecosystems such as deserts. Even in the most fragile environments, sometimes nature—and people—can surprise us,” writes DeWeerdt. “But turn and look in another direction and you are likely to see warfare’s enduring scars.”

#### I access a war impact – that goes nuclear

Drum, Staff Writer, ’10 [Kevin, Mother Jones, Smart, Fearless Journalism, “The Non-Nuclear Nuke,” 4/23, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/non-nuclear-nuke AD: 4/23/10, Nisarg]

For years the Pentagon has been wrestling with a problem: when you get intel telling you that a high-value terrorist has been located somewhere, how do you take him out? They aren't likely to stick around at the target location for long, so you need something that can (a) get there quickly and (b) cause a lot of damage once it does. Bombers and cruise missiles take hours. Local forces, even if they're in place, aren't always lethal enough. What to do? One answer is to use ICBMs. Not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but missiles with a big conventional payload. The Obama administration is apparently planning to revive this idea, and Noah Shachtman explains why it's crazy: Over and over again, the Bush administration tried to push the idea of these conventional ICBMs. Over and over again, Congress refused to provide the funds for it. The reason was pretty simple: those anti-terror missiles look and fly exactly like the nuclear missiles we’d launch at Russia or China, in the event of Armageddon. “For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations,” a congressional study notes. That could have world-changing consequences. “The launch of such a missile,” then-Russian president Vladimir Putin said in a state of the nation address after the announcement of the Bush-era plan, “could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.” I guess I can imagine possible ways to fix this. I just can't imagine any good ways. Even if the Russians and Chinese and Indians and Pakistanis are provided with some reliable way of identifying non-nuclear ICBM launches, they could never be sure that the United States hadn't figured out some way to fool them. So they'd always be on a short fuse. And do we really want to make that particular fuse even shorter than it already is? Sometimes bad ideas are just bad ideas. This really seems like one of them.

#### Extinction and turns environment

Starr 9 (Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, October 2009, by Steven Starr Steven Starr is a Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the STAR (Strategic Arms Reduction) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986, new scientific research makes it clear that the environmental consequences of nuclear war can still end human history. A series of peer-reviewed studies, performed at several U.S. universities, predict the detonation of even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal within large urban centers will cause catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of the protective stratospheric ozone layer.

#### Biodiveristy isn’t essential to life

Maier 2012 [Donald S. Maier- Moral and Environmental Philosopher Aristotle & Company. “What’s So Good About Biodiversity?”. The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics VOLUME 19 (August 2012).] **NM**

The component set of species has undergone transformation due to human influences. The component set of ecosystems has been concomitantly transformed. This is a matter of humanity’s transformation of “the lay of the land” and of its biogeochemistry. It is the major point of the concept of anthropogenic biomes (mentioned in Sect. 5.3 , The moral force of biodiversity), none of which existed 70,000 years ago. The biomes from that past time are now extinct, like many of the species that occupied them, and partly on account of the extinction of those species. In other words, whatever biological conditions have sustained life over the last 200,000 years have also sustained so many changes in life that the planet now is hard to recognize as a later biotic and environmental version of its former self. This is a serious blow to the supposition that biodiversity, just as it was at some point arbitrarily selected within the interval of human tenure, was essential to sustaining life from that point onward.

### ---A2 Rights Malthus/Eco Authoritarianism

#### No link – we don’t prevent eco-authoritarianism and they don’t cause it – what the hell are you talking about

#### Authoritarians hate the environment—statistical evidence proves

Reese, 12 [Gerhard Reese, Friedrich Schiller University, “When Authoritarians Protect the Earth—Authoritarian Submission and Proenvironmental Beliefs: A Pilot Study in Germany”, Ecopsychology, September 2012, 4(3): 232-236, doi:10.1089/eco.2012.0035

In the environmental realm, previous research by Schultz and Stone (1994) suggested that authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs are negatively correlated: the more authoritarian one is, the less concern one demonstrates about the environment. These authors argued that the main reason for this finding is grounded in authoritarians’ belief that community, politicians, and business leaders are immersed in the dominant paradigm that economic growth has a higher value than environmental protection. Across two studies, Schultz and Stone found a substantial, negative relation between authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs (rs= -.51 and - .54). In a similar vein, Peterson and colleagues (1993, Study 2) showed that authoritarians were more hostile toward the environmental movement than less authoritarian individuals. In fact, authoritarians were more positive toward polluters compared with people supporting the environmental movement. Subsequent researchers also suggested that higher levels of rightwing authoritarianism predicted weaker proenvironmental beliefs (e.g., Sabbagh, 2005). Taken together, such findings suggest that an authoritarian personality or belief system1 is rather undesirable when it comes to the protection of our environment. Yet, as will be argued in the following, the relation between right-wing authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs requires a more fine-grained analysis. Precisely, it is suggested that above all, the subconstruct ‘‘authoritarian submission’’ should relate to stronger proenvironmental beliefs.

#### Prefer the evidence – multiple studies go aff, their evidence is based on unfounded speculation and isn’t grounded in reality

#### Authoritarianism guarantees nuclear war—short circuits deterrence

Holdorf, 10 [Polly Holdorf, graduate of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, MA in International Security and a BA in International Studies, “Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century”, http://csis.org/files/publication/110916\_Holdorf.pdf, Evan]

There are four specific objectives that nuclear-armed regional adversaries might seek to achieve through the use of nuclear weapons.14 They might seek to deter the United States from intervening in a conflict or projecting military power into the region by threatening escalation. If the United States is not deterred by threats of escalation, the adversary might consider using its nuclear weapons to limit or defeat U.S. military operations. The adversary might seek to intimidate U.S. allies or friends within the region, or to split regional political coalitions apart. Certainly the adversary would attempt to limit U.S. objectives in the confrontation and try to dissuade the United States from seeking to impose regime change. For authoritarian or despotic leaders, nuclear weapons may be seen as a means of survival. These types of leaders may be preoccupied with the survival not just of their regimes, but of their own personal survival. Regional adversaries facing a confrontation with the United States would know beyond any doubt that they faced an opponent with vastly superior military forces and resources. Adversarial leaders may not be prepared to face the disastrous consequences of a military defeat, particularly one that would result in their removal from power. Such leaders may feel that their only hope for survival would be to attempt to stave off, or at least delay, a defeat by employing a nuclear weapon against U.S. forces. It is also possible that an adversary, knowing that it cannot and will not prevail, may wish to “go out with a bang”; or they may wish to be remembered as the leader who stood up to the United States by utilizing nuclear weapons. A number of factors exist that could serve as catalysts for future nuclear use. Latent conflicts within a regional setting could ignite and nuclear threats may be signaled by one or both sides in order to influence the opposing states’ actions. A nuclear state on the verge of losing a conventional war might employ its nuclear weapons in order to avert defeat. Small nuclear states which harbor feelings of isolation (such as North Korea) could perceive the actions of others as threatening and therefore be intimidated into employing nuclear weapons as a means to protect their interests. Traditional means of deterrence may not work the same way between small states as they did with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Strategic discourse between two small nuclear-armed states may be lacking, thus elevating the prospect for the collapse of deterrence at the regional level. Small nuclear states may have flawed or incomplete intelligence regarding their relative positions in a conflict. A misperception regarding an adversary’s intentions could compel a country to conduct a preemptive strike on the opponent’s nuclear arsenal or conventional military forces. There is also the possibility that a small nuclear-armed state may have a deficient command and control structure, increasing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.15 The use of nuclear weapons in a regional setting could support a range of objectives including coercion, war termination, regime preservation or even revenge.16 Some states could view the use of nuclear weapons as a means-of-last-resort, while others may view them as the only viable means to alter the status quo or to remedy a deteriorating regional security situation.17 In some circumstances a state may view the use of nuclear weapons as the best, or the “least bad,”18 option available to them. The fear of regime change may be a compelling reason for a nuclear-armed regional adversary to consider employing nuclear weapons during a conflict. For leaders who are concerned about their ability to remain in power in the event of a war with a superiorly armed adversary, nuclear weapons could be viewed as a valuable tool to have in their arsenal. “If an attack by a U.S.-led coalition would pose a significant threat to your regime and your nation cannot afford conventional forces capable of deterring or defeating such an attack, you may regard nuclear weapons as the answer.”19 One can be certain that the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003 are still very fresh, particularly in the minds of the Iranian and North Korean regimes. These regimes are also aware that they have been identified as security threats to the United States.

#### Their ideology of a “fixed choice” is flawed:

#### A) it makes action to confront the problem impossible

Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fes-sustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th December 2012, Evan]

Closely related is that the lead-questions which frame the contemporary debate on democracy and sustainability implicitly suggest that we know what sustainability actually means and what targets need to be achieved, and only need to decide about the most appropriate political means for getting there. Yet, as the concept does not provide any specification of exactly what is to be sustained, at which level, for what reason, and for how long, the meaning of sustainability has so far remained as intangible as the beauty of nature, the intrinsic value of nature or any other entity that environmentalists have placed at the centre of their concern and political efforts. Beyond this, the focus of attention on the means, i.e. the How?, entirely eclipses the question of Whether?. Indeed, the current debates about democracy and sustainability notoriously claim that categorical ecological imperatives will render a transition towards sustainability inescapable and that in one way (democratic) or another (authoritarian), sustainability will have to be achieved. Time and again, reference is being made to supposedly objective bio-physical limits or tipping-points which purportedly make the transition towards sustainability inevitable, because transcending these limits would trigger ecological collapse and put the survival of the human species under threat. Undoubtedly, natural resources are finite, bio-physical limits do exist, and the sustainability crisis does render responsive action inescapable. Yet, the one-dimensional fixation on the alleged choice between democratic versus authoritarian pathways towards sustainability obstructs the view of what for the foreseeable future is the most likely scenario: sustained unsustainability.

#### B) That turns solvency—rejecting this conception by voting aff is key to engendering solutions

Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fes-sustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th December 2012, Evan]

For the new debate on democracy and sustainability all this represents a most challenging task. The questions which have framed this debate so far contribute little to tackling this agenda. With their implicit assumptions and normative commitments they obstruct rather than facilitate a realistic analysis and constructive discussion. They cultivate notions of democracy and autocracy which are largely unrelated to socio-political reality. They contribute to the construction and maintenance of societal self-descriptions which reassure us of our profound democratic and ecological commitment. They mobilise for the defence of democracy and against the threat of eco-authoritarianism without ever realising to what extent the prevalent understandings of democracy have emancipated themselves from the egalitarian-progressive agenda, and to what extent the spectre of eco-dictatorship is really just a tool in the campaign for sustained unsustainability. Therefore, the first objective for a new debate on democracy and sustainability must be to break away from these established patterns of discourse. The assumptions and normative commitments which have framed and constrained the debate so far need to be subject to radical scrutiny. This will open up the discursive arena and create space for genuinely innovative and constructive thinking. Given that this debate concerns the very foundations of the established societal consensus, we must not expect it to deliver quick answers and easy solutions. Indeed the demand for quick fixes will most reliably choke the debate before it gets going. The hope that a few institutional reforms might turn contemporary democracies into ecocracies is just as unfounded as the belief in an expertocratic-authoritarian pathway to sustainability. But this only re-emphasises the need to open the discursive agenda and struggle for a genuinely innovative debate.

#### No link—there’s no forced choice between authoritarian and democratic practices—they can be combined

Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fes-sustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th December 2012, Evan]

Common questions which, in addition to the ones cited at the beginning of this essay, figure prominently in the current debate include: How does the eco-political performance of democratic systems compare to that of authoritarian systems? Will our democratic systems collapse under the pressure of the environmental crisis? May the achievement of sustainability necessitate a change of political regime? Like those cited earlier, these questions make a range of implicit assumptions which are themselves not subjected to any critical enquiry. They pre-structure the debate in ways that, from the outset, preclude certain lines of investigation. For example, such questions, in a simplifying and generalising manner, juxtapose democratic and authoritarian systems. However, given that both democratic and autocratic systems come in a large variety of shapes and that, furthermore, contemporary democracies are, as outlined above, rapidly acquiring expertocratic-authoritarian features, while authoritarian systems like China are experimenting with strategies of decentralisation and local empowerment, such a simplistic binary distinction is manifestly unhelpful – if not outright ideological. It ignores factual political developments and instead focuses public attention on a hypothetical alternative. In fact, if there is any truth in the diagnosis of a post-political condition, democratic and autocratic modes of government might find themselves located on the same side of the new cleavage between the political formulation and implementation of competing visions of societal organisation and development and the purely managerial execution of systemic imperatives which are non-negotiable, self-legitimizing and allow for no alternative. In any case, the alleged choice between democratic and authoritarian policy approaches does not occur in practical day-to-day politics. And given that in eco-political matters democratic and autocratic forms of government both have a frighteningly poor performance record, ecologists may feel they are being offered the choice between a rock and a hard place.

### ---A2 Over-population

#### The status quo doesn’t kill off a ton of people, so it doesn’t solve

#### Their projections are inaccurate – even if the population is growing now, it will eventually level off.

Rowley 8 (John, People and Planet, “Population projected to peak by 2070”, http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=3198)

The simultaneous growth of population in some regions of the world, and the beginning of a decline in others – especially Eastern Europe – together with rapid ageing of the population in many regions, is the subject of a fascinating new series of graphic projections, which give a fresh insight into future global population trends. The analysis, carried out by global researchers at IIASA, is based on assumptions about future levels of fertility, mortality and migration, but adds a wealth of recent new empirical evidence. It concludes that the probability that the world’s population will peak during the present century at about 9 billion has increased slightly since the last projections in 2001. The median projection shows the global population peaking at 9 billion at around 2070 and then slowly declining. Under the new projections, shown in the graph above, global numbers in 2100 could be as high as 11.1 billion or as low as 6.2 billion. However these extremes are highly unlikely. There is rather more than a 10 per cent chance that the end of century population will be less than today’s 6.6 billion, but only a 2 per cent chance that it might double to 13.2 billion.

#### Carrying capacity doesn’t apply for humans – tech can solve

Lindblad 7- Bryn, Swarthmore College Environmental Studies, “Complexities of the Carrying Capacity Calculation” http://fubini.swarthmore.edu/~ENVS2/S2007/blindbl1/Carrying\_Capacity.htm

Environmentalist Bill McKibben sums up the dilemma of applying conclusions made from studying species, such as deer, to human problems: "Consider the simplest difficulties. Human beings, unlike deer, can eat almost anything and live at almost any level they choose: hunter-gatherers use 2,500 calories of energy a day, while modern Americans use seventy-five times as much. Human beings, unlike deer, can import what they need from thousands of miles away. And human beings, unlike deer, can figure out new ways to do old things. If we need to browse on hemlock trees to survive, we could crossbreed lush new strains, chop down competing trees, irrigate forests, spray a thousand chemicals, freeze or dry the tender buds at the peak of harvest, genetically engineer new strains -- and advertise the merits of pine branches til everyone was ready to switch. The variables are so enormous that professional demographers barely bother even trying to figure out carrying capacity" (McKibben, 1998, p.73). Cohen concludes that the basic ecological definitions of carrying capacity fail to be applicable to human populations. The logistical curve has been horrendously wrong at prediction human population trends; we cannot calculate an average population size of a human population that is neither growing nor declining because the population has yet to stop growing; and Liebig's law of minimum fails to take into account human beings' ability to substitute resources when one becomes scarce (Cohen 1995, pp.256-7).

#### Tech, growth, and governments check.

Leslie 96 (Joh, Professor emeritus of philosophy, U of Guelph and Fellow @ Royal Society of Canada, The End of the World, p74-75)

There are some grounds for hope. First, technology might come to the rescue in unexpected ways, particularly if assisted by changes in society's values. Beyond the Limits suggests that the impact of each new human on the environment might in theory be reduced 'by a factor of a thousand or more': a good start would be to give the world's population 'the productivity of the Swiss, the consumption habits of the Chinese, the egalitarian instincts of the Swedes, and the social discipline of the Japanese.'133 Second, as countries become richer they tend to move to lower fertility rates ('the demographic transition'). If the fertility rate recently found in West Germany spread to the rest of the world, there would be no humans in existence by about the year 2400. Affluence means no need for children to share your labor, or to give assurance that one or other of them will survive to grow food for your old age. Again, because of unavailability of contraceptives and exclusion of women from decision-making at least a quarter of today's pregnancies are definitely unwanted by the pregnant, according to the World Health Organization. Well, the equivalent of under a month's global expenditure on armaments could make contraceptives available to everyone. Television soap operas in Brazil, showing families as typically small and happy but sometimes large and miserable, have been encouragingly effective, and there is evidence that the demographic transition begins in poor countries after just a small rise in incomes. Third, governments have had some success by combinations of reward and punishment. Despite the indignation expressed by Westerners at its population-control program of 1975-7 - sterilization was officially compulsory for one of the parents in each family that had three children, while tiny rewards were given for other sterilizations - India is still offering its citizens cash for voluntarily ending their reproductive lives. The amount involved, so few rupees that they couldn't buy twenty dollars, is accepted surprisingly often. In China a more draconian 'one child only' policy, backed by losses of benefits, by fines and by compulsory sterilizations, forced fertility downwards almost to the replacement rate. The cost in human misery was immense, but constant famine could well have been the normative. China had doubled its already huge population between 1960 and 1980.

#### Malthus’s prediction is unscientific and flawed

Deming 04 University of Oklahoma’s School of Geology and Geophysics [David, Malthus Reconsidered, March 22, http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba469/]

Empirical falsifications of Malthus' proposition are often met by the criticism that not enough time has passed for population growth to outstrip food production. But how much time is necessary to test the hypothesis? Is 200 years not enough? A hallmark of scientific hypotheses is that they make specific predictions that can be falsified. If Malthus' hypothesis cannot be falsified within any finite value of time, then its scientific status is questionable. Demographic Transitions. Malthus did not foresee that technological changes would enable resource growth to outstrip population growth. Nor did he anticipate the demographic transition that takes place as societies move from agricultural to technological civilizations. Malthus thought that population increase in prosperous societies was a universal rule and called it an "incontrovertible truth."

# A2 Ks

## Generic K Frontline

### 1AR Perm/Metaphors Key

#### Perm do both

#### Perm – use the metaphor of organ transplant to effect their criticism

#### Metaphors DA – their failure to use metaphor means ONLY the perm solves. Bougher says people interpret information through metaphor, so information that doesn’t fit the metaphor will be ignored – their alternative presents a way of thinking which will be dismissed because it doesn’t fit our frames. ONLY shifting metaphorical frames via the aff allows the alt to change thinking – the permutation unlocks alt solvency

### ---A2 “perm use metaphor for their K” = severance

#### It’s not severance – the aff is bound to the advocacy statement, which is the resolution as a metaphor – I use this advocacy for another purpose, drawing another advantage from it

#### It’s just like kicking a util contention and winning by link turning a disadvantage – the aff still defends their original advocacy, but they adopt a new justification for it by hijacking the negative’s offense

#### And, it’s entirely consistent with the aff’s original justification – the metaphor of organ transplantation ruptures the body state; the perm uses the same metaphor to rupture something else too

#### Finally, I still defend disadvantages to rupturing the body state, so it’s not severance – I add the negative’s advocacy to the aff’s which is exactly what a perm does

### ---“perm use metaphor for their K” = intrinsic

#### Not intrinsic – it combines the whole aff with a part of the counterplan, using the aff’s advocacy to the additional purpose of the alt – everything the perm adds to the aff is something that’s part of the counterplan, which is a legitimate perm

#### *For example, a plan that uses the US government to presume consent obviously could perm a counterplan that raises the minimum wage, using the US government to do the counterplan. Similarly, my aff which uses a metaphor to rupture the state can perm their alt, using a metaphor to do the alt.*

### Hierarchies Impact

#### We turn this – the state-as-body metaphor necessitates a hierarchy that subjugates the poor and powerless

Brown 05 [Rasmussen, Claire (Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware), and Michael Brown (Department of Geography, University of Washington). "The body politic as spatial metaphor.” Citizenship Studies 9.5: 469-484] AJ

The description of the embodied polity assumes a naturally bounded and unified space in which the parts come together for form a whole. The body is defined as a particular space in situ, rather than in a space (see Grosz, 1992). Within this space, the body prescribes a particular relationship between members of the body politic and the unity to which they belong. The naturalness of the body implies a necessary relationship to the body; the belly cannot exist alone, nor may it escape the space of its particular body. The citizen is bound to the polity through the natural structure represented by the space of the body. Second, the organic body is also naturally hierarchical. The internal spatial structure and orientation are key to conveying a normative order within the space of the polity. For example, the head, being the highest point on the body suggests superiority and greater significance that all other parts of the body, while lower organs like the belly or appendages like the feet connote worse or less important parts of the body politic (see Dirven, 1983; Boers, 1996). Placed on the head are lesser rulers, administrators and bureaucrats such as judges and provincial administrators. Suggesting might and physical power, the military is placed in the arms and hands. Central in the torso is the spiritual “heart” of the polity: the priesthood. The peasants are embodied in the feet, the lowest point in the image that is furthest from the head. Above them are courtiers, those who serve and support the prince. Comparing the polity to the natural space of the body lends itself to a functionalist understanding of this hierarchy. The unhealthy body politic is one in which either a single part of the body (quite often the belly, the signifier of the common people) is neglected, or is unwilling to cooperate, thereby leading to a gradual weakening of the entire body. In comparing the polity to the organic or natural space of the body, the metaphor reifies the hierarchical relationship between the state and its subjects, providing a justification for centralized power. As Lefort notes, the body politic, when viewed as a natural, organic body, is linked with a form of politics that sees political membership as grounded in a particular space and that minimizes participation. However, even as the body of the King lost its central place in political theory, the metaphor of the body politic does not die, it is transformed. We should understand this shift as both a change in the way we think about politics and in the way we think about body. Hables-Gray argues that, starting with Thomas Hobbes, political theorists begin using the body less as a way to justify political power through its apparent grounding in nature than as a representation of the very artificiality of political bodies.

## A2 no perm

### A2 No Perm Top Level

#### One, the neg has to answer the aff – the perm just tests whether the alt disproves the aff by disproving competition, it’s not a co-option and doesn’t assume debate about policies. If I win a “perm” I prove the neg hasn’t disprove the aff, so I win the round.

#### Two, this allows negs to read plan-plus counter-advocacies – for example, do the aff and say racism is bad – and they’d automatically win – they should be forced to disprove the aff; key to discussing the aff instead of avoiding it

### A2 Aff can choose whatever

#### I couldn’t read whatever I want – speech time and being in the *direction* of the topic limits my advocacy – I shouldn’t lose for not doing everything

### A2 No opportunity cost

#### Method debates still have opportunity costs – it’s the neg’s job to prove why using both methods together is net worse or contradictory

### A2 Haven’t performed

#### It’s not about co-opting their performance or impacts – the perm only tests whether their performance disproves the aff, we don’t need to do what they did to test that

## PIKs frontline

### PIK Generic TL

#### 1. Perm do the PIK – it’s legit, I chose an advocacy statement which I’m bound to, but I’m not bound to other words I chose

#### 2. PIKs are a voting issue–

#### A) they shift the discussion to one detail of the aff, circumventing broader discussion of metaphors

#### B) they evaluate one part of the aff independently, rather than the aff holistically, which produces the narrow-thinking politics I criticize

#### The Bougher 2 evidence says this is key to development of students as critical thinkers, which the rules of the activity should foster to produce effective citizens.

#### *C) they kill fairness by mooting 6 minutes of the AC, which gives the aff less time to answer neg arguments.*

### Can’t Solve

#### The judge should evaluate the whole speech act of both sides, asking whose performance was more important – the traditional advocacy model assumes the Cartesian subject whose cognition is separated from how they relate to the reading of each speech. The Bougher 1 evidence says this is flawed since citizens aren’t just information machines but are affected by social context

#### Only the aff’s speech highlighted the importance of metaphor and described another metaphor to solve. Even if they SAY they do the aff, they didn’t actually DO the aff so they don’t solve

### Every instance key

#### All the little votes lay the foundation for a destructive system—political salience is in your hands

Ansary 5 [Alex, 12/29/05, Mass Mind Control; Through Network Television; Are Your Thoughts Your Own?]

Some people are wrong about 5% of the time. Some are wrong most of the time. I wish I was wrong all the time. A lot of people deal with these intense realities, by asking me rhetorically, "What is the solution, smart guy?" Remember, it's the viewers, the consumers and all the other little votes called dollars that helped this oligarchy system lay its concrete foundation in our backyards. We must recognize the truth about why the system is flawed and enslaving us if we wish to beat it. The most important solution to fighting this type of brainwashing and mind control is to start with ourselves and our own awakening in the smaller things. In this case, it's brainwashing but after awhile we break Outside the Box and begin venturing outside the system and into unknown terrain. Fighting with people and forcing them to understand 'our truth' is not a solution. If our collective free will created this nightmare, than only our collective free will change it. The battle begins in the heart and mind of the beholder, and then extends outward from there, only to those open to the information.

#### Your ballot is the currency of debate—consistently challenging dogmatic subjective formations though the use of alternative modes of acting, meaning-making, and sense-making can open up new possibilities and cultivate new subjectivities

#### Every instance is key—a revolutionary future can only come about through a series of small steps that work through a process of becoming possible

#### Change is possible – refusing it because of its supposed futility creates a self-fulfilling prophecy

Deleuze and Parnet 87 (Gilles and Claire, dialogues II, p. 146-147)

All this constitutes what can be called a right to desire. It is not surprising that all kinds of minority questions—linguistic, ethnic, regional, about sex, or youth—resurge not only as archaisms, but in up-to-date revolutionary forms which call one more into question in an entirely immanent manner both the global economy of the machine and the assemblages of national States. Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the fascist return to a war-machine in general, why not think that a new type of revolution is in the course of becoming possible, and that all kinds of mutating, living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of consistence which undermines the plane of organization of the World and the States?9 For, once again, the world and its states are no more masters of their plane than revolutionaries are condemned to the deformation of theirs. Everything is played in uncertain games, ‘front to front, back to back, back to front . . .”. The question of the future of the revolution is a bad question because, in so far as it is asked, there are so many people who do not become revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place.

### Word PIC

#### The negatives scriptocentric approach reproduces imperialism

Conquergood ‘02[The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research pp 147. Dwight Conquergood was a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University]

In even stronger terms, Raymond **Williams challenged** **the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of** “highly educated” **people** who are “so **driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice** that there are **other** forms of skilled, intelligent, **creative activity**” such as “theatre” **and “active politics**.” **This** error “**resembles** that of **the narrow reformer who supposes** that farm **labourers** and village craftsmen **were** once **uneducated**, merely **because they could not read.”** He argued that **“the contempt” for performance and practical activity**, “**which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves”** ([1958] 1983:309).Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that **scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action** **and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read**. According to de Certeau, **this** scriptocentrism is a hallmark of Western imperialism. **Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign:** “‘**Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]”**

#### Their certainty about the effects of language belies the nature of human agency and the importance of context, making us powerless in the face of language – Extricating the language from the plan doesn’t make the words “go away” – Confrontation via the permutation solves best

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13)

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

#### Their word pic stakes out the political implications of our words for us—this shuts down the creative potential of dialogue—this proves they solve none of case

Freire, ’70 (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Opressed, 1970**)**

If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it dialogue imposes itself as the +way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person’s “depositing” ideas in another; nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be “consumed” by the discussants. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind. Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love.[[4]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n4)Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause — the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love people — I cannot enter into dialogue. On the other hand, dialogue cannot exist without humility. The naming of the world, through which people constantly re-create that world, cannot be an act of arrogance. Dialogue, as the encounter of those addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from others — mere “its” in whom I cannot recognize other “I"s? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of pure men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are “these people” or “the great unwashed"? How can I dialogue if I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I dialogue if I am closed to — and even offended by — the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness? Self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world. Someone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only people who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know.

#### Isolated instances of renaming fail to create change

Schram 95 (Sanford F., Associate Professor of Political Science at Macalester College, former Visiting Professor at the La Follette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin and Visiting Affiliate at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, “Discourses of Dependency: The Politics of Euphemism,” Words of Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and The Social Science of Poverty, Published by The University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0816625778, p. 21-23)

The deconstruction of prevailing discursive structures helps politicize the institutionalized practices that inhibit alternative ways of constructing social relations.5 Isolated acts of renaming, however, are unlikely to help promote political change if they are not tied to interrogations of the structures that serve as the interpretive context for making sense of new terms.6 This is especially the case when renamings take the form of euphemisms designed to make what is described appear to be consonant with the existing order. In other words, the problems of a politics of renaming are not confined to the left, but are endemic to what amounts to a classic American practice utilized across the political spectrum.7 Homeless, welfare, and family planning provide three examples of how isolated instances of renaming fail in their efforts to make a politics out of sanitizing language. [end page 21] Reconsidering the Politics of Renaming Renaming can do much to indicate respect and sympathy. It may strategically recast concerns so that they can be articulated in ways that are more appealing and less dismissive. Renaming the objects of political contestation may help promote the basis for articulating latent affinities among disparate political constituencies. The relentless march of renamings can help denaturalize and delegitimate ascendant categories and the constraints they place on political possibility. At the moment of fissure, destabilizing renamings have the potential to encourage reconsideration of how biases embedded in names are tied to power relations.8 Yet isolated acts of renaming do not guarantee that audiences will be any more predisposed to treat things differently than they were before. The problem is not limited to the political reality that dominant groups possess greater resources for influencing discourse. Ascendant political economies, such as liberal postindustrial capitalism, whether understood structurally or discursively, operate as institutionalized systems of interpretation that can subvert the most earnest of renamings.9 It is just as dangerous to suggest that paid employment exhausts possibilities for achieving self-sufficiency as to suggest that political action can be meaningfully confined to isolated renamings.10 Neither the workplace nor a name is the definitive venue for effectuating self-worth or political intervention.11 Strategies that accept the prevailing work ethos will continue to marginalize those who cannot work, and increasingly so in a post­ industrial economy that does not require nearly as large a workforce as its industrial predecessor. Exclusive preoccupation with sanitizing names overlooks the fact that names often do not matter to those who live out their lives according to the institutionalized narratives of the broader political economy, whether it is understood structurally or discursively, whether it is monolithically hegemonic or reproduced through allied, if disparate, practices. What is named is always encoded in some publicly accessible and ascendent discourse. 12 Getting the names right will not matter if the names are interpreted according to the institutionalized insistences of organized society.13 Only when those insistences are relaxed does there emerge the possibility for new names to restructure daily practices. Texts, as it now has become notoriously apparent, can be read in many ways, and they are most often read according to how prevailing discursive structures provide an interpretive context for reading them.14 The meanings implied by new names of necessity [end page 22] overflow their categorizations, often to be reinterpreted in terms of available systems of intelligibility (most often tied to existing institutions). Whereas renaming can maneuver change within the interstices of pervasive discursive structures, renaming is limited in reciprocal fashion. Strategies of containment that seek to confine practice to sanitized categories appreciate the discursive character of social life, but insufficiently and wrongheadedly. I do not mean to suggest that discourse is dependent on structure as much as that structures are hegemonic discourses. The operative structures reproduced through a multitude of daily practices and reinforced by the efforts of aligned groups may be nothing more than stabilized ascendent discourses.15 Structure is the alibi for discourse. We need to destabilize this prevailing interpretive context and the power plays that reinforce it, rather than hope that isolated acts of linguistic sanitization will lead to political change. Interrogating structures as discourses can politicize the terms used to fix meaning, produce value, and establish identity. Denaturalizing value as the product of nothing more than fixed interpretations can create new possibilities for creating value in other less insistent and injurious ways. The discursively/structurally reproduced reality of liberal capitalism as deployed by power blocs of aligned groups serves to inform the existentially lived experiences of citizens in the contemporary postindustrial order.16 The powerful get to reproduce a broader context that works to reduce the dissonance between new names and established practices. As long as the prevailing discursive structures of liberal capitalism create value from some practices, experiences, and identities over others, no matter how often new names are insisted upon, some people will continue to be seen as inferior simply because they do not engage in the same practices as those who are currently dominant in positions of influence and prestige. Therefore, as much as there is a need to reconsider the terms of debate, to interrogate the embedded biases of discursive practices, and to resist living out the invidious distinctions that hegemonic categories impose, there are real limits to what isolated instances of renaming can accomplish.

### A2 Word PIC – More

You should evaluate the ontological strategy of the 1AC prior to the discourse it uses—language does not represent an idea, it expresses a fluid strategy—the distinction is between what language means vs what it does—even if they win the language we use has adverse meanings, its effect on the world serves to liberate dualisms means we solve the net benefit

Strathausen 10 (Carsten Strathausen is Associate Professor of German and English at the University of Missouri. His first book was The Look of Things: Poetry and Vision around 1900 (University of North Carolina Press, 2003). Carsten is the editor of A Leftist Ontology (University of Minnesota Press, 2009), and the translator of Boris Groys' Under Suspicion: A Phenomenology of the Media (forthcoming 2011, Columbia University Press). He has also published numerous essays on culture, philosophy, and intellectual history and is currently completing a book project on The Aesthetics of New Media, “Epistemological Reflections on Minor Points in Deleuze”, Theory and Event Volume 13, Issue 4, dml)

#### There is also an independent totalitarianism net benefit—their prescription of language for us is a top down imposition.

Freire, ’70 (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Opressed, 1970)

As we attempt to *analyze* dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: *the word.* But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed — even in part — the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis.[[1]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n1) Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.[[2]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n2) An unauthentic word, one which is unable to transform reality, results when dichotomy is imposed upon its constitutive elements. When a word is deprived of its dimension of action, reflection automatically suffers as well; and the word is changed into idle chatter, into verbalism, into an alienated and alienating “blah.” It becomes an empty word, one which cannot denounce the world, for denunciation is impossible without a commitment to transform, and there is no transformation without action. On the other hand, if action is emphasized exclusively to the detriment of reflection, the word is converted into *activism*.The latter — action for action’s sake — negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible. Either dichotomy, by creating unauthentic forms of existence, creates also unauthentic forms of thought which reinforce the original dichotomy. Human existence cannot be silent nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world. To exist humanly is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the names as a problem and requires of them a new naming*.* Human beings are not built in silence,[[3]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n3)but in word, in work, in action-reflection. But while to say the true word — which is work, which is praxis — is to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few persons, but the right of everyone. Consequently no one can say a true word alone — nor can she say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words. Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming — between those who deny others the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression.

## A2 Anthro K

### TL Anthro Turns

#### 1. Wrong K to read – the whole point of the aff is using the human body to derail traditional notions of what it means to be human – these are at the root of anthropocrentrism

#### Perm do both – the aff challenges anthro by incorporating animals into our bodies, the ultimate site of human privilege and closely guarded against that which is considered “other” – here are three quotes from my Fishel solvency evidence that clarify this:

#### A) it EXPLICITLY says

“At its most radical, these interminglings/incorporations of strangers/animals into our very bodies may lead us to create and embrace forms of global community not based on citizenship in a particular state or because of a certain ethnicity”

#### B) I challenge the value of the human since

“The human body and its transplantable parts reveal much about the values we assign to the private self, sociality and intimacy, humanity, and human nature”

#### C) Aff opposes exclusion along the line of humanness

“Our ideas of what make us human, whole, and pure have always been at the forefront of the creation of political order. The history of colonization demonstrates the reality of placing some outside of what the center considers “human”

#### 2. The metaphor of organ transplantation includes xenotransplantation, incorporating the bodies of other beings into our own bodies which breaks down divisions between people and animals

#### 3. Perm – use the metaphor of organ procurement to rupture human-centeredness – it’s consistent with the aff’s advocacy statement

#### 4. Perm solves best – challenging dominant metaphors and narratives of anthropocentrism is key to solve

Bell and Russell 2k (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, <http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf>)

N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human transactions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vul- nerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the human-centred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

#### ONLY the perm solves – Bougher says people interpret information through metaphor, so information that doesn’t fit the metaphor will be ignored – their challenge to anthro will be dismissed because it doesn’t fit our frames. ONLY shifting anthropocentric metaphorical frames via the aff solves

### Aff turns environment

#### We criticize sovereignty, which is anthropocentric – who is INCLUDED in the body of society is anthropocentric

Wendt 8 [(Alexander Wendt, political scientist who is one of the core social constructivist scholars in the field of international relations The Ohio State University; Raymond Duvall, University of Minnesota) “Sovereignty and the UFO” Political Theory August 2008 vol. 36 no. 4 607-633] AT

Few ideas today are as contested as sovereignty, in theory or in practice. In sovereignty theory scholars disagree about almost everything—what sovereignty is and where it resides, how it relates to law, whether it is divisible, how its subjects and objects are constituted, and whether it is being transformed in late modernity. These debates are mirrored in contemporary practice, where struggles for self-determination and territorial revisionism have generated among the bitterest conflicts in modern times. Throughout this contestation, however, one thing is taken for granted: sovereignty is the province of humans alone. Animals and Nature are assumed to lack the cognitive capacity and/or subjectivity to be sovereign; and while God might have ultimate sovereignty, even most religious fundamentalists grant that it is not exercised directly in the temporal world. When sovereignty is contested today, therefore, it is always and only among humans, horizontally so to speak, rather than vertically with Nature or God. In this way modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, or constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone.1 Humans live within physical constraints, but are solely responsible for deciding their norms and practices under those constraints. Despite the wide variety of institutional forms taken by sovereignty today, they are homologous in this fundamental respect. Anthropocentric sovereignty might seem necessary; after all, who else, besides humans, might rule? Nevertheless, historically sovereignty was less anthropocentric. For millennia Nature and the gods were thought to have causal powers and subjectivities that enabled them to share sovereignty with humans, if not exercise dominion outright.2 Authoritative belief in non-human sovereignties was given up only after long and bitter struggle about the “borders of the social world,” in which who/what could be sovereign depends on who/what should be included in society.3 In modernity God and Nature are excluded, although in this exclusion they are also reincluded as the domesticated Other. Thus, while no longer temporally sovereign, God is included today through people who are seen to speak on Her behalf. And while Nature has been disenchanted, stripped of its subjectivity, it is re-included as object in the human world. These inclusive exclusions, however, reinforce the assumption that humans alone can be sovereign. In this light anthropocentric sovereignty must be seen as a contingent historical achievement, not just a requirement of common sense. Indeed, it is a metaphysical achievement, since it is in anthropocentric terms that humans today understand their place in the physical world. Thus operates what Giorgio Agamben calls the “anthropological machine.”4

#### The aff’s reformulation of the insular nature of sovereignty solves environment destruction

Hayward 5 [(Tim, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of the Just World Institute; Director MSc International Political Theory; Convenor Fair Trade Academic Network.) “Greening the Constitutional State: Environmental Rights in the European Union” In The State and the Global Ecological Crisis] AT

If a green posture toward the nation-state can be discerned from the diverse writings of green political theorists and fellow environmentalists, it is that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environ- mental management, facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection. At worst, it is fundamentally ecocidal.1 Indeed, there are very few radical political ecologists and green political theorists who are prepared to defend the nation-state as an institution that is able to play a positive role in securing sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem integrity. Moreover, those interested in global political ecology are increasingly rejecting the “statist frame” through which international relations and world politics have been traditionally understood, prefer- ring to understand states as but one set of actors or institutions among a myriad of actors and institutions on the global scene that are implicated in ecological destruction.2 In all, the radical green analysis seems to point toward the need for alternative forms of political identity, authority, and governance that break with the traditional statist model of exclusive terri- torial rule. In this chapter, I take the position that this green antipathy toward the nation-state and state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation should not be taken as a reason for avoiding an inquiry into the emanci- patory potential of the nation-state as a significant node in any future net- work of ecological governance. This is especially true given that we can expect states to persist as major sites and channels of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green institutional transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be path-dependent. In any event, if it is indeed the case that states are so deeply implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry ￼into the potential for their transformation or even their modest reform into something greener would seem to be compelling. To the extent that those who reject a statist analysis still concede that the state has an important role to play, the question arises as to what that role ought to be, given its present limitations and trajectory. After all, implicit in the day-to-day policy demands made of the state (both domestically and internationally) by environmentalists is a notion of what the state ought to be doing (or not doing)—in short, a green ideal or vision of what a “good state” might look like. Actively defending and cultivating such an ideal would seem to be politically and strategically necessary if the green movement is to avoid unwitting, ad hoc reinforcement of the destructive or oppressive tendencies of states in the course of pursuing its green public policy goals. I am concerned to encourage a debate among green theorists and activists as to how we might rethink the nation-state and the state system from a critical green perspective (which I call critical political ecology). I acknowledge the contradictory role of the nation-state in managing ecological problems but suggest we search for ways of amplifying the state’s role as an environmental protector while dampening its ecologically destructive potential over time. These complementary, paths point toward less exclusionary ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and citizenship yet retain the nation-state as a container of social processes (albeit with some potentially radical reworking of the meaning of “nation” and “national sovereignty”). I suggest that while in the long run such an approach provides a fundamental challenge to the link between territorially based structures of democratic rule and particular peoples, in the short to medium term it sees the state as a crucial facilitator in the transition toward more ecologically responsive governance. By way of theoretical preliminaries, my critical political ecology framework approaches the state from a structurationist, or critical construc- tivist, perspective, which emphasizes the mutual constitution of agents and social structures.3 Whereas mainstream rationalist approaches to international relations (namely, neorealism and neoliberal institutional- ism) regard the principle of state sovereignty as an immutable ordering principle of world politics that is accepted as a given, critical constructivists understand state sovereignty as a protean concept, the meaning of which is determined by a web of constitutive discourses that are constantly contested and evolving (such as the norms of nonintervention, ￼ ￼self-determination, and their subsidiary discourses, such as the rules of war, the so-called right to develop, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources, and so forth). The lesson for the green movement is that by playing a more informed and self-conscious role in the debates over the meaning and application of these norms, the movement might help to redefine sovereignty as an ally in its broader global project. Three Standard Green Critiques of the State Green theorists (and many environmentalists) have been highly skeptical of the nation-state and the state system. The three most significant (and recurring) of these critiques concern The anarchic character of the system of sovereign states, which is under- stood as structuring a dynamic that leads to the “tragedy of the com- mons.” The parasitical dependence of states on private capital accumulation; that is, the state is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally com- promised by, the promotion of capital accumulation, which is a key driver of ecological destruction, and states are now actively promoting economic globalization in ways that further undermine their own polit- ical autonomy and steering capacity. The highly centralized and hierarchical character of states as institutions, with imperatives that are fundamentally at odds with the green vision of a more participatory democracy and human-scale, decentralized forms of governance. In support of these three propositions, there is no shortage of detailed historical accounts of the various ways in which particular states (whether communist or capitalist, developed or undeveloped) have acted as resource plunderers and active prosecutors of environmentally destructive and sometimes violent agendas, most graphically during times of war but also during times of peace.4 Moreover, if one of the defining features of states is that they hold the monopoly of legitimized violence, with democracy featuring as a contingent rather than defining characteristic of states, then they would seem by their very nature to represent institutions that run contrary to the basic green principle of nonviolence. Taken together, these three general objections would appear to provide a powerful green indictment of states per se (rather than just particular “ecocidal” governments), with the implication that the prospects for the ￼ ￼development of more ecologically responsive states are bleak. This reading also has significant short-term tactical and longer-term strategic implications for environmental movements and green parties struggling with limited resources, both of which, without further analysis, would seem to be best advised looking for alternative sites of political action. Yet we should not be too hasty to assume that the structures and social dynamics referred to in these three analyses are necessarily always anti- ecological and always mutually reinforcing (although they often can be) or that they provide a complete green analysis and evaluation of the emanci- patory potential of states as governance structures. Moreover, on their face, none of these arguments addresses the crucial question of state legitimacy or places any store on the possibilities of deepening the democratic accountability of states to the citizens of particular states, to transnational civil society, or to the society of states in general. It is as if the democratic form of the state were dismissed being not merely as contingent but also as illusory in the sense that it is typically overridden by the struc- tural imperatives of international anarchy, global capitalism, and administrative hierarchy. These are, to be sure, deeply problematic structural dynamics for those concerned to secure global environmental integrity. However, they are not “iron laws” but rather constantly evolving practices that can change in character and influence depending on the movement of social forces and the prevailing social and cultural conditions and understandings. Indeed, one does not have to search very far to find historical examples of how each of these dynamics can be qualified, re- strained, or otherwise moderated by state and nonstate agents acting back upon states, which in turn have acted back upon economic and social structures. Here, we might single out three, mutually informing developments that have served to moderate, and in some exceptional cases work synergistically to transform, the respective “logics” of anar- chy, capitalism, and administrative hierarchy: The rise of environmental multilateralism, including environmental treaties and declarations and international environmental standards The emergence of sustainable development as an alternative develop- ment strategy and of ecological modernization as a new “competitive strategy” of corporations and states The emergence of domestic environmental legislation, including new democratic discursive designs within the administrative state (such as ￼community right-to-know legislation, community environmental moni- toring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public inquiries It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conduct a detailed and systematic evaluation of these developments and the degree to which they may or may not have qualified international anarchy, global capitalism, and bureaucratic domination, not to mention other, less overarching political dynamics.5 In any event, we would expect the story to vary significantly from state to state and region to region. Nonetheless, it is possible to track some broad trends and to suggest a framework for how greens might understand and selectively accentuate some of these positive trends in relation to where and how they may be situated as political actors. Here I concentrate only on the first two structural constraints, namely, global anarchy and the compromised capitalist state. My critical political ecology framework will be defended as an alternative to the deep pessimism of ecorealists, eco-Marxists, and radical political ecologists about the possibilities of more ecologically enlightened state governance. Along the way, I also seek to highlight the dangers of the green movement’s turn- ing its back on the state. International Anarchy: Ecorealism versus Critical Political Ecology In a recent critical assessment of the prospects for a green democratic state, Michael Saward has pointedly asked, “Could it be that the contem- porary state is simply not the type of entity which is capable of systemati- cally prioritizing the achievement of sustainability?”6 Historically, the defense of state territory, military success, and the exploitation of natural resources and the environment for the purposes of national economic development have been widely understood as overriding state imperatives that are common to all states and constitutive of the state’s very form.7 Indeed, the exploitation of natural resources within the territory has sometimes been justified as a “nation-building exercise” or intimately linked with national security.

### A2 Citizenship Link

#### We CHALLENGE the idea of citizenship – that was literally the THESIS OF THE AFF – it’s exclusionary and assumes a bounded body politic which the aff challenges – I turn this link

#### No link – we include animals in our *ethics* sphere without requiring participation in politics – saying political citizenship should include animals is *impractical* and causes *reactionary anthropocentrism*, turning the kritik

Dower 2 [(Nigel, Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen in philosophy/ethics) “Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction”] AT

Now most people recognise these days that cruelty to individual animals is wrong in itself and that the same applies to neglect of the animals in our care. But those who grant this have already abandoned anthropocentrism, the belief that none but human interests count and that only humans have moral standing. The moral standing of living creatures does not mean that they all count equally for all purposes, or that cows and sheep, for example, should be given voting rights. What it does mean is that genuine interests matter, such as the interest of sentient animals in not being subjected to avoidable suffering at human hands. Rejection of anthropocentrism does not involve the view that all species warrant equal concern, since the species do not all have like interests or the same range of interests or capacities. Non-humans cannot be given votes because of their lack of powers of self-determination and, at least in most cases, their lack of language. The suggestion of some ‘deep ecologists’ that we have equal obligations with regard to all species probably helps account for the reversion of some people (in reaction to this) to anthropocentrism, as if there were no positions in between these extremist camps. For opponents of anthropocentrism are free to recognise that moral agency and moral responsibility qualify most humans for distinctive recognition and respect by virtue of their powers of self-determination and all that goes with these powers. This debate also has a bearing on the question of whether non-human creatures should be regarded as global citizens. When Aldo Leopold suggested that humanity should cease to be a conqueror of the land community (roughly, nature) and become a plain member and citizen of it (Leopold 1953: 204) he probably envisaged other species as fellow citizens in the community of life on the planet. But for this sense of community, membership simply involves interdependence in the cycles of nature. It does not involve being a responsible agent. A quite different sense of community is in use when ‘community’ is used to refer to the network of relations of responsible agents, the sense used, for example, in discussion of communities as sources of obligations in part 2 above. This, l suggest, is also the sense of community relevant to global citizens and global citizenship. For example, the community which jointly shoulders the task of caring for the natural environment is a community of responsible agents (that is, people who are responsible to some degree but not without qualiﬁcation). There is, however, a third sense of community, the set of moral patients or beings that responsible agents should take into account. This is a kind of moral community and its recognition means that there is no need to exclude non-humans from the moral community in all senses, even though they are all (or nearly all) excluded from my second sense of community. It may be worth adding that my belief is that the moral community in the third sense is roughly coextensive with the membership of the planetary community in the ﬁrst sense (Earth's biological community), although the community of moral patients much more obviously includes future creatures than talk of the biological community of Earth's creatures usually does. I conclude at this point that the boundaries of moral concern, including the concern of global citizens, do not and should not exclude non-human interests, even though global citizenship is almost entirely conﬁned to human beings. Respect for non-human creatures need not erode concern for fellow humans, with their distinctive characteristic capacities.

### A2 Critical Pedagogy Link

#### 1. The aff never talked about critical pedagogy – no link

#### 2. I’m not traditional humanist pedagogy – all the links above proves my pedagogy is anti-anthropocentric

#### This solves – critical pedagogy isn’t *inherently* anthropocentric, your authors just think it should account for anthro, which the aff did

Bell and Russell 2k (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, <http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf>)

Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we believe that educators must continue to probe its limitations and implications. Accordingly, we consider here how poststructuralism, as it is taken up within critical pedagogy, tends to reinforce rather than subvert deep- seated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for granted the “borders” (as in Giroux, 1991) that define nature as the devalued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a human-centred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experience are being conceptualized outside the field of critical pedagogy (in some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) to call into question these very assumptions. Although we concentrate primarily on societal narratives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as educators.

#### Perm solves better – combining critical pedagogy with their K creates productive synergies

Bell and Russell 2k (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, <http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf>)

In challenging anthropocentrism, the two of us find cause for hope in the fact that our critique can be seen as compatible with the work of many proponents of critical pedagogy. Specifically, attention to local contexts, lived relationships, and embodied learning within critical pedagogy matches similar considerations within environmental thought and education. The poststructuralist emphasis on societal narratives and language practices, already well developed in critical pedagogy, is likewise being taken up by environmental scholars and educators. What strikes us as most auspicious, then, is the potential for shared conversations, with insights from one field sparking unasked questions and opening up unexplored pathways for another. For instance, carrying forward the concerns and convictions of Dewey (1938/1963) and the progressive education movement, theorists of critical pedagogy have written extensively about the disjuncture between the kinds of environments and interactions necessary for active and transform- ative learning and the social relations we enter into through academic training (e.g., McKenna, 1991). They recommend practices situated in students’ cultures (e.g., Shor, 1992, p. 44) and in the particular commun- ities, schools, and other social groups of which students are a part (e.g., Walsh, 1991, p. 99). In so doing, they stress the importance of relationships, contexts, and local histories in defining who we are, calling into question the individualistic and universalistic narratives that shape curriculum and schooling generally (e.g., Giroux, 1991, p. 24; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ- mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our ina- bility to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environmental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such notions as “empowerment.”

### Impact Defense

#### Anthropocentrism is inevitable, but strategic anthropomorphism is possible – we can identify with and make decisions for the benefit of other beings

**Scholtz, 5** – associate Professor in Law, North-West University, (“Animal Culling: A Sustainable Approach or Anthropocentric Atrocity?: Issues of Biodiversity and Custodial Sovereignty”, MqJICEL (2005) Vol 2)

The CBD recognizes that the value of the biosphere is integrated with the importance of conservation of the biosphere for human survival. Loss of biodiversity in nature may impact on man just as the actions of man impact on nature.49 The anthropocentric approach evoked responses from various scholars who have advocated that nature itself should be awarded subjective rights.5 In a previous publication the author introduced the so-called ‘qualitative approach’ in order to escape the dichotomy of subject (man) and object (nature). A holistic approach is needed whereby the two opposites are united in a single organism. Instead of arguing for or against an anthropocentric approach, one must favour and promote ‘quality’ of the organism as the goal which needs to be achieved.51 According to this viewpoint it is impossible to escape anthropocentrism. **Anthropocentrism is inevitable** even in the instance where human beings confer rights on natural objects. It is futile to engage in an approach which does not pay heed to this reality. The focus on quality reconciles the interests of both man and nature. Quality encompasses quality of life for man which requires quality of, for instance, the ecosystem of which humans are a part. The focus on quality provides one with a certain conceptual understanding of the relationship between man and the environment. The question which arises is whether the qualitative approach really addresses the criticism that sustainable development is anthropocentric and that the interests of nature may accordingly be disregarded in favour of human needs? The acknowledgement that one should focus on quality already manifests in the concept of diluted anthropocentrism. This diluted form of anthropocentrism may also be relevant for the notion of sustainable development. To illustrate this point one may refer to the precautionary approach which is one of the well-known principles of sustainable development. This approach requires that despite absence of scientific evidence that actions may harm the environment, protective and/or prohibitory measures must be taken. The broad scope of this approach implies that various factors must be taken into account. These may extend beyond human interests to include the interests of nature.52 This important principle or approach is indicative of the diluted anthropocentrism inherent in the ideal of sustainable development. If one also takes notice of intergenerational equity in addition to the precautionary approach sustainable development, then the line of reasoning is further strengthened as actions detrimental to nature may have negative effects on future generations. The quality of life of future generations may be diminished by a decrease in biodiversity through the actions of the present generation. The recognition of the qualitative approach may be of importance in decisionmaking in issues of sustainable development. Where a decision-maker needs to balance the three elements of sustainable development; namely ecological, developmental and societal needs; the qualitative approach implies that one does not change the values which need to be balanced. Rather, it is a case where the perceptions of the adjudicator are altered to accord with reality. This resulting decision would reflect the reality which does not support the ‘fiction’ that the human component can be disregarded as the ecocentric approach propounds. One of the presumptions on which the qualitative theory is built is that conservation and use can only be achieved from a homocentric approach and further, that alternative theories establish a fiction whereby the human adjudicator is disregarded by way of elimination. This does not reflect reality. For some commentators this presumption is unconvincing. For example, Gillespie contends that: … non-anthropocentric theorists are not claiming that it is possible to know exactly what it is to be a non-human piece of Nature, but only that it is still possible to make certain broad assumptions about the general interests of living entities. Without this ability, a male could not be non-sexist, or a Caucasian, non-racist.53 Gillespie’s viewpoint is not without merit, but does this mean that the qualitative approach is incorrect? That the human component in relation to environmental protection cannot be disregarded does not imply that humans cannot make decisions which are in the broad interests of biodiversity. By way of analogy, it would of course be absurd to state that a caucasian is incapable of being non-racist. These examples do not, however, suffice to explain the complex homocentric relationship between man and the environment. Caucasians may be non-racist, but in a society in which they dominate it is most probable that they may pursue their self-interest as a group in certain circumstances.54 This does not mean that the dominant group is unaware of the general interests of others, but rather pertains to the adjudication of interests. As such it is not a question of knowledge regarding the interest of other entities, but the issue pertains to the adjudication of interests. The examples provided by Gillespie furthermore differ from the situation between humans and nature. Objects of nature are incapable of voicing their concerns in the same way as humans. It is accordingly true that man may make certain assumptions regarding nature’s interests, but man will evaluate these interests from an anthropocentric perspective. The qualitative theory therefore attempts to ameliorate man’s selfinterest to accord with a more holistic approach in which the interests of man are more in line with the requirements of biodiversity, for instance.55 According to the qualitative approach, biodiversity needs to be conserved and used in a sustainable fashion because of its instrumental value. Biodiversity has a qualitative instrumental value which far exceeds the total of man’s self-interest. Self-interest, in this instance, presupposes a certain interest in non-human elements because of the linkage between man and environment.

## A2 Anarchism/borders bad

### A2 Borders Bad CP TL

#### 1. Their counter-advocacy is *profoundly unfeasible* – “fiating” such a radical shift is unproductive since nothing we do can ever bring about such a shift

#### 2. Perm do both – their kritik is consistent with ours

#### 3. At worst, they draw attention to the importance of the state – bringing up their criticism creates fears about the possibility of anarchy which only *re-entrenches* the state – only the aff’s metaphor challenges borders without re-entrenching them

#### 4. The state/borders are TOO EMBEDDED for their criticism do anything – metaphors must be our starting point

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Prepared for the ISA Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011] AT

To take metagenomics and the microbiomes of the human body seriously means the human body becomes a community, not only a container--a “mutualistic human-microbial” (Metagenomics 2007, 32) series of interactions. Not only are we embedded in our environment, but our bodies are home to our own communities of micro flora and fauna. From this perspective it is impossible not to see the similarities between relationships in the internal relations between members of microbiotic communities in the human gut and the relations between members of a political society. This complicates the view of an autonomous, rational self and the bordered sovereign state defended in mainstream IR theory. Paul Feyerabend in Against Method writes that, in order to begin to see alternatives “We must invent a new conceptual system that suspends, or clashes with, the most carefully established observational results, confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot form part of the existing perceptual world” (Feyerabend 2010, 15). In IR, it is nearly impossible to begin a critique against the state as it is the starting point for action and theorizing in the international realm. As he asks: “Now, how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time? How can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and straightforward observations, and reveal their presuppositions? How can we discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do (Feyerabend 2010, 15)” This paper is an attempt to put forward, in the language of international relations, a set of external and alternative assumptions “constituting, as it were, an entire alternative world” following Feyerabend in his assertion that “we need a dream-world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may actually be just another dream world). The first step in our criticism of familiar concepts and procedures “must therefore be an attempt to break the circle” (Feyerabend 2010, 15). This paper offers metagenomics as a first step in imagining a different way to “dream” international community. It is to recognize Jane Bennett’s “vital” and shared” materiality of our human constitution and “to conceive of these materials as lively and self-organizing, rather than as passive or mechanical means under the direction of something nonmaterial, that is, an active soul or mind” (2010, 10). To live, as Donna Haraway said, in the “concatenated worlds” and situated becomings that we have inherited through our connections and encounters in the world (Gane, 2006, 145.). To admit, along with Lynn Margulis, that “the completely self-contained individual’ is a myth that needs to be replaced with a more flexible definition” (Margulis, 2002, 19). What kind of “body politic” could be framed with these “lively” bodies as a foundation? By juxtaposing the “body self-contained and self-regulating” and the “body as an ecosystem” metaphors, one can see that many contested issues in the history of Western thought, such as the nature of the Cartesian self, the role of identity creation and difference, and how we differentiate “self” from “other,” or non-self, can be answered differently. Are there better metaphors that can be used to understand the body and its relation to its “outside” and “inside”?

#### 5. Perm use organ transplantation to rupture and totally destroy the borders and body-state. Their criticism is ENTIRELY consistent with the aff – we can access everything they say

#### Only the perm can realistically solve – presenting anarchy as a mere fact will “bounce off” the frames citizens adopt now – that’s the Bougher evidence – only shifting the frame can reformulate the way people think, which the aff solves

#### 6. Even if their advocacy is good – they need a reason why it’s good to discuss it – our evidence says revealing and changing the state’s metaphors is important; the neg has no evidence that discussing impossible projects is productive, which means the aff accesses pre-fiat impacts and they don’t, so the aff’s a prior question to the alternative

#### 7. Merely erasing the lines of IR risks reinscribing them, and fails to recognize how the state and individual are co-constituted – only poking holes in the rigid boundaries of the body-state can solve

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

However, I am unwilling to add to a growing literature about shifting or moving our focus in IR to different levels of analysis--instead of the international, the world; instead of the state, the individual; instead of anarchy, cooperation. By using the body, through the interrogation of bodily metaphors in politics, it is my aim to not to draw a simple line from the international to the individual as a way to ‘fix’ modern forms of violence created by certain conceptions of the international and an international system of states and subjects, but to look at the practices that create borders, exclusions, and limits in both time and space. Necessarily, it will include an admission that drawing these lines is a complex practice--merely erasing them or replacing them will not lead us out of a politics of the international to a more inclusive politics of the world or one based on the concerns of indiviuals (Walker, 2010, 6). This in no way endorses a move from state politics to body politics as a solution to the problem. The state and the individual are co-constituted from the very beginning in Western politics. This will not change outcomes or alleviate violence--it only serves to reinforce claims about how we think about subject creation and the borders that separate an idea of ‘I’ or ‘we’ from others. In this work, I do not seek to ‘embody’ International Relations, but to dislocate it, 5 to make it question the limits it has set in sovereign subjectivity and its anthropocentric practices. By this I mean that this project is not trying to find a ‘deeper’ or more ‘authentic’ meaning in the body, but to investigate how body metaphors operate in International Relations in order to determine what kinds of violence these body metaphors permit or excuse. We understand more about the human body and its processes than political theorists did when they began to imagine political metaphors based on the body. Illustrative of these new understandings, organs are exchanged on the global market and genomic information flows across borders; bacterial and viral communities, both symbiotic and pathogenic, affect our bodies and through this our politics. We can no longer uphold the the fiction of autonomous selfhood. This means the view of the body as a ‘free agent’ or Newtonian actor with sharp boundaries and distinctions from other bodies must be questioned. In fact, a larger question that this dissertation struggles with is what it means to be human now that we know other clife forms in our body outnumber us DNA-wise an estimated 9 to 1. “It might be important to figure out whether persons really are solid, single, lasting, and independent beings. This has huge implications for ethics and politics” (Morton, 2010, 119). The examples offered in this paper will force us to look at both inside and outside our bodies in order to unsettle the view of an Cartesian object/subject we thought was ‘natural’ and human. It will use the body metaphor to re-articulate politics at the borders to open up a space to begin to ask different questions about world order. On a larger level, I hope, through careful examination of the underlying normative claims of scientific and medical advances, to trace a history of the body in order to discover the ethical commitments needed to respond to current global challenges. This will also challenge IR’s theoretical and practical understandings of the body politic in order to interrogate whether the tools and ways of thinking in traditional IR are sufficient for answering the challenges and opportunities raised by new understandings of the body and the body politic in the 21st century. These examples force us to question traditional means of state and individual security connected to sovereignty and the sovereign state advanced in the field of IR, both as a discourse and as policy. Important (and admittedly questions that will not be answered by one paper) are: What other kinds of organization can we imagine beyond the Westphalian state system? What new metaphors can we create or are emerging to transform our notions of political community? To begin to look seriously at these large questions, the next section will briefly explore the metaphor of the ‘body politic’ and provide an explanation of how this work defines the ‘body’ and bodies in the world.

#### 8. Cross apply Ringmar – metaphor is more powerful than specific policies or even actual force – our method solves better than theirs

## A2 Biopower K

### Biopower TL

#### The K is the quintessential slippery slope – they say the state is bad in this instance, but not always, which is debate-speak for “I won’t defend the logical conclusion of my arguments.” They have no warrant for why state action is uniquely bad in this instance

#### “Questioning the state” is not always good – their critique-intoxicated focus shuts off the state as a productive avenue for change, which is sometimes the best and only place for goods. State action outweighs:

#### Simulation key to recognizing the structure of power structures – understanding the state means we can effectively challenge it later

#### The state is the only institution that has the power to do certain things – individual action is not enough, and movements are often organized through the state. At the very least, most movements will reach a point where they either must work within the state or compromise with it – anti-racism, for instance

#### Turn – the K destroys possibility of productive social justice within the state. This allows neolib to fill the gaps, which is worse since it subjects people to destructive forces and then lets them die

Li 09 [Tania Murray Li (Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Canada). “To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations.” Antipode Vol. 41 No. S1 2009 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 66–93] AJ

A biopolitical program, as I have argued in other work, can usefully be viewed as an assemblage of elements, pulled together at a particular conjuncture, in relation to a given ensemble of population and territory (Li 2007a, 2007b). Just as the connection between capital and labour that constitutes “capitalist development” needs to be examined in all its historical and spatial specificity, so does the emergence of a biopolitical program that seeks to sustain life. Although situated within the broad historical trajectory Foucault (1991) described as the emergence of “government”, that is, the grounding of the rationale for rule in techniques for knowing and improving the condition of the population, the deployment of biopolitical programs to secure life is uneven, suggesting that a range of social forces is involved. What are these forces? Karl Polanyi (1944) offers an underdeveloped but still fruitful way of thinking about the social forces involved in protecting life. He rejected an analysis based on a narrow view of class interest, or a concept of capitalism on auto-pilot that cannot be tamed or directed. Instead, he highlighted the role of cross-class alliances in promoting life-enhancing interventions, their adoption by European regimes across the spectrum from left to right, and their emergence under authoritarian conditions as well as democratic ones. He also pointed out that many interventions arose as pragmatic responses to particular problems such as unemployment, and crises in public health. While the extension of market relations was planned, he argued, planning was not (1944:141). There are multiple social forces at work in a make live conjuncture. Polanyi wrote, for example, of the meeting of the justices of Berkshire at the Pelican Pub in Speenhamland in 1795, when they ruled that parishes should subsidize wages on a scale related to the price of bread, thereby countering the emergence of a “free” market in labour, and inventing the “right to live” (1944:77). He also traced the social forces behind this event, and this invention. Similarly, we can understand the emergence of Britain’s post-war welfare state as an assemblage of elements: post- war patriotism, the shameful exposure of malnutrition in the urban underclass, memories of suffering in the depression, pressure from organized labour, fears of the potentially revolutionary consequences of mass unemployment, and new expertise in planning, among others. Sadly, the desolate data on life expectancy I cited earlier gives ample reason to question Polanyi’s confidence that “society as a whole” (1944:152) is equipped with a homeostatic capacity to protect “itself” from the risk of destruction. Clearly, in the history of life-preserving interventions, social protection has been racialized and spatialized. Not everyone has been able to claim a “right to live”. In the “late Victorian holocausts” described by Mike Davis (2002), market fundamentalism in colonial India dictated that Indians should be valued only as units of labour. There would be no Indian Poor Law. If there was no demand for Indian labour, Indians should be allowed to die, as they did in vast numbers in 1876–1878 and again in 1896–1902, about 20 million people in all. Colonial authorities banned charitable efforts to supply food to these people as interference in the natural law of the market. Such interference, the experts argued, would only make matters worse, not only for the British whose coffers would be drained, but also for the Indians, whose development would be diverted from its natural—though deadly—path. Letting die was not an oversight. It was a calculated decision, rationalized in terms of the greater good. Echoing the late colonial holocausts, as Davis (2006:174) observes, the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s deliberately exposed rural populations of the global South to the full blast of market discipline, while withdrawing social protections. “Letting die” was part of this biopolitical triage, not in its rhetoric—one of economic growth and development—but in its results. In the period 1990–2003, 21 countries experienced a decline in the Human Development Index, which includes factors such as life expectancy and infant mortality (UNDP 2003). The effects of structural adjustment were horrendous, and policies of a similar kind are still promoted. Yet death and destruction were not everything. Even at their height, neoliberal attacks on social protection were tempered by countermoves such as safety nets, employment schemes, and Millennium Development Goals that pulled in the other direction. Likewise, colonial regimes often had protective aspirations that coexisted in uneasy tension with the search for profit, the need for stability, and other agendas (Li 2007b, in press). How can we understand these contradictory formations? One approach to the contradiction between dispossession and protection would be to look at how it is sustained by quotidian practices of compromise that enable, at the end of the day, a monstrous disavowal (Mosse 2008; Watts 2009:275). Or we could approach it as a matter of bad faith: dispossession is real, protection is just talk. Or protection is real but minimal, self-serving, and disciplinary: its purpose is to manage the chaos created by dispossession, and stave off revolt (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Peck and Tickell 2002). Another approach, the one I took in The Will to Improve (Li 2007b), is to take make live aspirations at their word, while acknowledging the contradictions that cause them to fall short. There is, from this perspective, no master plan, only assemblages pulled together by one set of social forces, only to fragment and reassemble. Some of the elements of a make live assemblage are located within the state apparatus. Writing about the rise of neoliberalism in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, Pierre Bourdieu (1998:2) distinguished between what he called the “left hand of the state, the set of agents of the so- called spending ministries which are the trace, within the state, of the social struggles of the past”, and the “right hand of the state”, often headquartered in ministries of finance. In a democratic system, and within the container of the nation state, tensions between productivity and protection may be worked out by means of the ballot and embedded in laws that define entitlements and—just as important—a sense of entitlement that is not easy to eradicate. In the UK, as in France, decades of neoliberal government did not eliminate public expectations about the provision of public services, especially state-mediated social security for people facing hard times. As Janet Newman and John Clarke (2009) argue, announcements of the “death of the social” have been premature. Nevertheless, under increasingly globalized conditions, it is less obvious that nation states provide containers for cross- class settlements, or command the resources to engage in projects of productivity or protection, as contradictory pressures operate at multiple scales (Swyngedouw 2000). Echoing the left-hand/right-hand split at a transnational scale, the UN system, with its Declaration on Economic and Social Rights, including a right to food, and a “rights-based approach” to development, sits awkwardly alongside the IFIs, convinced that sacrifice is necessary in order to promote growth, from which the poor will eventually benefit (Kanbur 2001; United Nations 2007). The IFIs, unable to admit that their own policies are implicated in dispossession and abandonment, attempt to pass the responsibility on to national governments, obliged to prepare poverty reduction strategies as a condition of receiving funds. Many national regimes, in turn, have been radically reconfigured by decentralization measures, making it difficult for them to deliver on national commitments, and devolving responsibilities downwards to districts, “communities”, groups of “stakeholders” and other weakly territorialized units with uncertain mandates and capacities (Craig and Porter 2006). To the left-hand/right-hand mix, then, is added the problem of territorial jurisdiction and scale, and the further problem of population mobility. As a result, it is often very unclear who is responsible for the fate of which ensemble of population, and what resources they could command to make the dispossessed live better. The attempt to govern through communities, and make them responsible for their own fate, has been prominent in the era of neoliberalism, especially in the form of micro-credit schemes that require the poor to supply their own employment as entrepreneurs (Elyachar 2005). Variations on the theme of community self-reliance have reappeared with regularity in Indonesia for 200 years, and appeared again in the 1997–1998 economic crisis, when some experts argued that there was no need to supply a “safety net” for displaced urban workers since they could be reabsorbed into the village economy. There was a program to supply them with one-way tickets “home” (Breman and Wiradi 2002:2–4, 306; Li 2007b). The World Bank subsequently glorified this event with a label, “farm financed social welfare”, heralded as a remedy for “urban shocks” (World Bank 2008:3). The same discourse arose in 2009, as global recession set in. A news report about job losses in Thailand anticipated an “exodus of workers back to the family farm”, waxed lyrical on the “bright green rice terraces”, coconut groves, and fishponds dotting “an exceedingly fertile countryside”, and quoted the country director of the Asian Development Bank on the virtues of the Thai countryside as a “social safety net” (International Herald Tribune 2009). A critical flaw in these observations, however, is that a large number of those who exit rural areas have no farms, and some of them have been landless for multiple generations. If “farm-financed social welfare” works at all, it works for prosperous landowners. For the poor it is a mirage, with potentially lethal effects. In his recent book, Mark Duffield (2007:19) draws a stark contrast between “insured life” in the global North, and “non-insured surplus life” in the global South. The goal of transnational development intervention, he argues, is not to extend northern-style social protections to the population of the global South, but to keep the latter in their place—ensconced in their nations, communities and families, where they must be self-sufficient, and not make demands. I think the distinction between insured and uninsured life is accurate enough as a description of the status quo, but it is not the end of history. As I noted earlier, some parts of the development apparatus talk in terms of rights and entitlements, even though they do not have the means to secure them. More significantly, Duffield’s North–South division underestimates the aspiration for broader forms of social justice that exists within some nations of the global South, is nurtured in unions, social movements, left-leaning political parties and the “left hand” of the state apparatus, and can sometimes assemble a protective biopolitics, despite the odds. In the next section, I examine one such assemblage in India, that aspires to secure the “right to food” on a national scale, and contrast it with the situation in Indonesia, where movements for social justice are truncated, and the myth of village self-sufficiency leaves the dispossessed seriously exposed.

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#### Answers their internal link since there is no overarching state structure that decides policy, only social forces pulling in different directions

## A2 Cap K

#### Perm do the aff and non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt (which should be all of it)

#### Case turns K – Capitalist and neoliberal power structures rely upon violent exclusion that is enforced by the state – discounting the role of the state means the K can’t solve but perm can

Notes From Nowhere 03 [Notes from Nowhere (international editorial team directly involved in popular mobilisations across the planet). “We Are Everywhere The Irresistible Rise Of Global Anticapitalism.” Verso, London. 2003] AJ

The fence surrounding the military base in Chiapas is the same fence that surrounds the G8 meeting in Genoa. It’s the fence that divides the powerful from the powerless, those whose voices decree, from those whose voices are silenced. And it is replicated everywhere. For the fence surrounds gated communities of rich neighbourhoods from Washington to Johannesburg – islands of prosperity that float in seas of poverty. It surrounds vast estates of land in Brazil, keeping millions who live in poverty from growing food. It’s patrolled by armed guards who keep the downtrodden and the disaffected out of shopping malls. It’s hung with signs warning you to ‘Keep out’ of places where your mother and grandmother played freely. This fence stretches across borders between rich and poor worlds. For the unlucky poor who are caught trying to cross into the rich world, the fence encloses the detention centres where refugees live behind razor wire. Built to keep all the ordinary people of the world out of the way, out of sight, far from the decision-makers and at the mercy of their policies, this fence also separates us from those things which are our birthright as human beings – land, shelter, culture, good health, nourishment, clean air, water. For in a world entranced by profit, public space is privatized, land fenced off, seeds, medicines and genes patented, water metered, and democracy turned into purchasing power. The fences are also inside us. Interior borders run through our atomized minds and hearts, telling us we should look out only for ourselves, that we are alone. But borders, enclosures, fences, walls, silences are being torn down, punctured, invaded by human hands, warm bodies, strong voices which call out the most revolutionary of messages: “You are not alone!” For we are everywhere. We are in Seattle, Prague, Genoa, and Washington. We are in Buenos Aires, Bangalore, Manila, Durban, and Quito. Many of these place names have been made iconic by protest, symbols of resistance and hope in a world which increasingly offers little room for either. The Zapatistas have joined with thousands around the world who believe that fences are made to be broken. Refugees detained in the Australian desert tear down prison fences, and are secreted to safety by supporters outside. The poor, rural landless of Brazil cut the wire that keeps them out of vast uncultivated plantations and swarm onto the properties of rich, absentee landlords, claim the land, create settlements, and begin to farm. Protesters in Québec City tear down the fence known as the ‘wall of shame’ surrounding the summit meeting of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and raise their voices in a joyful yell as it buckles under the weight of those dancing on its bent back, engulfed in euphoria even while the toxic blooms of tear gas hit. The radical guerrilla electricians in South Africa break the fence of privatization that keeps the poor from having electricity by installing illegal connections themselves. Peasant women across Asia gather to freely swap seed, defying the fences of market logic that would have them go into debt to buy commercial seed. “Keep the seeds in your hands, sister!” they declare. Those who tear down fences are part of the largest globally interconnected social movement of our time. Over the last ten years, our protests have erupted on continent after continent, fuelled by extremes of wealth and poverty, by military repression, by environmental breakdown, by ever-diminishing power to control our own lives and resources. We are furious at the increasingly thin sham of democracy, sick of the lies of consumer capitalism, ruled by ever more powerful corporations. We are the globalization of resistance. But where we came from, what we have done, who we are, and what we want have remained untold. These are our stories.

#### Perm also outweighs – the case tears down internal fences that isolate individuals from one another – that is the crucial basis of capitalist thinking

## A2 Death K

### Top Level link debate

#### I NEVER claimed a death impact, let alone a specific conception of death – there is no link

#### I don’t make specific predictions about coming extinction so *II don’t fear death*, but rather make changes that address structural conditions in politics that allow for genocide

#### I don’t have an extinction impact – saying “death good” doesn’t make sense in this context since once people are alive, they shouldn’t be murdered – they already have some value which should be preserved

#### Perm – use the metaphor of organ transplantation to rupture life and embrace death

#### The aff turns the K – organ transplantation ruptures the sanctity of the body, which is deeply connected to the primacy of life

#### Perm solves best – all the aff evidence says metaphors are powerful in changing perceptions, whereas failing to use metaphors means their method will never change the way people view the world

### Death is Bad

#### Their evidence is in the context of individual choices to live or die, not genocide on other people who haven’t chosen to die – it doesn’t apply to forcing death on others

#### Value is subjective – you don’t know how other people experience the world, you only the know what values you have chosen for yourself– if people see value in their lives, then they should be allowed to live

#### Death is bad—to die removes pleasure

Preston 7 – Rio Hondo College AND Minnesota State Community and Technical College (Ted; Scott Dixon, “Who wants to live forever? Immortality, authenticity, and living forever in the present”, Int J Philos Relig (2007) 61:99–117, dml)

Death might be very bad for the one who is dead. If death deprives him of a lot of pleasure—the pleasure he would have enjoyed if [s]he had not died—the death might be a huge misfortune for someone. More explicitly, death might be extrinsically bad for the one who is dead even though nothing intrinsically bad happens to him as a result. In my view, death would be extrinsically bad for him if his life would have contained more intrinsic value if he had not died then (Ibid, p. 140). This is a tricky issue. On the one hand, someone might claim that even a negative evil has to happen to someone, and the dead person who no longer exists is no longer a “somebody” to experience the evil, so there shouldn’t be any subjective harm. On the other hand, it is a powerful intuition that death deprives the dead of something, somehow. Nagel tries to resolve this problem by claiming that the person who used to exist can be beneﬁted or harmed by death, and tries to show that our intuitions are in harmony with this idea. For instance, he claims we could and would say of someone trapped in a burning building who died instantly from being hit on the head rather than burning to death, that the person was lucky, or better off, for having died quickly. Of course, after dying from the head trauma, there was no one in existence who was spared the pain of burning to death, but Nagel claims that the “him” we refer to in such an example refers to the person who was alive and who would have suffered (Nagel, 1987). Nagel believes the person subjectively beneﬁted, although no subject was there to receive the beneﬁt. It would be easier to understand this objectively in terms of the qualitative assessment of Feldman; however, that is not Nagel’s position. Similarly, if someone dies before seeing the birth of a grandchild, and there is no life after death, there is no person in existence who is presently being deprived of anything at all, including, of course, births of grandchildren. But the person who was alive and who would have seen it, if not for death, has counterfactually and subjectively missed out on something. The same kind of thing could be said about death as a negative evil. When you die, all the good things in your life come to a stop: no more meals, movies, travel, conversation, love, work, books, music, or anything else. If those things would be good, their absence is bad. Of course, you won’t miss them: death is not like being locked up in solitary conﬁnement. But the ending of everything good in life, because of the stopping of life itself, seems clearly to be a negative evil for the person who was alive and is now dead. When someone we know dies, we feel sorry not only for ourselves but for him, because he cannot see the sun shine today, or smell the bread in the toaster (Ibid, p. 93). This is admittedly a confusing concept: the idea that one can be negatively harmed or beneﬁted even when one does not exist, but it is a concept Nagel claims is intuitively powerful for us, and which Feldman supports. It is confusing because of its counterfactual base; that a subject experiences harm or good even though there is no subject. It is intuitive because we do talk and think in terms of what it would have been for someone to experience. What these two articulations may show is that counterfactuals are being used in different ways, with the intuitive version masking a lot of the work of the counterfactual harm version. In response to the problem of locating when death is a problem for someone, Feldman claims that a state of affairs can be bad for someone regardless of when it occurs: “The only requirement is that the value of the life he leads if it occurs is lower than the value of the life he leads if it does not occur” (Feldman, 1992, p. 152). The comparison is between the respective values of two possible lives. The state of affairs pertaining to someone dying at some particular time, is bad for that person, if “the value-for-her of the life she leads where [that state of affairs] occurs is lower than the value-for-her of the life she would have led if [that state of affairs] had not taken place” (Ibid, p. 155). When is it the case that the value-for-her of her life would be comparatively lower? Eternally. Eternally, as opposed to at any particular moment, because “when we say that her death is a bad for her, we are really expressing a complex fact about the relative values of two possible lives” (Ibid, p. 154). Lives taken as a whole, that is. It seems that Feldman is offering an objective qualitative analysis here, which may be addressing a different component than Nagel’s subjective argument does. If we take the two arguments together, they may offer a rather compelling account of why deprivation is a bad thing in an abstracted sense. We should not forget, however, that a possible life is not a life that is lived or being lived. In that way, they both lose a bit of their intuitive force. In another attempt to undermine the Epicurean argument that death is not a bad thing but one that focuses upon one’s actual desires and interests, we may turn to Nussbaum’s work. Adding to an argument already developed by David Furley, Nussbaum argues that death is bad for the one who dies because it renders “empty and vain the plans, hopes, and desires that this person had during life” (Nussbaum, 1994). As an example, consider someone dying of a terminal disease. Subjectively, the terminally ill person is unaware of this fact, though some friends and family do know. This person plans for a future that, unbeknownst to him, will be denied him, and, to the friends and relatives who objectively know, “his hopes and projects for the future seem, right now, particularly vain, futile, and pathetic, since they are doomed to incompleteness” (Ibid). Moreover, the futility is not removed by removing the knowing spectators. “Any death that frustrates hopes and plans is bad for the life it terminates, because it reﬂects retrospectively on that life, showing its hopes and projects to have been, at the very time the agent was forming them, empty and meaningless” (Ibid). Nussbaum is making an interesting move here. She is collapsing the subjective and objective views, such that if the agent were aware, his projects would change and mirror reality. He would realize that his interests cannot be realized, and would change his interests, and live out his days with an accurate assessment of his interests and mortality. Nussbaum appreciates this argument because it shows how death reﬂects back on an actual life, and our intuitions do not depend on “the irrational ﬁction of a surviving subject” (Ibid, p. 208). This argument is in harmony with Nagel’s claim that death can be bad for someone—even if that someone no longer exists. And, because it is rooted in the feared futility of our current projects, it is not vulnerable to the “asymmetry problem” (i.e., the alleged irrationality of lamenting the loss of possible experience in the future due to “premature” death, but not lamenting the loss of possible experience in the past due to not having been born sooner) since the unborn do not yet have any projects subject to futility. Nussbaum adds, to this argument, however, by appealing to the temporally extended structure of the relationships and activities we tend to cherish. A parent’s love for a child, a child’s for a parent, a teacher’s for a student, a citizen’s for a city: these involve interaction over time, and much planning and hoping. Even the love or friendship of two mature adults has a structure that evolves and deepens over time; and it will centrally involve sharing futuredirected projects. This orientation to the future seems to be inseparable from the value we attach to these relationships; we cannot imagine them taking place in an instant without imagining them stripped of much of the human value they actually have. . . . Much the same, too, can be said of individual forms of virtuous activity. To act justly or courageously, one must undertake complex projects that develop over time; so too for intellectual and creative work; so too for athletic achievement. . . . So death, when it comes, does not only frustrate projects and desires that just happen to be there. It intrudes upon the value and beauty of temporally evolving activities and relations. And the fear of death is not only the fear that present projects are right now empty, it is the fear that present value and wonder is right now diminished (Ibid, p. 208–209). This argument also helps to explain our intuition that death is especially tragic when it comes prematurely. While we might grieve the death of someone at any age, it seems especially bad when it is a child, or a young adult, that died. We sometimes explicitly state this in terms of the deceased having “so much left to do,” or having their “whole lives ahead of them.” It is not that death is unimportant when it is the elderly who die, but that, in many cases, the elderly have already had a chance to accomplish goals they have set for themselves. Indeed, many times those who face impending death with tranquility are those who can say, of themselves, that they have already lived a long, full life—while the elderly who most lament death are those who regret what they have failed to do in the time they had. “It is those who are most afraid of having missed something who are also most afraid of missing out on something when they die” (Kaufmann, 1976, p. 231).

#### Murder is unethical—we should not need a card for this and you should not let them flip the burden—this is an instance where it’s justified to let your predispositions enter the round because it’s a strongly held intuition, just like your intuition that they need warrants for their claims—if you think ending the lives of others is prima facie bad then you should vote aff immediately because they even suggested it

### A2 Suffering Good

#### We control uniqueness – meaning isn’t doomed, it’s just transient – we should stop suffering when we can

Mitchell Smolkin, doctor who specializes in depression, Understanding Pain, 1989 p75-79

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, [humanity] man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy? With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who do exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering. Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a questionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibiting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He [One] who dedicates [oneself] himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of [hu]mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again. Those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can intermittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76

#### Suffering destroys meaning

Edelglass 6 William Edelglass is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marlboro College, “LEVINAS ON SUFFERING AND COMPASSION” Sophia, Vol. 45, No. 2, October 2006

Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, even suffering that is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. Suffering is a rupture and disturbance of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys the capacity for systematically assimilating the world. 9 Pain isolates itself in consciousness, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. Suffering, then, is an absurdity, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental justifications of extreme suffering necessarily are insensible to the unbearable pain theyseek to legitimize. Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, death, announced in suffering, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other who perpetrates violence (TI239). This tyranny, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in its dignity as origin and identity' (TI237). Because suffering is unjustifiable, it is a tyranny breaking open my world of totality and meaning 'for nothing.' The gratuitous and extreme suffering that destroys the capacity for flourishing human activity is generally addressed by thinkers in European traditions in the context of metaphysical questions of evil (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only when it is both severe and unjustified. II But for Levinas suffering is essentially without meaning and thus cannot be legitimized; all suffering is evil. As he subsumes the question of death into the problem of pain, 12 so also Levinas understands evil in the context of the unassumability and meaninglessness of suffering. 13 The suffering of singular beings is not incidental to an evil characterized primarily by the subordination of the categorical imperative to self-interest, or by neglect of the commands of a Divine Being. Indeed, for Levinas, evil is understood through suffering: 'All evil relates back to suffering' (US92). No explanation can redeem the suffering of the other and thereby remove its evil while leaving the tyranny of a pain that overwhelms subjectivity.

### A2 Nietzsche

#### Nietzsche concedes we’re bodily beings, so any value requires absence of suffering – he assumes a comfortable bourgeois existence that abstracts away from the reality of poverty and warfare

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We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of "external goods" in the good human life. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is no philosopher in the modern Western tradition who is more emphatic than Nietzsche is about the central importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures. Again and again he charges Christian and Platonist moralities with making a false separation between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw the conclusion that is naturally suggested by his position: that human beings need worldly goods in order to function. In all of Nietzsche's rather abstract and romantic praise of solitude and asceticism, we find no grasp of the simple truth that a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks shelter, basic health care, and the basic necessities of life, is not likely to become a great philosopher or artist, no matter what her innate equipment. The solitude Nietzsche describes is comfortable bourgeois solitude, whatever its pains and loneli- ness. Who are his ascetic philosophers? "Heraclitus, Plato. Descartes, Spi- noza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer"—none a poor person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive. And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions, he does not understand what the democratic and socialist movements of his day were all about. The pro-pity tradition, from Homer on, understood that one functions badly if one is hungry, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of one's faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern development of democratic-socialist thinking. Since Nietzsche does not get the basic idea, he does not see what socialism is trying to do. Since he probably never saw or knew an acutely hungry person, or a person performing hard physical labor, he never asked how human self-command is affected by such forms of life. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live front day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the "higher men" doing all the day long? The reader docs not know and the author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsche's life contained and the sort we find if we examine the lives of truly impov- erished and hungry people. We might say. simplifying things a bit, that there are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might call bourgeois vulnerabil- ity—for example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains that are painful enough but still compatible with thinking and doing philosophy—and what we might call basic vulnerability, which is a deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired or not developed. Nietzsche, focuv ing on the first son of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.\*® The second sort. I claim, he simply ne- glects—believing, apparently, that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.5"

### Oppression O/w

#### We also have a RACISM impact – doesn’t just cause death; oppression is unethical in itself and causes mass suffering, which outweighs the kritik

#### Racism is the foremost impact – it makes all ethical action impossible

Albert Memmi, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 2000

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

### A2 schopenhauer

#### 1. Suffering is the exception, not the rule.

Knapp 09 - Alex KNAPP, Editor-in-Chief of Heretical Ideas—a webzine devoted to in-depth examination of opinions, ideas, and culture, B.S. in Biochemistry from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, J.D. from the University of Kansas, 2009 [“Is Suffering the Universal Human Condition?,” Heretical Ideas: A Journal of Unorthodox Opinion, February 5th, Available Online at http://www.hereticalideas.com/2009/02/is-suffering-the-universal-human-condition/, Accessed 12-07-2009]

From the basic Buddhist tenet that life is suffering to Medieval Christian idea that we suffer on Earth to receive rewards in heaven, the idea of suffering as the human condition is an accepted cliché in many areas of religion and philosophy. Some even go so far as to say that suffering is a universal human condition; that it is both inevitable and we should accept it. This, as I see it, is a problem. First, let’s explore the idea of suffering as being the universal human condition. What does this mean? Well, the adjectives “universal” and “human” suggest that suffering is something that everyone experiences. The term “condition” implies that suffering is something chronic and enduring. In other words, stating that suffering is the universal human condition means that everybody suffers, and implies that suffering is the essential aspect of being human. This assertion seems to be spurious on face. While memories and experiences of suffering can be intense and enduring, they are this way precisely because they are the exception, and not the rule. If suffering were endemic to human existence, it would be almost unnoticed, since it would be experienced all the time. To use a somewhat applicable analogy, there are oftentimes when one thinks that a certain song is going to be played on the radio, and it is. An event such as this is often remembered. However, in remembering the one incident, it is unlikely that one would remember the numerous occasions in which one predicted that the radio would play a certain song, and it did not. In the same way, suffering is memorable, not because always present, but because it is the exception in one’s life. It is important to note, however, that this is a generalization. There are undoubtedly human beings whose life consisted of, on balance, more suffering than non-suffering. This does not disprove the point, though. The fact that many people can examine the suffering of others with a great intensity of feeling underscores the point that for most people, suffering is a relatively rare event. As the existential philosopher William Hasker notes, most of us would say that our lives have been, on the whole, good, and that we are glad that we exist.

#### 2. Turn—the alternative causes greater suffering—

#### a. It undermines moral agency

Knapp 09 - Alex KNAPP, Editor-in-Chief of Heretical Ideas—a webzine devoted to in-depth examination of opinions, ideas, and culture, B.S. in Biochemistry from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, J.D. from the University of Kansas, 2009 [“Is Suffering the Universal Human Condition?,” Heretical Ideas: A Journal of Unorthodox Opinion, February 5th, Available Online at http://www.hereticalideas.com/2009/02/is-suffering-the-universal-human-condition/, Accessed 12-07-2009]

Since we have established the contention that suffering is not the universal condition, the next point to examine is what the proper moral response to suffering is. Well, if suffering is the exception, not the rule, of human existence, then the proper moral response to suffering is its alleviation, in both others and oneself. In other words, suffering should be perceived as a problem to be fixed, rather than a condition that can’t be avoided. Given this notion, one can then observe that the focus on suffering as the universal human condition actually thwarts its alleviation. This is because if we accept the notion that suffering as the universal human condition, we also accept it as inevitable. An example of this acceptance can be seen in Greek tragedy. One of the essential characteristics of tragedy is that the person who suffers must be a good person whose suffering is undeserved and caused by a “tragic flaw.” This flaw must also be something that the hero cannot do anything to change. For example, Oedipus suffered the fate that the Oracle of Delphi predicted, despite the efforts on the part of both himself and his father. In other words, there was no way for Oedipus to prevent himself from suffering. As Plato rightly pointed out, by accepting Fate as the cause of suffering, the idea of moral agency completely disappears. After all, if suffering is inevitable, then how can anyone be held responsible for it?

#### b. It equalizes disparate suffering.

Knapp 09 - Alex KNAPP, Editor-in-Chief of Heretical Ideas—a webzine devoted to in-depth examination of opinions, ideas, and culture, B.S. in Biochemistry from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, J.D. from the University of Kansas, 2009 [“Is Suffering the Universal Human Condition?,” Heretical Ideas: A Journal of Unorthodox Opinion, February 5th, Available Online at http://www.hereticalideas.com/2009/02/is-suffering-the-universal-human-condition/, Accessed 12-07-2009]

This idea of the inevitability of suffering also leads to the equalization of suffering. In other words, if suffering is the universal human condition, then the suffering of any individual is meaningless, because everyone suffers. Spelman points out one manifestation of this in AIDS victims who compare the epidemic to the Holocaust. Although AIDS is certainly a terrible disease, there is a great difference between suffering caused by an impersonal virus, and deliberate torture and mass murder at the hands of one’s fellow human beings. However, since accepting the inevitability of suffering involves eliminating questions of moral agency, it becomes quite simple to equate the sufferers of a disease to the victims of attempted genocide.

#### This prevents corrective actions to decrease specific instances of suffering.

Knapp 09 - Alex KNAPP, Editor-in-Chief of Heretical Ideas—a webzine devoted to in-depth examination of opinions, ideas, and culture, B.S. in Biochemistry from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, J.D. from the University of Kansas, 2009 [“Is Suffering the Universal Human Condition?,” Heretical Ideas: A Journal of Unorthodox Opinion, February 5th, Available Online at http://www.hereticalideas.com/2009/02/is-suffering-the-universal-human-condition/, Accessed 12-07-2009]

The removal of moral agency and the equalization of suffering finally leads to apathy towards the suffering of others. Since suffering is inevitable, the proper moral response to suffering, if there need be a response at all, is through compassion or pity for those who suffer. These feelings, however, provide no impetus for corrective action. Since suffering is inevitable, then there is nothing one can do to alleviate it. After all, if one’s suffering is just as bad as another’s, then what can one do? A shrug of the shoulders and a response of “Sorry bud, but I have my own problems” is about the most one can hope for. Thus, the problem of claiming that suffering is somehow “universal” brings about two problems. First, it ignores the fact that suffering is not, in fact endemic to the human condition. But more importantly, the acceptance of the idea that suffering is universal perpetuates human misery by eliminating the impetus to get rid of it.

#### 3. Turn—the alternative kills happiness – it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy – vote aff to reject them

#### a. Optimism makes us happier than pessimism—schopenhauer is wrong.

Schalakx 8 - Rozemarijn SCHALKX, Scholar at the University for Humanistics (Netherlands), AND Ad BERGSMA, Faculty of Social Sciences at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands), 2008 [“Arthur’s Advice: Comparing Arthur Schopenhauer’s Advice On Happiness With Contemporary Research,” Journal of Happiness Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 390]

We mentioned above that optimism is correlated with higher well being, and it is worthwhile to go deeper into this subject, because Schopenhauer believed that superficial optimism would render people vulnerable to depression. He advised people not to be too optimistic, because the worst is yet to come. Research however shows that optimism is also a positive trait in challenging circumstances. It helps people to see the negative in perspective: by seeing the future as enjoyable, you are more likely to see negative events as temporary. Optimism gives people the strength to deal with the negative, because it helps people to focus on aspects of a given situation that are within their personal control, so they can make the best of adversities. Optimism correlates positively with well being (Scheier et al., 2001).

#### b. Following schopenhauer’s advice leads to unhappiness.

Schalakx 8 - Rozemarijn SCHALKX, Scholar at the University for Humanistics (Netherlands), AND Ad BERGSMA, Faculty of Social Sciences at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands), 2008 [“Arthur’s Advice: Comparing Arthur Schopenhauer’s Advice On Happiness With Contemporary Research,” Journal of Happiness Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 390]

Schopenhauer wrote one of the first self-help books. It gives the reader advice on how to make life bearable. Some of his remarks are very apt. For instance he advises the reader to restrain from striving for wealth; and contemporary data shows that once a basic income is achieved, more money does little to increase happiness. He also advises us to stay busy, which is a valid suggestion. Schopenhauer rightly observed that a person’s character is a key determinant of happiness. Ironically, he did not realize the strong interaction between his own personality and his view on happiness. His gloomy view on human interaction dominates his advice about happiness. Contemporary data prove Schopenhauer wrong in these remarks on social interaction. Social interaction is a key determinant for happiness. His advice to shy away from people and to distrust others is probably the worst advice for anyone to follow. The book is amusing and well written, but it would be a mistake to follow all of its recommendations. Schopenhauer did not succeed in using his pessimistic world-view constructively for creating happiness enhancing advice. Misanthropy and social isolation will make you unhappy, even when you are someone with a neurotic personality like Schopenhauer.

#### 4. Schopenhauer’s pessimism was a product of syphilis and his hatred of women.

BMJ 38 [“Nova et Vetera,” The British Medical Journal, Volume 2, Number 404, July 2nd, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 22]

While a medical student at the University of Gottingen Arthur Schopenhauer, who was born 150 years ago, contracted syphilis, which was treated with huge doses of mercury, so popular at that time. The accompanying wretchedness of salivation, depression, and internal pain were responsible for his lifelong syphilophobia, and out of his hatred of women—under-sized, short-legged, long-haired creatures whose sole purpose in the world was to spread syphilis—grew his philosophy of pessimism. In commemoration of this anniversary Danzig, his native city, has recently issued a set of three stamps bearing his likeness.

#### That means his philosophy should be discarded—it can’t be universalized from his specific situation.

Roberts 03 - Laura ROBERTS, freelance writer, indie publisher, editor-in-chief, and sex columnist, 2003 [“Misogyny in the Writings of Arthur Schopenhauer,” Helium, Available Online at http://www.helium.com/items/993109-misogyny-in-the-writings-of-arthur-schopenhauer, Accessed 12-07-2009]

Ultimately, we must either find a way to forgive Schopenhauer's bitterness or we must cast his philosophy aside as hopelessly stuck in personal misery. He cannot be of any use or insight to us if his specific situation is reasoned to universal proportions; most of us do not possess his utter contempt for anything, much less females as a group. Truly, it is even unusual for his time period (particularly when factoring in the beginnings of feminism in the United States' suffragist movement [29]) to find someone so virulently opposed to the idea that women could possess intelligence or creativity. It is unfortunate that such a great mind wasted so much energy on disgust and loathing for a large section of the population that would now like to read, understand, and accept his ideas. Schopenhauer's arrogance apparently an intrinsic part of his genius was never looked upon favourably, but today it makes him almost impossible to read without either laughing or screaming.

### A2 benatar

#### NO LINK – we don’t claim an extinction impact

#### Benatar’s argument relies on any pain outweighing any pleasure. He also assumes that only the absence of pain, is good for future people who do not yet exist, whereas both are good for people who currently exist. This asymmetry between pain and pleasure and between existent and nonexistent people is nonsensical.

Baumi 8 [BenaBetter to exist: a reply to Benatar Seth D. Baumi Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 34, no. 12, pages 875-876, 2008] AT

**The benefits/harms asymmetry is** commonly **manifested** (including **in Benatar**’s writing) **in the claim that no amount of benefit**, however large, **can make up for any amount of harm**, however small. This claim comes from an intuition that while we have a duty to reduce harm, we have no duty to increase benefit. The corresponding ethical framework is often called ‘negative utilitarianism’.7 Negative utilitarianism resembles maximin in its resolute focus on the worst off- as long as some of those worst off are in a state of harm, instead of just in a state of low benefit.Like maximin, negative utilitarianism can recommend that no one be brought into existence- and that all existing people be ‘euthanized’. I find negative **utilitarianism** decidedly **unreasonable: our willingness to accept some harm** in order **to enjoy the benefits of another day seems praiseworthy, not mistaken.** I thus urge the rejection of this manifestation of the benefits/harms asymmetry.¶ ¶ **The existent/non-existent asymmetry is** commonly **manifested** (including **in Benatar’s** writing)in the **claim that**, in decisions which might bring people into existence, **the welfare of** those **would-be people don’t count.** This claim comes from an intuition that we cannot benefit or harm people by bringing them into existence, because if they don’t come into existence, then there is no ‘them’ to benefit or harm. The corresponding ethical framework is often called ‘person-affecting utilitarianism’.8 **This metaphysical trickery is unsatisfying.** It seems quite reasonable that, all else equal, **the entry into the world of some new, happy people can make the world a better place** (or vice versa for unhappy people). Furthermore, person-affecting utilitarianism has troubling consequences such as **permit**ting **existing people to go on a frivolous binge even to the point of destroying the world for all would-be people.** I thus urge the rejection of this manifestation of the existent/non-existent asymmetry.¶ ¶ **Benatar** supports both the benefits/harms asymmetry and the existent/non-existent asymmetry, but he does not do so uniformly.iv He **accepts the benefits/harms asymmetry for people who don’t already exist but he rejects it for people who already exist.** Alternatively (and equivalently), **he accepts the existent/non-existent asymmetry for benefits but he rejects it for harms.** In other words, **he does not value benefits to people we could bring into existence, but he values harms to them as well as benefits and harms to existing people.** This set of views is how he reaches his bold claim that new people should not be brought into existence but does not reach the claim that people who already exist should be ‘euthanized’. This ‘anti-birth utilitarianism’ has received support from others as well, including Narveson9 and Vetter.10¶ ¶ **If we reject both asymmetries**, as I urge, then **Benatar’s bold claim disappears and we return to the** more pedestrian **discussions of which and how many people to bring into existence**, and of course how to treat everyone once they come into existence. These discussions are important, but they need not be considered here. My one intention with this paper is to show that **Benatar’s bold claim can readily be rejected** not just out of reflexive distaste for the claim but also **out of sound ethical reasoning.**

#### This argument is miscut. Benatar argues we shouldn’t recreate existence not end it

DeGrazia 10 [David,“Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar.” Theor Med Bioeth (2010) 31:317–331. DT.]

For one thing, he contends, the argument fails to distinguish between two senses¶ of ‘‘a life worth living’’: (1) a life worth starting and (2) a life worth continuing¶ (pp. 22–23). A person may judge that the beneﬁts of her life compensate for the¶ harms and that her life is therefore (now) worth continuing. That a life includes¶ beneﬁts sufﬁcient to compensate for the harms may constitute an appropriate¶ standard for judging that a life is worth continuing. The problem with the optimistic¶ thesis that most cases of coming into existence are not cases of wrongful life is the¶ assumption that an appropriate standard for a life worth continuing is also an¶ appropriate standard for a life worth starting. Benatar denies this assumption. ‘‘For¶ instance,’’ he argues, ‘‘while most people think that living life without a limb does¶ not make life so bad that it is worth ending, most (of the same) people also think that¶ it is better not to bring into existence somebody who will lack a limb. We require¶ stronger justiﬁcation for ending a life than for not starting one’’ (p. 22)

#### Squo is structurally improving---health, environment and equality

Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rn-lomborg

COPENHAGEN – For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world. Pessimists see a world where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as “cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But, rather than picking facts and stories to fit some grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶ Consider gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In 1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture, which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline, leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶ Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest improvements. Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection of 76 years in 2050).¶ The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶ In economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear. Most of the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP. And the overall trend is even clearer. Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the most good.

### A2 lanza

#### Their argument is irrational—inevitable uncertainty means you should err negative - we don’t know enough about death and Lanza is advancing a theory that hasn’t even been peer reviewed yet—defer to the side of caution because our impact is extinction—if they’re wrong, the world is gone forever, but if we’re wrong, you always have an escape hatch later

#### People aren’t particles – death is real

Morris **Myers 9**, biologist and associate professor at the University of Minnesota, 12-10-2009, “The dead are dead”, Pharyngula,http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/the\_dead\_are\_dead.php

But then **Lanza goes on to babble about quantum physics and many-worlds theory**. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling - the 'Who am I?'- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this **energy doesn't go away at death**. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other? Consider an experiment that was recently published in the journal Science showing that scientists could retroactively change something that had happened in the past. Particles had to decide how to behave when they hit a beam splitter. Later on, the experimenter could turn a second switch on or off. It turns out that what the observer decided at that point, determined what the particle did in the past. Regardless of the choice you, the observer, make, it is you who will experience the outcomes that will result. The linkages between these various histories and universes transcend our ordinary classical ideas of space and time. Think of the 20-watts of energy as simply holo-projecting either this or that result onto a screen. Whether you turn the second beam splitter on or off, it's still the same battery or agent responsible for the projection. I have heard that first argument so many times, and it is facile and dishonest. **We are not just "energy".** **We are a pattern of energy and matter,** **a very specific** and precise **arrangement** of molecules in movement. **That can be destroyed**. **When you've built a** pretty **sand castle and the tide** comes in and **washes it away**, **the grains of sand are still** all **there, but** what **you've lost is the arrangement** that you worked to generate, and **which you appreciated**. **Reducing a complex** functional **order to nothing but the constituent parts is an insult to the work**. **If I were to** walk into the Louvre and **set fire to the Mona Lisa**, and afterwards take a drive down to Chartres and blow up the cathedral, **would anyone defend my actions** by **saying**, "well, **science says** matter and **energy cannot be** created or **destroyed**, therefore, Rabid Myers did no harm, **and we'll** all **just enjoy viewing the ashes** and rubble from now on"? No. That's crazy talk. We also wouldn't be arguing that the painting and the architecture have transcended this universe to enter another, nor would such a pointless claim ameliorate our loss in this universe. **The rest of his argument is quantum gobbledy-gook.** **The behavior of** subatomic **particles is not a good guide to what to expect of the behavior of large bodies**. **A photon may have no rest mass, but I can't use this** fact **to justify my** grand **new weight loss plan; quantum tunnelling does not imply that I can ignore doors** when I amble about my house. **People are not particles!** **We are the product of the aggregate behavior** **of** the **many particles** that constitute our bodies, and **you cannot ignore the importance of these higher-order relationships** when talking about our fate.

## A2 Dualism K

### A2 Dualism K top level

#### 1. The body-state metaphor is dualistic – it sees the body as insulated from the outside world

#### 2. Perm do both

#### 3. Perm use the metaphor of organ transplantation to rupture dualism

#### Perm solves – organ transplantation doesn’t just mean human organs – organs can be anything, from lab produced material to animal organs – integrating aspects of the outside world into our bodies calls into question the dualism that separates us from the environment

#### 4. They can’t solve – as long as that metaphor continues to exist we will externalize the outside world, causing dualism. The alt can’t change the way people think since the fact they present will merely “bounce off” the status quo dualistic metaphorical frame – that the Bougher evidence – only rupturing the metaphorical sanctity of the body-state through the aff can solve

#### 5. We turn their impact

#### A) We criticize sovereignty, which is anthropocentric – who is INCLUDED in the body of society excludes the environment, causing its destruction

Wendt 8 [(Alexander Wendt, political scientist who is one of the core social constructivist scholars in the field of international relations The Ohio State University; Raymond Duvall, University of Minnesota) “Sovereignty and the UFO” Political Theory August 2008 vol. 36 no. 4 607-633] AT

Few ideas today are as contested as sovereignty, in theory or in practice. In sovereignty theory scholars disagree about almost everything—what sovereignty is and where it resides, how it relates to law, whether it is divisible, how its subjects and objects are constituted, and whether it is being transformed in late modernity. These debates are mirrored in contemporary practice, where struggles for self-determination and territorial revisionism have generated among the bitterest conflicts in modern times. Throughout this contestation, however, one thing is taken for granted: sovereignty is the province of humans alone. Animals and Nature are assumed to lack the cognitive capacity and/or subjectivity to be sovereign; and while God might have ultimate sovereignty, even most religious fundamentalists grant that it is not exercised directly in the temporal world. When sovereignty is contested today, therefore, it is always and only among humans, horizontally so to speak, rather than vertically with Nature or God. In this way modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, or constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone.1 Humans live within physical constraints, but are solely responsible for deciding their norms and practices under those constraints. Despite the wide variety of institutional forms taken by sovereignty today, they are homologous in this fundamental respect. Anthropocentric sovereignty might seem necessary; after all, who else, besides humans, might rule? Nevertheless, historically sovereignty was less anthropocentric. For millennia Nature and the gods were thought to have causal powers and subjectivities that enabled them to share sovereignty with humans, if not exercise dominion outright.2 Authoritative belief in non-human sovereignties was given up only after long and bitter struggle about the “borders of the social world,” in which who/what could be sovereign depends on who/what should be included in society.3 In modernity God and Nature are excluded, although in this exclusion they are also reincluded as the domesticated Other. Thus, while no longer temporally sovereign, God is included today through people who are seen to speak on Her behalf. And while Nature has been disenchanted, stripped of its subjectivity, it is re-included as object in the human world. These inclusive exclusions, however, reinforce the assumption that humans alone can be sovereign. In this light anthropocentric sovereignty must be seen as a contingent historical achievement, not just a requirement of common sense. Indeed, it is a metaphysical achievement, since it is in anthropocentric terms that humans today understand their place in the physical world. Thus operates what Giorgio Agamben calls the “anthropological machine.”4

#### B) Bougher 2 says I increase deliberative democracy by making citizens aware of the metaphors that constrain thinking – this is key to the environment

Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change, “Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]

It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion.65 Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest.70

#### C) their kritik cedes the possibility of reform of the state, reinforcing environmental destruction. The aff’s reformulation of the insular nature of sovereignty solves ecologically destructive patterns – turns the K

Hayward 5 [(Tim, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of the Just World Institute; Director MSc International Political Theory; Convenor Fair Trade Academic Network.) “Greening the Constitutional State: Environmental Rights in the European Union” In The State and the Global Ecological Crisis] AT

If a green posture toward the nation-state can be discerned from the diverse writings of green political theorists and fellow environmentalists, it is that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environ- mental management, facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection. At worst, it is fundamentally ecocidal.1 Indeed, there are very few radical political ecologists and green political theorists who are prepared to defend the nation-state as an institution that is able to play a positive role in securing sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem integrity. Moreover, those interested in global political ecology are increasingly rejecting the “statist frame” through which international relations and world politics have been traditionally understood, prefer- ring to understand states as but one set of actors or institutions among a myriad of actors and institutions on the global scene that are implicated in ecological destruction.2 In all, the radical green analysis seems to point toward the need for alternative forms of political identity, authority, and governance that break with the traditional statist model of exclusive terri- torial rule. In this chapter, I take the position that this green antipathy toward the nation-state and state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation should not be taken as a reason for avoiding an inquiry into the emanci- patory potential of the nation-state as a significant node in any future net- work of ecological governance. This is especially true given that we can expect states to persist as major sites and channels of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green institutional transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be path-dependent. In any event, if it is indeed the case that states are so deeply implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry ￼into the potential for their transformation or even their modest reform into something greener would seem to be compelling. To the extent that those who reject a statist analysis still concede that the state has an important role to play, the question arises as to what that role ought to be, given its present limitations and trajectory. After all, implicit in the day-to-day policy demands made of the state (both domestically and internationally) by environmentalists is a notion of what the state ought to be doing (or not doing)—in short, a green ideal or vision of what a “good state” might look like. Actively defending and cultivating such an ideal would seem to be politically and strategically necessary if the green movement is to avoid unwitting, ad hoc reinforcement of the destructive or oppressive tendencies of states in the course of pursuing its green public policy goals. I am concerned to encourage a debate among green theorists and activists as to how we might rethink the nation-state and the state system from a critical green perspective (which I call critical political ecology). I acknowledge the contradictory role of the nation-state in managing ecological problems but suggest we search for ways of amplifying the state’s role as an environmental protector while dampening its ecologically destructive potential over time. These complementary, paths point toward less exclusionary ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and citizenship yet retain the nation-state as a container of social processes (albeit with some potentially radical reworking of the meaning of “nation” and “national sovereignty”). I suggest that while in the long run such an approach provides a fundamental challenge to the link between territorially based structures of democratic rule and particular peoples, in the short to medium term it sees the state as a crucial facilitator in the transition toward more ecologically responsive governance. By way of theoretical preliminaries, my critical political ecology framework approaches the state from a structurationist, or critical construc- tivist, perspective, which emphasizes the mutual constitution of agents and social structures.3 Whereas mainstream rationalist approaches to international relations (namely, neorealism and neoliberal institutional- ism) regard the principle of state sovereignty as an immutable ordering principle of world politics that is accepted as a given, critical constructivists understand state sovereignty as a protean concept, the meaning of which is determined by a web of constitutive discourses that are constantly contested and evolving (such as the norms of nonintervention, ￼ ￼self-determination, and their subsidiary discourses, such as the rules of war, the so-called right to develop, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources, and so forth). The lesson for the green movement is that by playing a more informed and self-conscious role in the debates over the meaning and application of these norms, the movement might help to redefine sovereignty as an ally in its broader global project. Three Standard Green Critiques of the State Green theorists (and many environmentalists) have been highly skeptical of the nation-state and the state system. The three most significant (and recurring) of these critiques concern The anarchic character of the system of sovereign states, which is under- stood as structuring a dynamic that leads to the “tragedy of the com- mons.” The parasitical dependence of states on private capital accumulation; that is, the state is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally com- promised by, the promotion of capital accumulation, which is a key driver of ecological destruction, and states are now actively promoting economic globalization in ways that further undermine their own polit- ical autonomy and steering capacity. The highly centralized and hierarchical character of states as institutions, with imperatives that are fundamentally at odds with the green vision of a more participatory democracy and human-scale, decentralized forms of governance. In support of these three propositions, there is no shortage of detailed historical accounts of the various ways in which particular states (whether communist or capitalist, developed or undeveloped) have acted as resource plunderers and active prosecutors of environmentally destructive and sometimes violent agendas, most graphically during times of war but also during times of peace.4 Moreover, if one of the defining features of states is that they hold the monopoly of legitimized violence, with democracy featuring as a contingent rather than defining characteristic of states, then they would seem by their very nature to represent institutions that run contrary to the basic green principle of nonviolence. Taken together, these three general objections would appear to provide a powerful green indictment of states per se (rather than just particular “ecocidal” governments), with the implication that the prospects for the ￼ ￼development of more ecologically responsive states are bleak. This reading also has significant short-term tactical and longer-term strategic implications for environmental movements and green parties struggling with limited resources, both of which, without further analysis, would seem to be best advised looking for alternative sites of political action. Yet we should not be too hasty to assume that the structures and social dynamics referred to in these three analyses are necessarily always anti- ecological and always mutually reinforcing (although they often can be) or that they provide a complete green analysis and evaluation of the emanci- patory potential of states as governance structures. Moreover, on their face, none of these arguments addresses the crucial question of state legitimacy or places any store on the possibilities of deepening the democratic accountability of states to the citizens of particular states, to transnational civil society, or to the society of states in general. It is as if the democratic form of the state were dismissed being not merely as contingent but also as illusory in the sense that it is typically overridden by the struc- tural imperatives of international anarchy, global capitalism, and administrative hierarchy. These are, to be sure, deeply problematic structural dynamics for those concerned to secure global environmental integrity. However, they are not “iron laws” but rather constantly evolving prac- tices that can change in character and influence depending on the move- ment of social forces and the prevailing social and cultural conditions and understandings. Indeed, one does not have to search very far to find historical examples of how each of these dynamics can be qualified, re- strained, or otherwise moderated by state and nonstate agents acting back upon states, which in turn have acted back upon economic and social structures. Here, we might single out three, mutually informing developments that have served to moderate, and in some exceptional cases work synergistically to transform, the respective “logics” of anar- chy, capitalism, and administrative hierarchy: The rise of environmental multilateralism, including environmental treaties and declarations and international environmental standards The emergence of sustainable development as an alternative develop- ment strategy and of ecological modernization as a new “competitive strategy” of corporations and states The emergence of domestic environmental legislation, including new democratic discursive designs within the administrative state (such as ￼community right-to-know legislation, community environmental moni- toring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and public inquiries It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conduct a detailed and systematic evaluation of these developments and the degree to which they may or may not have qualified international anarchy, global capitalism, and bureaucratic domination, not to mention other, less overarching political dynamics.5 In any event, we would expect the story to vary significantly from state to state and region to region. Nonetheless, it is possible to track some broad trends and to suggest a framework for how greens might understand and selectively accentuate some of these positive trends in relation to where and how they may be situated as political actors. Here I concentrate only on the first two structural constraints, namely, global anarchy and the compromised capitalist state. My critical political ecology framework will be defended as an alternative to the deep pessimism of ecorealists, eco-Marxists, and radical political ecologists about the possibilities of more ecologically enlightened state governance. Along the way, I also seek to highlight the dangers of the green movement’s turn- ing its back on the state. International Anarchy: Ecorealism versus Critical Political Ecology In a recent critical assessment of the prospects for a green democratic state, Michael Saward has pointedly asked, “Could it be that the contem- porary state is simply not the type of entity which is capable of systemati- cally prioritizing the achievement of sustainability?”6 Historically, the defense of state territory, military success, and the exploitation of natural resources and the environment for the purposes of national economic development have been widely understood as overriding state imperatives that are common to all states and constitutive of the state’s very form.7 Indeed, the exploitation of natural resources within the territory has sometimes been justified as a “nation-building exercise” or intimately linked with national security.

### Impact Answers

#### They deny the fundamental independence of the world from humanity – any risk my representations are productive is a reason to prefer the perm

Cronon 95 [(William, Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison) “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature” Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90] AT

In critiquing wilderness as I have done in this essay, I’m forced to confront my own deep ambivalence about its meaning for modern environmentalism. On the one hand, one of my own most important environmental ethics is that people should always be conscious that they are part of the natural world, inextricably tied to the ecological systems that sustain their lives. Any way of looking at nature that encourages us to believe we are separate from nature—as wilderness tends to do—is likely to reinforce environmentally irresponsible behavior. On the other hand, I also think it no less crucial for us to recognize and honor nonhuman nature as a world we did not create, a world with its own independent, nonhuman reasons for being as it is. The autonomy of nonhuman nature seems to me an indispensable corrective to human arrogance. Any way of looking at nature that helps us remember—as wilderness also tends to do—that the interests of people are not necessarily identical to those of every other creature or of the earth itself is likely to foster responsible behavior. To the extent that wilderness has served as an important vehicle for articulating deep moral values regarding our obligations and responsibilities to the nonhuman world, I would not want to jettison the contributions it has made to our culture’s ways of thinking about nature.

#### Stewardship is a productive method to form protective ethical relations with the nonhuman

Welchman 12--Philosophy Assiniboia Hall 2-40University of Alberta Edmonton Department AB [Jennifer, “A Defense of Environmental Stewardship”, 2012 www.academia.edu/335593/A\_Defense\_of\_Environmental\_Stewardship]RMT

First stewardship is a traditionally a form of guardianship: a role whose practice requires the observance of constraints on the pursuit of personal interest. Second, stewardship, in contrast to other forms of guardianship, has a longstanding association with landholdings . Third, stewardship is an ongoing role or relationship maintained over time with the stewards ‘ principals and with the lands, things, or persons in their care. Fourth, performance of the role requires the exercise of certain moral virtues. To be a competent steward, one must possess and act fromdispositions such as loyalty, temperance, diligence, justice, and integrity, as well as intellectual virtues or technical skills such as prudence and practical rationality. 2 Thus as a replacement for older notions of humanity ‘ s relationship such as ownership or conquest, the appeal of environmental stewardship is readily comprehensible. As traditionally construed, stewardship is an inherently virtuous practice, since its performance involves the constraint of personal self-interest and the cultivation of morally important dispositions. 3 This would appear to explain what some commentators have thought an anomaly in discussions of stewardship, that ― while stewardship on behalf of a malign higher authority is theoretically possible, this has not featured in the literature. ‖ (Worrell and Appleby, 266.) Genuinely good stewards are simply not the sorts of persons to knowingly or willingly serve evil principals who act contrary to the virtues of loyalty, temperance, integrity, and justice that are integral to practice of stewardship. Such individuals might find themselves serving immoral persons as a result of force, fraud, or non-culpable ignorance. But once they realized the truth, such individuals would surely exit the role as soon as possible. In some respects, however, environmental stewardship differs from traditional stewardship. Traditional stewardship, whether of estates, ships, passengers, or finances, was a kind of occupation performed in return for financial or other remuneration and for a limited period of time. Thus the duties of stewardship and the requirement to cultivate the virtues integral to its performance were not incumbent upon all alike, but only upon those specifically appointed to such positions. By contrast, the environmental stewardship advocated in documents like the Millennium Declaration incorporates none of these limitations. Environmental stewardship is a presented as a role every morally decent person ought to adopt towards nature, without specific appointment by any other individual, remuneration for services rendered, or forany specific period of time. But while the wider sense of stewardship employed in the Millennium Declaration is a departure from earlier usages linking stewardship with specific occupations, it was, as indicated above, not unprecedented, especially in countries in which Protestant Christian organizations have been influential. In the late 19 th century, Protestant churches in need of revenue for church missions and activities began to call for regular donations from the laity in keeping with the stewardship, that ― while stewardship on behalf of a malign higher authority is theoretically possible, this has not featured in the literature. ‖ (Worrell and Appleby, 266.) Genuinely good stewards are simply not the sorts of persons to knowingly or willingly serve evil principals who act contrary to the virtues of loyalty, temperance, integrity, and justice that are integral to practice of stewardship. Such individuals might find themselves serving immoral persons as a result of force, fraud, or non-culpable ignorance. 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(See Lynn, Hudnut-Beumler) The scope of the duties involved were considerably expanded in the early 20 th century with the rise of theSocial Gospel movement in the United States, Canada, and the British Empire. According to theSocial Gospel movement, the requirements of Christian stewardship were not limited to the giving of a tenth of one ‘ s income to one ‘ s church. Everything a person possessed, time and talents, land and money, was properly the creator ‘ s and thus to be employed in the furtherance of the creator ‘ s ends. Stewardship sermons and campaigns stressing this theme became a common occurrence within many Protestant congregations. While these efforts remained primarily focused on ensuring adequate financing for church ministries, they had the effect of popularizing their broadened vision of stewardship amongst their own congregants, and through them, the surrounding community as well. (See Fraser, Phillips, White and Hopkins.)This helps to explain why, in the latter half of the 20 th century, so many organizers of grassroots conservation organizations saw the notion of stewardship as a resource for conceptualizing the conduct towards nature for which they were campaigning. By the beginning of the 1990s, voluntary stewardship ‘ organizations, dedicated to the conservation of wilderness areas, parks, rivers, estuaries, coastlines, and/or species, existed at local, regional, and national levels, across North America and most of the English-speaking world. Local and national governments followed the trend set by grassroots organizations as they began to create and 7implement ‗ stewardship ‘ programs to support conservation efforts by private landholders and resource managers. Examples include the United States Forest Stewardship Program (1990), the United Kingdom ‘ s Countryside Stewardship Scheme (1991), the Canadian Province of Ontario ‘ s Stewardship Program (1995), the Canadian Habitat Stewardship Programme (2000), Australia ‘ sEnvironmental Stewardship Programme (2007.) 4 Initiatives like these expanded the class of persons eligible to serve as environmental stewards by eliminating several defining features of Christian and/or traditional stewardship,such as belief in a deity, formal appointment, and/or remuneration for services rendered. Individuals were called to serve the public interest, the interests of members of threatened species, or the interests of future generations, rather than their creator. Further, they were calledupon to appoint themselves stewards, rather than await appointment by others. And third, stewardship was redefined as an essentially voluntary, pro bono service, or, when government supported, remunerated only to degree necessary to ensure that stewards were not put at acompetitive disadvantage with rivals in the practice of their primary occupations. Thus anyone willing and able to become actively involved in the conservation or preservation of the particular parks, rivers, estuaries, coastlines, forests, or species with which these organizations andgovernment-sponsored programs were specifically concerned was eligible to engage in environmental stewardship.At the same time, developments in environmental policy at the international level would further expand the class of persons eligible for environmental stewardship beyond those forwhom direct participation in grass-roots or government-sponsored stewardship programs was apractical possibility. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration had committed its signatories to finding8ways to meet their ― solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present andfuture generations ‖ (United Nations, 1973, 4), a search that would lead to development of the1992 United Nations ‘ Environmental Program, Agenda 21. 5 Agenda 21 so expanded the class of persons eligible to act as environmental stewards that for the first time it became as nearlyuniversal as the Christian conceptions which had preceded it. What Agenda 21 did was torecognize a new kind of activity as a form of environment stewardship: ‗ productstewardship. ‘ (United Nations 1992, 237) Product stewardship requires the minimization andmitigation of negative environmental impacts of any form of commercial production upon anyenvironmental systems affected, including predictable effects of products after sale or transfer totheir end consumers. Thus product stewardship extends to the entire life cycle of any humanartefact, from production and distribution to its eventual consumption or disposal. As everyhuman being is involved in the life cycle of the products he or she produces, transfers, orconsumes, every human being has the opportunity to participate directly in environmentalstewardship. In keeping with Agenda 21 's calls for governments and non-governmentalorganizations to promote product stewardship, national and local governmental authorities beganto create and implement product stewardship policies around the world. During the sameperiod, nongovernmental organizations were also formed to support and coordinate such efforts,most notably perhaps, the Forest Stewardship Council (1993) and the Marine StewardshipCouncil (1997.)

### A2 Wilderness link

#### Representations of wilderness are key to limit human domination and foster respect for the nonhuman other – the perm unlocks productive use of my discourse

Cronon 95 [(William, Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison) “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature” Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90] AT

If the core problem of wilderness is that it distances us too much from the very things it teaches us to value, then the question we must ask is what it can tell us about home, the place where we actually live. How can we take the positive values we associate with wilderness and bring them closer to home? I think the answer to this question will come by broadening our sense of the otherness that wilderness seeks to define and protect. In reminding us of the world we did not make, wilderness can teach profound feelings of humility and respect as we confront our fellow beings and the earth itself. Feelings like these argue for the importance of self-awareness and self criticism as we exercise our own ability to transform the world around us, helping us set responsible limits to human mastery—which without such limits too easily becomes human hubris. Wilderness is the place where, symbolically at least, we try to withhold our power to dominate. Wallace Stegner once wrote of the special human mark, the special record of human passage, that distinguishes man from all other species. It is rare enough among men, impossible to any other form of life. It is simply the deliberate and chosen refusal to make any marks at all…. We are the most dangerous species of life on the planet, and every other species, even the earth itself, has cause to fear our power to exterminate. But we are also the only species which, when it chooses to do so, will go to great effort to save what it might destroy. (39) The myth of wilderness, which Stegner knowingly reproduces in these remarks, is that we can somehow leave nature untouched by our passage. By now it should be clear that this for the most part is an illusion. But Stegner’s deeper message then becomes all the more compelling. If living in history means that we cannot help leaving marks on a fallen world, then the dilemma we face is to decide what kinds of marks we wish to leave. It is just here that our cultural traditions of wilderness remain so important. In the broadest sense, wilderness teaches us to ask whether the Other must always bend to our will, and, if not, under what circumstances it should be allowed to flourish without our intervention. This is surely a question worth asking about everything we do, and not just about the natural world. When we visit a wilderness area, we find ourselves surrounded by plants and animals and physical landscapes whose otherness compels our attention. In forcing us to acknowledge that they are not of our making, that they have little or no need of our continued existence, they recall for us a creation far greater than our own. In the wilderness, we need no reminder that a tree has its own reasons for being, quite apart from us. The same is less true in the gardens we plant and tend ourselves: there it is far easier to forget the otherness of the tree. (40) Indeed, one could almost measure wilderness by the extent to which our recognition of its otherness requires a conscious, willed act on our part. The romantic legacy means that wilderness is more a state of mind than a fact of nature, and the state of mind that today most defines wilderness is wonder. The striking power of the wild is that wonder in the face of it requires no act of will, but forces itself upon us—as an expression of the nonhuman world experienced through the lens of our cultural history—as proof that ours is not the only presence in the universe. Wilderness gets us into trouble only if we imagine that this experience of wonder and otherness is limited to the remote corners of the planet, or that it somehow depends on pristine landscapes we ourselves do not inhabit. Nothing could be more misleading. The tree in the garden is in reality no less other, no less worthy of our wonder and respect, than the tree in an ancient forest that has never known an ax or a saw—even though the tree in the forest reflects a more intricate web of ecological relationships. The tree in the garden could easily have sprung from the same seed as the tree in the forest, and we can claim only its location and perhaps its form as our own. Both trees stand apart from us; both share our common world. The special power of the tree in the wilderness is to remind us of this fact. It can teach us to recognize the wildness we did not see in the tree we planted in our own backyard. By seeing the otherness in that which is most unfamiliar, we can learn to see it too in that which at first seemed merely ordinary. If wilderness can do this—if it can help us perceive and respect a nature we had forgotten to recognize as natural—then it will become part of the solution to our environmental dilemmas rather than part of the problem. This will only happen, however, if we abandon the dualism that sees the tree in the garden as artificial—completely fallen and unnatural—and the tree in the wilderness as natural—completely pristine and wild. Both trees in some ultimate sense are wild; both in a practical sense now depend on our management and care. We are responsible for both, even though we can claim credit for neither. Our challenge is to stop thinking of such things according to set of bipolar moral scales in which the human and the nonhuman, the unnatural and the natural, the fallen and the unfallen, serve as our conceptual map for understanding and valuing the world. Instead, we need to embrace the full continuum of a natural landscape that is also cultural, in which the city, the suburb, the pastoral, and the wild each has its proper place, which we permit ourselves to celebrate without needlessly denigrating the others. We need to honor the Other within and the Other next door as much as we do the exotic Other that lives far away—a lesson that applies as much to people as it does to (other) natural things. In particular, we need to discover a common middle ground in which all of these things, from the city to the wilderness, can somehow be encompassed in the word “home.” Home, after all, is the place where finally we make our living. It is the place for which we take responsibility, the place we try to sustain so we can pass on what is best in it (and in ourselves) to our children. (41)

## A2 Disabilities K

### Body-State = Ableist

#### We access their impacts – the AC criticizes ablenationalism and confronts exclusion of the disabled body

Scott 99 [(Krista, PhD in women's studies and feminist scholar health advocate) “Imagined Bodies, Imagined Communities: Feminism, Nationalism, and Body Metaphors” http://www.stumptuous.com/imagine.html] AT

Disability is a feminist issue, but is largely ignored in feminist debates... The concept of a disabled citizen could be described as a contradiction in terms. The incarceration of some people with disabilities... has been and continues to be an act of denial of citizenship... their bodies and minds constitute their crime... Nationalism and disability interpenetrate in a variety of ways with a complex array of outcomes... The process of building/imagining ethnic and nationalist communities often actively seeks to exclude certain groups which threaten a sense of cohesiveness. From this quote, it is evident that a critique of the national body or body-as-state should operate on several levels: first, on a concrete level wherein people whose bodies do not fit the ideal are denied civil/citizenship rights (which indicates that they are not considered fully part of the nation-state); second, on an abstract level wherein the imagined communities do not include bodies who are perceived as a threat to the unified whole. As Meekosha and Dowse note, "The nationalist project and disability are linked not only in the process of exclusion but also in the claiming of a political and social space." Thus there are many directions and opportunities for feminist critique of and theorizing around (to name but a few) technoscience, postcoloniality, disability, agency/subejctivity, and of course, nationalism using the metaphor and experiences of physical and metaphoric bodies. In our present world of transnational identities and capital, a conception of the body-as-state that is predicated on a unified, hierarchical and clearly bounded body is no longer fruitful or positive (if it ever was). The cyborg as theory, experience, and methodology provides a rich point of entry into new kinds of imagining bodies and communities. As Sandoval concludes: Each [cyborg] technology of the methodology of the oppressed thus creates new conjunctural possibilities, produced by ongoing and transforming regimes of exclusion and inclusion.

#### We access the root cause – Society’s desire for ontological security and cohesion facilitates a regime of ableism that produces the subtext of disability as negative ontology that makes any attempt to address ableism fail

Campbell 5 [Fiona Kumari Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Legislating Disability Negative Ontologies and the Government of Legal Identities, Foucault and the Government of Disability, 108-133] \*gender modified to avoid your shenaniganz

Ontology Wars and the “Unthinkability” of Disability A system of thought . . . is founded on a series of acts of partition whose ambiguity, here as elsewhere, is to open up the terrain of their transgression at the very moment when they mark off a limit. To discover the complete horizon of a society’s symbolic values, it is also necessary to map out its transgressions, its deviants. —marcel detienne, Dionysos Slain Activists with disabilities have placed great trust in the legal system to deliver freedoms in the form of equality rights and protections against discrimination. While these equalization initiatives have provided remedies in the lives of some individuals with disabilities, their subtext of disability as negative ontology has remained substantially unchallenged**.** It is crucial, however, that we persistently and continually return to the matter of disability as negative ontology**,** as a malignancy, that is, as the property of a body constituted by what Michael Oliver refers to as “the personal tragedy theory of disability,” a conception in whose terms disability cannot be spoken as anything other than an anathema. On the personal tragedy theory, Oliver notes, “disability is some terrible chance event which occurs at random to unfortunate individuals” (1996, 32). In the terms of the “tragedy theory,” disability is assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is, inherently negative. This conception of disability underpins most of the claims of disability discrimination that are juridically sanctioned within the welfare state and is imbricated in compensatory initiatives and the compulsion toward therapeutic interventions. Insofar as this conception of disability is assumed, the presence of disability upsets the modernist craving for ontological security. The conundrum of disability/impairment is not a mere fear of the unknown, nor an apprehensiveness toward that which is foreign or strange (the subaltern). Disability and disabled bodies are effectively positioned in the nether regions of “unthought**.”** For the ongoing stability of ableism, a diffuse network of thought, depends upon the capacity of that network to “shut away,” to exteriorize, and unthink disability and its resemblance to the essential (ableist) human self**.** As Foucault explains: The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in m(i)n [sic] like a shriveled up nature or a stratified history; it is in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality. (1994, 326) In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive outside—that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity. Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness. Indeed, the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation. The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within modernism’s unitary subject and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “falling away” and “crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease.Such effects of terror may produce instances of disability hate crimes, disability vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror rarely enter judicial domains, but rather are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification. In short, this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal of law’s power to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses. Disability “harms” and “injuries” are only deemed bona fide within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions (read: ‹ctions) elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered viable in law. Law’s collusion with biomedical discourse informs us not only about modes of disability subjectification; in addition, and more importantly, that collusion informs us about what it means to be “hum(i)n” under the rein/reign of ableism**.** Thus far, I have discussed (at the center, not the periphery) matters of an ontological character in order to introduce the notion of the ontological terror, that is, the unthought of disability, as a signi‹cant actor in the promulgation of ableism with law in liberal society. In the next section, I turn to consider practices of freedom as they are actualized within this ableist regime of law.

#### The body-state we criticize is ableist – we critique ableist metaphors of “bodily perfection”

Scott 99 [(Krista, PhD in women's studies and feminist scholar health advocate) “Imagined Bodies, Imagined Communities: Feminism, Nationalism, and Body Metaphors” http://www.stumptuous.com/imagine.html] AT

The idealized model of the body-state which appears in recent traditional Western political discourse is derived both from medical models of the late 18th-early 20th century and from the political thought of that period. This body is a homogeneous whole which has a discrete inside and outside, or public and private elements. There is nothing unknown about this body, no uncomfortable internal contradictions which cannot be solved by the external hand of medical or state administrators. This is a tidy body which does not leak or excrete undue amounts of messy effluvia; there are no deformities, disabilities, or blemishes. This body has a clear gender, race, and class orientation which corresponds to political notions of the "great chain of being". While the political body has generally been thought to be male (since in traditional scientific and political discourse the "norm" has always been male, and the female body constituted as "other" with varying degrees of deviance assigned to it), there are plenty of interesting discursive uses of the state body as female, and it is to these that I turn to inform the bulk of this essay.

## A2 Gender/Fem K

### Body-Nation is Female

#### The body-nation is gendered as female, resulting in the policing of women’s bodies and rape as a tool of war – the aff envisions a paradigm shift that is a prerequisite to solve

Scott 99 [(Krista, PhD in women's studies and feminist scholar health advocate) “Imagined Bodies, Imagined Communities: Feminism, Nationalism, and Body Metaphors” http://www.stumptuous.com/imagine.html] AT

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The woman-as-nation does not exist in her own right as a desiring subject, but rather as a quasi-eroticized object-member of a kinship network of children-citizens, lover-defenders, and so forth. Reflecting current notions of women's bodies as passive "receivers" of aggressive male sexual attention, the woman-as-nation must constantly be defended against penetration/domination by her sons and lovers, as Pettman states: "Eroticizing the nation/country as a loved woman's body leads to associating sexual danger with boundary transgression and boundary defence." The woman-nation does not desire; rather she is always an object of desire, which "can materialize in competition between different men for control... a triangle, a love story, a fairy tale is often constructed, necessitating a villain, a victim, and a hero." The battle over ownership of the beautiful Helen of Troy was a symbol of the war between nations, and it is thus with this model of woman-as-nation. To deserve this attention, however, the woman-as-nation must be "chaste, dutiful, daughterly, or maternal". Above all, she must be beautiful, "[b]ut only the national women are the Beautiful Ones. Other men's/nation's/state's women, especially those who have been racialized or otherwise othered, may be exotic, licentious, tempting, dangerous, inferior, but they are not Beautiful like the home/national woman is." Needless to say, the woman-as-nation can be excluded from protection "by unruly, ungrateful behaviour, or by dishonouring themselves/their men/nation by associating with 'other men'." Simply being a desiring sexual subject or possessing characteristics of heterogeneous ethnicity is enough to disqualify the woman-as-nation as worth defending. The boundaries of the body of woman-as-nation are carefully demarcated and controlled. Pettman writes: There is a complex relationship between actual women's bodies and the dangers women face and nationalist discourse using representations of women's bodies to mark national or communal boundaries. Here policing the boundaries too easily becomes the policing of women's bodies and relations with 'other' men and women. As I wrote earlier, the ideal political body has a discrete inside and outside, and the meanings of these bodily/national boundaries are especially significant in nationalist politics. The metaphorical woman-as-nation meets the real women of the nation when national integrity is deemed to be threatened. Pettman states: "The use of women as boundary-markers suggests why the control of women and especially their sexuality is strategic in the maintenance and reproduction of identity and difference and so of 'the community'." Just as the idealized woman of virtue does not allow her boundaries to be "penetrated", so too does the idealized woman-as-nation prevent invasion by other nations' warrior-lovers. However, as Pettman points out, this trope is highly dependent on race/ethnicity and class: "There is a complex politics of [sexuality and] reproduction here, as the category 'woman' fractures along lines of power, identity, and difference." If woman-as-nation is constituted as impenetrable and chaste, then rape as a tool of war suggests some provocative meanings in relation to this paradigm. The invasion by hostile male warrior-lovers from another nation happens on both a metaphoric and concrete level. If the nation is a chaste woman's body, then to invade the bodily boundaries of this nation involves sexualized dishonour to the children-citizens and lover-defenders (since in this paradigm rape is never a crime against the woman herself, but rather against the men to whom she stands in a kinship relation). "'Woman-as-nation' 'contains the tacit agreement that men who cannot defend their woman/nation against rape have lost their claim to that body, that land.'" Rape as a very real and horrible tactic of war, formerly regarded as an insult to the men of the nation, is now beginning to be recognized as a human rights violation of a specifically gendered nature. However, it continues to be shockingly evident in recent nationalist struggles. Thus, the model of woman-as-nation, like other models of political bodies, reflects both idealized notions of what women's bodies should actually involve, and current political and national concerns. As Cynthia Enloe has shown in The Morning After, the role of militarization and war plays a fundamental part in constructing paradigms of woman-as-nation. Postwar periods tend to be those in which women are most strongly urged to be "maternal citizens", and foreign occupation of a country implicitly involves access to local women's sexual services. Women's recent roles as lover-defenders in the context of military service have met with great anxiety, which tends to be cast in terms of bodily worries over pregnant/sexually active/premenstrual or menstruating soldiers.

<continues>

If we accept that the traditional paradigm of woman-as-nation is informed by a very particular view of women's bodies, and that this view can change according to current medical models and political configurations, it stands to reason that to intervene in metaphors of women's bodies is to intervene, on some level, with models of the nation-state. We have seen that ideas about women's bodies, for example in the realm of boundary or reproductive politics, shape the actual experiences of women's lives. Thinking about alternative models that challenge the static woman-as-nation is thus not an idle project. To reiterate Benedict Anderson's point, how we imagine our communities affects how we experience them. The traditional model of the female body upon which the woman-as-nation paradigm is based depends on certain medical and political discourses which are representative of much of the Western thought of the late eighteenth-early twentieth centuries. For example, the notion of race purity, an important question for Western scientists and medical ethicists as well as immigration officials in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, informs current discourses of the social and ethnic purity of the woman-as-nation, even though the actual practice of eugenics is no longer part of any state policy. However, much of what was held to be scientific truth in the past is no longer applicable. With the development of genetic research, we now know that humans are both more diverse and more similar than previously thought; this has rendered earlier "truths" about race and gender to be baseless. The advent of new reproductive technologies (NRTs) has challenged the process of women's reproduction and maternal practices, both for affluent women who benefit from choosing to use NRTs, and for poor women who have had NRTs inflicted upon them. Xenotransplantation, organ donations, and artificial body parts are commonplace medical practice, as soon will be generation of new extra-corporeal organs from human cartilage or stem cells; this means that even the innards of the body cannot claim biological consistency or purity. In addition, humans are able to move around in much greater numbers than ever before, and with much greater ease. Large and multilayered diasporas are being generated as people flow around the globe, either by choice, as in the migration of people who seek work or investment possibilities in somewhere other than their home countries, or by force, as in the mass refugee migrations seen in political crises such as the civil war in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. Thus, our model of the static, clearly bounded and categorizable human body which informs the woman-as-nation paradigm is no longer workable, and we need another.

## A2 Heidegger

### Heidegger TL

#### We link turn Heidegger – he understands Dasein as being existentially linked with others and sharing common purpose, which the aff promotes

Sembera 07 [(RICHARD, Ottawa Pyschoanalytic Society). “Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time.” University of Ottawa Press, 2007] AJ

How, then, do we in fact experience this shared being-in- the-world at the everyday level? Who, in other words, are these others whom we happen to find along with ourselves in the world? According to Heidegger, they are precisely those "from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, among whom one also is" [§26, p. 118]. This everyday existence, in which no strict difference is made between oneself and others, Heidegger terms "being-there-with" [Mitdasein],54 that is, being together with others in a world of entities towards which we all comport ourselves in the manner of concernedness. That is to say: at the everyday level, we meet with people at work. The Other is experienced with respect to the shared purpose of concerning oneself with entities as tools. We interact with each other by going about our business, that is, by pursuing the purpose we have in our concernedness with entities and their use as tools, as means for achieving ends. It belongs to the essential structure of Dasein that others are there in the world along with us and that in our primary interaction with them we make no strict distinction between our purposes and theirs in our use of tools. The proprietor of the corner store is there to sell me ice cream. The bus driver is there to drive me downtown. The teacher is there to teach me. The newspaper vendor is there to sell me a newspaper. In all these examples concerning the use of entities as tools, whether ice cream, the bus, information, or the newspaper, the manipulation of these entities is understood as fulfilling a common purpose. In selling me ice cream, the proprietor is fulfilling his own purpose of selling ice cream, while at the same time he is fulfilling my own purpose by doing so. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak not of two different purposes but of one common purpose: exchanging ice cream for currency. The same is true of the vendor's perspective on the matter; and it is also true in the case of the other examples.55 Heidegger, continuing the theme of the essential difference of Dasein from to-handed and at-handed entities, introduces a special term for comportments towards other people (other entities characterized by Dasein). Whereas our fundamental comportment towards entities used as tools is concernedness (i.e., employment and use), Heidegger terms the fundamental character of our comportments towards others "concernfulness" [Fursorge]. Concernfulness is an existential: a fundamental ontological structure of Dasein. This implies that Dasein, insofar as it exists within a world, is not only possessed of an understanding of its own existence but also understands itself as essentially linked with others in the act of existing. That is to say: "As being-with [Mitsein], Dasein 'is7 thus essentially for the sake of others." Even when a particular Dasein happens to be neglecting its proper concernfulness towards others, the fact that this is recognized as neglect at all shows that Dasein is essentially linked with others. For Heidegger, it is never possible to free oneself from the shared character of the world. The choices we make in our everyday life as we pursue our concernedness with entities always have consequences for others. For Heidegger an existential isolation from others is impossible, because the existential structure of Dasein necessarily implies the presence of others. The "isolation" of which Heidegger speaks in the context of authenticity has an entirely different sense, as we shall see in Section 3.3.

#### The isolated ego is impossible – shared experience is the starting point

Sembera 07 [(RICHARD, Ottawa Pyschoanalytic Society). “Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time.” University of Ottawa Press, 2007] AJ

This is a somewhat subtle point, the significance of which is likely to seem obvious to non-philosophers or those without an in-depth knowledge of the history of philosophy. In short, Heidegger's analysis is directed against Descartes' account of subjectivity. One could argue that this account is the distinguishing feature of Modern philosophy, as it has exercised a decisive influence on virtually every important philosophical movement following Descartes. For our purposes, the Cartesian theory of subjectivity can be interpreted as having two main influential features: (1) knowledge of one's own perceptions is held to be more reliable than knowledge of the external world; and (2) our knowledge of the external world is held to be some sort of inference from our own perceptions. These two theoretical features lead to the central problem of how to demonstrate the existence of other subjects beside oneself in the world (the problem of solipsism). Husserl, who was strongly influenced by Descartes, addresses this problem in the Cartesianische Meditationen, fifth meditation, §§ 42-62. For Husserl, our perception of other people as fellow subjects with conscious experiences resembling our own is an inference from their bodily movements. These bodily movements, experienced as similar to ours, are therefore understood to be the results of a conscious awareness similar to our own. Heidegger, by contrast, attempts to deal with the problem by denying that the Cartesian theory in fact accurately reflects our experience of the world. At the level of everyday comportment we do not begin with an encapsulated ego, which, possessed of certainty concerning its own existence, goes on to examine the content of its perceptions and infer the existence of other conscious beings in a spatially extended world. Rather, the world in which we live at the everyday level is first and foremost a shared world. We begin with the conviction that there are other people in the world along with us. Since we begin with this conviction, there is no need to explain it in theoretical terms. It is a brute fact of our experience. In fact, in order to arrive at the conception of an epistemologically isolated ego conceived as a Cartesian res cogitans ("thinking thing") we have to subject our experience of the world to a thoroughgoing theoretical revision. Descartes has to obliterate our everyday experience of the world in order to carry out his "method of universal doubt" and arrive at the proposition "I think, therefore I am." Of course, Heidegger might reply, theoretical problems will arise after the superimposition of this stripped-down theoretical framework upon our experience of the world. Our experience of the world has not been explained but erased. The problem of solipsism is a natural result of the fact that the theory is fundamentally unsuited to the facts it purports to explain. Of course, the fact that our world is by nature and prior to all theoretical analysis a shared world does not mean that we never make mistakes —that we never, for example, mistake a storefront mannequin for a real person at a distance. However, it does mean that beginning with an epistemologically encapsulated perceiving ego-thing and then attempting to explain how this ego-thing gets outside the range of its perceptions into a real world with real people is very much a case of putting the cart before the horse. The more interesting question is how Descartes could possibly have overlooked something that was as plain as the nose on his face.53

### A2 subordinates individual to global citizenship

#### 1. No link – global citizenship doesn’t impose the interests of the world on you but only recognizes our shared humanity – it’s not about interests

#### 2. Aff dismembers the body-state metaphor which solves the fascism impact in the Martin evidence, which subordinates individuals to the state and imposes others’ goals on you –this is a stronger link

#### 3. turn – in the body-state metaphor, all parts of the body are geared towards the purposes of the body which subordinates your will to the state

#### 4. individual rejection can’t solve larger political discoursese that socialize individuals

#### bougher 1 rejects the Cartesian model of citizenship – individuals are also influenced by social factors

### A2 Organ Transplant = Tech link

#### 1. The aff doesn’t increase organ transplants or use any more technology that what already exist – it’s not technology

#### 2. The metaphor of organ transplant isn’t technological thought – the aff is a thought experiment, thinking about the way organs are transferred between people is productive; even if actual transplants require technology, the thought experiment doesn’t

## A2 Racism/Colonialism

### Case Apps---Substantive Version Only

#### Martin says the metaphor of the body-state creates a suppressed hierarchy, where racial hierarchies are masked in order to perpetuate them – this results in racism which turns their impact

### Top Level Racism K

#### Sovereignty replicates colorblindness and excludes non-whites as they were seen as outside sovereignty – this founded colonialism and racism – the aff reveals the way sovereignty is imagined rather than objective, which solves

Chowdry and Rai 9, Professors of International Studies [01/29/09, Geeta Chowdhry is a President's Distinguished Teaching Fellow, Professor at North Arizona University; Shirin M. Rai is a Professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick University, She has directed a Leverhulme Trust funded programme on Gendered Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament (2007-2011). “The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Inclusion: Race-based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations”, Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 84–91, February 2009]

At first glance, the field of IR has hardly any parallels to the racial realism/colorblindness discussed above. Conventional IR do not claim any position on race, much less a colorblind position; indeed there is a “well-trained silence” around issues of race (Persaud 2002:58). However, much like the ontological maneuvers of racial realists that lead them to their objectivity claims, the well-trained silence of IR emerges from epistemological and ontological maneuvers in the discipline that replicate the colorblind position that we refer to. We suggest that while there is an alleged colorblindness to the discipline, issues of race and gender are systemically coded into some of the concepts such as the nation-state and sovereignty that are central to the discipline. Arguably, the focus of conventional IR on nation-states depends upon neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of race or racialized subjects. However, the centrality of the Westphalian state and the principle of sovereignty as the constitutive pillars of disciplinary authority and legitimacy in IR lead to several racialized inclusions and exclusions. Karena Shaw (2002) and Sankaran Krishna (2001), amongst others, discuss the ways in which the nation-state and sovereignty determine these inclusions and exclusions. Shaw examines the constitution and legitimation of disciplinary authority in IR by focusing on the exclusion of indigenous peoples from IR. For Shaw, the “preconditions established by the assumption of sovereignty as the grounds of analyses” in IR “provides the basic tension that any attempt to include indigenous peoples in disciplinary conversations must negotiate” (Shaw 2002:64). Acknowledging that the focus on sovereignty excludes yet to be decolonized indigenous peoples from the disciplinary boundaries, she also suggests that the efforts of scholars such as Franke Wilmer (1993) and Neta Crawford (1994) to seek inclusion of native voices in IR based on the terms of sovereignty limit their analysis. According to Shaw, Wilmer’s analysis on how indigenous voices are moving towards inclusion in IR does not take into account the fact that indigenous peoples “have not been incidental frills at the edges of but have always been central to IR—both as a discipline and as practices of politics among nations” (Shaw 2002:68). For example, Shaw suggests that the role of international law, primarily through the doctrine of terra nullius, in the violence and dispossessions enacted upon indigenous peoples remind us of how racialized difference was used in the theft of land and to deny sovereignty to indigenous nations. In addition, she reminds us that “the active marginalization of indigenous peoples has been necessary for IR to appear and function” (Shaw 2002:68). Another example of the ways in which the sovereignty abstraction of IR erases significant histories is provided by Krishna (2001). Remarking on the horrendous violence engendered by European powers during the misnamed Hundred Years of Peace (1815–1914), Krishna suggests the claim of peace for the period between 1815 and 1914 could only be made by relying on the abstraction of sovereignty. As the colonized were not perceived as sovereign entities, the violence against them during their occupation did not merit an accounting in the peace narrative. In addition to these claims of Krishna, it is important to note that the racialized and gendered construction of Africa, Asia, and the Americas as barbaric and uncivilized played an equally important role in the ontological maneuvers of the sovereignty narrative. Colonization became mission civilisatrice and references to the white man’s burden exorcised any repugnance for the inhumane practices associated with it. The history of the sovereign modern state in Europe is thus deeply embedded in the history of the imperial project of Europe. While most accounts of the history of modernity including the modern state claim a linear chronology, beginning with its origins in Europe and then its dissemination to the rest of the world, postcolonial scholars suggest the mutual constitution of the “West and the rest” in which the nation state and its identity emerge in the context of the “imperial social formation.”6 The state-centeredness of the sovereignty narrative rests on the assumption of an anarchical world in which sovereign nation states negotiate their interests, sovereignty being the alleged equalizing concept in IR. In this narrative, the sovereign state is thus projected as the universal and highest form of authority in the anarchical world system dissimilating its Eurocentric, hierarchical and violent origins. “Indeed, reflection on the past 300 or so years—since Westphalia—indicates that the dominant political form has in any case been the imperial state and empire rather than the sovereign state” (Laffey and Weldes 2004:125). Race(ing) the Global Security Imaginary: Identity, Nation, and Citizenship In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States of America unleashed “a war on terror” strongly supported by Britain, Spain, and Australia. While these events and what followed have been discussed by numerous scholars, we discuss briefly the “new” global security imaginary that emerged in the post-9/11 world. We conceptualize the global security imaginary as “a way of naming, ordering and representing” international security (Mälksoo 2006). It is this imaginary that draws boundaries, constructs identities and danger, and performs security (see Muppidi 1999; Weldes 1999). We suggest that the two conventional pillars of IR—the nation-state and sovereignty—remain central to the construction of this imaginary leading to a renewed interest in issues of national identity and citizenship in metropolitan centers. In the previous section, we have discussed the ways in which race is foundational to the sovereignty narrative. In this section we draw on Burton et al.’s engagement with the “imperial turn” to discuss the ways in which a racialized global security imaginary which serves the needs of metropolitan centers recuperates and reinscribes race into IR in significant ways through the twin concept of the nation-state. While the nation-state and sovereignty are constitutive of conventional IR, it generally treats the nation-state as given and does not take seriously questions regarding its construction, its nature, and its identity. However, critical interventions into IR (based on the historical sociology and anthropology of the state) interrogate the nation-state project and suggest that the nation is not based on pre-existing identities; rather the state inscribes “an imagined political community” to legitimize its national and sovereign status (Anderson 1983). The importance of understanding the nation as an imagined, political, cultural, and social project cannot be overstated for it demonstrates that the nation is not pre-given but is constructed and needs to constantly produce and reproduce itself (Campbell 1990). The construction of the imagined political community relies on the construction of a noncommunity, the “other,” the enemy, and maintenance of internal and external boundaries based on these constructions. Race, ethnicity, gender, religion, caste, class, and so on are crucial elements in the constructions of national boundaries, working particularly through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship defines who belongs to the nation and who does not; those who do not belong could be both within and outside the nation. Citizenship uses race, for instance, as an exclusionary mechanism to maintain the territorial integrity and identity of the nation legally and metaphorically defining those who really belong to the “imagined community” and others who are excluded from this community.

#### I control the *root cause* of racism. Colonialism occurs not because of particular geopolitical interests or foundational racism but because of the biopolitical commitment to *eugenic violence* that stems from the desire to defend the body-state

Elden 2 [Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2002 (Boundary 2 29.2) ]

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques. A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir : Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136)

## A2 OOO/Materiality

### A2 OOO Top Level

#### Perm do the aff and non-exclusive parts of the alt.

#### The aff’s thesis link turns this—the body-state metaphor affirms the human as subject – we call personhood as a separate ontological category into question

Fishel 9 [(Stefanie, Postdoctoral Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at Colgate University, AAUW American Fellow 2010-2011) “Profanation and Body Parts: An Experiment Agamben and IR” Submitted to the International Studies Association Conference Feb 2009] AT

This exploration is also based on the belief that the human body can be studied as a microcosm and the insights garnered at the corporeal level can be used to illuminate the assumptions that we make about parts and wholes, the one to the many, the self to the global. “The human body and its transplantable parts reveal much about the values we assign to the private self, sociality and intimacy, humanity, and human nature” (Sharp 2007, 17). The body also creates it own borders, and the body’s inviolability or disaggregation is an important debate that mirror debates about national borders. Who do we want to keep out and who deserves to be secured within? “With the specter of ethnic cleansing hovering over the world and with the paranoid policing of borders in the U.S. and elsewhere, the commerce in human bodies has a menacing pragmatism--getting rid of certain (radically unstable) categories of people, so-called undesirables… , and, in so doing, creating the means to save those worth saving …” (Stanford 1997, 31). Our ideas of what make us human, whole, and pure have always been at the forefront of the creation of political order. The history of colonization demonstrates the reality of placing some outside of what the center considers “human.” Even with a growing international controversy over organ procurement from Chinese prisoners 5 and the international trafficking of organs from India 6 and South America 7 , the discourses (and politics) of organ trade and procurement remain heavily medicalized, technical, and based on “expert opinion.” This bares a deep faith in technology as the redemptive force in the modern world (Stanford 1997, 34), and demonstrates that many believe that technology can answer all of contemporary society’s problems. This focus elides the majority of ethical and political issues raised by organ transfer and procurement. In many ways, technology and medical advances are beginning to make literal what was once a metaphor. The body can now literally be taken apart and shared with organ transplantation. What does it mean when the human body can be disaggregated into fragments that are derived from a particular person but are no longer constitutive of human identity? Pig’s islets and heart valves are used to replace failing human parts. Even at a less "theoretical" level, organ transfer and xenotransplantation forces us to deeply reevaluate what it means to be human and entangled in diverse relationships that defy borders, and even species distinction. In organ transfer, both the donor and recipient have to come to terms with, for lack of a better phrase, being un-whole. In xenografting, fears of contamination from a "lesser" being predominate. Discourses of purity and altruism thoroughly penetrate both of these discourses. If a new conception of what it means to be human follows from medical innovation what would be the legal, political and ethical status of this new being? Following Donna Haraway, can this new being deny a desire for wholeness or unity as an end, but accept the fractured identities and parts that create her and search for unity and connection with other beings, both like and unlike? Responsibilities are likely to be radically different given the changing life forms and novel social relationships based on the sharing of organs, tissues, and genes, to name but a few. At its most radical, these interminglings/incorporations of strangers/animals into our very bodies may lead us to create and embrace forms of global community not based on citizenship in a particular state or because of a certain ethnicity. This will be kinship by blood, but not in a way we have experienced thus far in the course of human history. I chose organ transfer and procurement to serve two purposes in this paper: the first, as I illustrated above, is to use the body to illuminate what assumptions under gird our ideas of the global and the human and question these hidden assumptions and to demonstrate that emergent material realities question IR’s theoretical relevance to the world. This paper also takes a sideways stab at two assumptions that persist in IR: well functioning states take care of the bodies inside their borders (and hence IR theory does not have to) and, secondly, our deep liberal commitments to individuality by demonstrating that our bodies are not the stable, sacred wholes we once thought they were. 8

#### Permutation—affirm the 1AC as a subject-less object

#### There is NO IMPACT – objects aren’t capable of suffering – a rock can’t feel pain or be harmed by oppression – means you prioritize impacts that affect human beings

#### Coherence DA—OOO is an inconsistent philosophy that harbors the outcasts of coherent ethical systems—it has no academic consensus and can’t form a thesis – their alt can’t ever change anything

Blake 14 [Terrence, (Sydney University, Author, Philosopher, Lecturer, Guy who Passionately Hates OOO), Academia Edu Independent, “HARMAN’S “THE THIRD TABLE” (II): comparison with Latour and Laruelle”], June 8, 2014]RMT

I have spoken in this article principally of Graham Harman’s OOO because I do not believe that OOO exists in general and I also think that its apparent unity is a deceptive facade. There is no substance to the movement, it is rather a matter of agreement on a shared meta-language, i.e.mutual reliance on a common terminology and set of themes, under the aegis of which many different positions can find shelter. I have spoken here almost exclusively of THE THIRD TABLE because Graham Harman’s formulations change from book to book, and in this little book Harman offers us his meta-language in a pure state. In his other books Harman, without noticing, slides constantly between a meta-ontological sense of object and a sense which corresponds to one possible instanciation of this meta-language, thus producing much conceptual confusion.

### A2 Metaphors = Discourse Link

#### Even if discourse is/isn’t a material object, OOO ignores the way language does in fact convey meaning and change outcomes – metaphors and language CAN affect the world since people think and act according to those metaphors, which can legitimize war

#### OOO is sophistry – its concern with analyzing the materiality of language misses how meaning is created between people

Bakker 13 [R.Scott, (P.H.D. In Philosophy From Vanderbilt, Canadian Fantasy Writer, OOO Flamewar Contributor) *Three Pound Brain*, “A Material Churl in A Material World”, April 4]RMT

For whatever reason, soul, mind, being-in-the-world, whatever they are, seem dramatically incompatible with objects (whatever they are). Now the attraction of the so-called ‘materialist turn’ in Continental circles is obvious enough: it aligns speculation with the sciences, and thus (apparently) affords it a relevance and theoretical credibility that prior Continental philosophy so obviously lacked. The problem, of course, is that Continental materialisms are by no means content with those limits. Though they repudiate the discourses that preceded them, they refuse to relinquish the domains those discourses took as their natural habitat. Ethics. Politics. Not to mention the human condition more generally. These are the things Continental philosophy takes itself to be primarily about. So even though science–historically at least–has been shut out of the domain of the intentional, these materialisms continue to theorize these domains. But where Brassier or Roden, for instance, advert to an Anglo-American tradition that, because it never abandoned its scientific affiliations, managed to develop sophisticated responses to the question of meaning, others reference vague compatibilities or occult formulations or worse yet, simply stomp their feet. This is why for me so much of the speculative materialist turn in Continental philosophy strikes me as an exercise in ignorance, wilful or accidental. Historically speaking, soul or mind or being-in-the-world have constituted the great bete noire of all materialist philosophies, and yet these object oriented newcomers, these ‘realists,’ think they can scrupulously theorize things like the materiality of language while completely ignoring the mystery of how that materiality comes to mean. And this, I’m afraid to say, makes it difficult to see these positions as anything other than sophistry, ingroup language games where the difficult questions, the very questions upon which the bulk of philosophy are raised, are dismissed or wilfully ignored to better facilitate a kind of claim-making possessing no real cognitive constraints whatsoever. A kind of make-believe philosophy. Some hard words, I know–but these are ideas, not relatives, we’re talking about. Meanings. I encourage anyone who takes umbrage, or just anyone merely sympathetic to Bryant’s (or Hagglund’s or Zizek’s) account, to show me the short-circuit in my thinking. As I’ve said before, I’m just a tourist. When I find issues that seem this glaring, this damning, I can’t shake the feeling that I have to be missing something. Lord knows it’s happened before. In fact, it’s the only reason I occupy the miserable position I hold now… Being wrong.

### A2 Ecology Impact

#### Alt doesn’t solve – they don’t see objects as valuable, but as the same kind of being as people, but that still allows us to destroy objects – ontology is separate from ethics and doesn’t affect how we value the natural world

#### We criticize sovereignty, which is anthropocentric – who is INCLUDED in the body of society excludes the environment, causing its destruction

Wendt 8 [(Alexander Wendt, political scientist who is one of the core social constructivist scholars in the field of international relations The Ohio State University; Raymond Duvall, University of Minnesota) “Sovereignty and the UFO” Political Theory August 2008 vol. 36 no. 4 607-633] AT

Few ideas today are as contested as sovereignty, in theory or in practice. In sovereignty theory scholars disagree about almost everything—what sovereignty is and where it resides, how it relates to law, whether it is divisible, how its subjects and objects are constituted, and whether it is being transformed in late modernity. These debates are mirrored in contemporary practice, where struggles for self-determination and territorial revisionism have generated among the bitterest conflicts in modern times. Throughout this contestation, however, one thing is taken for granted: sovereignty is the province of humans alone. Animals and Nature are assumed to lack the cognitive capacity and/or subjectivity to be sovereign; and while God might have ultimate sovereignty, even most religious fundamentalists grant that it is not exercised directly in the temporal world. When sovereignty is contested today, therefore, it is always and only among humans, horizontally so to speak, rather than vertically with Nature or God. In this way modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, or constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone.1 Humans live within physical constraints, but are solely responsible for deciding their norms and practices under those constraints. Despite the wide variety of institutional forms taken by sovereignty today, they are homologous in this fundamental respect. Anthropocentric sovereignty might seem necessary; after all, who else, besides humans, might rule? Nevertheless, historically sovereignty was less anthropocentric. For millennia Nature and the gods were thought to have causal powers and subjectivities that enabled them to share sovereignty with humans, if not exercise dominion outright.2 Authoritative belief in non-human sovereignties was given up only after long and bitter struggle about the “borders of the social world,” in which who/what could be sovereign depends on who/what should be included in society.3 In modernity God and Nature are excluded, although in this exclusion they are also reincluded as the domesticated Other. Thus, while no longer temporally sovereign, God is included today through people who are seen to speak on Her behalf. And while Nature has been disenchanted, stripped of its subjectivity, it is re-included as object in the human world. These inclusive exclusions, however, reinforce the assumption that humans alone can be sovereign. In this light anthropocentric sovereignty must be seen as a contingent historical achievement, not just a requirement of common sense. Indeed, it is a metaphysical achievement, since it is in anthropocentric terms that humans today understand their place in the physical world. Thus operates what Giorgio Agamben calls the “anthropological machine.”4

#### My impact turns their – Bougher 2 says I increase deliberative democracy by making citizens aware of the metaphors that constrain thinking – this is key to the environment

Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change, “Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]

It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion.65 Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest.70

#### Prefer it – it’s has a more *material* impact on the environment by changing the way we manage the environment – their impact is vacuous and doesn’t describe HOW they affect the environment

### A2 Academia/Material Change Impact

#### They are LESS MATERIAL than the aff – they choose to criticize the ontological assumptions of the AC rather than the practical effects metaphorical thinking has on the world – they link to this impact, they’re EXACTLY the “cultural criticism” that points out flaws in the AC’s representations rather than changing material reality which they criticism

#### We AGREE with this argument – we’re not cultural criticism but a shift in the way politics operates. The aff is a prerequisite to specific policy changes – it changes the way politicians and citizens THINK and ACT that allow atrocities

### A2 “You’re Non-Material”

#### The 1AC is material – we care about metaphors because they have a tangible impact on how people think and act

#### If addressing categories of thought is a link, they link to themselves – their kritik challenges the way people think in terms of the subject-object dichotomy

#### We’re not cultural criticism but a shift in the way politics operates. The aff is a prerequisite to specific policy changes – it changes the way politicians and citizens THINK and ACT that allow atrocities

#### Decisions to prioritize different sets of values can change political realities—consider our impacts not our method

Guattari, 89 (Felix, The Three Ecologies, p. 43)

It must also be stressed that this promotion of existential values and the values of desire will not present itself as a fullyfledged global alternative. It will result from widespread shifts in current value systems and from the appearance of new poles of valorization. In this respect it is significant that, over the last few years, the most spectacular social changes have resulted from precisely these kinds of long-term shifts; on a political level in the Philippines or Chile, for example, or on a nationalitary level in the USSR.78 In these countries, thousands of value-system revolutions are progressively percolating their way up through society and it is up to the new ecological components to polarize them and to affirm their importance within the political and social relations of force.

## A2 Logocentrism

### Link Level

#### The 1AC wasn’t rationalist – Bougher explicitly challenges Cartesian dualism

#### Saying that some truth exists doesn’t commit me to logocentrism – there are multiple forms of knowing, all the aff has to win is that inducing truths from observations about the world is one of them – we don’t privilege one form over another

#### Perm do their alt through metaphor – Metaphors recognize the connection between seemingly unrelated things – the aff draws out and then dismembers the connection between human bodies and states – this recognizes other possible meanings and avoids turning *concepts* into *things* which turns their impact

Bleiker [(Roland, PhD Cand @ Australian National U. of Political Sci) Alternatives 22, 57-85]

No concept will ever be sufficient, will ever do justice to the object it is trying to capture. The objective then becomes to conceptualize thoughts so that they do not silence other voices, but coexist and interact with them. Various authors have suggested methods for this purpose, methods that will always remain attempts without ever reaching the ideal state that they aspire to. We know of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogism, a theory of knowledge and language that tries to avoid the excluding tendencies of monological thought forms. Instead, he accepts the existence of multiple meanings, draws connections between differences, and searches for possibilities to establish conceptual and linguistic dialogues among competing ideas, values, speech forms, texts, and validity claims, and the like. Jurgen Habermas attempts to theorize the preconditions for ideal speech situations. Communication, in this case, should be as unrestrained as possible, such that “claims to truth and rightness can be discursively redeemed,” albeit, one should add, though a rationalism and universalism that it violently anti-Bakhtinian and anti-Adornian. Closer to the familiar terrain of IR we find Christine Sylvester’s feminist method of empathetic cooperation, which aims at opening up questions of gender by a “process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears, and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to heeding when building social theory. But how does one conceptualize such attempts if concepts can ever do justice to the objects they are trying to capture? The daring task is, as we know from Adorno, to open with concepts what does not fit into concepts, to resist the distorting power of reification and return the conceptual to the nonconceptual. This disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of critical philosophy. It impedes the concept from developing its own dynamics and from becoming an absolute in itself. The first step toward disenchanting the concept is simply refusing to define it monologically. Concepts should achieve meaning only gradually in relation to each other.

#### Perm do both – if the aff and alt are contradictory, that’s a net benefit to my interp – if they’re not then the perm is possible and you vote aff

Bleiker [(Roland, PhD Cand @ Australian National U. of Political Sci) Alternatives 22, 57-85]

Adorno even intentionally uses the same concept in different way in order to liberate it from the harrow definition that language itself had already imposed on it. That contradictions could arise out of this practice does not bother Adorno. Indeed, he considers them essential. One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary, and the discontinuous. Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior universal standard of reference. What is different appears as divergent, dissonant, and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalizing standpoint, which we must avoid if we are to escape the reifying and excluding dangers of identity thinking. Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity then is not to be found by evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be preferred over artificially constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus, Adorno advocates writing in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, and place. He adheres to Nietzsche’s advice that one should approach deep problems like taking a cold bath, “quickly into them and quickly out again.” The belief that one does not reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those who fear cold water. But Nietzsche’s bath has already catapulted us into the vortex of the next linguistic terrain of resistance – the question of style.

#### The aff’s use of metaphor turns their impact – metaphors deconstruct static meaning and even radical deconstruction must recognize the undeconstructibility of justice

MacDonald, 1999 (Department of Political Studies, Queens University, 1999, Eleanor Science & Society 63.2)

In an unusually direct moment in his article, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority'," Derrida makes the statement, “deconstruction is justice” (Derrida, 1992, 15). The question of the relationship between deconstruction and politics returns continuously to this claim. It also, of necessity, begs the question of what then is “deconstruction.” In Spectra: of Marx, Derrida describes deconstruction as ‘a motif.“ As well, in a comparison with Marxist philosophy he suggests that what he is doing is “a performative interpretation”: “An interpretation that transforms what it interprets is deﬁnitive of the per-formative as unorthodox with regard to speech act theory as it is with regard to the llth Thesis on Heuerbach (‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to dumgeit')" (Derrida, 1994, 51). Elsewhere, in the same text, Derrida uses the term “inﬁnite critique‘ to describe his approach: A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice. . . . Such a thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable, inﬁnite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. This critique belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is conﬁded, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event. (Derrida, 1994, 90.) What this experience of ‘inﬁnite critique‘ or this ‘motif’ of de- construction appears as, is a series of maneuvers performed on texts. These maneuvers seem designed to interrupt our conﬁdence in meaning, and in the categories through which we organize meaning, by making these apparent, by playing with them, and by indicating the arbitrariness of their boundaries or oppositions. Deconstructive practices consist in a combination of wordplay, of play on metaphors, of taking things “to extremes,‘ of introducing apparently unrelated texts as parallel to the central one and reading them alongside it, interweaving the multiple texts until meanings become jumbled, and new and unexpected meanings begin to emerge. The overall effect is to unsettle a text, to disturb any straightforward reading of it, to eventually abandon questions about authorial intention, to set the text adrift, as it were. And why is this “justice”? First, because of the "aporia" that it introduces — the sense of confusion that is in fact the "true“ or “honest” and "ethical" response to and perception of the world. I use the word ‘honest’ because what is other is truly other, and therefore ﬁnally unknowable — one is only being honest in an acknowledgment of this. And second, this is “ethical” because categories of meaning, it would seem, are imposed by us, onto others and otherness as a way of ordering, containing, and therefore dominating what is “other to ourselves.” Language is a necessary violence for which deconstruction is the just or ethical response. What is true, then (in the understanding of the world that Derrida provides through deconstruction), is inadequation, non-commensurability, disjointedness. The ethical response is a recognition of this unknowability, a suspicion of all self-certainty. The political response is one of a corresponding openness, a promise of “democracy-to- come” (a promise which Derrida also assures us can never be wholly realizable in the present, in any present). At stake here is the very concept of democracy as concept of a promise that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inadequation, disjunction, disad- justment, being “out of joint”). That is why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia — at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of a living present. (Derrida, 1994, 64-5.)

### Impact level

#### Their critique of objectivity devolves into radical anti-Semitism and utopianism that can’t affect the real world – pragmatism is the best middle ground – it recognizes social construction without rejecting objectivity, which solves their impact but doesn’t link to my offense

Daniel A. Farber 95, Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota, AND Suzanna Sherry, Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty, University of Minnesota. “Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?” California Law Review May, 1995 83 Calif. L. Rev. 853, lexis

Several years ago, the Duke Law Journal published a remarkable exchange over the validity of societal standards of merit. Duncan Kennedy, one of the founders of Critical Legal Studies, opened the debate. In support of affirmative action in law school faculty hiring, Kennedy attacked existing standards of merit as socially constructed and impossible to apply in a colorblind fashion. n2 In response, Judge Richard Posner, a leading pragmatist and pioneer in Law and Economics, criticized Kennedy's affirmative action proposal and implicitly defended merit standards. n3 Posner, in turn, was labeled a racist by Jerome Culp, a prominent advocate of Critical Race Theory. Culp accused Posner of exercising the "majority voice, attempting to silence black voices." n4 Posner's fatal flaw was his failure to acknowledge that "facially objective and disinterested standards in fact serve the interests of the white majority," n5 and therefore are not truly objective at all. As we will see, a similar position on merit is taken by other leading critical theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon. n6 This essay will suggest the existence of deeply troubling links between the logic of this position and historic forms of racial and religious discrimination. More than the evaluation of the merit of legal scholarship is at stake in this debate. Although the debate about merit was sparked by a disagreement over the narrower question of law school hiring, the critique of merit is tied to fundamental philosophical issues. As critical scholar Gary Peller has pointed out, the critique of merit stems from philosophical attacks on the concepts of objectivity and knowledge currently employed in our society. n7 For example, Catharine MacKinnon disavows "standard scientific [\*855] norms" because the radical feminist critique of "the objective standpoint as male" is necessarily "a critique of science as a specifically male approach to knowledge." n8 Similar attacks have been mounted on traditional moral concepts such as fairness and justice. According to Richard Delgado, a leading critical race theorist, "normative orderings always reflect the views of the powerful" and therefore serve to stifle social change. n9 Consequently, the "game" of normative discussion is "rigged against" the oppressed, for "one cannot use categories like justice, equality, etc., to overturn the very system" that created those values. n10 Normative talk, Delgado suggests, merely masks the operation of the "Home Office," which "does not speak normativese at all, but a sharper, brusquer, unfamiliar language full of consonants and commands." n11 Thus, like "merit," existing concepts of truth and morality are seen as part and parcel of systems of oppression. We will refer to this stance as "radical constructivism," since it views these fundamental concepts as socially constructed aspects of systems of power. This viewpoint should be contrasted with more moderate forms of social constructivism, such as the view that categories defining social groups (such as homosexuals) are socially constructed. These moderate views do not challenge our entire structure of thought and are not the subject of this discussion. n12 The position taken by Delgado, MacKinnon, and Culp (and to some extent by Kennedy) cuts considerably deeper to the bone of existing conceptual schemes. These broad philosophical implications [\*856] prompt us to write about a topic that, considered narrowly, might seem to involve only an intramural dispute over academic standards. The views of radical constructivists have not gone unopposed. Pragmatists such as Posner argue that current conceptions of objectivity, knowledge, and merit may be flawed but are necessary starting points in analysis. As he puts it, "those who believe that "reality' is constructed rather than found are prone to forget that not every social construction is arbitrary." n13 Although anti-dogmatic and refusing to accept even the most entrenched beliefs as final truths, n14 pragmatism also has a common sense vein that keeps it from veering into radical constructivism and utopianism. n15 While open to uses of metaphor, rhetoric, and even imaginative but false ideas in advancing inquiry, pragmatists do not abandon conventional values of truth and merit: But to acknowledge that mistakes, emotive utterances, and literal falsehoods (which may be imaginative or emotional "truths") can have social utility is not to deny that truth and falsity can and ordinarily must be distinguished. It is not to endorse sloppy or tendentious scholarship, an "anything goes" attitude toward claims and assertions, or, what is closely related, the belief that, like everything else, science and mathematics are "just rhetoric." n16 The pragmatist, then, "recognizes the importance of logic and clear thinking," and does not embrace "epistemological or moral skepticism, or scientific or moral relativism." n17 We join this debate in support of Posner's position, but we do so only indirectly, by arguing that the logical implications of radical constructivism are disturbingly anti-Semitic. n18 In a sense, our argument might itself be considered an exercise in Critical Race Theory, since it assesses a viewpoint (radical constructivism) from the perspective of a historically oppressed group. In a nutshell, our argument is as follows. Radical constructivists contend that standards of merit are socially constructed to maintain the power of dominant groups. n19 In other words, "merit" has no meaning, except as a way for those in power to perpetuate the existing hierarchy. In explaining [\*857] why some minorities have been less successful than whites, these writers repudiate genuine merit as even a partial explanation of the current distribution of social goods. They are then left in a quandary, unable to explain the success of other minority groups that have actually surpassed the dominant majority. If the accomplishments of these "model minorities" - Jews, Japanese Americans, and Chinese Americans - cannot be justified as reflecting the merit of their endeavors, then some other explanation must be sought. Unfortunately, once merit is put aside, no explanation for competitive success can be anything but negative. These groups have obtained disproportionate shares of important social goods; if they have not earned their shares fairly on the merits, then they must have done so unjustly. Thus, the radical constructivist view of merit logically carries negative implications regarding groups that have surpassed the dominant majority - in particular, Jews, the group that is our primary focus. Although radical constructivists are surely as appalled by anti-Semitism as by racism, we contend that negative stereotypes about Jews and some Asian Americans are a logical concomitant of the rejection of the concept of merit. Anti-Semitic propositions are a nearly inescapable implication of the radical constructivist critique of merit. Rejecting merit could inadvertently leave these writers closer to the rhetoric and politics of Louis Farrakhan than to those of Martin Luther King, Jr. Before expanding on our argument, we present a few important caveats. First and most emphatically, we do not suggest that the scholars we discuss harbor anti-Semitic feelings, even unconsciously. n20 We seek to alert them to logical implications they will surely find unacceptable, in order to prompt them to rethink their current attachment to radical constructivism. In short, we accuse the theory, not the theorists, of anti-Semitism. n21

#### Reality exists – failure to recognize that cedes control of truth to the powerful and crushes progressive reform

Sokal 96 (Alan, professor of physics at New York University, “A Physicist Experiments with cultural Studies,” June 5, http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua\_franca\_v4/lingua\_franca\_v4.html)

Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Textraises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language. Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literarytheory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about “the social construction of reality” won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity. The results of my little experiment demonstrate, at the very least, that some fashionable sectors of the American academic Left have been getting intellectually lazy. The editors of Social Textliked my article because they liked its conclusion: that ``the content and methodology of postmodern science provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project.'' They apparently felt no need to analyze the quality of the evidence, the cogency of the arguments, or even the relevance of the arguments to the purported conclusion.

#### Their alt won’t have any relevance – people must be convinced to accept your arguments, which is impossible if you reject standards of reasoning and truth

#### Empirics go aff – Sokal submitted an article about *literal nonsense* to a postmodern journal and they accepted it – rejecting standards of truth and objectivity devolves into incoherence – they can’t affect the real world

#### Their politics requires a violent clearing away of the scientific method as a means of determining epistemology.

Rasch 4 (Will.I.Am, Professor of Germanic Studies at the University of Indiana, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, p. 104-107)

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari offer a similar invitation. Our task— which is to say, philosophy’s task — is, finally, once and for all, to overcome the time honored but world-distorting distinction between transcendence and immanence. It is the philosopher, the true philosopher, and only the philosopher, who can institute the infinite plane of immanence we are to inhabit. That plane, which is, of course, not physical and not explicable according to ‘spatiotemporal coordinates’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 37), can only be described by way of evocative similes and metaphors. If, for example, ‘concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling’, then ‘the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them’. Or, if ‘concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame’, then ‘the plane is the breath that suffuses the separate parts’. And again: ‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events: not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 36). This last, of course, defines ontology as such. The world is, independent of its observers. Thus the world, or, in this case, the plane of immanence, ‘constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 41). Nor is it unusual that the plane of immanence and what it grounds are described as absolute (‘Concepts are absolute surfaces or volumes, formless and fragmentary, whereas the plane is the formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal’ [Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 36]), unadulterated (‘the plane of immanence is always single, being itself pure variation’ IDeleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 39]), and infinite (‘That is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven, like a gigantic shuttle. ... Diverse movements of the infinite are so mixed in with each other that, far from breaking up the One-All of the plane of immanence, they constitute its variable curvature, its concavities and convexities, its fractal nature as it were. ... The plane is, therefore, the object of an infinite specification so that it seems to be a One-All only in cases specified by the selection of movement’ [Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 38,39]). All these images can be elucidated intelligently; or they can at least provoke further evocations that can make a powerful claim on our philosophical imagination. Yet, to repeat, none can demonstrate its own accuracy, and none can be demonstrated to be logically correct or empirically accurate. Nor should that be demanded of them. Of interest to us in the context of this study, however, is not the validity of these ontological claims, but the political world they imply or the political positions explicitly derived from them. The call for philosophy to constitute an infinite plane of immanence as a radically new ontology is made from within a particular narrative — in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, from within a rather Manichean philosophy of history. The characters in this world drama are Immanence, played by Philosophy (at its best), and Transcendence, portrayed, in all its evil disguises, by The Priestly Caste, which can include Philosophy (at its worst). ‘The Greeks’, Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘were the first to conceive of a strict immanence of Order to a cosmic milieu that sections chaos in the form of a plane. ... In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over the chaos’. And it was Spinoza (with Nietzsche’s help) who showed us that the plane of immanence is ‘surrounded by illusions’, ‘thought’s mirages’, like the ‘illusion of transcendence’, the ‘illusion of universals’, the ‘illusion of the eternal’, and the ‘illusion of discursiveness’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 49—50). But alas, such true philosophy has its enemies, and even within philosophy its false friends. From without, there is the priest, for instance, or the sociologist; there is the epistemologist, the linguist, the psychoanalyst, and the logician; and now, closest to home, there comes the ‘most shameful moment’, the moment of ‘computer science, marketing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 10). And from within, there is the desire ‘to think transcendence within the immanent’, to think the functional equivalent of transcendence in the transcendental. This philosophic fall from grace (punctuated only by the above mentioned protests of a Spinoza or a Nietzsche) follows a fairly consistent trajectory marked by Plato, Christianity, and the modern invention and development of the transcendental subject by Descartes, Kant and Husserl (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 44—48). Nevertheless, despite these philosophic Quislings, the world-historical battle is essentially conducted by Philosophy and Religion. The religious sage conceives of ‘the institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside by a great despot or by one god higher than the others. ... Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence. ... Only friends can set out a plane of immanence as a ground from which idols have been cleared’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 43). The irony — or is it tragedy? — of this radical immanence lies, of course, in the clearing away of these idols, for this ‘clearing’ is anything but friendly. If philosophy and only philosophy, if only true philosophy can institute immanence, then philosophy, perhaps in the personified guise of a Philosopher-King or, more romantically, a Philosopher-Revolutionary, must wage war against its enemies, those usurpers of its role coming from the realms of religion, the human sciences and social engineering. Radical immanence, it seems, can only be achieved by radically eliminating competing spheres of belief and knowledge, or, ironically, by instituting again a proper hierarchical relationship in which philosophy reigns supreme. Thus, the institution of a new, correct ontology and the new, infinite plane of immanence that that ontology allows cannot wait for the withering away of the state of transcendence, but must be put in place by revolutionary warfare, even if the revolution in question is ‘bloodless’. The post-revolutionary state is one in which the enemies of immanence have been defeated and in which all traces of the Gulag have been made to disappear. It is a state which friends and only friends can call home. That is, after all, what friends are for.

#### Rejecting science causes extinction – asteroids exist in objective reality, not discourse

Sullivan 98 (Phillip A., professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Toronto’s Institute for Aerospace Studies, “An Engineer Dissects Two Cases Studies”, A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, edited by Noretta Koertge)

As both knowledge and practice, science is now intrinsic to our cultural ethos; indeed, our daily lives become increasingly dependent on it. Moreover, if recent predictions about the likelihood of an asteroid hitting the Earth in the not-too-distant future are correct, science may yet be called on to save humankind from catastrophe. [38](JavaScript:doPopup('EndNote','Page_92_Popup_1.html','width=480,height=384,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')) The cultural studies preoccupation with relativist accounts deflects attention from the elucidation of important issues arising from our dependence on science. These include the distinction between science and pseudoscience and between science and technology, the role of the state in promoting science and science education, and—possibly the most important—the misuse of science by scientists themselves and by special-interest groups.

#### In the face of real impacts, you should default to praxis, not philosophical skepticism – your degree of credence in the aff’s impacts is high enough to justify treating it as true

Zizek 7 (Slavoj, philosopher, http://beanhu.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/zizek/)

Let’s show them all, huh? Okay, philosophy. This, I can do it, at least traditionally, in two lines, no? Philosophy does not solve problems. The duty of philosophy is not to solve problems but to redefine problems, to show how what we experience as a problem is a false problem. If what we experience as a problem is a true problem, then you don’t need philosophy. For example, let’s say that now there would be a deadly virus coming from out there in space, so not in any way mediated through our human history, and it would threaten all of us. We don’t need, basically, philosophy there. We simply need good science desperately to find… We would desperately need good science to find the solution, to stop this virus. We don’t need philosophy there, because the threat is a real threat, directly. You cannot play philosophical tricks and say “No, this is not the”… You know what I mean. It’s simply our life would be… or okay, the more vulgar, even, simpler science fiction scenario.It’s kind of “Armageddon” or whatever. No, “Deep Impact.” A big comet threatening to hit Earth. You don’t need philosophy here. You need… I don’t know. To be a little bit naive, I don’t know. Strong atomic bombs to explode, maybe. I think it’s maybe too utopian. But you know what I mean. I mean the threat is there, you see. In such a situation, you don’t need philosophy. I don’t think that philosophers ever provided answers, but I think this was the greatness of philosophy, not in this common sense that philosophers just ask questions and so on.

## A2 Wilderson

### A2 Wilderson TL

#### 1. Link turn

#### The metaphor of the body-state grounds colonialism and racism – there might be other causes, but aff is a key one

#### The boundaries argument – whiteness works by creating literal and metaphorical divisions, obscuring our knowledge of the conditions of people of color. Breaking these down turns the K

### Rupture Civil Society

#### Perm – use the metaphor of organ transfer to rupture the body of civil society

#### The aff turns the alt – they say we must rupture civil society – we ask how? The aff creates the means for civil society to be ruptured, since the aff tears apart the idea of a bounded body-society – this is the start of a metaphorical strategy to break down civil society

#### Their failure to use metaphor is a net benefit to the perm – Bougher says people interpret information through metaphor, so a method that doesn’t shift those frames will bounce off them – calling for the end of civil society when the body-state is supreme means your call becomes irrelevant, an insignificant act of dissent that is dismissed because it doesn’t fit conventional frames. The aff is a starting point – we shift the frame, which both ruptures civil society itself, and allows your demands on the system to be heard.

### ---No Social death

The rest of these answers are all generics

### ---No Whiteness RC

### Racism/Colonialism Turn

#### Sovereignty replicates colorblindness and excludes non-whites as they were seen as outside sovereignty – this founded colonialism which caused anti-blackness – the aff reveals the way sovereignty is imagined rather than objective, which solves

Chowdry and Rai 9, Professors of International Studies [01/29/09, Geeta Chowdhry is a President's Distinguished Teaching Fellow, Professor at North Arizona University; Shirin M. Rai is a Professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick University, She has directed a Leverhulme Trust funded programme on Gendered Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament (2007-2011). “The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Inclusion: Race-based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations”, Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 84–91, February 2009]

At first glance, the field of IR has hardly any parallels to the racial realism/colorblindness discussed above. Conventional IR do not claim any position on race, much less a colorblind position; indeed there is a “well-trained silence” around issues of race (Persaud 2002:58). However, much like the ontological maneuvers of racial realists that lead them to their objectivity claims, the well-trained silence of IR emerges from epistemological and ontological maneuvers in the discipline that replicate the colorblind position that we refer to. We suggest that while there is an alleged colorblindness to the discipline, issues of race and gender are systemically coded into some of the concepts such as the nation-state and sovereignty that are central to the discipline. Arguably, the focus of conventional IR on nation-states depends upon neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of race or racialized subjects. However, the centrality of the Westphalian state and the principle of sovereignty as the constitutive pillars of disciplinary authority and legitimacy in IR lead to several racialized inclusions and exclusions. Karena Shaw (2002) and Sankaran Krishna (2001), amongst others, discuss the ways in which the nation-state and sovereignty determine these inclusions and exclusions. Shaw examines the constitution and legitimation of disciplinary authority in IR by focusing on the exclusion of indigenous peoples from IR. For Shaw, the “preconditions established by the assumption of sovereignty as the grounds of analyses” in IR “provides the basic tension that any attempt to include indigenous peoples in disciplinary conversations must negotiate” (Shaw 2002:64). Acknowledging that the focus on sovereignty excludes yet to be decolonized indigenous peoples from the disciplinary boundaries, she also suggests that the efforts of scholars such as Franke Wilmer (1993) and Neta Crawford (1994) to seek inclusion of native voices in IR based on the terms of sovereignty limit their analysis. According to Shaw, Wilmer’s analysis on how indigenous voices are moving towards inclusion in IR does not take into account the fact that indigenous peoples “have not been incidental frills at the edges of but have always been central to IR—both as a discipline and as practices of politics among nations” (Shaw 2002:68). For example, Shaw suggests that the role of international law, primarily through the doctrine of terra nullius, in the violence and dispossessions enacted upon indigenous peoples remind us of how racialized difference was used in the theft of land and to deny sovereignty to indigenous nations. In addition, she reminds us that “the active marginalization of indigenous peoples has been necessary for IR to appear and function” (Shaw 2002:68). Another example of the ways in which the sovereignty abstraction of IR erases significant histories is provided by Krishna (2001). Remarking on the horrendous violence engendered by European powers during the misnamed Hundred Years of Peace (1815–1914), Krishna suggests the claim of peace for the period between 1815 and 1914 could only be made by relying on the abstraction of sovereignty. As the colonized were not perceived as sovereign entities, the violence against them during their occupation did not merit an accounting in the peace narrative. In addition to these claims of Krishna, it is important to note that the racialized and gendered construction of Africa, Asia, and the Americas as barbaric and uncivilized played an equally important role in the ontological maneuvers of the sovereignty narrative. Colonization became mission civilisatrice and references to the white man’s burden exorcised any repugnance for the inhumane practices associated with it. The history of the sovereign modern state in Europe is thus deeply embedded in the history of the imperial project of Europe. While most accounts of the history of modernity including the modern state claim a linear chronology, beginning with its origins in Europe and then its dissemination to the rest of the world, postcolonial scholars suggest the mutual constitution of the “West and the rest” in which the nation state and its identity emerge in the context of the “imperial social formation.”6 The state-centeredness of the sovereignty narrative rests on the assumption of an anarchical world in which sovereign nation states negotiate their interests, sovereignty being the alleged equalizing concept in IR. In this narrative, the sovereign state is thus projected as the universal and highest form of authority in the anarchical world system dissimilating its Eurocentric, hierarchical and violent origins. “Indeed, reflection on the past 300 or so years—since Westphalia—indicates that the dominant political form has in any case been the imperial state and empire rather than the sovereign state” (Laffey and Weldes 2004:125). Race(ing) the Global Security Imaginary: Identity, Nation, and Citizenship In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States of America unleashed “a war on terror” strongly supported by Britain, Spain, and Australia. While these events and what followed have been discussed by numerous scholars, we discuss briefly the “new” global security imaginary that emerged in the post-9/11 world. We conceptualize the global security imaginary as “a way of naming, ordering and representing” international security (Mälksoo 2006). It is this imaginary that draws boundaries, constructs identities and danger, and performs security (see Muppidi 1999; Weldes 1999). We suggest that the two conventional pillars of IR—the nation-state and sovereignty—remain central to the construction of this imaginary leading to a renewed interest in issues of national identity and citizenship in metropolitan centers. In the previous section, we have discussed the ways in which race is foundational to the sovereignty narrative. In this section we draw on Burton et al.’s engagement with the “imperial turn” to discuss the ways in which a racialized global security imaginary which serves the needs of metropolitan centers recuperates and reinscribes race into IR in significant ways through the twin concept of the nation-state. While the nation-state and sovereignty are constitutive of conventional IR, it generally treats the nation-state as given and does not take seriously questions regarding its construction, its nature, and its identity. However, critical interventions into IR (based on the historical sociology and anthropology of the state) interrogate the nation-state project and suggest that the nation is not based on pre-existing identities; rather the state inscribes “an imagined political community” to legitimize its national and sovereign status (Anderson 1983). The importance of understanding the nation as an imagined, political, cultural, and social project cannot be overstated for it demonstrates that the nation is not pre-given but is constructed and needs to constantly produce and reproduce itself (Campbell 1990). The construction of the imagined political community relies on the construction of a noncommunity, the “other,” the enemy, and maintenance of internal and external boundaries based on these constructions. Race, ethnicity, gender, religion, caste, class, and so on are crucial elements in the constructions of national boundaries, working particularly through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship defines who belongs to the nation and who does not; those who do not belong could be both within and outside the nation. Citizenship uses race, for instance, as an exclusionary mechanism to maintain the territorial integrity and identity of the nation legally and metaphorically defining those who really belong to the “imagined community” and others who are excluded from this community.

## A2 WOT

### Aff turns WOT

#### The aff turns the war on terror

Chowdry and Rai 9, Professors of International Studies [01/29/09, Geeta Chowdhry is a President's Distinguished Teaching Fellow, Professor at North Arizona University; Shirin M. Rai is a Professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick University, She has directed a Leverhulme Trust funded programme on Gendered Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament (2007-2011). “The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Inclusion: Race-based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations”, Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 84–91, February 2009]

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It is this imaginary that draws boundaries, constructs identities and danger, and performs security (see Muppidi 1999; Weldes 1999). We suggest that the two conventional pillars of IR—the nation-state and sovereignty—remain central to the construction of this imaginary leading to a renewed interest in issues of national identity and citizenship in metropolitan centers. In the previous section, we have discussed the ways in which race is foundational to the sovereignty narrative. In this section we draw on Burton et al.’s engagement with the “imperial turn” to discuss the ways in which a racialized global security imaginary which serves the needs of metropolitan centers recuperates and reinscribes race into IR in significant ways through the twin concept of the nation-state. While the nation-state and sovereignty are constitutive of conventional IR, it generally treats the nation-state as given and does not take seriously questions regarding its construction, its nature, and its identity. However, critical interventions into IR (based on the historical sociology and anthropology of the state) interrogate the nation-state project and suggest that the nation is not based on pre-existing identities; rather the state inscribes “an imagined political community” to legitimize its national and sovereign status (Anderson 1983). The importance of understanding the nation as an imagined, political, cultural, and social project cannot be overstated for it demonstrates that the nation is not pre-given but is constructed and needs to constantly produce and reproduce itself (Campbell 1990). The construction of the imagined political community relies on the construction of a noncommunity, the “other,” the enemy, and maintenance of internal and external boundaries based on these constructions. Race, ethnicity, gender, religion, caste, class, and so on are crucial elements in the constructions of national boundaries, working particularly through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship defines who belongs to the nation and who does not; those who do not belong could be both within and outside the nation. Citizenship uses race, for instance, as an exclusionary mechanism to maintain the territorial integrity and identity of the nation legally and metaphorically defining those who really belong to the “imagined community” and others who are excluded from this community.

#### Our method turns theirs – empirics go aff, a proposal from a US Air Force Major proposes the body-as-state metaphor to justify expulsion of so-called terrorist threats within the body politic and to continue a never-ending war on terror

Stickle 4 [(DOUGLAS R. STICKLE, MAJOR, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies) “Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base” Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base] AT

In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush declared the dawn of a new kind of war. He has repeatedly emphasized that means and measures of success in this new war will differ greatly from wars past. However, if this “war on terrorism” is unlike any other war, then what is it like? From the public state- ments of high-ranking US officials, metaphorical answers emerge: terrorism is a metastasizing cancer, a plague, a threat from which we are not immune. This study explores the analogies of immunity, infection, and cancer. In doing so it addresses the classic strategic question: What is the nature of the enemy and of the fight? In the never-ending battle against microbes and a 30-year-old “war on cancer,” the enemies are microbes and malignancies—threats from without and threats from within. In the context of the announced war on terrorism, I convert these biological and medical themes for reflective contemplation and conclude that the administration might look further to the language of disease to better communicate the challenges of the war on terrorists.

## A2 Agamben

### Agamben TL

#### Wrong K to read – the whole point of the 1AC is to challenge and limit the power of the state – the 1AC impacts are about biopolitics and the exclusion of identity groups that the state has marked for death

#### Bougher 1 and 2 say we should equip citizens with the tool to critically process political information – metaphors are a prereq to challenging with the system since that’s how politics maintains power right now

#### Ringmar says power structures operate through dominant discourses – resisting these are key

#### The 1AC is not presumed consent – none of the generic links apply

## A2 Counter-Advocacies

### Metaphors Key

#### Only metaphors can solve the aff

#### First, the body-state metaphor exists in the status quo – engaging this metaphor is the only way to solve the impacts

#### Second, the Bougher evidence says citizens will always use metaphors to understand the world – rational understandings are cast aside if they don’t fit our conceptual frame; means shifting the body-state concept is a pre-requisite to any other advocacy

### A2 Germs

#### Perm do both – these metaphors are compatible

#### Solvency deficit – this metaphor is extremely narrow, and can’t solve the way enemies are portrayed not just as bacteria but as vermin, cancers, parasites – only the aff’s metaphor of transplantation ruptures the unity of the ENTIRE body rather than integrate just one type of enemy

#### First – the parasite metaphor – the Musolff evidence says this was the primary metaphor justifying the holocaust as Jews were seen as parasites not as germs

#### Second – the tumor metaphor – it’s used to justify murder of civilian populations in the war on terror

Fishel 14 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “Bug Splats and other metaphors” http://installingorder.org/2014/04/17/bug-splats-and-other-metaphors/] AT

I have written on a similar subject: the use of medicine and surgical metaphors in warfare. The rhetoric and feeling of this use of language is the same. For example To [John] Brennan the people of north-west Pakistan are neither insects nor grass: his targets are a ‘cancerous tumour’, the rest of society ‘the tissue around it’”. To highlight war, metaphor, and their relationship George Lakoff writes that there is a common metaphor in which military control by the enemy is seen as a cancer that can spread. In this metaphor, military “operations” are seen as hygienic, to “clean out” enemy fortifications. Bombing raids are portrayed as “surgical strikes” to “take out” anything that can serve a military purpose. The metaphor is supported by imagery of shiny metallic instruments of war, especially jets (Lakoff 1991). In the case of humanitarian intervention, the language used often frames the interventionist actions creating metaphors from the field of medicine. We offer humanitarian “relief, “injections” of foreign aid, and “prescriptions” for ameliorating unrest. These metaphorical frames show that bodies must behave in certain ways, thereby implicitly arguing that certain ideas about healthy bodies and lives must serve as a template for unhealthy ones. Humanitarian intervention is then about healing these “unhealthy” bodies.

#### Third – the body-state metaphor as a whole is a form of ablenationalism that sees disabled bodies as outsiders – the germ metaphor can’t solve

Scott 99 [(Krista, PhD in women's studies and feminist scholar health advocate) “Imagined Bodies, Imagined Communities: Feminism, Nationalism, and Body Metaphors” http://www.stumptuous.com/imagine.html] AT

Disability is a feminist issue, but is largely ignored in feminist debates... The concept of a disabled citizen could be described as a contradiction in terms. The incarceration of some people with disabilities... has been and continues to be an act of denial of citizenship... their bodies and minds constitute their crime... Nationalism and disability interpenetrate in a variety of ways with a complex array of outcomes... The process of building/imagining ethnic and nationalist communities often actively seeks to exclude certain groups which threaten a sense of cohesiveness. From this quote, it is evident that a critique of the national body or body-as-state should operate on several levels: first, on a concrete level wherein people whose bodies do not fit the ideal are denied civil/citizenship rights (which indicates that they are not considered fully part of the nation-state); second, on an abstract level wherein the imagined communities do not include bodies who are perceived as a threat to the unified whole. As Meekosha and Dowse note, "The nationalist project and disability are linked not only in the process of exclusion but also in the claiming of a political and social space." Thus there are many directions and opportunities for feminist critique of and theorizing around (to name but a few) technoscience, postcoloniality, disability, agency/subejctivity, and of course, nationalism using the metaphor and experiences of physical and metaphoric bodies. In our present world of transnational identities and capital, a conception of the body-as-state that is predicated on a unified, hierarchical and clearly bounded body is no longer fruitful or positive (if it ever was). The cyborg as theory, experience, and methodology provides a rich point of entry into new kinds of imagining bodies and communities. As Sandoval concludes: Each [cyborg] technology of the methodology of the oppressed thus creates new conjunctural possibilities, produced by ongoing and transforming regimes of exclusion and inclusion.

#### This desire for an ontological security facilitates a regime of ableism that produces the subtext of disability as negative ontology

Campbell 5 [Fiona Kumari Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Legislating Disability Negative Ontologies and the Government of Legal Identities, Foucault and the Government of Disability, 108-133] \*gender modified to avoid your shenaniganz

Ontology Wars and the “Unthinkability” of Disability A system of thought . . . is founded on a series of acts of partition whose ambiguity, here as elsewhere, is to open up the terrain of their transgression at the very moment when they mark off a limit. To discover the complete horizon of a society’s symbolic values, it is also necessary to map out its transgressions, its deviants. —marcel detienne, Dionysos Slain Activists with disabilities have placed great trust in the legal system to deliver freedoms in the form of equality rights and protections against discrimination. While these equalization initiatives have provided remedies in the lives of some individuals with disabilities, their subtext of disability as negative ontology has remained substantially unchallenged**.** It is crucial, however, that we persistently and continually return to the matter of disability as negative ontology**,** as a malignancy, that is, as the property of a body constituted by what Michael Oliver refers to as “the personal tragedy theory of disability,” a conception in whose terms disability cannot be spoken as anything other than an anathema. On the personal tragedy theory, Oliver notes, “disability is some terrible chance event which occurs at random to unfortunate individuals” (1996, 32). In the terms of the “tragedy theory,” disability is assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is, inherently negative. This conception of disability underpins most of the claims of disability discrimination that are juridically sanctioned within the welfare state and is imbricated in compensatory initiatives and the compulsion toward therapeutic interventions. Insofar as this conception of disability is assumed, the presence of disability upsets the modernist craving for ontological security. The conundrum of disability/impairment is not a mere fear of the unknown, nor an apprehensiveness toward that which is foreign or strange (the subaltern). Disability and disabled bodies are effectively positioned in the nether regions of “unthought**.”** For the ongoing stability of ableism, a diffuse network of thought, depends upon the capacity of that network to “shut away,” to exteriorize, and unthink disability and its resemblance to the essential (ableist) human self**.** As Foucault explains: The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in m(i)n [sic] like a shriveled up nature or a stratified history; it is in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality. (1994, 326) In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive outside—that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity. Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness. Indeed, the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation. The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within modernism’s unitary subject and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “falling away” and “crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease.Such effects of terror may produce instances of disability hate crimes, disability vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror rarely enter judicial domains, but rather are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification. In short, this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal of law’s power to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses. Disability “harms” and “injuries” are only deemed bona fide within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions (read: ‹ctions) elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered viable in law. Law’s collusion with biomedical discourse informs us not only about modes of disability subjectification; in addition, and more importantly, that collusion informs us about what it means to be “hum(i)n” under the rein/reign of ableism**.** Thus far, I have discussed (at the center, not the periphery) matters of an ontological character in order to introduce the notion of the ontological terror, that is, the unthought of disability, as a signi‹cant actor in the promulgation of ableism with law in liberal society. In the next section, I turn to consider practices of freedom as they are actualized within this ableist regime of law.

### A2 Use Narratives

#### Homogenization disad – their reading of a single person’s experience means we impose that experience over everyone else in a similar situation – this papers over important differences in race, gender, and other identity categories that radically affect how people will experience a situation. Only the aff is all-inclusive since it addresses the underlying categorization of bare life that allows violence to be committed against marginalized groups.

#### Perm do both – integrate the aff’s metaphor and neg’s narrative into a cohesive whole

#### Perm use the aff’s metaphor to structure the neg’s narrative

#### Perm – draw narrative implications from the aff’s metaphor – for example, seeing the body-state as perforated implies a narrative of open exchange replacing extermination of difference

#### Perm – use neg’s narrative to structure the aff’s metpahor

#### All these perms work better than narratives alone – gives narratives greater meaning, supplements the impact of both narratives and metaphors, and acts as a fallback in case one fails

Bougher 14 [(Lori, Postdoctoral Research Associate at Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) “COGNITIVE COHERENCE IN POLITICS: UNIFYING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CIVIC COGNITION” in Warring with Words: Narrative and Metaphor in Politics, April 29] AT

The field needs more extensive explorations of the individual roles metaphor and narrative play in civic cognition, but there should also be greater effort to integrate the two constructs. Although metaphor and narrative are both powerful devices for integrating various fragments of the political world into a coherent picture, the irony is that metaphor and narrative have been examined predominantly in isolation from one another (Bezeczky, 2000; Hanne, 1999, 2011). Metaphor’s main components are source analog, target analog, and mapping, while narrative includes, for example, a plot, characters, and setting. The essence of metaphor is the cross-domain transfer of knowledge; the essence of narrative is storytelling. These concepts are neither mutually exclusive nor are they the same. Research suggests a symbiotic relationship between metaphor and narrative. First, metaphor can provide a structure that guides narrative, infusing texts with symbolic meaning. As Stone (2012) summarized, “on the surface, [metaphors] draw a comparison between one thing and another, but in a more subtle way they usually imply a larger narrative story and a prescription for action” (p. 171). Narrative is often implicit in studies that have focused exclusively on metaphor. Simply hinting at a metaphor (e.g., crime as a virus) can help 5 citizens build a fuller story from the information given (see Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2012). However, metaphors seem to only function as narrative frames when they are included early on in a text (Ibid.). The capacity of metaphor to give text a cohesive narrative structure is so strong that a weak metaphoric comparison can make a storyline less compelling (Thagard, 2011). Because metaphors can help citizens fill in information that is not provided in texts, they also provide compact versions of narrative. The metaphoric frames of “genocide” and “captive liberation,” for example, will “activate divergent stories of the U.S. War in Iraq” (Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 2012, p. 14). At the same time, metaphor can supplement narratives by presenting elaborated flourishes within a given text. To illustrate, the “marketplace” metaphor for economics has often been “further flanked by a number of other metaphorical clusters,” including those based on the military, sports, or religion (Hanne, 1999, p. 46). Narrative likewise can structure metaphor. Just as metaphors can elaborate certain points in a narrative, narrative can give meaning to a mix of seemingly unrelated metaphors. In addition, narrative itself can serve as an influential source analog for metaphoric transfer. Dehghani, Gentner, Forbus, Ekhtiari, & Sachdeva (2009) found that Iranian participants applied popular cultural narratives to make sense of moral dilemmas that shared structural similarity to collective myths. Just mentioning characters from popular narratives can also prompt individuals to apply that narrative as a metaphoric source. For example, mentioning the character of Robin Hood in reference to a political candidate will likely lead citizens to infer that the candidate is an advocate for the poor and disadvantaged. Overall, metaphor and narrative can act as structuring guides for one another. Citing the work of Daniel Cohen, Hanne (1999) summarized that “it may be useful to think of metaphor as compressed narrative, or, indeed, of narrative as extended metaphor” (p. 39). One caveat is that using metaphor as “narrative shorthand” can mask or demote some features of the narrative itself (Ibid., pp. 40-41). The two devices, however, can also act as substitutions when the other fails. Some events, such as 9/11, can be so traumatic that individuals are unable to develop continuous narratives, relying instead on metaphor to help make sense of and express their thoughts and feelings about the event (Brockmeier, 2008; see also, e.g., Angus & Mio, 2011). Although metaphor and narrative clearly interact, future research must more robustly test and clarify the nature of their relationship. Does metaphor help enrich the processing and understanding of narrative, affording citizens a “deeper rationality” or “emotionally focused” grasp (see, e.g., Fischman & Haas, 2012; Angus & Mio, 2011, respectively) on political issues, events, and situations? Likewise, can narrative help extend the cognitive web of metaphors that link any one political narrative to a number of different life domains (e.g., health, family, work, etc.)? And to what extent do narrative and metaphor facilitate or inhibit the other’s role in political learning and comprehension? 6 Questions such as these and their empirical answers will help refine a more unified model of civic cognition.

## A2 Cyborg Body Politic

### Top Level A2 Cyborg

#### Several disads to a “cyborg body politic” – it’s too static, still bounded by the state, and while it includes the non-human cyborg it excludes the non-human natural

Brown 05 [Rasmussen, Claire (Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware), and Michael Brown (Department of Geography, University of Washington). "The body politic as spatial metaphor.” Citizenship Studies 9.5: 469-484] AJ

This rethinking of the body politic, drawing from a creative reconceptualization of the body, is nonetheless limited in terms of its geographical imagination. The space of the cyborg body politic, while demonstrating the dissolution of the singular human subject into her own technological creations, nonetheless portrays the space of politics as static and fixed. Indeed, the reference to territory as infrastructure and the reference to the nation-state implies that this body politic is still bounded in terms of external relationships to the institution of the nation-state, and in internal relationships to the relationship between humans and machines. Thus the nature/culture boundary is preserved by excluding the non-human “natural” from within the constructed realm of the polity. The cyborg represents the body politic as a singularity that predetermines which relationships are privileged (human/technology) and the space in which politics will happen.

### Privilege

#### The aff’s valorization of technology to imagine a trans-human future is based on the physical exploitation of third-world worker

HS 13 [(HumanStrike Blog, blog on neoliberalism, capitalism, and critical theory; cites Giorgio Agamben, prof of philosophy at Univ of Vienna, and Christian Mazzari, Director of Socio-Economic Research at the Scuola Universitaria della Svizzera Italiana) “bare life, immaterial labour, foxconn. first draft” Human Strike Blog, July 24, 2013] AT

Jon Seltin makes a similar argument about transhumanists, those who dream of a post-human future in which we transcend the boundaries of our physical bodies and use technology to become immortal. They, too, ignore the physical reality of the machines they use, and the hidden labor that produces them. As he puts it: “The supposed fluidity, transcendence and liberation associated with digital technologies and hyperbolic post-human futures are structurally contingent on the cheap labour and dehumanisation of these other post-humans” (Seltin 2009, 53). Likewise, the fact that post-operaists can argue for a living wage and make the claim that we have almost approached communism, and need only rid ourselves of the parasitic phantom of financial capitalism, is predicated on ignoring the processes that produce the cognitive worker’s means of production: the bare life of the assembly-line worker making their iphones, and the bare life of the migrant domestic worker ensuring their reproduction. Seltin reminds us of “…those assembly workers whose integration with technologies and machines is marked not by liberation and transcendence but their absolute antitheses: by crippling poverty, an absolute lack of economic and personal security, and a complete alienation from the symbolic spaces that their labor produces. While many electronics assembly workers may have no access to the internet, their cheap labour provides the material basis upon which the dreams of digital disembodiment of transhumanists are based.” (2009, 53).

#### Yes, the aff is a metaphor – but it doesn’t deny the existence of material reality – your metaphor is profoundly problematic because it assumes the position of the privileged 1st world consumer, ignoring the exploitation that makes our lives possible

HS 13 [(HumanStrike Blog, blog on neoliberalism, capitalism, and critical theory; cites Giorgio Agamben, prof of philosophy at Univ of Vienna, and Christian Mazzari, Director of Socio-Economic Research at the Scuola Universitaria della Svizzera Italiana) “Neoliberalism, Suzhi, and Bare Life” Human Strike Blog, MAY 21, 2013] AT

So, this value that is imbued in urban middle-class children in China or in well-off children in the United States who are groomed from a young age to be competitive, flexible, desirable, is derived from the reproductive labor of a highly regulated, super-exploited flexible class of migrant domestic workers. While this labor is paid, unlike the reproductive labor of the wife or mother in Fortunati’s formulation, I believe that the relation between obscured domestic work and the productive, “high-quality” bodies of cognitive laborers is the same. The former are portrayed as unskilled or, in Endnotes’ formulation, as merely a result of high income-differentials, and not productive of value, while the latter are seen as the true workers of our immaterial age. This blindness to the value-producing nature of racialized, gendered domestic work is comparable to the refusal to see women’s work as ‘real work’ by Marxists in the mid-twentieth century, and is, as I shall argue later, necessary to post-operaist discourses about immaterial labor and their subsequent arguments for social democracy. One last note before returning to the main current of this piece: Hairong tells us that employers see the malleability of domestic laborers as a ‘blank slate’ that can be shaped according to their own needs, while Anagost tells us that she observed in discourses of suzhi “nothing less than a substitution of bodies in which the extraction of value from one body was being accumulated in the other (2004, 191). She argues that the bare life of migrant workers, their pure potentiality–or in Hairong’s formulation the ‘blank slate’ of their subjectivity–is appropriated in order to form the ‘qualified life’ of middle-class, intellectual workers (Anagost 2004, 193). Here we can begin to see the relation between bare life and qualified life as sources of value, one hidden and obscured and one privileged through attention both from middle-class intellectual workers and supposedly critical anti-capitalists. In the next section, I will address more fully this notion of bare life and qualified life in domestic labor, industrial production, and cognitive labor, the omission of these nuances among contemporary post-operaists, and the effect of this lacuna on their analyses and political strategies. Bare Life and Qualified Life: Factories and Cognitive Labor According to Agamben, classical Greeks used two different terms to describe life: “zoē, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group….what was at issue [in using bios] for both thinkers was not at all simple natural life but rather a qualified life, a particular way of life” (Agamben 1998, 1). He then offers us a framework for understanding both the historical and contemporary logic of sovereignty and biopolitics: “The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” (1998, 9). While I find Agamben’s framework extraordinarily important overall, I would like to focus particularly on the production of bare life and qualified life, zoē and bios, in the realms of production. The extraction of value from bare life is fundamental to contemporary capitalism, but there remains an important distinction between the extraction of value from bare life and from qualified life, even as those distinctions may be experienced by the same bodies. Thus while for the Western or urban cognitive worker value is extracted from their bare life, it is additionally extracted from their qualified life: they are subjectivized as both zoē and bios, in line with Agamben’s formulation of the inseparability of the two under contemporary sovereignty. However, the Chinese factory worker or the migrant domestic worker are subjected purely as zoē, as a source of bare life existing outside of the law and functioning only to produce value. I argue for this distinction in contrast to Marazzi, who sees bare life as interchangeable with the proletariat (Marazzi 2011, 41-42), even while unwittingly focusing on those forms of labor that are most qualified. What I take issue with is not the argument that the body is an exploited source of value for all subjects under contemporary capitalism, but the failure to recognize the dramatic differences in how that exploitation functions and is distributed according to race, gender, and geographical location. Christian Marazzi tells us, in his critique of financial capitalism, that “bio-capitalism produces value by extracting it not only from the body functioning as the material instrument of work, but also from the body understood as a whole.” (2011, 49). This may be correct, but let us examine the arenas in which this value extraction takes place in his work. Echoing our earlier discussion of the birth of neoliberalism, he tells us of “the emergence of atypical labor and of second generation autonomous labor, former employees who become self-employed” (2011, 50), and then of the massive value produced by our cooperative labor in the form of co-production: “These crowdsourcing strategies, leaching vital resources from the multitudes, represent the new organic composition of capital, the relationship between constant capital dispersed throughout society and variable capital as the whole of sociality, emotions, desires, relational capacities and a lot of ‘free labor’ (unpaid labor) dispersed in the sphere of the consumption and reproduction in the forms of life, of individual and collective imaginary” (2011, 115). Who are the “multitudes” in this formulation? Who are the productive workers, and is this value that is extracted from them extracted from their bare life or from qualified life? By seeing value as produced only through the collective intellectual work of those people who are plugged into the internet, into culture, into crowdsourcing, Marazzi casts those workers from excluded populations as irrelevant, as always already not part of the multitudes. From where does the productive capacity of these “multitudes” come? Are these creative subjects produced only through their own self-work? Do the physical tools that they use spring into existence from the general intellect? From where do their computers, their iphones, their network routers and servers come? I would like to return here to Anagost’s formulation of bare life and suzhi, and the notion of the qualified life, bios. The neoliberal subject is precisely not bare life, it is in fact an extraordinarily qualified life, imbued with values, qualities, and skills that make it so productive in Marazzi’s view. I do not think it entirely coincidental that suzhi translates into quality, and that Anagost and Hairong perceive the presence of migrant domestic workers in urban families as part of a process of investing in and increasing the suzhi of the children. This value that is extracted from domestic workers, the value that is transferred to children who will become cognitive laborers, computer programmers, entrepreneurs–Marazzi’s multitudes–is an accumulation of quality: the future entrepreneur becomes ‘qualified’ precisely by an extraction of value from the unqualified, bare life of the domestic worker. Anagost still sees bare life as fundamental to the experience of both: “it would seem that the body–or if not the body as such, then Agamben’s ‘bare life’–provides a common substrate that underlies both the Chinese state’s strategies for developing the latent potentialities of the masses and the absorption of the individual in technologies of the self, in which care of the body becomes an obsessive focus of bourgeois consumption–an intensification of the body as a site of investment” (2004, 200). However, even if the bare life of Marazzi’s multitude is extracted for value, they still exist as bios as well. The domestic workers, and, as we shall soon see, the industrial workers producing the very digital devices needed for co-production, exist entirely as excluded bare life, in a state of exception much more brutal than that which extracts value from our qualified life. Citing Agamben, Nicholas De Genova defines bare life as “what remains when human existence, while yet alive, is nonetheless stripped of all the encumbrances of social location and juridical identity, and thus bereft of all of the qualifications for properly political inclusion and belonging” (De Genova 2012, 133). It is hard to imagine describing the cognitive worker of the post-operaists’ multitudes as “stripped of…social location and juridical identity.” Indeed, it is precisely their social existence that makes them productive of value. Not so with the workers in China’s Foxconn factories or the Export Processing Zones of Southeast Asia. These workers exist in conditions of super-exploitation, working 12 hours daily and up to a month straight without time off during periods of high demand (China Labor Watch). They are the hands that assemble the ideas of Marazzi’s multitudes. Like the blank slate of the domestic worker, they are pure potentiality, desired for their malleability and their dexterity, performing repetitive actions as quickly as possible. Here there is no need for them to improve themselves; there is no entrepreneurship of the self, only a massive reserve army of labor that can be used and discarded as needed. Here is where value is truly extracted from bare life, from bodies “stripped of…social location and juridical identity.” Anagost again: In neoliberal economic logics, this latent potentiality of the body as a body for exploitation is unleashed by the positioning of the subject at the edge of a precipice, through the threat of a failure to be recognized as a body of value or even annihilation of the body’s very existence due to unsafe labor conditions. In other words, not only does potentiality define capacities that are expressed in the usual sense of being the product of education and training, but there is a superexploitation of the body through an expansion of what it can be made to tolerate in terms of work discipline and stress. (2004, 201, emphasis mine). De Genova agrees with this characterization of the migrant laborer as bare life: “to the extent that migrant labor commonly confronts territorially-defined ‘national’ states with the raw force and vital energies of human life—as labor-power–with no juridical sanction, we may recognize anew the figure of bare life, the negative, abject counterpart to human universality and pure potentiality, which sovereign power can only seek to banish” (De Genova 2012, 145). With this foundation, I would like to turn now to the concentration camp, to Agamben’s argument that the camp contains the logic of modern sovereignty, is the “nomos of the modern.” Specifically, I argue that those sites of production most ignored by theorists of cognitive labor–sweatshops in LA, Export Processing Zones in SE Asia, industrial centers in China–are camps in Agamben’s sense, states of exception where workers are reduced entirely to bare life. In describing the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and the subsequent extension of their logic into the heart of sovereign power in democracy, Agamben tells us that “[i]nsofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation” (1998, 169). Later: “if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crimes that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific topography” (Agamben 1998, 174). Thus the Nazi concentration camps, the refugee camps into which refugees without political status are herded and held in a zone of indistinction, or, as I argue following Jon Seltin, the Export Processing Zones that exist specifically in a state of exception, are all part of the same logic of sovereignty and reduction of life to bare life. As Seltin tells us: “The EPZ is by its very definition a ‘state of exception’, the logic of which establishes the conditions for the production of instrumentalized bare life. The definitional feature of an EPZ is that the laws and policy framework governing its operations are ‘distinct from what applies elsewhere” (2009, 54). EPZs are granted exemptions from the labor laws of the countries in which they reside, tax breaks, and tariff relaxations; they are, literally, camps designed according to the needs of capital, in which the citizens of the countries of their geographical location are stripped of their juridical existence. We can see this logic at play in maquiladoras, in the EPZs of SE Asia, in the use of undocumented migrants in sweatshops in LA, and in the use of interns in Foxconn’s factories to circumvent minimum wage standards (Friends of Gongchao, 2013). The conditions of these camps, or industrial centers, are likewise characterized by their role as “the most biopolitical space to ever have been realized.” Seltin again: “The workers in EPZs are often subject to strict biopolitical regimes of control, regulation and observation….Wright [in an ethnographical study of Mexican electronics maquiladoras workers] describes how the female employees are expected to, very literally, ‘embody the very concept of flexibility’ in that they are regarded as incomplete subjects, as untrainable bare life whose bodies serve “merely a conduit for the supervisor’s knowledge.’ Thus the maquiladora floor-worker is produced through the utter differentiation of zoē and bios, that is, as a body which is governed and operated through what Wright describes as a ‘prosthetics of supervision” (2009, 54). If these industrial centers are the fundamental biopolitical space where bare life is put to work, it seems disingenuous to view the labor of cognitive workers in the United States and Western Europe through the same lens. While the logic of availability, total mobilization of one’s potentiality, and total subsumption under capital may be the same, the practical application is extraordinarily different. It is no coincidence that these divisions of labor are separated along racialized, gendered, and geographic lines; capitalism has depended on and continues to depend on an uneven population and uneven geographical development. It is also no coincidence, I believe, that those theorists of cognitive labor and the general intellect, those so concerned about the ways our affects are put to work and our creativity exploited, cast labor as universal and homogenous, with an enormous blindspot hovering over superexploited portions of the proletariat: migrants, workers in post-colonial or post-socialist countries, those cast as inferior by white supremacy and patriarchy. The social democrats and orthodox Marxists of yesteryear focused only on the formal industrial working class, dismissing domestic labor, reproductive work, or agricultural labor as unimportant, and dismissing the struggles of people of color or women as superfluous to the primary contradiction of labor and capital. Likewise, the social democrats of today, the self-appointed theorists of the multitude and global insurgency, see only that type of work that they themselves perform, and not the underlying labor that props them up. Jon Seltin makes a similar argument about transhumanists, those who dream of a post-human future in which we transcend the boundaries of our physical bodies and use technology to become immortal. They, too, ignore the physical reality of the machines they use, and the hidden labor that produces them. As he puts it: “The supposed fluidity, transcendence and liberation associated with digital technologies and hyperbolic post-human futures are structurally contingent on the cheap labour and dehumanisation of these other post-humans” (Seltin 2009, 53). Likewise, the fact that post-operaists can argue for a living wage and make the claim that we have almost approached communism, and need only rid ourselves of the parasitic phantom of financial capitalism, is predicated on ignor ing the processes that produce the cognitive worker’s means of production: the bare life of the assembly-line worker making their iphones, and the bare life of the migrant domestic worker ensuring their reproduction. Seltin reminds us of “…those assembly workers whose integration with technologies and machines is marked not by liberation and transcendence but their absolute antitheses: by crippling poverty, an absolute lack of economic and personal security, and a complete alienation from the symbolic spaces that their labor produces. While many electronics assembly workers may have no access to the internet, their cheap labour provides the material basis upon which the dreams of digital disembodiment of transhumanists are based.” (2009, 53) Anagost tells us, citing Spivak, that “capital ‘must provide itself with the mind of one class of human beings and the body of the other.’ The mind of the capitalist class is appropriated as the conscious bearer of the movement of capital–’capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will’ (Marx). The body of the working class is appropriated for its superadequation, the surplus value it produces” (2004, 205). The general intellect of the post-operaists, the collective intelligence created by a global network of cognitive workers that they bemoan as a commons which is enclosed by capital, is perhaps instead the mind of capital, putting to work the bodies of migrants in China, migrant domestic workers, and women of color. We must be aware of the role that biopolitics plays in crafting us as subjects and extracting value from us, but we must also be aware that the global proletariat, or the ‘multitude’, is not a homogeneous mass that experiences exploitation in the same way, but a highly differentiated series of populations, some few of which are granted massive privileges at the expense of many others. Remembering this reminds us that a simple shift in government policies or a return to the welfare state won’t deliver us to communism, nor will individual practices of revolt and refusal through a solitary ‘human strike,’ but only a complete destruction of the current world and its subsequent re-imagining.

#### This devaluation of life reproduces the zero point of the holocaust

Dillon 1999 (Michael, Prof of politics @ the University of Lancaster, Another Justice in Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 april)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti-mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality of required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economics of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.” They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. 35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logi-cally, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of the holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life.

# T Frontlines

## Overview

### A2 Topicality – Fairness TL

#### Counter-interp: The aff must affirm the topic or organ transplantation through the use of metaphor

#### Overview –

#### K and autonomy ground is the same since they criticize using the dead body for another. Even if you couldn’t predict the aff you can apply prep to it – it’s the same as reading a new framework – even if you didn’t predict it, you can still engage, so it’s fair

#### Turn– plans delink most neg ground but my counter-interp guarantees a K link. Outweighs – having a link is more important than predicting it, you can still use analytics or apply generic positions as long as they link

### A2 T – Education TL

#### Education outweighs. Norms of fairness depend on the terminal goal of the activity; debate and basketball have different rules, but they’re both fair based on the goal of the activity– it’s a question of what kind of education debate aims at – all my evidence is offense on T since it proves inclusion of my aff is good

### ---2AR education TL

#### The question is what *kind* of education we receive – their model results in micro education that teaches us about organ policy, mine is macro level shifts in the way we conceptualize politics. Politics operates under the metaphor of the body-state which results in all the aff impacts; their demand to debate assuming this model of politics only reinforces that metaphor

#### There are ( ) benefits to this model of education

#### ( ) prior question---values precedes policies; Bougher says even educated citizens can be the easiest to manipulate – even if their model teaches us things, it can’t shift the body-state metaphor that allows atrocities to be justified to citizens – *questioning mental models citizens use are a prerequisite to the specific ideas included or excluded by that model*

#### ( ) impact/scope – organ policy is a minor aspect of politics whereas lack of education about the overall structure of politics is what allows *wars*, *genocides*, and *violence* to be justified to the public – a self-reflexive citizenry is more important than one that knows how organs are distributed

### AFC

#### *Aff chooses framing* – the neg will always shift the focus of the debate to moot the 1AC which skews aff strategy since I have to answer T just to access the aff. This is worse since the neg can react to the aff whereas I go into the round blind, giving them a structural advantage.

## Counter-interp/I meet

### Society---Metaphors

#### Cross-apply Ringmar – society isn’t reality, but a metaphor – there’s no fixed meaning to their interp, and nothing for me to violate

### Society = People

#### Society is

Merriam Webster’s Dictionary. “society”

people in general thought of as living together in organized communities with shared laws, traditions, and values

#### Not the government – government affs are non-topical which disproves their interp

### Resolved

#### We should contemplate the results of reading the 1AC – resolved means

Random House (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to adefinite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

### A2 Can’t Affirm Thru Metaphor

#### Fishel 1 says everything is a metaphor – means either I meet your interp, or nothing does – it must be possible to engage the topic through metaphor

### A2 Metaphors Extra T

#### All politics uses metaphors, so the topic will inevitably be debated as a metaphor – it’s just a question of which metaphors- that’s Ringmar. The results of reading metaphors is intrinsic to all topical affs

#### Resolved means

Random House (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to adefinite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

#### we should contemplate the results of reading the resolution as a metaphor – the effects of interrogating the metaphor is topical as per “resolved”

### Extra T Good

#### Impact turn extra T – first, all affs will claim some extra-topical “no links” or turns against neg positions – having it in the AC means you have 1NC answers to it and don’t have to deal with shiftiness

#### Second, it gives the neg more ground to link disads to – a wide metaphors aff is better than a hyper-specific plan

## A2 Limits/Predictability

### A2 Predictability---top level

#### 1. Predictability insulates yourself from the outside world, the same logic that causes the aff impacts – the aff demands that you rupture the body, and rupture debate by opening it to the unpredictability of the outside world

#### 2. Predictability is a choice – they chose what to research, and the counter-interp would make my aff a norm on the topic

#### 3. Wiki solves predictability – it’s their fault they didn’t write a neg

#### 4. Inevitable – affs break new advantages and frameworks regardless, I’m only a small decrease in predictability

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#### 4. Even “fairness” is not an absolute truth, regard their arguments with heavy skepticism

Delgado 92 [Richard Delgado, (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. 41 Thus, the stronger party is able to have his way and see himself as principled at the same time. 42 Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead 43 -- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" 44 "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" 45 What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. 46 These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled [\*820] to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, 47 and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. 48 We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. 49 Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a downcast look; 50 ambivalence; 51 the question, "Do you really think we should?"; slowness in following the man's lead ; 52 a reputation for sexual selectivity; 53 virginity; youth; and innocence. 54 Indeed, only a loud firm "no" counts, and probably only if it is repeated several times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body language such as pushing the man and walking away briskly. 55 Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. 56 Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what [\*821] really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. 57 First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; 58 then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts. 59 A nice trick if you can get away with it.

### A2 Dialogism/Clash

#### 2. T kills dialogue – they’re reading generics instead of engaging. Outweighs on strength of link – it’s certain that T shuts down discussion in this debate, but uncertain whether it increases discussion in future rounds – dialogism is a reason to DROP them for T

#### 3. T doesn’t solve – people will read the same aff since they’ll frontline T more – voting for T sends the message that you can win without engaging but doesn’t deter, which kills dialogue

### A2 Clash K2 Discussion

#### 1. The aff isn’t about maximizing dialogue but challenging a metaphor that causes harm – they don’t access the aff

#### 2. Their interp means you can’t discuss my aff AT ALL – there’s clash, but it’s about the wrong subject which can’t solve – a limited discussion is better than none

### A2 small topic = predictable

#### small topics encourage fringe affs that aren’t from the lit to avoid repetitive debates – expanding the topic means other people stay in the topic, even if this debate doesn’t

### A2 Rules = Creativity

#### 1. The counter-interp still endorses rules, so it also fosters creativity

#### 2. Their interp kills innovation – the affs on the topic are repetitive, only mine is creative

### A2 Reciprocity

#### Turn – the neg gets kritiks – it’s only reciprocal if the aff does too

## A2 Switch-Side

### A2 Switch Side

#### Counter-interp solves – forces affs in the direction of the topic, which forces switching sides – I can’t read this on neg

#### T debate doesn’t solves – phil debaters read Kant on both sides regardless

#### Prior question – we don’t debate policy questions if they’re never seen as open questions – genocide can seem unquestionable until we interrogate the metaphors that enable them – prerequisite to switching around debating them

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#### Cognitive studies show that dissent against normative rules leads to better switch side thinking

Feinberg 8 (Matthew Feinberg and Charlan J. Nemeth Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and Employment The “Rules” of Brainstorming: An Impediment to Creativity? <http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/167-08.pdf>)

In contrast to such literature, there is some theoretical reasons and recent evidence to suggest that these rules and, in particular, the rule “not to criticize” may actually inhibit creativity. Rather, there is evidence of the value of debate even criticism in the stimulation of creative thought. A variety of studies demonstrates that exposure to a persistent minority dissenter sparks more flexible, open-minded, and multi-perspective thinking which, in turn, produces less conformist and more creative outcomes (e.g., Peterson & Nemeth, 1996; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985). This line of research maintains that the benefits of dissent stem from the cognitive conflict it generates; the dissent compels those in the majority to search for possible explanations as to why the dissenter is willing to openly disagree and suffer the rejection that often accompanies such disagreement. This search for explanations then fosters thinking on all sides of the issue (Nemeth, 2003). People search for information on all sides of the issue, use multiple strategies in problem solving and detect solutions that otherwise would have gone undetected (Nemeth, 1995).

### A2 Steinberg and Freeley

#### It’s a debate – no matter what I say, the neg will disagree; the structure guarantees we won’t unproductively agree which solves

#### The aff is a more productive discussion than the topic – they have no reason the topic is good whereas I’ve criticized traditional notions of the topic

#### Broad questions challenging assumptions causes better learning than specific questions – outweighs in the long-term

Colander 9 (David, Professor of Economics at Middlebury College, and KimMarie, , professor of economics in the University of Richmond, Liberal Education, Vol. 95, No. 2 “The Economics Major and Liberal Education,” Spring)

The success or failure of a liberal education, or an undergraduate major, depends far more on how the educational process influences students’ passion for learning than it does on what specifically they learn. A successful liberal education creates a lifelong learner, and classroom instruction is as much a catalyst for education as it is the education itself. Because passion for learning carries over to other fields and areas, the catalyst function of education does not depend on content. Academic departments tend to focus on both the need for depth in the field and the need for specialized training as a component of liberal education. The push for depth over breadth by disciplinary scholars is to be expected. Just as a Shakespeare scholar is unlikely to be passionate about teaching freshman composition, a scholar of classical game theory is unlikely to be passionate about teaching general economic principles within the context of an interdisciplinary consideration of broad themes. Because breadth is not usually associated with research passion by disciplinary specialists, and because a college is a collection of disciplinary specialists, breadth often gets shortchanged; it is interpreted as “superficial.” But in reality, breadth pertains to the nature of the questions asked. It involves asking questions that are unlikely to have definitive answers—“big-think” questions that challenge the foundations of disciplinary analysis. By contrast, depth involves asking smaller questions that can be answered—“little-think” questions that, too often, involve an uncritical acceptance of the assumptions upon which research is built. Questions and areas of study have two dimensions: a research dimension and a teaching dimension. The disciplinary nature of both graduate education and undergraduate college faculties leads to an emphasis on “research questions,” which tend to be narrow and in-depth, and a de-emphasis on “teaching questions,” which tend to involve greater breadth. Economics has its own distinctive set of teaching questions: Is capitalism preferable to socialism? What is the appropriate structure of an economy? Does the market alienate individuals from their true selves? Is consumer sovereignty acceptable? Do statistical significance tests appropriately measure significance? It is worthwhile to teach such “big-think” questions, but because they do not fit the disciplinary research focus of the profession, they tend not to be included in the economics major. This is regrettable, since struggling with “big-think” questions helps provoke a passion for learning in students and, hence, can be a catalyst for deeper student learning. It is similarly worthwhile to expose students to longstanding debates within the field. For example, Marx considered the alienation created by the market to be a central problem of western societies; Hayek argued that the market was necessary to preserve individual freedom; and Alfred Marshall argued that activities determine wants and, thus, wants cannot be considered as primitives in economic analysis. Such debates are highly relevant for students to consider as they study economics within the context of a liberal education. But these kinds of debates are not actively engaged as part of cutting-edge research, which instead tends to focus either on narrow questions that can be resolved through statistical analysis or on highly theoretical questions that exceed the level of undergraduate students.

## a2 Role play

### Role Play Top Level

#### 2 impact turns–

#### They make us *reactionary* policymakers who respond to difference by exterminating it – operating within the body-state metaphor means we support the racist policies that follow from the metaphor

#### The idea that you can assume the personhood of the state assumes the state has a body, which causes violence

#### 2. How you conceptualize the state is a prerequisite to pretending you are the state – the aff is a prior question to role-playing and outweighs

#### 3. 90% of other rounds are policy education, which solves their impact – SOME rounds need to question conventional assumptions

#### 4. Roleplaying overlooks our role in manufacturing violence and abdicates responsibility

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control.

### A2 Decision-making

#### The aff asks you to decide what conceptual frames to use – this is a better decision:

#### Their decision-making is non-unique – their impact evidence says we decide between two actions all the time so we don’t need more training on it

#### Prior question – most choices appear intuitive given a frame that limits choice to begin with – challenging that frame creates more open decision-makers who are more likely to make the right choice

#### The point of debate is self-reflexive decision-making: the role is to train you to decide what to believe in by comparing arguments – the aff is exactly that so it’s more specific to the role of debate

### Aff K2 Policymaking

#### I control the internal link - Analyzing underlying assumptions is important for policymaking

Keller 1, Whittaker, and Burke 01 Thomas E., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, James K., professor of Social Work, and Tracy K., doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer

Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According tojansson {1984, pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamen- tal skills when pursuing policy practice activities: • value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; • conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; • interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; • political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and • position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process—identifying the values underlying policy choices, recog- nizing and evaluating multiple alterna- tives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy prac- tice skills seems to share much in com- mon with developing capacities for critical thinking.

#### Critical thinking is all about challenging modes of thought. The K obviously does that better than generic policymaking debates.

Case et al 99 [SHARON BAILIN, ROLAND CASE, JERROLD R. COOMBS and LEROI B. DANIELS. “Conceptualizing critical thinking.” j. curriculum studies, 1999, vol. 31, no. 3, 285-302. Taylor and Francis Group] AJ

Thus, teaching critical thinking is best conceptualized not as a matter of teaching isolated abilities and dispositions, but rather as furthering the initiation of students into complex critical practices that embody value- commitments and require the sensitive use of a variety of intellectual resources in the exercise of good judgement. Initiation of children into these practices begins long before they enter school. By the time they are in primary school they are already making and criticizing judgements and arguments of various sorts, though their arguments and criticisms may not be very good. The educator’ s task is to continue the student’ s initiation in a more discriminating and self-conscious way, such that good critical practice is encouraged and poor practice is abandoned. This involves not simply teaching students standards and concepts of which they were previously ignorant, but also getting them to appreciate the value of changing some of their previously established commitments and practices.¶ Although the long-range educational project is to develop competence in thinking critically in a variety of areas, the attainment of this end is necessarily a gradual process that can begin in the earliest years in school. Teaching students how to appraise evidential arguments in history or chemistry may have to await secondary school or university, but primary students can begin to learn important commitments and habits of mind, such as thinking reasons and truth are important, respecting others in discussion, being open-minded, and being willing to look at issues from others’ points of view. They can learn a variety of critical concepts, such a those necessary for distinguishing between de® nitions and empirical state- ments; they can learn a number of heuristics, such as asking for examples when the meaning of a term is unclear and reminding themselves to double-check claims before accepting them as fact; and they can learn principles, such as trying to think of alternatives when deciding what is the best thing to do. As they become more mature they can expand the range of intellectual resources they are able and willing to employ and improve the judgement with which they employ them.

## A2 Specific Authors

### A2 Greenhill Giroux

#### 1. Giroux says politics are important, but the 1AC proves that my method is key to politics – Giroux CONCEDES

Henry Giroux 6, prof of edu and cultural studies at Penn State, 6 (Comparative Studies of South Asia)

Abstracted from the ideal of public commit- ment, the new authoritarianism represents a political and economic practice and form of militarism that loosen the connections among substantive democracy, critical agency, and critical education. In opposition to the rising tide of authoritarianism, educators across the globe must make a case for linking learning to progressive social change while struggling to pluralize and critically engage the diverse sites where public pedagogy takes place. In part, this suggests forming alliances that can make sure every sphere of social life is recognized as an important site of the political, social, and cul- tural struggle that is so crucial to any attempt to forge the knowledge, identifications, effective investments, and social relations that constitute political subjects and social agents capable of energizing and spreading the basis for a sub- stantive global democracy. Such circumstances require that peda- gogy be embraced as a moral and political prac- tice, one that is directive and not dogmatic, an outgrowth of struggles designed to resist the increasing depoliticization of political culture that is the hallmark of the current Bush revolu- tion. Education is the terrain where conscious- ness is shaped, needs are constructed, and the capacity for individual self-reflection and broad social change is nurtured and produced. Educa- tion has assumed an unparalleled significance in shaping the language, values, and ideologies that legitimize the structures and organizations that support the imperatives of global capital- ism. Efforts to reduce it to a technique or meth- odology set aside, education remains a crucial site for the production and struggle over those pedagogical and political conditions that pro- vide the possibilities for people to develop forms of agency that enable them individually and col- lectively to intervene in the processes through which the material relations of power shape the meaning and practices of their everyday lives. Within the current historical context, struggles over power take on a symbolic and discursive as well as a material and institutional form. The struggle over education is about more than the struggle over meaning and identity; it is also about how meaning, knowledge, and values are produced, authorized, and made operational within economic and structural relations of power. Education is not at odds with politics; it is an important and crucial element in any definition of the political and offers not only the theoretical tools for a systematic critique of authoritarianism but also a language of possibility for creating actual movements for democratic social change and a new biopolitics that affirms life rather than death, shared respon- sibility rather than shared fears, and engaged citizenship rather than the stripped-down val- ues of consumerism. At stake here is combining symbolic forms and processes conducive to democratization with broader social con- texts and the institutional formations of power itself. The key point here is to understand and engage educational and pedagogical practices from the point of view of how they are bound up with larger relations of power. Educators, students, and parents need to be clearer about how power works through and in texts, representations, and discourses, while at the same time recognizing that power cannot be limited to the study of representations and discourses, even at the level of public policy. Changing con- sciousness is not the same as altering the insti- tutional basis of oppression; at the same time, institutional reform cannot take place without a change in consciousness capable of recognizing not only injustice but also the very possibility for reform, the capacity to reinvent the conditions and practices that make a more just future pos- sible. In addition, it is crucial to raise questions about the relationship between pedagogy and civic culture, on the one hand, and what it takes for individuals and social groups to believe that they have any responsibility whatsoever even to address the realities of class, race, gender, and other specific forms of domination, on the other hand. For too long, the progressives have ignored that the strategic dimension of politics is inextricably connected to questions of criti- cal education and pedagogy, to what it means to acknowledge that education is always tan- gled up with power, ideologies, values, and the acquisition of both particular forms of agency and specific visions of the future. The primacy of critical pedagogy to politics, social change, and the radical imagination in such dark times is dramatically captured by the internationally renowned sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. He writes, Adverse odds may be overwhelming, and yet a democratic (or, as Cornelius Castoriadis would say, an autonomous) society knows of no substitute for education and self-education as a means to influence the turn of events that can be squared with its own nature, while that nature cannot be preserved for long without “critical pedagogy”—an education sharpening its critical edge, “making society feel guilty” and “stirring things up” through stirring human consciences. The fates of freedom, of democracy that makes it possible while being made possible by it, and of education that breeds dissatisfaction with the level of both freedom and democracy achieved thus far, are inextricably connected and not to be detached from one another. One may view that intimate connection as another specimen of a vicious circle—but it is within that circle that human hopes and the chances of humanity are inscribed, and can be nowhere else.59

## A2 I/L Controllers

### A2 Clash K2 Discussion

#### 1. The aff isn’t about maximizing dialogue but challenging a metaphor that causes harm – they don’t access the aff

#### 2. Their interp means you can’t discuss my aff AT ALL – there’s clash, but it’s about the wrong subject which can’t solve – a limited discussion is better than none

### A2 Topical Version

#### It’s a critique of state centricity and challenges the metaphors in IR – organ policy can’t solve. At best it’d be extra-T and lose anyways

#### The topic assumes a harmful idea of the body-state metaphor where organs can be taken because citizens are subsumed under the body of the state – that’s the AC Jones evidence

### A2 T prior

#### it’s a debate about whose method is better, they say T solves their impact, whereas I say the aff solves mine – you should vote for the method that’s better – the aff outweighs T, real-world violence is worse than unfairness in a debate round

#### The aff also asks what we should be debating by criticizing the topic – proving the aff is bad doesn’t automatically precede the aff since it’s also pre-fiat offense

### A2 Be Neg

#### 2. We’re not guaranteed a link, so the aff can no link the argument instead of engaging – only reading it as an aff forces discussion

#### 3. Every instance is key – we should refuse to endorse the metaphor

#### 4. I’m the direction of the topic – the neg can’t say organ transplantation good so I can’t be neg

#### 5. They’ll read theory on *both sides* anyways – that proves theory’s illegitimate – the aff is key in this round

### A2 Move in Direction of Topic

#### The aff defends organ transplantation as good – that’s the direction of the topic since presumed consent seeks to increase transplants

#### Counter interp means I meet – the K ground is still the same since neg Ks about individuality of the body or biopower still link

## A2 Impacts

### A2 Education

#### Goal-oriented education surrenders agency of the critic to the state, which is allowed to determine what constitutes competence while ignoring individual suffering

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EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower – a follower of the social order – both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

### A2 Fairness

#### 1. Fairness is inevitable – if debate is a game, then adding rules prevents a true evaluation of both sides’ true ability to make arguments – T is an attempt to give them an unfair advantage by limiting what I can say

#### 2. Fairness is impossible – affs will never be fair enough; negs read T even against conventional affs – their violation doesn’t identify an actual deficit, prefer education impacts

#### 3. No impact – for fairness to be a procedural requirement, it has to have some significance since rules only matter if they’re non-arbitrary – they need to win an external impact

#### 4. Calls for fairness and limits are not neutral – these values uphold existing power structures

Delgado 92 [Richard Delgado, (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. 41 Thus, the stronger party is able to have his way and see himself as principled at the same time. 42 Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead 43 -- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" 44 "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" 45 What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. 46 These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled [\*820] to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, 47 and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. 48 We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. 49 Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a downcast look; 50 ambivalence; 51 the question, "Do you really think we should?"; slowness in following the man's lead ; 52 a reputation for sexual selectivity; 53 virginity; youth; and innocence. 54 Indeed, only a loud firm "no" counts, and probably only if it is repeated several times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body language such as pushing the man and walking away briskly. 55 Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. 56 Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what [\*821] really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. 57 First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; 58 then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts. 59 A nice trick if you can get away with it.

### A2 Jurisdiction

#### Begs the question – why should the judge vote for the topic? The ballot has no intrinsic meaning so if I win the aff is important, that’s what their jurisdiction *should* be

#### Metaphors are part of the judge’s jurisdiction – everyone understands concepts through metaphor

#### The judge is also an educator and an academic so their jurisdiction would allow educational or academically productive arguments, not just topical ones

#### No impact – they haven’t proven violating their jurisdiction has any external impact, at worst the impacts of the aff would outweigh any marginal harm

# A2 specific schools

## Kinkaid---T

### Overview

#### Counter-interp: The aff must affirm the topic or organ transplantation through the use of metaphor

#### K and autonomy ground is the same since they criticize using the dead body for another. Even if you couldn’t predict the aff you can have prep on it – it’s the same as reading a new framework – even if you didn’t predict it, you can still engage so it’s fair

#### Politicians use metaphors to shape how citizens view their responses – Musolff says the body-state metaphor constructs violence and the Holocaust as natural to the public – including the aff is key to expose and question the political impact metaphors; failing to do so causes my impacts

#### Debating specific policies is insignificant if citizens don’t recognize how policies are justified to them with metaphors

#### Prior question – Bougher 1 says learning about metaphors teach information processing skills which outweighs since *even educated citizens can be manipulated* with metaphorical framing – only *exposing* metaphors allows us to consciously reflect on policies instead of passively accepting them

#### Scope – they only teach us about organ policy, I shift the way citizens think about politics as a whole

#### The impact outweighs – war, oppression, and genocide are results of a public that’s unable to engage

#### The terminal impact to debate is education. Norms of fairness depend on the terminal goal of the activity; debate and basketball have different rules, but they’re both fair based on the goal of the activity– it’s a question of what kind of education we should have – every aff role of the ballot card is offense on T since it proves inclusion of my aff is good

#### Their offense assumes an ideal Cartesian citizen, in which we use autonomous reasoning capacities to deliberate about policies – this ignores *social context* – our Bougher 1 evidence indicts this model, it ignores the way metaphorical frames shape our thinking, we’re not capable of objective deliberation without challenging this FIRST

### A2 #1 - Not a policy action

#### 1. They didn’t read a definition – no 2NR definitions since I dno’t have time in the 2AR to read new offense

#### 2. Cross-apply Ringmar – society isn’t reality, but a metaphor – there’s no fixed meaning to the resolution, so the aff’s affirmation through metaphor is legitimate and inevitable

#### 3. Society is

Merriam Webster’s Dictionary. “society”

people in general thought of as living together in organized communities with shared laws, traditions, and values

#### Not the government – government affs are non-topical which disproves their assertion about government action

#### 4. No impact – why should the judge vote for the topic? The ballot has no intrinsic meaning so if I win the aff is important, that’s what their jurisdiction *should* be

### A2 #2 – Fairness

#### This is a mere assertion that my aff is unfair – they haven’t proven this

#### Counter-interp limits out what they asserted is unfair, which solves

#### No impact – for fairness to be a procedural requirement, it has to have some significance since rules only matter if they’re non-arbitrary – they need to win an external impact

### A2 #3 – switch side

#### Ringmar says discussion about the state assume the body-state metaphor, on BOTH SIDES of the topic, so switch-side can’t solve and *locks us into harmful conceptual frames*

#### Counter-interp solves – it forces affs in the direction of the topic, which forces switching sides and disagreement

#### topical debate doesn’t solves – phil debaters read Kant on both sides and util debaters read util on sides regardless

#### They assert topic education is good which I’ve answered above – they don’t have a warrant for this

### A2 T version

#### Presumed consent can’t solve the way metaphors operate in politics

#### No topical version – it’s a critique of state centricity and challenges the metaphors in IR. At best it’d be extra-T and lose anyways

### A2 prior question

#### Counter-interp also decides on a topic for debate, which solves their starting point argument

#### T is just an indict to the aff’s method – compare impacts, not the procedure

# WIP

## TO ADD

### A2 State Good/institutionalism

### Cap k

-sovereignty = capitalist

### chow k

-we don’t do nothing

### “democracy” k

### More A2 Wilderson

### A2 Nietzsche

### A2 Organ commodification K

## misc

### Rando cards

#### Short introduction to the aff

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

What follows is an exploration into the visceral power of bodies to speak to global politics, both through International Relations, and by means of the idea that there might be something one could take as an “international society” or define as a “global citizen.” This project began with the notion that there was something puzzling about how International Relations (IR) as a discourse and practice speaks of the body or, put in slightly different terms: how IR theorizes and understands the human body in the tripartite schema of system, state, and individual. How is this “global citizen” as an “individual” understood beyond the civil and legal terms that dominate the field? Not just as a voter or singular rational actor, but as an actual body that can be fragile, leaky, diseased, sold, colonized, male, female, multiple—a corpus, as Jean-Luc Nancy so expressively writes, as

a collection of pieces, bits, members, zones, functions. Heads, hands, and cartilage, burnings, smoothness, spurts, sleep, digestion, goose-bumps, excitiation, breathing, digesting, reproducing, mending, saliva, synovia, twists, cramps, and beauty spots” (Nancy 2006, 155). This body is a powerful body, one that cannot be fully regulated or precisely monitored. And yet its seductive power to IR theorists is unmistakable. Following in the footsteps of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, and other precursors for instance, IR theorists have understood or likened the state, the international system, and their “organs” to bodies. The “people” and the “nation” too have been envisaged as unitary bodies subject to uniform systemic or constitutional processes or functions like democracy and the social contract. In any case, the question arises as to how the body is understood and represented in IR and to what ends? Although this work cannot offer—and, indeed, would not want to offer—a definitive answer to this question it explores the possibility that a focus on the corporeal body can suggest productive responses to the puzzles of global politics today. As Foucault told the editors of Quels Corps? in 1975: “One needs to study what kind of body the current society needs...” (Foucault 1980a, 58).

#### Broad Introduction

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Dangerous Crossings Conference October 1st and 2nd 2011] AT

Metaphors hold an important place in theories of language and our metaphors based on the body and the state have long been used to explain and naturalize political organization and community in Western philosophy and political theory.1 International Relations, drawing from many of the same traditions, relies upon its own understanding of the body politic to order and guide its political commitments. This paper explores the connections between these bodily metaphors and world politics. It does this through through the science of metagenomics and its effect on what it means think about the body and politics based on bodies, both human and nonhuman. This paper, and the larger project, contends that metaphors born of old notions of the body may affect our ability to adapt to changing material realities of the 21st century and make it difficult to respond to the needs of human and nonhuman communities. We must take into account these emerging material conditions--typified by metagenomics in this paper-- that carry dilemmas and hopes rife with ethical challenges and opportunities that, in turn, cannot be answered with our current domestic and international frameworks. It will accomplish this by looking through the lens of the body politic in order to investigate both the metaphor of the body politic and the materiality of the body and its existence among other bodies and, most importantly, what these configurations may mean for ideas of future political community. These material conditions are likely to bring together a very different body politic than previously theorized. The cognitive theory of metaphor 2 used in this paper, which will be expanded below, is important for two reasons in this work. Firstly, it gives metaphor a place in how we see and make sense of the world and secondly, it allows metaphor itself to have a transformative effect on politics and our conceptions of the world. In short, words and bodies matter, but perhaps in different ways and for different reasons than previously conceived of in International Relations. In order to show these changes, this paper endeavors to create a robust dialogue between the social and biological sciences. It also hopes to sharpen and correct some of the outdated pseudoscientific facts and metaphors often employed in political science. As Lynn Margulis writes in Acquiring Genomes, “Society will be better served by a more accurate scientific understanding, and this is not to be gained by substituting one pole of oversimplified metaphors for another.” With this caution in mind, in this paper, metaphor is used as a device to explain and introduce alternate imaginings of political community and also to remind us that metaphorical thinking is a powerful tool for understanding and relating to abstract concepts. The main task of this work is to investigate the construction of the body itself through metaphor and scientific thought, beliefs about the biological body, and the transfer of these beliefs to politics.

To this end, I will introduce how this analysis fits into the discourse of International Relations, discuss bodies and the body politic, introduce metagenomics as a way to complicate the body politic, and weave in layers of metaphor to each of the above topics. II. International Relations and Bodies International Relations (IR), at base, is a collection of stories about how we understand and engage with the world. It is also, both as theory and praxis, a collection of responses about how we create community and space for politics globally, and more importantly for most views of IR, how we, as humans, can survive in a complex, diverse, and finite world. Hence, IR as a discourse is broad, contradictory, and often argumentative. Competing world views vie for what is ‘real’ in global politics. This is especially true in Anglicized and American IR where a certain kind of political realism has ‘debated’ with other other paradigms over what is allowed to be ‘true’ in matters of international life.3 For this work, it is essential to engage with concepts important to International Relations in order to generate a dialogue about pressing and contentious issues and their global salience. That said, as a subfield of Political Science, International Relations has never said much, explicitly at least, about the human body.4 In other disciplines, and in recent years, there has been an increased interest in the study of the body as a social and material phenomenon beyond a scientific or medical perspective. This reassessment of the body as a topic in its own right has missed International Relations, but theories, ideas, and discussions about human life and its place in the global can be found in a variety of recent literature in the field. This is due in part to a concomitant questioning of the sovereign state as the most relevant actor in a complex, interconnected, and globalized world with diverse actors and multiple relations of power and accountability. Much of mainstream International Relations writing since, say, 1989 has been concerned with the shifting and changing of the international system; a system that was perceived as a relatively predictable and stable during the Cold War. The State is waning, in crisis, failing, or unable to handle the increased flows of capital, diseases, and people. Environmental issues and social welfare issues have bared weaknesses in the state form to handle both emergencies and issues of accountability. Changes in war-fighting techniques and acts of terror (both state and non-state) demonstrate that the State is monolithic and ill equipped to handle the asymmetrical forms of violence in the international system. But, even with all the changes and challenges to the State, it continues to hold our political imagination. Because of this paucity of imagination, human life is often only discussed through the language of sovereignty and the sovereign subject; underwritten by liberal commitments and limited through so-called realist assumptions. State security, foreign policy, raison d’etat, and international anarchy dominate the field of IR leaving the human abandoned near the fringes of what is accepted as a legitimate topic for study. Therefore, an important task for this project will be to carefully connect ideas of the body with the discipline of IR and ask how bodies, lived experiences, and multiple actors who are generally not recognized as appropriate can be considered a topic for International Relations as discussion has generally centered upon the so-called relevant actors in IR: states, later, the United Nations and other intergovermental organizations, and more recently non- governmental organizations. While many IR theories address the individual through scholarship on human rights, the institutional focus of the discipline leaves the body under studied and under theorized. I would like to argue that that within each theory of IR, ideas about ‘bodies’ are implicit. This is shown most easily by reflecting on the debate over intervention for humanitarian purposes, individual accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity that have supported the creation of the International Criminal Court, or international law’s specific concerns over the bodies of fallen soldiers in the Geneva Conventions. At a deeper level, it can be argued that International Relations has always been about the definition of life through theories of sovereignty and sovereign subjects and the subsequent actions taken to protect this life.

#### State has become universalized

Fishel 11 [(Stephanie, International Relations theorist, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Postdoctoral Fellow at Colgate University) “New Metaphors for Global Living: Metagenomics as Paradigm” Prepared for the ISA Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011] AT

International Relations (IR), at base, is a collection of stories about how we understand and engage with the world. It is also, both as theory and praxis, a collection of responses about how we create community and space for politics globally, and how we, as humans, survive in a complex, diverse, and finite world. Therefore, International Relations is, perhaps most importantly, about relationships--the creation, maintenance, and defense of the connections formed in this world. 3 What can we expect from these relationships? Who and what are the participants in these relationships? Hence, IR theory as a discourse is broad, contradictory, and often argumentative. Competing world views vie for what is “real” and “true” in global politics and often pose as neutral explanations about how the world “really is.” This is especially true in Anglicized and American IR theory where a certain kind of political realism has “debated” with other paradigms over what is allowed to be true in matters of international life. 4 Following Robert Cox’s remark about theory: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” and adding that he should have continued on to stress that the questions and problems that drive theory are often more important than the solutions they propose. Gilles Deleuze writes that a focus on solutions does not serve when thinking philosophically. One must look at the problem to which the theory is responding. “People say to them: things are not like that. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not" (Deleuze 1991). Also important are the conditions of possibility for these questions; one must begin to see how things might be different if new questions are asked. In other words, there are no critiques of solutions, only problems. Often, then, it can be seen that we have answered questions in a certain way and subsequently forgotten there was a question identified. 5 3 I owe this understanding to Siba Grovogui. 4 See generally, Neorealism and its Critics edited by Robert Keohane (1986). 5 The Westphalian state system is a good example of this. The State, as we know it, was a way (answer) to curb a particular form (question) of political violence in Europe between secular and sectarian forces. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is often recognized as the beginning of this sovereign state system as we know it although it takes another 200 years before this system is more than a sum of its parts (Bartelsen 1995, 137). This state and state system--once a specific answer to a specific series of problems--has become universalized as the only way to imagine political community in the modern world.

#### Role of metaphors

Analytical derivations of the body reach IR through philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and scientific literature. From these fields, metaphor arrives in IR to supply a framework for looking at the body and its relation to international politics in a discourse where there is little place to find purchase otherwise. Changes or shifts in metaphors can also be an excellent way of tracing larger changes in political beliefs and commitments. The cognitive theory of metaphor is important for two reasons in this work. First, it gives metaphor a place in how we see and make sense of the world and lastly, it allows metaphor itself to affect politics and our conceptions of the world. In short, words and bodies matter, but perhaps in different ways and for different reasons than previously conceived of in International Relations. This work is interested in the question of what metaphors are for, and not necessarily about political metaphors or what metaphors are (cf. Carver 2008); it is not an exercise in discourse or linguistic analysis nor is it trying to contribute to an already large and existing literature on metaphor in politics and political language. Instead, it hopes to define how bodily metaphors can be productive in International Relations, both as a way to elucidate and acknowledge the ways in which bodies matter in IR--in spite of the under-theorization and gaps in the literature--and to identify how understandings of the actual body will add to debates in IR. It will also build on work previously done on global politics and political metaphor (Marks 2003; Little 2007; Esposito 2004; Slingerland 2007; Kornprobst 2008; Beer 2004; Dalby 1998). Beginning with Aristotle and his writings on rhetoric and metaphor, many have argued over metaphor’s role in language and creation of meaning. There is a healthy amount of debate over metaphor--its definition and application--in English and Political Theory, especially since the mid 1950s. Ted Cohen summarizes the debate succinctly: Although these remarks of Hobbes and Locke may seem remote, their import has prevailed until quite recently. The works of many twentieth-century positivist philosophers and others either state or imply that metaphors are frivolous and inessential, if not dangerous and logically perverse, by denying to them (1) any capacity to contain or transmit knowledge; (2) any direct connection with facts; or (3) any genuine meaning. In what seems to me a peripheral consequence of the move away from classical positivism, this opinion about metaphor has been abandoned, and it is becoming common-almost customary-to credit metaphors with all three virtues (Cohen 1978, 5). An important step in understanding metaphor beyond the Hobbesian and Lockean came from the interaction theory began by I.A. Richards in The philosophy of rhetoric (1936) and first detailed by Max Black in Models and Metaphors (1962). I chose to use cognitive and pragmatic theories of metaphor as they focus on the embodied nature of metaphor. They also define metaphor as a conceptual and contextual system rather than the older ideas of metaphor as rhetoric or fanciful wordplay following Thomas Hobbes’s and John Locke’s theories of language. In cognitive theories, metaphor is not defined as a characteristic of extraordinary language or of poems and rhetoric, but a central part of our conceptual system drawing from embodied experiences. “An important claim of the cognitive linguistics approach to metaphor analysis is that metaphor is, in fact, primarily a matter of thought, not language, and that conceptual metaphor is ubiquitous and unavoidable for human beings” (Slingerland 2007, 56). This approach to metaphor is defined in George Lakoff’s and Mark Johnson’s book Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff 1980). This influential treatise of metaphor is expanded in later books (Lakoff 1989;Lakoff 1999). Lakoff and Johnson write “[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 3). Our conceptual system guides how we see and make sense of the world on a daily basis. This means that much of what we do everyday engages in metaphor and metaphorical thinking. Metaphors are not random occurrences--they are systematic and include more than language. Importantly, metaphors are grounded in our experience of the world and our cultural ways of representing ideas in the world and “understanding emerges from interaction, from constant negotiation with the environment and other people” (Lakoff 1980, 230). This works through “mapping” concepts from a source domain to a target domain. Target domains are the conceptual and abstract worlds of ideas, mental or emotional states, social understandings, and often the “unseen and unknown domains of the physical world as, for example, the world of molecular action”(Quinn 1991, 57). The use of metaphor in science is common, especially for explaining complicated scientific findings to the public. Source domains come from the physical world and are often things that are easily understood or experienced bodily. Simply put, we take our experiences and understandings of the physical world and use them to explain abstract or nonphysical phenomenon as something we can relate to from our material experience. It is in this mapping from the source domain that we can see the strength of metaphor comes from its grounding in what we have experienced. The choice of a particular source domain to match a particular target domain has an experiential basis. For example, affection is typically related to bodily warmth, and understanding often correlates with digesting. Both “affection” and “understanding”--the abstract concepts--are understood in terms of our bodily experience “warmth” and “digestion” respectively. The Lakoffian cognitive linguists thus emphasize the “embodied” nature of metaphor (Shogimen 2008, 81). Our understanding and creation of metaphors also rely on cultural understandings. Not only do we understand these metaphors from having a body of a certain sort (experiencing up- down, in-out, warm-cold, etc), but this body also understands the world through cultural presuppositions, some of which have more effect than others. (Lakoff, 1980, 57-58). We tend not to see them as metaphors at all because we live by these metaphors and they become so embedded in language we do not recognize their metaphorical origins. Lakoff and Johnson call these collections of “speech formulas,” or “fixed-form expressions.” or “phrasal lexical items” (1980, 51). They write that these act as single words, but are in fact structured by a single metaphorical concept. For example, drawing upon the LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME 7 metaphor, we often speak of life situations with phrases such as “the odds are against us” or “we’ll have to take our chances” without these being viewed as metaphors, but as everyday language. “Nevertheless, your way of talking about, conceiving, and even experiencing your situation would be metaphorically structured” (Lakoff, 1980, 51). Lakoff and Johnson write that some metaphors came to be because of the way our culture understands concepts centrally important to it. “They emerged naturally in a culture like ours because what they highlight corresponds so closely to what we experience collectively and what they hide corresponds to so little. But not only are they grounded in our physical and cultural experience; they also influence our experience and our actions” (1980, 68). They use the examples LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE or TIME AS MONEY. Both of these metaphors employ a simple ontological metaphor that tells us that both labor and time can viewed as a quantifiable substance, that is, they can be “used up” or assigned monetary value (1980, 66). This mapping allows us to comprehend statements such as I have to budget my time. I spent too much time on that. I’ve invested a lot of time on this project. You don’t use your time profitably. This mistake resulted in a considerable loss of time (Lackoff, 1999) [italics in original] The authors stress that this understanding is not universal. They were born from our culture because they highlight aspects that are centrally important to our way of seeing the world--the way work is viewed, and our interest in purposeful ends and quantification (1980, 76), but note that these aspects important to our culture de-emphasize or hide other aspects of labor and time. Lakoff and Johnson give two examples to demonstrate this effect. The first is if we regard labor as a kind of activity it assumes that we can tell productive activity from other kinds of activity, like play. The second is that if we see labor in terms of time--along with a purposive idea of time itself--this can lead to the parallel idea of LEISURE TIME. “what is hidden by the RESOURCE metaphors for labor and time is the way our of LABOR and TIME affect our concept of LEISURE, turning it into something remarkably like LABOR” (1980, 67). The primary metaphor highlighted in this paper are ontological metaphors, or experiences with physical objects, especially our own bodies. Lackoff and Johnson define ontological metaphors as “ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities or substances” These ontological metaphors “allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms--terms that we can understand based on our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lakoff, 1980, 34). They also rely on spatial orientation metaphors like up- down, front-back, center-periphery, and near-far. We can then see nonphysical ideas as objects and understand them in orientational terms. These come form the fact that we have the bodies that we have and that they function a certain way in our environment (1980, 14). For example, HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN “I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits...I’m feeling down. I’m depressed...My spirits sank” (1980, 15). It is plausible that this came from a certain physical basis: “Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive state” (1980, 15). These examples make clear that we must experience our bodies to use them to explain other more abstract concepts. Also, we can understood things in the world via a range of metaphors and, of course, they must be understood non-metaphorically as well. “Part of a concept’s structure can be understood metaphorically, using structure imported from another domain, while part may be understood directly, that is, without metaphor” (Lakoff and Turner 1989, 58). These ontological sets of metaphors based on entities and substance not only helps us, as stated above, understand our world in terms of objects or substances, but it also “allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind” (Lakoff, 1980, 25.) We can then “refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them--and, by this means, reason about them” (1980, 25). This, for example, can include what the authors name as container and personification metaphors. “Each of us is a container,” they write, “with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation” (1980, 29) and we project this onto to other physical objects. For example, we move from one room into another, we hike into and out of the woods, and the clearing in the woods with a natural boundary we perceive as something different even if the line is fuzzy. The authors argue that “[t]here are few human instincts more basic than territoriality. And such defining of a territory, putting a boundary around it, is an act of quantification” (1980, 30). Personification metaphors are perhaps the most obvious as the physical object or nonhuman entity can be comprehended in human terms by using human motivations, characteristics or activities. This paper agues that the container metaphor, given new understandings of the human body and its microbiome, is losing its power to describe the materiality of the world. To briefly anticipate later sections in the paper, metagenomics shows that while we may be bounded entities the relationship between communities within (and without) is more reciprocal and open than combative and closed. Human bodies are composed of a multitude of symbiotic relationships--pluralistic, yet connected through procedures and functions that add to the larger entity. This is illustrated below in reference to changing metaphorical framing around the role of microbes and their “agency” in the role of human health. I will return to this claim, but for the remainder of the section I will broaden the discussion beyond cognitive theories to the way in which metaphor is more broadly used and is useful in this paper as well as point out the limitations of this theory of metaphor. The exploration of metaphor places the assumptions IR has about concepts such as subjectivity, sovereignty, and security under scrutiny and allows for behaviors and beliefs about the bodily and material grounding of these concepts to be investigated (Marks 2003, 142). It supplies a way to understand the international in terms of the body and its relations with other bodies, both human and nonhuman. At base, this is what a metaphor does--aids us in understanding one thing in terms of another. They “focus the mind on certain previously unseen aspects of any area of inquiry” (Marks 2003, 156) and the discovery, creation, or emergence of new metaphorical framings can open up political possibilities for international relations. New metaphors based on the human experience in all its variations and framings can open new paths for demystifying international relations and clarifying how politics and society work. Inasmuch as all human interaction is based on the language of metaphors, the more we put metaphorical imagery to work, the more we can gain comprehension about of what human interaction, on all levels of existence is about (Marks 2003, 153). Awareness of a metaphor leads to being able to change perceptions and actions based on this metaphor (Napier 2003, 65) as well as illustrate how change is made or not made possible. The flip side of the coin can also be true, however. Metaphors can stymie, reify, hypostatize, and obscure issues, concepts, and factors in the target domain. Or put differently “As repositories of cultural understandings, metaphors are some of the principal tools with which dominant ideologies and prejudices are represented and reinforced” (Cisneros 2008, 571). By way of example, the dominant metaphor for understanding the immune system and microbial interactions is one of warfare, conflict, and destructive interactions. The focus on the attack and defense role of the immune system, or the “recognition and elimination of the non-self” (Napier 2003, 1) obfuscates the equally important examples of cooperation, altruism and co-evolution of different species and their relation to the human immune system (Ulvestad 2007). Metaphors also tend to reinforce a belief in the a priori reality of both objects and subjects. Put differently, cognitive theories of metaphor are based in theories of phenomenology that take for granted a human “self” or “subject” that encounters “objects” already existing in the world. The role of the object and its role is downplayed this view as something static that is only brought into being by its encounter with human consciousness--it is “the world-for-a-human- consciousness” that focuses on a “narrow world of human intentionality” (Latour 1999, 9) In this work, I will emphasize a Deleuzian understanding of affect and “blocs of sensation” giving a role not just to the human, but also to the other players in this relationship. This also bares another related shortcoming of this theory--it remains, because of its origin in language, anthropocentric. It can only take us so far in understanding the complex relations between the human, the nonhuman and “things” due to its return from materiality (or the world of actors) to the human domain of language. For these last points, science studies comes to my aid as a way to shift from standpoint to standpoint: the human to inhuman, metaphoricity to materiality. Science Studies In part, this project takes its methodological direction from science studies, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and science, technology, and science studies (STS). A brief explanation is warranted as science studies is not is not generally referenced in IR. 8 Broadly, the lessons I take from science studies are practices or sets of practices that begin to question the division between facts and values and the human and the nonhuman in order to better understand our moral, political, and ethical responsibility to both. We also share a common understanding of science as a practice and culture. Science studies takes science as an object of study, not just as a body of knowledge or a particular way to collect empirical observations about the world (Pickering 1995, 2). Simply put, I am not using science as a trump card that assigns all the theories in this dissertation the specious role of truth: Science is not removed from the social and political and it does not always have a more unmitigated view of reality, truth, and the “world as- it-is.” I do not use examples from the life sciences to “fix” the mistaken ideas of social science. On the contrary, I agree with Bruno Latour in his assertion that there is no “magical machine that speaks the truth and pays no price for it in controversy” (Latour 2002, 77). A prominent IR scholar, Ole Waever, commented in 1998 that “the relationship between IR and sociology of science is virtually nonexistent,” but that it could offer interesting insight into the field and study of IR. (quoted in Buger 2007) I believe that, more than just offering a framework to understand IR practice as a “science,” science studies can offer IR a way to, and a language for, creating politics in a realm with multiple actors. Science studies and IR share a common interest in predicting and understanding diverse actors’ behavior in complex and complicated environments. Many of the pressing issues in global politics demand policies and actions beyond the scope of the sovereign state: pollution, pandemics, nuclear proliferation, the need for biodiversity, climate change, to name but a few examples. Science and science studies can offer concrete ways to address these issues and IR’s relevance, both as an academic discourse and as a contributor to policy, can be advanced by fostering an engagement with the main ideas of science studies. To return to the definition of International Relations as a series of relationships, the example of metagenomics contained in this paper speak to these relationships in productive ways. In particular, Bruno Latour’s “actant,” or “hybrid,” Donna Haraway’s “cyborg,” and Michel Serres’s “quasi-object” help to understand a world that cannot be comfortably explained in terms of subjects and objects. All of these terms try to demonstrate the imbricated nature of human and nonhuman relations. Science studies offers a way, through the study of laboratory practice, to focus “on the complex and controversial nature of what it is for an actor to come into existence.” (Latour 1999, 303). Latour borrows the word “actant” from semiotics to include nonhumans in this definition, but it must be remembered that the human-nonhuman distinction is used to bypass the subject-object distinction. In Latour’s words “Associations of humans and nonhumans refer to a different political regime from the war forced upon us by the distinction between subject and object” or “what the object would look like if it were not engaged in a war to shortcut due political process” (Latour 1999, 308). Especially important for this paper, the more familiar focus on agency as a thing or a person that acts in a particular way for a particular result is shifted to a complex realm of actants who may not have agency in ways that are familiar to us--like methane eating bacteria in the Gulf of Mexico--but clearly have “trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (Bennett 2010, viii) . 9 Instead of starting with a priori entities, science studies defines the actor by what it does rather than what it is. An important dimension of science studies is its interest in creating, or composing, a politics that can take into account more than just humans, because a common world must be composed of all beings who share the earth. This must include acknowledging the connections between humans and nonhumans (see Latour 2004). This is done, in part, by dismantling the difference between content and context in order to understand the many translations that occur between the two. “Translations” replace this rigid dichotomy by focusing on the way in which “actors modify, displace, and translate their various and contradictory interests” (Latour 1999, 311). Bodies For this paper, the body is not be theorized as a system of signs, a social construction, or a symbol. Although this paper is organized around metaphor, the body is a material, lived body, not a textual one. Metaphor plays the role of interlocutor in the discourse of International Relations and a way to organize my arguments about the creation of politics centered on the body. I am also aware that the ‘biological’ body is also constructed through the discourse of the biological sciences and public opinion. It is hoped that the example of metagenomics helps to ameliorate the tension between theoretical ‘body as discourse’ and the deterministic ‘body as biological.’ As Bryan Turner writes in The Body and Society: “We do not have to develop a sociological appreciation of the physicality of the body since the ‘natural body’ is always and already injected with cultural understanding and social history” (Turner, 1996, 34). The addition of the materiality of the body separates this work from both the heavily discursive focus on the body as text or information prevalent in IR writings, and from the trend toward theological and transcendent analyses of the body as “bare life” or zoë from the work of Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 1998). This work will forward an idea of life as vital and entangled with others rather than as an endpoint for modern biopolitics. This helps to envision or think a more positive biopolitics--“affirmative biopolitics that has yet to come” (Esposito 2008, 10)--and reflects my belief that politics will stay firmly entangled in matters of life and death. 10 It behooves us to create a more “ductile paradigm” (Esposito 2008) and to find a more more affirmative way to connect biology and politics. 11 My engagement with theory hopes to bring out a “feeling” about the world to contribute to a larger language of affect about whom and what we share worlds with on this planet. Affect not just as attention to our body and emotions, but to that (and whom) acts upon us. This is a view of causality that assigns affect to both sides of a causal relationship, or, in other words, a Spinozan sensitivity to the pull of other bodies; a processual concern over what bodies do rather than the Kantian concern about what we can know about these bodies; a Derridian experiment about singular beings and their ability to “live together” in a “democracy to come” (Borradori 2003). In the next two sections, with the background provided in the first part of the paper, this paper asks the reader to take two steps. The first is to recognize a different construction of the human and how politics based on this body both as metaphor and materiality can be shaped. The second is to give a glimpse of a richer and more complex global politics filled with diverse actants and teeming with lives that all rely on each other. Lively Containers of the Bodies Politic We are are all symbiotic colonies of genes. -Richard Dawkins Corpus: a body is a collection of pieces, bits, members, zones, functions. Heads, hands, and cartilage, burnings, smoothness, spurts, sleep, digestion, goose-bumps, excitiation, breathing, digesting, reproducing, mending, saliva, synovia, twists, cramps, and beauty spots. It’s a collection of collections, corpus corporum, whose unity remains a question for itself. -Jean-Luc Nancy

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#### Random facts

Procurement – to obtain; also applies to military equipment. Metaphor?

Presuming consent – cards from the PICs about this being a fiction 🡪 metaphor

Society is probably highly metaphorized

The deceased?

### Turns colonialism

#### Aff turns colonialism – proven by Mussolini

Mical 12 [“The State as a Body” Italian 320 – Spring 2012 • Dickinson College Mar 7, 2012] AT

What I found most interesting was the connection to Machiavelli’s The Prince but also his The Discourses to Mussolini’s speeches. It all seems to begin when Mussolini mentions the need to populate Italy further as a means to justify their colonialization: “Since the nineteenth century, Italy’s colonialism had been justified as “demographic,” as a “need” caused by the large numbers of Italians who had been forced to emigrate abroad in order to find work and sustenance.” This next quote shows this concept even further: “. . . A continued increase in population was deemed necessary in order to provide the nation with this pressing “need” to expand its borders.” This fascist way of justifying colonialism then places a strong emphasis on the reproduction of its citizens and thus their health. Overall, this makes the state seem like a metaphorical “body” which is mentioned later in the article. Mussolini viewed himself as a “doctor” with cures for both the internal and external diseases of the “body” but this idea is not a new concept. We can see this idea of the state being a body even in Thomas Hobbes work. But Machiavelli, which I am reading for another class right now, was the person that I saw a connection with the most while reading this article. Machiavelli compares what an actual doctor says about disease to the metaphorical diseases of a state: “. . . these princes have not only to watch out for present problems but also for those in the future, and try diligently to avoid them . . . and what physicians say about disease is applicable here: at the beginning a disease is easy to cure but difficult to diagnose; but as time passes, not having been recognized or treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure.” Mussolini tried to do what Machiavelli had advised many years ago. He mentions the importance of external threats and internal ones, just as Machiavelli does in The Discourses with regards to conspiracies, and recognizing how to avoid such threats. For Mussolini, his external threats were politically opposed parties and his “cure” was the “policing of the national borders.” The cure for internal threats was expelling them. Here we can see two concepts even found in modern medicine today: first you prevent a disease and if you cannot, then you try to expel it.